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Abstract.		Political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 are	 two	 of	 the	most	 relevant	 actors	 in	politics,	 despite	 this,	 their	 relations	 have	 attracted	 a	moderate	 interest	 among	the	scholars.	Thus,	in	a	time	when	political	parties	look	for	new	ways	to	connect	with	 the	 citizens	 that	 do	not	 trust	 them	anymore,	while	 social	movements	 are	approaching	 to	 institutional	 politics,	 their	 relationship	 is	 even	 more	 relevant	than	 ever	 to	 understand	 upcoming	 political	 and	 social	 events.	 Therefore,	 this	thesis	explores	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	In	particular,	 it	 focuses	 in	 the	dynamics	of	 the	elements	capable	of	altering	 the	type	of	relationship	existing	between	them.	Using	the	method	known	as	“analytic	narratives”	it	investigates	the	story	of	the	interactions	between	political	parties	and	 social	 movements	 in	 the	 cities	 of	 Milan	 and	 Barcelona.	 First	 it	 gives	 a	coherent	 form	 to	 the	 events	 occurred	 around	 the	 local	 elections	 of	 both	 cities,	and	highlights	 the	key	actors	and	some	crucial	elements	 for	 those	 interactions.	Secondly,	through	game	theory	tools	it	analyses	these	elements	to	observe	their	role	in	shaping	the	type	of	relationship	that	is	establish	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.				I	 partiti	 politici	 e	 i	 movimenti	 sociali	 sono	 due	 degli	 attori	 più	 rilevanti	 della	politica,	 nonostante	 ciò,	 le	 loro	 relazioni	 hanno	 attratto	un	moderato	 interesse	tra	gli	studiosi.	Così,	in	un	momento	in	cui	i	partiti	politici	cercano	nuovi	modi	di	connettersi	 con	 i	 cittadini	 che	 non	 li	 affidano	 più,	 mentre	 i	 movimenti	 sociali	stanno	 avvicinando	 alla	 politica	 istituzionale,	 il	 loro	 rapporto	 è	 ancora	 più	importante	che	mai	per	comprendere	i	prossimi	eventi	politici	e	sociali.	Pertanto,	questa	 tesi	 esplora	 la	 relazione	 tra	 partiti	 politici	 e	 movimenti	 sociali.	 In	particolare,	 si	 concentra	 sulle	 dinamiche	 degli	 elementi	 in	 grado	 di	 alterare	 il	tipo	 di	 relazione	 esistente	 tra	 di	 loro.	 Usando	 il	 metodo	 conosciuto	 come	“analytic	 narratives”,	 esamina	 la	 storia	 delle	 interazioni	 tra	 partiti	 politici	 e	movimenti	sociali	nelle	città	di	Milano	e	Barcellona.	In	primo	luogo	dà	una	forma	coerente	agli	eventi	accaduti	nelle	elezioni	locali	di	entrambe	città	ed	evidenzia	gli	 attori	 chiavi	e	gli	 elementi	 cruciali	per	queste	 interazioni.	 In	 secondo	 luogo,	attraverso	 gli	 strumenti	 di	 teoria	 dei	 giochi,	 analizza	 questi	 elementi	 per	osservare	il	loro	ruolo	nella	definizione	del	tipo	di	relazione	che	si	stabilisce	tra	partiti	politici	e	movimenti	sociali.		 	
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							Simplicity	is	a	great	virtue	but	it	requires	hard	work	to	achieve	it	and	education	to	appreciate	it.	And	to	make	matters	worse:	complexity	sells	better.			Edsger	W.	Dijkstra		 	
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									Social	movements	are	at	once	the	symptoms	and	the	instruments	of	progress.	Ignore	them	and	statesmanship	is	irrelevant;	fail	to	use	them	and	it	is	weak.	Walter	Lippmann							A	social	movement	that	only	moves	people	is	merely	a	revolt.	A	movement	that	changes	both	people	and	institutions	is	a	revolution.		Martin	Luther	King	Jr.		 	
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Chapter	One.	
Introduction.		Presenting	reality	in	a	simple	way	making	things	more	comprehensible	and	clear	should	 be	 the	 goal	 of	 any	 academic	 work.	 Therefore,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 political	parties	have	 lost	 their	 connection	with	citizens	and	social	movements	 increase	their	 relevance	 in	 institutional	 politics,	 this	 dissertation	 aims	 to	 present	 the	relationship	between	these	actors	in	a	simple	and	compressible	way.	Due	to	its	relevance,	this	is	an	interaction	that	deserves	to	be	studied	from	several	points	of	views.	 Hence,	 this	 dissertation	 tries	 to	 advance	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 its	aspects,	focusing	specifically	on	the	discovery	of	the	diverse	elements	that	affect	the	 relationship	modifying	 it	 from	one	 type	 to	another.	To	pursue	 the	 study	of	this	 matter,	 an	 unusual	 methodological	 approach	 is	 used,	 which	 enable	 us	 to	answer	 questions	 that	 are	 still	 unknown.	 The	 use	 of	 “analytic	 narratives”	provides	 a	 framework	 to	 explore	 the	 consequences	of	 some	elements	over	 the	various	 types	 of	 relationships	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	theorized	 by	Michael	 Hanagan	 (1998).	 Thanks	 to	 this	method	 it	 is	 possible	 to	bring	elements	 to	 light	 that	were	not	seen	as	relevant	previously,	and	examine	their	role	for	this	relationship.	To	obtain	the	required	data	for	the	analysis,	this	approach	will	be	used	to	study	the	events	of	interaction	between	political	parties	and	 social	 movements	 in	 the	 cities	 of	 Milan	 and	 Barcelona	 around	 the	 local	elections	 of	 2010	 and	 2015-16.	 The	 ultimate	 expectation	 of	 this	 work	 is	 to	contribute	to	the	gap	in	the	knowledge	about	two	of	the	most	fundamental	actors	in	politics.	This	chapter	will	outline	the	content	of	this	dissertation,	as	well	as	the	academic	process	that	guided	this	study.		
1.1	Background	of	the	study.	Political	parties	and	social	movements	have	been	thoroughly	studied	by	scholars	-for	 instance,	 (Kriesi,	 2015)(Kitschelt,	 1993)(Rohrschneider,	 1993).	 Their	functions,	 their	 activities	 and	 their	 internal	 organization	 are	 all	 examples	 of	matters	 that	have	been	 studied	deeply,	 showing	 that	both	are	 crucial	 actors	 in	
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political	science	and	political	sociology.	Their	relationship	is	presented,	thus,	as	an	 essential	 component	 to	 understand	 nowadays	 politics.	 However,	 little	 has	been	 written	 about	 the	 interaction	 between	 these	 actors	 despite	 them	 being	essential	to	understand	politics.	How	is	this	relationship,	what	are	the	meanings	for	politics,	which	are	the	elements	that	affect	it,	and	which	are	the	various	types	of	that	interaction,	all	these,	are	questions	that	have	not	been	fully	answered	yet.			Political	 parties	 have	 dominated	 institutional	 politics	 since	 their	 beginnings	(Ware,	 1996).	 They	 essentially	 started	 by	 people	 with	 similar	 ideas	 siting	together,	 becoming	 groups	 which	 compete	 for	 getting	 citizens’	 support,	 and	finally	being	established	as	 the	actors	around	which	 the	whole	political	system	revolves	 (Scarrow,	 2006).	 However,	 even	 though	 parties	 are	 still	 the	 central	actors	 of	 the	 political	 arena,	 their	 position	 is	 less	 preeminent	 than	 before	 and	nowadays	 they	 have	 to	 share	 their	 role	 with	 other	 actors,	 specifically	 social	movements	 (Della	 Porta,	 2015).	 Authors	 such	 as	 Robert	 Michels	 (1999),	Duverger	 (1963),	 Sartori	 (2005),	 Panebianco	 (1988),	 Kirchheimer	 (1966),	 or	Katz	and	Mair	(1995),	have	studied	the	structure	of	political	parties	and	shown	how	these	structures	affect	the	parties’	behaviour	in	great	detail.	These	authors	have	focused	on	how	political	parties	have	adapted	internally	to	social	changes,	e.g.	 through	 the	 introduction	of	universal	enfranchisement,	 the	development	of	the	mass	media,	or	the	expansion	of	the	middle	class.	Their	studies	have	shown	how	during	the	20th	century,	political	parties	have	changed	from	cadre	parties,	to	mass	 parties	 and	 then	 to	 catch-all	 parties.	 Finally,	 so-called	 cartel	 parties	developed	in	an	attempt	to	operate	in	the	new	environment	in	the	most	efficient	way.	 However,	 nowadays,	 political	 parties	 have	 a	 different	 relationship	 with	citizens	 and	 consequently	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 structures	 than	 before.	 In	 a	different	social	context	where	politicians	are	negatively	perceived	by	big	parts	of	the	 citizens1,	 parties	need	other	 actors	 to	 keep	mediating	between	 institutions	and	civil	society	(Donatella	Della	Porta	&	Chironi,	2015).	Hence,	albeit	we	live	in	a	time	in	which	several	kinds	of	parties	exist	at	the	same	time,	the	todays’	most-common	type	of	political	party’s	structure	 includes	new	elements	 from	outside																																																									1	Surveys	such	the	Eurobarometer	or	the	European	Social	Survey	show	that	is	not	a	phenomenon	restricted	to	a	single	country	or	linked	to	particular	events.	
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the	party.	Nowadays,	political	parties	are	lead	by	a	reduced	number	of	members	(Farrell	&	Webb,	2000),	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	undergo	a	process	hybridization	(Lobera,	 2015)	 (Schoonmaker,	 1988).	 This	 means	 that	 in	 certain	 tasks	traditionally	 performed	by	 political	 parties,	 such	 as	 the	mobilization	 of	 voters,	external	 actors	 like	 social	movements	 have	 now	 a	more	 relevant	 role	 (Gomez	Ribas,	2010).		Social	 movements	 are	 networks	 of	 mobilized	 actors	 to	 influence	 political	decision-making	through	various	forms	(Pfister,	2016).	The	ways	of	influencing	have	changed	during	history,	based	on	the	context	and	the	necessity	to	optimize	their	 capacity	 of	 influence.	 And	 although	 social	 movements	 do	 not	 have	 the	control	over	public	institutions,	their	influence	on	the	long-term	power	balance,	-exemplified	 by	 movements	 such	 as	 feminism	 or	 the	 environmentalism-	 is	undeniable	 (Pfister,	 2016).	 As	 such,	 social	 movements	 are	 not	 just	 secondary	actors	 but	 a	 different	 way	 for	 citizens	 to	 participate	 and	 influence	 politics	 by	using	other	channels	than	political	parties.	Thus,	as	citizens	feel	 further	distant	from	 political	 parties	 -as	 the	 surveys	 confirm-,	 they	 look	 for	 other	 ways	 to	participate	in	politics,	and	social	movements	are	one	way	to	do	so.	Traditionally	focused	on	producing	changes	on	a	particular	issue,	some	social	movements	now	also	 jump	 to	 institutional	 politics	making	 this	 explanation	more	 fuzzy	 (Iglesias	Turrión	&	Monedero,	2011).	Social	movements	use	citizens’	trust	in	them,	which	is	higher	than	that	in	political	parties2,	to	arise	as	crucial	actors	for	understating	Western	politics.			The	story	behind	the	relationship	between	both	actors	goes	back	to	the	very	first	moment	 of	 the	 appearance	 of	 social	 movements	 (Tilly,	 2004).	 Traditionally	political	 parties	have	been	 the	 targets	of	 social	movements	demands,	 trying	 to	influence	parties’	behaviour.	This	influence	is	so	relevant	that	entire	families	of	European	 parties	 owe	 their	 existence	 to	 the	 previous	 decisions	 of	 some	movements	 (Piccio,	 2016).	 Of	 course,	 this	 influence	 is	 not	 unidirectional,	 as	political	 parties	 have	 also	 used	 social	 movements	 to	 forward	 their	 interest,	either	to	win	elections	or	using	movements’	capacity	 to	 introduce	 issues	to	the																																																									2	According	to	the	numbers	of	the	previous	surveys.	For	more	information	see	Chapter	Two.	
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public	agenda,	which	could	be	useful	 for	 the	parties.	This	 interaction	created	a	relationship	with	 enormous	 influence	 on	 every-day	 politics.	 Despite	 its	 crucial	role	 for	 understanding	 politics,	 the	 attention	 dedicated	 to	 studying	 this	interaction	 it	 is	 still	 low.	 Notable	 exceptions	 are	 the	 works	 of	 Daniela	 Piccio	(2016)	 and	 Andrew	 Appleton	 (1994)	which	 determine	moments	 in	which	 the	interaction	 is	 especially	 likely	 to	 happen;	 the	 ways	 the	 interaction	 between	parties	and	movements	takes	place	(Tilly	&	Tarrow,	2015);	and	the	topical	areas	in	which	social	movements	mostly	interact	with	parties	(Rohrschneider,	1993).		
1.2	Statement	of	the	purpose.	The	purpose	of	this	work	is	not	to	study	political	parties	or	social	movements	as	independent	 actors,	 but	 to	 study	 their	 interaction.	 More	 specifically,	 the	objective	is	to	investigate	the	elements	that	affect	their	type	of	interaction.	To	do	so,	the	dissertation	will	follow	the	various	types	of	interaction	between	political	parties	 and	 social	 movements	 created	 by	 Michael	 Hanagan	 (1998).	 Hanagan	created	a	classification	of	various	types	of	relationships	between	political	parties	and	 social	 movements	 based	 on	 the	 intensity	 of	 collaboration	 between	 them.	However,	up	to	now	the	elements	that	are	able	to	affect	these	relationships	with	enough	 strength	 to	 alter	 their	 type	 are	 still	 unknown.	 Moreover,	 we	 neither	know	how	 these	 elements	 need	 to	 look	 like	 to	 affect	 the	 types	 of	 relationship.	This	creates	a	gap	in	the	knowledge	about	the	interaction	between	two	of	the	key	political	actors	that	this	dissertation	tries	to	address.			To	discover	more	about	these	elements,	a	thorough	knowledge	about	the	events	connected	to	the	interaction	between	parties	and	movements	is	essential.	Thus,	along	with	the	revision	of	various	kinds	of	documents,	 in-depth	 interviews	will	be	 conducted	 with	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 these	 kinds	 of	 interactions.	 These	interviews	 are	 crucial,	 as	 these	 actors,	 due	 to	 their	 particular	 position	 in	 the	events,	 have	 unique	 knowledge	 of	 what	 really	 happens	 in	 an	 environment	traditionally	 restricted	 for	 external	 observers.	 The	 events	 between	 left	 parties	and	social	movements	in	the	cities	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	will	provide	the	data,	which	will	be	analysed	with	the	tools	of	game	theory	to	test	their	relevance	and	impact	for	the	type	of	relationship.		
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1.3	Research	question.	As	an	academic	work,	the	purpose	of	this	dissertation	is	to	discover	more	about	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	and	follows	the	aim	 of	 answering	 a	 question	 that	 is	 still	 without	 response.	 In	 particular,	 the	question	guiding	this	research	is:		
How	do	 certain	 elements	 affect	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	political	 parties	
and	social	movements?		This	 research	 question	 can	 be	 fragmented	 into	 the	 following	 sub-research	questions:	
• Which	elements	affect	the	type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	
social	movements?	
• How	 can	 these	 elements	 influence	 the	 strategic	 choices	 of	 the	 political	
parties	and	social	movements	in	their	interaction?	
• How	 do	 the	 dynamics	 of	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	
movements	change	when	the	elements	assume	different	configurations?		In	 addressing	 these	 questions	 this	 work	 will	 firstly	 try	 to	 identify	 the	 key	elements	 that	 influence	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 in	 the	 study	 of	 the	 events	 of	 Milan	 and	 Barcelona.	 Secondly,	 this	research	will	analyse	the	way	in	which	these	elements	influence	the	relationship.	And	 finally,	 to	 comprehend	which	 consequences	 the	 various	 configurations	 of	these	 elements	 have	 for	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	social	movements.		This	 dissertation	 has	 certain	 expectations.	 The	 first	 expected	 finding	 is	 the	existence	 of	 a	 coherent	 story	 in	 all	 studied	 events,	 allowing	 us	 to	 understand	what	happened	and	under	which	circumstances.	The	second	expected	finding	is	the	 demarcation	 of	 the	 key	 actors	 able	 to	 produce	 variations	 in	 the	 outcomes.	The	 third	 finding	 is	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 crucial	 relations	 between	 the	 actors.	Once	 all	 of	 the	 above	 is	 revealed,	 it	 is	 expected	 to	 identify	 certain	 elements,	
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which	due	 to	 their	 configuration	 are	 able	 to	produce	 alterations	 in	 the	 type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	Likewise,	it	is	also	expected	 that	 these	 elements	 will	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 actors	 creating	incentives	 to	 be	 more	 or	 less	 collaborative.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 the	alterations	 in	 these	elements	alter	also	 the	 incentives	and	 the	behaviour	of	 the	actors.		
1.4	Overview	of	methodology.	Choosing	 the	 right	 methodology	 is	 capital	 for	 any	 academic	 work,	 as	 each	methodology	 provides	 specific	 tools	 capable	 of	 answering	 certain	 types	 of	questions.	 Thus,	 being	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 research	 to	 analyse	 the	 existence	 and	influence	of	key	elements	on	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	 and	 considering	 that	 this	 interaction	 is	 partially	 an	 unknown	territory,	it	is	advisable	to	face	the	first	contact	with	this	lack	of	knowledge	with	qualitative	 tools.	 Since	 we	 combine	 exploratory	 qualitative	 gathering	 with	 a	straightforward	 analysis	 of	 actors	 and	 their	 relationship,	 analytic	 narratives	appears	as	the	optimal	choice	of	method.	Analytic	narratives	is	an	approach	that	combines	two	parts:	the	systematically	presentation	of	a	series	of	events	on	the	one	hand,	with	 the	 analysis	 using	 game	 theory	 tools	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 In	 the	words	of	one	of	the	founders	of	this	approach,	Margaret	Levi,	this	combination	of	tools	 is	based	on	the	fact	that	“in	order	to	understand	instances	of	 institutional	origin	 and	 change,	 analytic	 narrativists	 insist	 on	 the	 combination	 of	 deep	knowledge	of	the	case	and	an	explicit	theoretical	model”	(2002,	p108).	Thus,	the	main	 goal	 of	 every	 work	 that	 uses	 analytic	 narratives	 is	 to	 highlight	 the	 key	elements	that	have	a	relevant	role	for	the	outcomes	of	the	studied	phenomena.	To	 do	 so,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 recognize	 the	 key	 actors,	 their	 choices	 in	 the	 crucial	moments,	the	interactions	between	them	and	the	consequences	of	every	choice	they	 make.	 Assuming	 actors	 display	 rational	 behaviour,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	understand	 their	 choices	 based	 on	 their	 preferences	 and	 to	 make	 predictions	about	 what	 happens	 in	 case	 of	 the	 alteration	 of	 the	 actors’	 preferences.	 The	purpose	 of	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 research,	 the	 narrative,	 is	 to	 extract	 the	 “key	players,	 their	 goals,	 and	 the	 features	 of	 the	 environment	 that	 influence	 actors’	behavior	(especially	the	rules	of	interaction,	the	constraints,	and	the	incentives)	
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from	 narratives	 of	 social	 episodes”	 (Asquer,	 2014,	 p80).	 Hence,	 the	 narrative	part	is	crucial	for	“sorting	out	what	matters	for	what”	(Levi,	2002	p111),	because	only	 once	 the	 elements	 are	 specified,	 they	 can	be	 analysed	 in	 the	 second	part.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 thanks	 to	 the	 first	 part	 and	 its	 tools	 (interviews,	 documents,	journals...)	that	it	is	possible	to	propose	a	series	of	elements	whose	relevance	will	be	 observed.	 In	 the	 present	work,	we	 are	 specifically	 looking	 for	 the	 elements	that	are	capable	of	altering	the	type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	 In	the	second	part	–the	analytical	one-,	 the	analysis	of	 these	elements	 will	 be	 conducted	 using	 the	 tools	 provided	 by	 game	 theory,	 in	particular	the	extensive-form	games.	With	the	help	of	these	games	it	is	possible	to	show	the	strategic	interactions	of	the	actors	involved,	the	sequence	of	actions	ordered	after	 key	moments	 in	which	 actors	 face	 a	 critical	 choice.	Game	 theory	allows	the	analysis	of	actors’	choices	and	the	consequences	of	these	choices	for	the	type	of	relationship	that	exists	between	the	actors.	That	is,	we	can	study	the	influence	of	every	key	element	on	the	decisions	of	the	actors	and	through	it	the	alterations	of	their	term	of	collaboration.			Since	analytic	narratives	drinks	from	the	observation	of	actual	cases,	the	events	that	occurred	in	the	cities	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	around	the	local	elections	were	chosen,	as	they	offer	very	interesting	insights	for	the	studies	of	this	dissertation.	The	 choice	 was	 based	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 notorious	 interaction	 between	political	parties	and	social	movements	in	both	cities.	On	the	one	hand,	in	Milan,	the	centre-left	coalition	 formed	mainly	by	 the	Partito	Democratico	and	Sinistra	Ecologia	Libertà,	 sustained	an	 important	collaboration	with	a	movement	called	Movimento	 Arancione.	 This	 movement	 born	 from	 another	 social	 movement	dedicated	 to	 fight	 for	 a	 quality	 public	 education	 in	Milan	 that	wanted	 to	 have	more	 influence	 in	 the	 city’s	 politics,	 and	 consequently	 organize	 them	 in	 the	Movimento	 Arancione.	 The	 influence	 of	 the	 Movimento	 Arancione	 over	 the	parties	was	so	strong	that	the	movement	was	able	to	assert	their	candidate	of	the	coalition	 for	 the	 local	 elections	 -Giuliano	 Pisapia-	 over	 the	 rest	 of	 preferred	candidates	by	the	biggest	party	in	the	coalition,	the	Partito	Democratico.	On	the	other	hand,	 in	Barcelona,	 the	Plataforma	de	Afectados	por	 la	Hipoteca,	 a	 social	movement	dedicated	to	fight	against	the	home	evictions	suffered	by	thousands	of	
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citizens	 during	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 had	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 local	 elections	 of	2015.	The	members	of	this	movement	led	a	political	project	named	Barcelona	en	Comú	 that	 was	 able	 to	 include	 several	 political	 parties	 and	 finally	 won	 the	elections,	 leading	 to	 one	 of	 the	 movement’s	 activists,	 Ada	 Colau,	 to	 become	mayor	of	Barcelona.		
1.5	Assumptions	and	definition	of	terms.	To	conduct	this	study	the	following	assumptions	were	made:			 1. Regarding	the	nature	of	the	actors,	all	actors	involved	in	the	study	will	be	considered	 to	behave	as	 rational	actors	 trying	 to	maximize	 their	benefit	with	each	choice	they	have.		2. It	is	assumed	that	the	interviewed	will	answer	truthfully	and	accurately	to	the	 interview	 questions.	 Answers	 will	 be	 based	 on	 their	 personal	experience,	and	their	professional	knowledge.	3. It	 is	 assumed	 that	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 acts	 as	 a	 coherent	 actor	 in	 the	interactions	 with	 other	 actors,	 despite	 being	 formed	 by	 several	 actors	with	their	own	particular	interests.	4. The	term	“social	movement”	will	be	understood	in	a	broad	sense.	As	such,	it	 will	 include	 both,	 social	 movements	 with	 a	 permanent	 or	 sporadic	organization,	and	those	without	an	organizational	structure.	This	implies	that	 associations	 with	 political	 activity	 or	 civic	 movements	 with	 some	social	relevance	in	politics,	e.g.	by	preparing	an	electoral	list,	will	also	be	treated	as	social	movements.		5. The	 terms	 “actors”	 and	 “players”	 are	 going	 to	 be	 understood	interchangeably,	specifically	for	the	purpose	of	game	theory.			Some	additional	assumptions	will	be	made	in	the	analytical	chapter,	specifically	regarding	the	nature	of	the	actors	in	the	game	theory	models	and	regarding	the	specific	treatment	of	certain	actors	in	a	defined	particular	context.		
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1.6	Organization	of	the	dissertation.	The	 thesis	 consists	of	 seven	parts:	1.	 Introduction,	2.	A	view	of	 the	 interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	3.	Methodology,	4.	The	case	of	the	 city	 of	 Milan,	 5.	 The	 case	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Barcelona,	 6.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	elements	highlighted	in	the	previous	cases,	and	7.	Conclusions.		The	 purpose	 of	 this	 introductory	 chapter	 is	 to	 set	 the	 scene	 for	 the	 thesis	 by	describing	its	overall	context,	including	aims,	objectives,	and	a	brief	presentation	of	 the	 used	 methodological	 techniques.	 Chapter	 Two	 presents	 the	 two	 actors	who	 are	 the	 object	 of	 study	 in	 this	 dissertation:	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements.	 It	 will	 review	 the	 role	 these	 actors	 have	 for	 the	 citizens,	 the	existence	 of	 a	 relevant	 interaction	 between	 them	 for	 politics,	 and	 the	 scarce	relevant	literature	about	this	interaction.	As	analytical	narrative	is	not	a	frequent	methodological	paradigm,	 it	 is	described	 in	detail	 in	Chapter	Three,	along	with	the	explanation	of	the	reasons	for	this	choice.	Furthermore,	the	techniques	used	to	collect	the	data	for	the	study	and	the	way	the	data	is	posteriorly	treated,	are	clarified	there	too.	In	Chapters	Four	and	Five	the	two	cases	involving	the	events	occurred	in	the	cities	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	are	presented.	Thus,	Chapter	Four	displays	 the	 events	 happened	 between	 the	 Partito	 Democratico	 and	 the	Movimento	 Arancione	 around	 the	 local	 elections	 in	 Milan.	 In	 this	 part	 of	 the	dissertation	it	 is	possible	to	find	a	coherent	explanation	of	the	historical	events	that	 performed	 the	 current	 situation	 between	 both	 actors,	 along	 with	 the	elements	 that	 affected	 their	 relationship.	 Chapter	 Five	 displays	 the	 events	happened	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Barcelona	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 Barcelona	 en	Comú	 as	 well	 as	 its	 internal	 and	 external	 relations.	 By	 making	 use	 of	 the	narrative,	the	actors	and	their	choices	are	presented	to	make	it	easier	to	observe	the	 crucial	 elements	 that	 have	 influence	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 type	 of	relationship	 between	 the	 various	 actors	 in	 the	 Barcelona	 case.	 Chapter	 Six	presents	 the	 elements	 extracted	 from	 the	 two	 narratives,	 which	 can	 have	 a	potential	 incidence	 on	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 that	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	adopt.	 It	 analyses	 the	 role	of	 these	elements	and	 the	 impact	 in	 the	
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relationships.	 Finally,	 the	 Conclusion	 offers	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 dissertation	 and	highlights	the	potential	of	the	analysed	elements	to	explain	several	interactions	between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 Moreover,	 it	 underlines	 the	existence	of	opportunities	of	further	research	in	the	field	of	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.		 	
Chapter	Two.	
The	interaction	between	political	parties	and	
social	movements.		This	 chapter	 is	 focused	on	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 two	main	 elements	 of	this	dissertation:	political	parties	and	social	movements.	The	aim	is	to	go	further	in	the	knowledge	about	their	place	in	the	political	arena,	their	relevance	for	the	citizens	 and	 the	 interaction	 between	 them	 as	 well	 as	 the	 potentials	 of	 that	interaction.	 Notwithstanding	 both	 are	 crucial	 elements	 in	 the	 study	 of	 politics	and	a	lot	has	been	written	about	political	parties	and	about	social	movements,	it	is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 their	 mutual	 relationship	 has	 not	 produced	 many	pages	 in	 the	 academia	 even	 if	 those	 entities	 share	 part	 of	 their	 space.	Researchers	have	 traditionally	allocated	political	parties	and	social	movements	into	 two	 different	 and	 independent	 fields,	 creating	 almost	 a	 barrier	 between	them.	 The	 consequence	 of	 that	 division	 is	 that	 the	majority	 of	 authors	 of	 each	topic	 did	 not	 see	 the	 other	 element	 as	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 their	 studies,	 and	 the	result	 was	 that	 they	 ended	 overlooking	 that	 relationship	 in	 their	 works.	 A	situation	that	happened	both	for	political	parties’	scholars	that	have	considered	social	movements	as	a	second-level	element	in	politics;	as	for	“social	movement	scholars	who	 tend	 to	 see	movements	 everywhere,	 but	 do	not	 connect	 them	 to	political	parties”	(Kriesi,	2015,	p.667).			Political	parties	and	social	movements	share	the	same	ambit	of	activities:	the	res	
publica;	 in	 particular,	 the	 public	 debate	 about	 common	matters.	 Therefore,	we	cannot	 expect	 to	 understand	 how	 politics	 really	 works	 without	 taking	 in	consideration	 both	 elements.	 Thus,	 meanwhile	 political	 parties	 have	 been	traditionally	 considered	 as	 the	 way	 to	 transform	 societies	 from	 within	institutions,	 social	 movements	 have	 been	 considered	 the	 way	 to	 transform	societies	 from	 without.	 But	 this	 approach	 placed	 social	 movements	 almost	outside	 the	 boundaries	 of	 politics,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 private	 demands.	 However,	nowadays	“social	movements	constitute	an	essential	element	of	normal	politics	
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in	 modern	 societies,	 and	 that	 there	 is	 only	 a	 fuzzy	 and	 permeable	 boundary	between	 institutionalized	 and	 noninstitutionalized	 politics”	 (Goldstone,	2003,p.2)		Currently,	 political	 parties	 are	 experiencing	 important	 credibility	 issues.	 Their	way	to	act	 is	not	acceptable	anymore	by	a	part	of	 the	citizens,	who	reject	 their	representation3	(Iglesias	 Turrión	 &	 Monedero,	 2011).	 The	 numbers	 of	 several	European	 surveys4	show	 that	 citizens	 do	 not	 longer	 trust	 political	 parties,	confirming	that	the	voters	see	them	as	a	foreign	element.	Hence,	even	if	political	parties	keep	an	important	role	on	politics,	its	position	is	less	central	than	in	the	past	 (Donatella	 Della	 Porta,	 2015).	 Moreover,	 talking	 about	 people	 being	involved	in	politics,	now	“there	is	a	perception	that	parties	are	‘damaged	goods’	as	 participatory	 vehicles”	 (Jordan	 &	 Maloney,	 2007,	 p.2).	 In	 fact,	 “fewer	individuals	now	enact	political	roles	as	loyal	party	members,	preferring	instead	to	 participate	 via	 non-partisan	 single-issue	 groups”	 (Farrell	 &	 Webb,	 2000,	p.123).	 Furthermore,	 social	 movements	 are	 more	 appreciated	 than	 political	parties	by	the	citizenry	not	just	as	an	element	to	fight	for	a	specific	goal,	but	as	a	social	resource	itself.	Thus,	social	“groups	are	seen	as	democratically	valuable	in	offering	more	effective	representation	(than	parties)	and	hence	securing	overall	public	 policy	 that	 better	 ‘fits’	 citizens’	 preferences”	 (Jordan	 &	 Maloney,	 2007,	p.2).			Parties	 and	 movements	 interact	 because	 both	 are	 immersed	 in	 the	 same	environment	 and	 they	 need	 each	 other	 to	 achieve	 their	 purposes.	 On	 the	 one	hand,	 if	 social	 movements	 want	 to	 obtain	 institutional	 changes,	 they	 need	political	parties	support	them	to	get	it.	In	fact,	social	movements	are	so	linked	to	the	other	public	actors	that	for	authors	like	J.	Goldstone	(2003,	p.2)	“we	cannot	study	movements	 independently	 of	 their	 political	 context”.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	political	 parties	 cannot	 ignore	 the	 relevance	 of	 social	movements	 as	mobilizer	and	agenda-setters,	especially	in	those	moments	were	citizens	are	turning	their																																																									3	The	15-M	movement	in	Spain	is	an	example	of	that	when	they	sing:	¡Que	no!	¡Que	no!	¡Que	no	nos	representan!	[No!	No!	They	do	not	represent	us!].	4	European	Social	Survey,	Eurobarometer,	British	Social	Attitudes,	Barometro	Centro	de	Investigaciones	Sociológicas,	General	Social	Survey	(ALLBUS)…	
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back	to	parties.	Here	again	Goldstone	(2003,	p.2)	believes	that	is	not	possible	to	understand	current	political	parties	 “without	understanding	 their	 intimate	and	ongoing	 shaping	 by	 social	 movements”.	 This	 relationship	 between	 political	parties	and	social	movements	 is	of	such	 importance	 for	politics	 that	Hanspeter	Kriesi	believes	that	“some	social	movements	have	the	capacity	to	fundamentally	transform	individual	parties	and	entire	party	systems”	(2015,	p.668).		
2.1	Public	perceptions	of	political	parties.	As	said	before,	nowadays	political	parties	have	significant	problems	to	connect	with	citizens	and	they	are	seen	more	as	a	problem	that	as	a	solution.	They	have	been	widely	 criticized	 for	 their	 oligarchic	 structure	 in	 the	 past	 by	 authors	 like	Robert	 Michels	 (1999).	 But	 lately,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 lack	 of	confidence	 from	citizens	 towards	 them	and	 their	 activities	 that	 are	 considered	self-interested	if	not	even	corrupt5.	Thus,	for	the	prestigious	and	awarded	author	Hanna	Pitkin,			 Our	 governors	 have	 become	 a	 self-perpetuating	 elite	 that	 rules	 –or	rather,	 administers–	 passive	 or	 privatized	 masses	 of	 people.	 The	representatives	 act	 not	 as	 agents	 of	 the	 people	 but	 simply	 instead	 of	them.	We	send	them	to	take	care	of	public	affairs	like	hired	experts,	and	they	 are	 professionals,	 entrenched	 in	 office	 and	 in	 party	 structures.	Immersed	 in	 a	 distinct	 culture	 of	 their	 own,	 surrounded	 by	 other	specialists	and	insulated	from	the	ordinary	realities	of	their	constituents’	lives,	they	live	not	just	physically	but	also	mentally	‘inside	the	beltway’6.	(Pitkin,	2004,	p339).			It	 is	 a	 widespread	 feeling	 between	 some	 authors	 that	 political	 parties	 have	detached	 themselves	 from	 civil	 society	 in	 their	 gradual	 approach	 towards	institutions	 (Donatella	 Della	 Porta,	 2015),	 worrying	more	 about	 how	 to	 reach																																																									5	For	instance,	by	groups	like	Occupy	or	the	Indignados	Movement.	6	"Inside	the	Beltway"	is	an	American	idiom	used	to	characterize	matters	that	are,	or	seem	to	be,	important	primarily	 to	officials	of	 the	U.S.	 federal	government,	 to	 its	 contractors	and	 lobbyists,	and	 to	 the	corporate	media	who	cover	 them—as	opposed	 to	 the	 interests	and	priorities	of	 the	general	U.S.	population.	Source:	The	Legal	English	Dictionary.	
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those	institutions	and	how	to	keep	it,	than	for	the	people	they	should	represent.	If	 so,	 political	 parties	 are	 not	 able	 to	 present	 themselves	 as	 trustful	 actors	capable	to	act	as	linkage	between	citizens	and	institutions	because	those	citizens	do	 not	 feel	 connected	 to	 parties	 anymore.	 Donatella	 Della	 Porta	 and	 Daniela	Chironi	 (2015)	 blame	 the	 behaviour	 of	 political	 parties	 for	 having	 “caused	 the	interactions	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 civil	 society	 to	 short-circuit”	 (p.65).	And	this	feeling	of	“decline	in	the	capacity	of	parties	to	act	as	mediators	between	public	 institutions	 and	 civil	 society”	 (Della	 Porta	 &	 Chironi,	 2015)	 is	 widely	spread	 among	 different	 countries.	 As	 the	 numbers	 of	 the	 Eurobarometer7	[see	table	1]	show,	78%	of	European	citizens	tend	to	not	trust	political	parties.			Table	1.	Trust	in	political	parties.	
	Source8:	data	taken	from	Standard	Eurobarometer	84	2015	(p.	52).		The	situation	is	even	more	severe	in	some	big	–in	terms	of	population-	European	countries	like	the	United	Kingdom	(81%),	Italy	(81%),	Spain	(86%)	and	France	(88%)	where	numbers	of	lack	of	trust	are	higher	than	the	average	[see	table	2].	But	 not	 just	 that,	 the	 numbers	 also	 show	 us	 that	 in	 all	 these	 big	 European	countries	-apart	from	United	Kingdom-	less	than	one	person	in	ten	tends	to	trust	political	 parties.	 Showing	 clearly	 that	 in	 those	 countries	 political	 parties	 have	lost	the	capacity	to	act	in	the	name	of	citizens,	who	not	believe	them	anymore.																																																											7	Standard	Eurobarometer	84	Autumn	2015.	8	Unless	otherwise	specified,	the	source	of	the	figures	and	tables	correspond	to	the	author	of	the	dissertation.	
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Table	2.	Trust	in	political	parties	by	countries.	
		 		 		 			 	Source:	data	taken	from	Standard	Eurobarometer	84	2015	(p.	52).		But	 this	 are	 not	 the	 only	 worrying	 numbers	 in	 the	 relationship	 people-representatives.	In	the	European	Social	Survey	(2014)	we	can	find	that	citizens	answer	that	their	concerns	are	not	relevant	for	politicians,	that	is,	that	they	feel	somehow	 ignored	 [see	 table	3].	 Thus,	 in	 a	 scale	 from	0	 (not	 trust	 at	 all)	 to	 10	(complete	trust)	76%	of	the	interviewed	answered	with	5	or	less	to	the	question	if	 “politicians	care	what	people	 think”	and	 just	5,5%	answered	with	8	or	more.	Showing	 clearly	 the	 feeling	 citizens	have	of	 being	 left	 apart	 in	 the	decisions	of	public	matters.			Table	3.	Assessment	of	politicians’	interest	in	regular	people.	
	Source:	European	Social	Survey	2014.	
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Dataset: ESS7-2014, ed. .0
Resource link: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview | Copyright: All rights reserved | Page: 1 / 1
Politicians care what
people think
Code Frequency % of all % of valid
Not at all 0 4,348 15.4 15.6
1 1 2,236 7.9 8.0
2 2 3,712 13.2 13.4
3 3 4,073 14.4 14.7
4 4 3,216 11.4 11.6
5 5 3,860 13.7 13.9
6 6 2,671 9.5 9.6
7 7 2,127 7.5 7.7
8 8 1, 10 3.9 4.0
9 9 284 1.0 1.0
Completely 10 157 0.6 0.6
Refusal 77 11 0.0 -
Don't know 88 400 1.4 -
No answer 99 16 0.1 -
Total 28,221 100.0 100.0
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	The	disaffection	of	the	European	citizens	is	not	only	towards	political	parties	and	politicians,	but	also	about	how	difficult	if	is	for	regular	citizens	to	be	involved	in	the	 political	 system	 in	 case	 they	want	 to	 change	 something.	 In	 table	 4	we	 can	observe	 that	 the	 big	majority	 of	 respondents	 believe	 that	 the	 political	 system	itself	 blocks	 any	 possible	 influence	 on	 politics	 by	 ordinary	 people.	 Based	 on	those	two	tables	[number	3,	and	4],	we	can	see	that	citizens	have	the	feeling	of	being	 irrelevant	 for	 political	 elites	 and	 also	 they	 think	 that	 this	 cannot	 be	changed	using	the	traditional	channels	the	political	system	provides.		Table	4.	Assessment	of	capacity	for	political	influence.	
	Source:	European	Social	Survey	2014.		Thereby,	it	seems	logical	after	observing	these	perceptions	citizens	have	towards	politicians	and	political	parties	that	just	4.5%	of	European	citizens	[see	table	5]	participate	actively	in	a	political	party.		
Dataset: ESS7-2014, ed.1.0
Resource link: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview | Copyright: All rights reserved | Page: 1 / 1
Political system allows
people to have influence
on politics
Code Frequency % of all % of valid
Not at all 0 4,217 14.9 15.2
1 1 2,109 7.5 7.6
2 2 3,471 12.3 12.5
3 3 4,068 14.4 14.7
4 4 3,175 11.3 11.5
5 5 3,564 12.6 12.9
6 6 2,540 9.0 9.2
7 7 2,257 8.0 8.2
8 8 1,451 5.1 5.2
9 9 435 1.5 1.6
Completely 10 399 1.4 1.4
Refusal 77 5 0.0 -
Don't know 88 521 1.8 -
No answer 99 9 0.0 -
Total 28,221 100.0 100.0
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Table	5.	Involvement	in	political	parties.	
	Source:	European	Social	Survey	2014.		For	Ingrid	Van	Biezen,	Peter	Mair	and	Thomas	Poguntke	(2012,	p.38)	“a	party’s	own	membership	 organisation	 is	 but	 a	 special	 variant	 of	 the	 linkage	 between	parties	 and	 the	 wider	 society”.	 For	 these	 authors	 “there	 is	 scarcely	 any	 other	indicator	 relating	 to	 mass	 politics	 in	 Europe	 that	 reveals	 such	 a	 strong	 and	consistent	 trend	as	 that	which	we	now	see	with	respect	 to	 the	decline	of	party	membership”	(2012,	p.38).	The	decline	of	party	membership	has	been	a	fact	for	a	while,	 but	 it	 has	now	 reached	 such	 a	 level	 that	 can	 redefine	parties’	 structure.	But	 even	 if	 this	 is	 true	 and	 political	 parties	 are	 more	 interested	 in	 electoral	effectiveness	over	any	other	feature,	at	the	end,	less	affiliates	means	fewer	direct	connections	with	society	and	citizens.	For	that	reason,	it	is	not	possible	to	deny	that	the	numbers	of	membership	loss	are	topic	that	parties	have	to	reflect	about	as	we	can	observe	in	table	6:		
Dataset: ESS7-2014, ed.1.0
Resource link: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview | Copyright: All rights reserved | Page: 1 / 1
Worked in political party
or action group last 12
months
Code Frequency % of all % of valid
Yes 1 1,279 4.5 4.5
No 2 26,885 95.3 95.5
Refusal 7 9 0.0 -
Don't know 8 40 0.1 -
No answer 9 8 0.0 -
Total 28,221 100.0 100.0
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Table	6.	Party	membership	change,	1980-2009.	
	Source:	Going,	going,...	gone?	The	decline	of	party	membership	(Van	Biezen	et	al.,	2012).		The	 crisis	of	 the	political	parties	 as	 a	 trustful	 element	of	political	participation	around	European	countries	is	thus	a	fact,	not	just	a	feeling	of	a	few	citizens	or	the	intuitions	 of	 some	 scholars.	 Moreover,	 all	 those	 numbers	 show	 that	 political	parties	 are	 largely	 unconnected	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 persons	 they	 represent.	Various	authors	 like	Claus	Offe	(1985)	or	Donatella	Della	Porta	(2015)	support	the	 theory	 that	 nowadays	 political	 parties	 have	 lost	 their	 capacity	 to	 involve	private	 individuals	 into	 public	 matters.	 The	 decrease	 of	 activity	 of	 political	parties	 as	 social	 integrators	 (Della	 Porta,	 2015)	 have	 limited	 their	 capacity	 to	change	 societies	 through	new	policies.	 In	part	because	 there	 is	within	political	parties	a	lack	of	the	real	internal	programmatic	debate	that	traditionally	allowed	parties	 to	 be	 the	 central	 element	 to	 propose	 new	 polices.	 This	 places	 other	entities	on	the	playing	field,	 like	think	tanks	or	social	movements,	as	the	actual	suppliers	 of	 new	 policy	 ideas	 for	 political	 parties	 and	 the	 media	 (Stone	 &	Denham,	2004);(Rich,	2005).	If	political	parties	are	no	longer	trusted	by	citizens,	
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they	need	to	use	other	channels	to	perform	their	traditional	functions:	articulate	and	 aggregate	 social	 interests;	 and	 create	 a	 link	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	political	system	(Hofmeister	&	Grabow,	2011).			
2.2	Public	perceptions	of	social	movements.	But	political	parties	do	not	monopolize	public	mobilization.	People	do	not	 stay	home	ignoring	what	is	happening	in	the	square.	The	numbers	of	people	involved	in	others	associations	show	us	that	belonging	to	a	political	party	is	not	the	only	way	 to	 participate	 in	 public	matters.	 The	 data	 analysed	 by	Della	 Porta	 (2015)	point	out	that	citizens	look	for	political	participation	outside	political	parties	as	those	are	 seen	as	 too	bureaucratic	and	with	 lack	of	 internal	participation	even	within	 those	 parties	 that	 activist	 feel	 ideologically	 close	 to.	 As	 opposed	 to	 the	numbers	of	participation	in	political	parties	[see	tables	5	and	6]	the	numbers	of	persons	that	worked	in	other	organisations	or	associations	reach	more	than	20%	of	the	population	[see	table	7].	Through	those	entities	citizens	can	canalize	their	interest	regarding	public	matters	and	express	their	concerns	about	them.	Thanks	to	 associations,	 a	 window	 to	 participate	 in	 public	 matters,	 independently	 of	political	parties,	is	open	to	citizens,	and	it	seems	that	they	are	using	it.		Table	7.	Involvement	in	civic	associations.	
	Source:	European	Social	Survey	2014.		It	 is	 important	 to	analyse	how	citizens	see	these	movements	and	organizations	before	concluding	that	such	entities	can	serve	as	a	way	to	express	the	concerns	citizens	have	about	politics.	 	Going	deeper	examining	that	phenomenon,	that	is,	
Dataset: ESS7-2014, ed.1.0
Resource link: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview | Copyright: All rights reserved | Page: 1 / 1
Worked in another
organisation or
association last 12
months
Code Frequency % of all % of valid
Yes 1 5,761 20.4 20.5
No 2 22,391 79.3 79.5
Refusal 7 5 0.0 -
Don't know 8 58 0.2 -
No answer 9 6 0.0 -
Total 28,221 100.0 100.0
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looking	at	 the	Eurobarometer	 figures,	 it	 is	clear	 that	citizens	give	an	 important	role	 to	 social	 movements	 in	 politics.	 The	 survey	 of	 the	 Flash	 Eurobarometer	named	 “Europeans’	 Engagement	 in	 Participatory	 Democracy”	 conducted	 with	more	 than	25.000	people,	 shows	 that	 three	out	 of	 four	Europeans	believe	 that	movements	 influence	 local	 decision-making	 process	 with	 their	 activities,	 and	70%	of	 the	 respondents	believe	 that	 they	do	 it	 at	a	national	 level	 [see	 table	8]	(Flash	 Eurobarometer	 373,	 2013).	 Those	 beliefs	 place	 social	 movements	 as	relevant	actors	to	achieve	specific	public	policies.			Table	8.	Social	movements’	influence	on	politics.	
	Source:	Flash	Eurobarometer	373	2013	(p.6)		In	general	 citizens	do	not	 just	believe	 that	 social	movements	 influence	politics,	but	 also	 that	 they	are	necessary	 to	 influence	politics.	 In	 that	way,	only	41%	of	people	 [see	 table	 9]	 agree	 that	 European	 citizens	 do	 not	 need	 these	 types	 of	organisations	 to	 influence	political	decision-making,	meanwhile	more	 than	half	of	the	interviewed	people	consider	that	social	movements	are	an	essential	tool	to	have	an	impact	on	policies	(Flash	Eurobarometer	373,	2013).		Table	9.	Importance	of	social	movements.	
	Source:	Flash	Eurobarometer	373	2013	(p.6)		Another	 relevant	 element	 to	 highlight	 is	 the	 proximity	 of	 social	movements	 to	citizens	in	confront	to	the	distance	with	which	political	parties	are	perceived,	as	we	have	 seen	before	 [see	 table	3].	Therefor,	 “a	majority	of	 respondents	 (59%)	
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[see	 table	 10]	 agree	 that	 they	 share	 the	 values	 or	 interests	 of	 some	 of	 these	organisations,	 and	 that	 they	 trust	 them	 to	 act	 in	 the	 right	 way	 to	 influence	political	 decision-making”	 (TNS	 Political	 &	 Social,	 2013,	 p.6)	 showing	 us	 a	connection	between	social	movements	and	citizens.		Table	10.	Proximity	towards	social	movements.	
	Source:	Flash	Eurobarometer	373	2013	(p.6)		Additionally,	it	is	important	to	highlight	the	relevance	social	movements	have	for	the	population	as	a	way	to	become	relevant	in	the	political	arena.	In	that	way,	“a	majority	 of	 European	 respondents	 (54%)	 [see	 table	 11]	 think	 that	 being	 a	member	of	a	non-governmental	organisation	or	association	is	an	effective	means	of	influencing	political	decisions”	(TNS	Political	&	Social,	2013,	p.25).		Table	11.	Effectiveness	in	terms	of	political	influence.	
		Source:	Flash	Eurobarometer	373	2013	(p.17)		With	all	 these	numbers	 regarding	what	 citizens	 think	about	 social	movements,	we	can	conclude	that	people	that	are	involved	in	social	movements	believe	that	these	organizations	are	able	to	change	some	political	situation.	And	it	seems	that	they	 are	 involved	 in	 those	 movements	 precisely	 for	 that	 reason,	 otherwise,	believing	 in	 social	 movement’s	 political	 capacity,	 they	 would	 not	 be	 involved	with	 them.	 Moreover,	 given	 the	 connection	 between	 social	 movements	 and	citizens	 and	 the	 rejection	 that	 political	 parties	 produce	 to	 citizens,	 we	 can	conclude	that	social	movements	play	a	crucial	role	for	political	participation	and	
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they	can	potentially	serve	as	a	bridge	between	citizens	and	political	parties,	as	well	as	public	institutions.			Meanwhile	 political	 parties	 lose	 affiliates,	 social	 movements	 increase	 their	legitimacy	 among	 citizens	 (Norris,	 2002).	 Old	 forms	 of	 political	 participation	embodied	 through	 political	 parties	 are	 losing	 ground	 in	 front	 of	 new	 forms	 of	political	participation:	 the	 social	 activism.	After	 the	2000’s,	being	 involved	 in	a	social	 movement	 that	 defends	 an	 issue	 and	 has	 no	 institutional	 power	 –and	consequently	 no	 political	 wear	 as	 political	 parties	 have-,	 seems	 to	 be	 more	appealing	 for	 citizens	 than	being	part	of	 a	party	and	enjoy	potential	 individual	benefits9.	 Della	 Porta	 says	 that	 in	 her	 last	 research	 it	 became	more	 than	 clear	that	there	 is	“fiducia	nei	movimenti	sociali	e	nelle	associazioni	volontarie	come	attori	 di	 una	 politica	 altra,	 si	 conferma	 invece	 la	 sfiducia	 degli	 attivisti	 nelle	istituzione	 della	 democrazia	 rappresentativa”	 (2015,	 p.219).	 Confirming	 what	Norris	and	herself	(2013)said	in	previous	works.			
2.3	Interaction.		The	 fact	 that	 two	 elements	 share	 the	 same	 field	 in	 which	 they	 perform	 their	activities	–like	political	parties	and	social	movements	do-	suggests	some	kind	of	interaction	between	them.	Different	authors	point	 towards	that	direction.	Della	Porta	and	Chironi	hold	that	“although	studies	on	social	movements	and	political	parties	 have	 usually	 treated	 the	 two	 separately,	 some	 empirical	 analyses	 have	shown	that	they	are	deeply	intertwined”	(2015,	p.61).	Actually,	looking	again	at	the	 data	 of	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey	 7	 (2014)	 this	 theory	 seems	 to	 be	confirmed.	Taking	 the	 variable	 “worked	 in	 another	organization	within	 last	 12	months” 10 	named	 people	 involved	 and	 running	 a	 simple	 univariate	 logit	regression 11 	using	 political	 interest	 12 		 named	 interested	 in	 politics	 as	independent	 variable,	 we	 can	 observe	 –with	 high	 significance-	 that	 when	 the	interest	 in	 politics	 is	 lower,	 also	 the	 probability	 to	 not	 work	 in	 another																																																									9	The	widely	studied	Mancur	Olson’s	individual	incentives	(Olson,	2002).	10	Transforming	it	to	a	binary	variable	with	values	1	being	involved	and	0	not	being	involved.	11	I	used	STATA	13.1	for	this	analysis	and	the	following	ones.		12	The	ESS	2014	asks	how	interested	would	you	say	you	are	in	politics	by	giving	a	scale	of	1	(very	interested)	to	4	(not	at	all	interested).	
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organization	decreases.	Or	in	other	words:	the	higher	the	interest	in	politics,	the	higher	the	probability	of	also	being	involved	in	associations	[see	table	12].			 Table	12.	Regression	A.		 (1)	VARIABLES	 People	involved		 	Interested	in		 -0.687***	politics		 (0.0159)	Constant	 0.0527		 (0.0378)		 	Observations	 39,981	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		From	 this	 data	 we	 can	 deduce	 that	 those	 persons	 that	 are	 involved	 in	associations	or	public	organizations	have	a	big	 interest	 in	politics.	They	do	not	join	associations	because	they	ignore	politics;	they	do	it	because	they	are	more	interested	in	producing	changes	in	the	society	than	other	citizens	and	use	other	channels	apart	from	political	parties	to	achieve	those	changes.	However,	people	more	 socially	 active	 do	 not	 reject	 the	 traditional	 channels	 of	 political	participation	 as	 we	 might	 think.	 Meyer	 and	 Tarrow	 already	 said	 that	“participation	 in	protest	activity	has	not	come	at	 the	expense	of	other	 forms	of	participation…	People	who	protest	are	more,	not	less,	 likely	to	vote	and	engage	in	the	whole	range	of	conventional	citizen	politics”	(Meyer	&	Tarrow,	1998,	p.7).	People	who	are	socially	active	also	keep	participating	in	electoral	events,	in	fact,	the	numbers	tell	us	that	they	do	it	more	than	the	rest	of	the	citizens.	Using	again	the	data	of	the	European	Social	Survey	7	(2014)	and	running	a	 logit	regression	with	 the	 variable	 vote	 as	 dependent	 variable	 and	 people	 involved 13 	as	independent	 variable,	 we	 find	 with	 a	 high	 significance,	 that	 when	 people	 are	involved	in	an	association	the	probability	of	voting	increases	[see	table	13].		
																																																								13	Both,	vote	and	people	involved	are	dummy	variables	with	values	0	and	1.		
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Table	13.	Regression	B.		 (1)	VARIABLES	 Vote		 	People	involved	 1.168***		 (0.0442)		Constant	 1.037***		 (0.0131)		 	Observations	 36,276	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		Political	parties	and	social	movements	are	linked	and	this	relationship	affects	the	entire	public	environment.	Without	citizens	able	to	participate	in	public	matters	it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 consider	 being	 involved	 in	 a	 real	 democracy.	 “There	 is	widespread	 agreement	 among	 varied	 democratic	 theorists,	 ranging	 from	 Jean	Jacques	 Rousseau	 to	 James	 Madison,	 John	 Stuart	 Mill,	 Robert	 Dahl,	 Benjamin	Barber,	David	Held,	and	John	Dryzak,	 that	mass	participation	 is	 the	 lifeblood	of	representative	democracy”	 (Norris,	 2002,	p.5)	but	 this	public	participation	 can	only	 be	 held	 in	 a	 safe	 environment.	 Democracy	 needs	 public	 engagement	 in	public	affairs	(Norris,	2002).	A	healthy	environment	means	more	trust	between	the	 actors	 and	more	probabilities	 of	 participation	of	 anyone.	 Statistics	 confirm	that	idea14	when	we	run	a	logit	regression	using	people	involved15	as	dependent	variable	 and	 trust	 in	 political	 parties16	as	 independent	 variable.	 With	 a	 high	significance	we	observe	 that	 the	more	 the	 trust	 increases	 in	political	parties	of	the	respondents,	also	 the	probability	 increases	 to	belong	to	an	association	[see	table	14].					
																																																								14	Database	of	the	European	Social	Survey	7	(2014).	15	Dummy	variable	with	values	0	and	1.		16	A	numerical	variable	with	values	that	go	from	0	(no	trust	at	all)	to	10	(complete	trust).		
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Table	14.	Regression	C.		 (1)	VARIABLES	 People	involved		 	Trust	in	political	 0.169***	parties	 (0.00572)		Constant	 -2.234***		 (0.0275)		 	Observations	 39,374	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		Trust	 in	 political	 parties	 increases	 the	 participation	 in	 public	 affairs	 and	increases	 the	 quality	 of	 democracy	 in	 a	 society.	 Linking	 the	 two	 elements	 of	study	of	that	dissertation			All	 of	 these	 three	 regressions	 show	 us	 that	 exists	 a	 clear	 connection	 between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	People	involved	in	movements	are	more	interested	 in	 politics,	 vote	 more	 and	 trust	 more	 in	 political	 parties	 than	 the	average.	 They	 share	 the	 political	 space.	 Political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	are	not	islands	in	the	political	arena.		
2.4	 The	 beginnings	 and	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	
interactions	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	
movements.	The	existence	of	a	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	is	not	 new.	 It	 is	 an	 old	 story	 that	 has	 had	 a	 major	 impact	 on	 their	 elements,	transforming	 political	 parties’	 structure	 and	 how	 social	 movements	 face	 their	goals.	Moreover,	this	interplay	is	not	an	exception	of	few	cases	during	history	of	politics;	 it	 is	 the	 general	 rule	 of	 behaviour	 of	 those	 elements.	 In	 fact,	 Daniela	Piccio	believes	that	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	movements	is	so	crucial	that,		
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The	 very	 origin	 of	 those	 that	would	 become	 the	most	 important	 party	families	of	 the	 twentieth	century	 in	Western	Europe	(i.e.:	 the	Socialists,	the	 Liberals	 and	 the	 Confessional	 parties)	 could	 not	 be	 understood	without	 reference	 to	 the	 diverse	 movements,	 pressure	 groups,	 and	associations,	 which	 became	 involved	 in	 institutionalized	 campaigns	shaping	the	configuration	of	party	organizations	(2016,	p265).		However,	despite	the	importance	and	the	constant	presence	of	these	connections	between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 during	 time,	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	define	 exactly	 when	 those	 started.	 The	 different	 names	 and	 configurations	 of	both	 elements	 do	 not	 make	 easier	 that	 task.	 For	 that	 reason	 is	 important	 to	identify	 first	 when	 both	 elements	 appeared	 and	 then	 pay	 attention	 to	 their	interaction.	Thus,	on	 the	one	hand,	political	parties	are	 the	oldest	 factor	 in	our	equation	as	 the	 first	of	 them	appeared	around	 the	 late	1600s	(Scarrow,	2006);	and	if	we	follow	Charles	Tilly	propositions	(2004,	p.3)	social	movement	“existed	nowhere	in	the	world	three	centuries	ago”,	placing	their	origins	about	late	18th-century.	 Political	 parties	 are	 also	 the	 most	 easy	 to	 recognize	 as	 they	 already	identify	 themselves	 as	 “political	 parties”	 in	 its	 early	 times,	 and	 they	 act	with	 a	clear	 goal:	 the	 institutional	 power	 (Ware,	 1996).	 In	 an	 environment	 where	coordinated	action	was	revealed	as	the	winning	choice,	they	became	quickly	the	central	actor	of	politics,	especially	after	the	19th-century	when	their	preeminence	was	undisputed	(Scarrow,	2006).			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 talking	 about	 our	 other	 factor,	 that	 is,	 social	 movements,	Charles	Tilly	maintains	 that	 “by	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	people	all	over	 the	world	 recognized	 the	 term	 "social	movement"	 as	 a	 trumpet	 call,	 as	 a	counterweight	 to	oppressive	power,	 as	 a	 summons	 to	popular	 action	 against	 a	wide	range	of	scourges”	(Tilly,	2004,	p.3).	But	as	the	movements	do	not	identify	themselves	 with	 the	 term	 at	 its	 origins,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 go	 further	 to	 know	when	 those	 actors	 were	 born.	 So,	 focusing	 on	 their	 roots,	 Tilly	 (2004)	 holds	social	movements	made	its	first	appearances	after	1750	in	the	United	States	and	Britain	 and	 later	 in	Western	 Europe.	He	 proposes	 two	 cases	 as	 the	 first	 social	movements	 in	 history	 that	 could	 be	 defined	 as	 such.	 The	 first	 one	 is	 the	
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mobilization	 of	 the	 population	 of	 the	 American	 British	 colonies	 against	 the	British	 Empire	 for	 a	 fair	 relationship	 with	 the	 metropolis.	 This	 movement	appeared	 because	 ordinary	 people	 -that	 is,	 not	 politicians-	 started	 to	 feel	 the	necessity	 to	 express	 themselves	 about	 a	 reality	 that	 was	 not	 anymore	sustainable	 for	 them.	 Thus,	 the	 movement	 “enlisted	 ordinary	 citizens	 such	 as	artisans	and	sailors	in	campaigns	of	sustained	opposition	to	royal	policies”	(Tilly,	2004,	p.25),	with	techniques	like	“special-purpose	associations,	public	meetings,	marches,	 petitions,	 pamphleteering,	 and	 statements	 widely	 reported	 in	 	 the	public	media”	(Tilly,	2004,	p.25),	that	have	not	been	used	before.	The	second	one	is	the	movement	that	ended	up	originating	the	seed	that	subsequently	led	to	the	French	 Revolution.	 In	 a	 situation	 where	 a	 few	 advantaged	 held	 important	privileges	meanwhile	 the	majority	was	 exploited	under	 the	 rules	of	 the	Ancien	
Régime,	 some	voices	 started	 to	 claim	 for	 changes.	The	 social	 claims	and	public	activities	-like	riots-	against	the	unequal	situation	of	the	population	are	already	considered	 by	 Tilly	 (2004)	 as	 social	 movements,	 however	 not	 the	 French	Revolution	itself.		Furthermore,	 Tilly	 (2004)	 proposes	 two	 cases	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 an	incipient	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 movements.	 The	 first	 case	would	 be	 the	 contacts	 between	 the	 antislavery	 movement	 in	 Britain	 with	politicians	 and	parties	 -mainly	 the	Whigs.	 The	 battle	 of	 this	movement	 for	 the	abolition	of	slavery	was	long	and	the	abolitionists	were	obliged	to	find	support	of	their	positions	in	Parliament	to	achieve	their	goal.	This	forced	them	to	combine	public	activities	addressed	to	convince	the	general	population	of	the	atrocity	of	that	practice,	with	a	direct	pressure	over	the	members	of	the	parliament	that	had	the	possibility	to	legislate	in	that	matter.	Meanwhile,	the	other	case	of	interaction	would	be	all	the	relationships	created	in	the	revolutionary	France	of	1848	where	the	different	political	positions	were	looking	for	socially	organized	support.	For	Tilly	(2004,	p.39)	March	1848	was	a	relevant	moment	in	that	field	as	“Lyon	and	France	installed	the	social	movement	as	a	regular	vehicle	of	popular	politics”.			However,	we	can	only	start	talking	properly	about	relationships	between	social	movements	 and	 political	 parties	 when	 labour	 movements	 initiated	 their	
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mobilizations	and	saw	 in	political	parties	–mainly	 those	 from	 the	 left-	possible	allies.	In	fact,	the	relationship	between	left	parties	and	social	movements	either	at	the	beginnings	or	later	in	time,	have	been	the	object	of	the	majority	of	studies	in	 the	 field	 (Kriesi,	 Koopmans,	 Duyvendak,	 &	 Giugni,	 1995)	 (Donatella	 Della	Porta,	 2013).	 The	 reason	 for	 Piccio,	 (2016,	 p.279)	 is	 because	 “the	 left	 wing	parties	 have	been	more	 inclined	 to	 take	 on	board	 social	movements’	 demands	and	provide	their	support	to	the	movements’	mobilizations.”	But	the	connections	between	social	movements	and	current	political	parties	are	not	exclusive	of	the	left	 as	 exists	 examples	 also	 for	 the	 conservative	 and	 other	 political	 options.	Thereby,	 social	 movements	 have	 shaped	 political	 parties	 as	 well	 as	 changed	party	 systems	 by	 introducing	 new	 actors.	 And	 for	 some	 of	 those	 parties	 the	degree	of	interdependence	with	social	movements	is	so	high	that	they	could	not	survive	in	the	way	we	know	them	without	social	movements	backup.			A	 very	 good	 example	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 in	 the	past	 is	 the	one	 that	had	as	 result	 the	creation	of	 the	Labour	Party	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 The	movements	 for	workers	 rights	 found	 in	 the	19th	century	and	the	beginnings	of	the	20th	century	good	allies	for	their	claims	in	the	 leftist	 parties	 all	 around	 Europe.	 But	 particularly	 relevant	 was	 the	relationship	 that	 involved	 the	 British	 trade	 union	 movement	 and	 the	 Labour	Party	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 Not	 just	 because	 both	 had	 the	 improvement	 of	workers’	 rights	 as	 a	 main	 goals,	 but	 also	 because	 the	 Labour	 was	 precisely	founded	 after	 the	 trade	 union	 movement	 saw	 that	 more	 institutional	representation	 to	 advance	 workers’	 conditions	 was	 necessary	 (Stewart	 Reid,	1955).	Subsequently,	“Labour	was	sustained	by	trade	union	funds	and	often	by	trade	 union	 activists”	 (Worley,	 2015,	 p.4),	 showing	 in	 that	 way	 how	 social	movements	can	effect	and	shape	political	parties	and	political	systems	as	Kriesi	held	(Kriesi,	2015).			However,	 the	 relationship	between	parties	 and	 trade	unions	 in	 the	UK	did	not	start	creating	the	Labour	but	challenging	an	already	existing	political	party.	Once	conquered	male	 suffrage,	 some	 workers	 leaders	 decided	 to	 run	 as	 candidates	endorsed	 by	 the	 Liberal	 Party	 (Pugh,	 2011).	 The	 Liberal	 Party	 tried	 with	 this	
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movement	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 all	 new	 proletarian	 voters	 would	 support	 them	instead	of	 the	Conservative	Party,	 the	other	big	party	at	 that	 time.	After	seeing	that	workers’	demands	were	not	take	into	consideration	the	way	union	leaders	expected,	“alliances	with	the	Liberals	began	to	strain	and	break”	(Worley,	2005,	p.5).	At	 some	point,	 the	 “leaders	of	organized	 labour	 in	Britain	had	completely	lost	 their	 faith	 in	 the	 Liberal	 party”	 (Stewart	 Reid,	 1955,	 p.60)	 and	 ended	 up	challenging	 the	 party	 that	 gave	 them	 the	 opportunity	 to	 be	 candidates:	 if	 the	Liberals	would	not	attend	their	demands	they	would	create	a	new	party	with	the	support	of	the	workers.	Founding	thus	a	new	actor	in	British	politics,	the	Labour	Party,	 which	 after	 few	 years	 would	 replace	 the	 Liberals	 as	 government	alternative	 to	 the	 Conservative	 Party.	 The	 interaction	 of	 the	 trade	 union	movement	and	the	Labour	was	so	strong	that	“trades	councils	became	electoral	agencies	 for	 the	 party”	 (Worley,	 2005,	 p.5)	with	 the	 evident	 strength	 that	 this	meant	 for	 electoral	 campaigns.	 This	 deep	 relationship	 between	 both	 elements,	the	 party	 and	 trade	 unions,	 made	 the	 Labour	 become	 a	 crucial	 actor	 in	 the	political	party	system	of	the	UK,	making	it	essential	to	understand	British	politics	as	 it	 almost	monopolized	 for	 long	 time	 the	 representatives	 of	 some	 areas	 like	Scotland,	Wales	and	North	of	England	(Pugh,	2011).			Another	 relevant	 case	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	-and	closer	in	time-	is	the	case	of	the	appearance	of	the	Green	Parties	around	 the	 world.	 It	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 understand	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 first	Green	Parties	without	taking	into	consideration	the	crucial	role	the	students’	and	environmental	 movements	 played	 in	 it	 (Schoonmaker,	 1988).	 With	 a	 lot	 of	similarities	 in	the	process	of	the	creation	of	the	Labour	Party,	“when	it	became	evident	 that	 none	 of	 the	 established	 parties	 would	 respond	 adequate	 to	 their	demands,	 activists	 from	 the	 [environmental]	 movements	 undertook	 to	 set	 up	their	own	political	party”	(Poguntke,	1994,	p.14),	 that	 is:	 the	Greens.	Again,	we	face	 a	 case	 where	 political	 parties	 risk	 having	 new	 opponents	 if	 they	 do	 not	attend	the	demands	of	the	social	movements.			But	even	more	relevant	than	its	creation,	the	interaction	between	the	party	and	social	movements	is	interesting	for	the	way	social	movements	condition	party’s	
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structure.	After	the	creation	of	the	party	the	Greens	“externalized”	part	of	what	were	traditionally	exclusive	party	elements	(Hofmeister	&	Grabow,	2011).	Thus,	“the	Greens	have	relied	heavily	upon	new	social	movements	for	communication	and	mobilization”	(Poguntke,	1994,	p.14).	Moreover,	the	Greens	do	not	just	use	peace	and	ecology	movements	as	an	electoral	resource,	but	also	as	a	structural	part	 of	 the	 party	 as	 those	 movements	 have	 been	 the	 equivalent	 of	 the	membership	 for	 the	 traditional	mass	 parties	 (Poguntke,	 1994).	 Thereby,	 “new	social	movements	and	the	Greens	are	related	through	a	multitude	of	overlapping	memberships	 and	 joint	 extra-parliamentary	 activities”	 (Poguntke,	 1994,	 p.15).	Creating	 a	 shared	 cultural	 space	 between	 the	 members	 of	 the	 party	 and	 the	members	 of	 the	 movements,	 with	 similar	 values,	 lifestyle,	 ideals,	 literature,	authors,	 newspapers…	 So	 deep	 is	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 party	 and	 the	movements	 which	 support	 it	 that	 the	 Greens	 have	 been	 defined	 as	 “a	 hybrid	movement/party”	 (Schoonmaker,	1988,	p.64).	This	party	model	would	provide	the	Greens	with	a	direct	connection	with	the	demands	of	their	potential	voters,	meanwhile	“existing	movements	would	give	such	demands	 legitimacy”	 through	the	 parliamentary	 activity	 of	 the	 party	 (Poguntke,	 1994).	 But,	 is	 important	 to	notice	that	the	relationship	between	environmental	movements	and	the	Greens	was	not	exclusive.	New	social	movements	also	had	contacts	with	other	political	parties	 besides	 the	 interest	 of	 the	Greens	 to	 canalize	 through	 the	party	 all	 the	demands	of	the	postmodern	voters	(Schoonmaker,	1988).	Therefore,	even	if,	“the	Greens	 played	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 these	 movements,	 they	 were	 far	 from	dominating	them	organizationally	or	politically”	(Poguntke,	1994,	p.14).			While	 “studies	 focusing	 on	 the	 relationships	 between	 social	 movements	 and	political	parties	have	traditionally	 looked	at	political	parties	of	 the	 left”	(Piccio,	2016,	p.279),	but	the	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	is	not	 limited	only	 to	 leftist	parties.	Connections,	 and	even	 collaborations	exist	also	with	right	and	conservative	parties,	and	a	good	example	of	that	are	the	links	of	the	Christian	Right	with	the	Republican	Party	in	the	USA.	That	movement	in	its	different	 configurations	 has	 been	 able	 to	 exercise	 enough	weight	 to	 condition	Republican	 Party’s	 political	 decisions,	 whether	 on	 policies	 or	 selection	 of	candidates.	Christian	Right	 followers	have	achieved	 such	an	 important	 role	 for	
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the	Republican	party	that	already	in	the	80’s	and	90’s	“evangelicals	had	become	an	establish17	component	of	the	Republican	electoral	coalition”	(Oldfield,	1996,	p.87).		The	 way	 the	 Republican	 Party	 chooses	 its	 candidates,	 that	 is,	 by	 primary	elections	 allowing	 people	 and	 not	 the	 party	 leaders	 to	 select	 the	 candidates	(Smith	 &	 Greenblatt,	 2013),	 makes	 the	 party	 vulnerable	 to	 outside	 forces	 to	influence	 the	results.	Consequently,	even	 if	associations	with	elements	 that	are	able	to	mobilize	the	voter	could	be	potentially	very	useful	 in	electoral	contests,	conservative	 “movements	 are	 seen	 as	 a	 disruptive	 force	 because	 of	 their	contentiousness;	 they	undermine	 elites	 and	produce”	 (Green,	Rozell,	&	Wilcox,	2001,	 p.414)	 unwanted	 candidates	 that	 put	 electoral	 victories	 at	 risk.	 Hence,	Republicans	 leaders	 do	 not	 see	 those	movements	 with	 a	 lot	 of	 enthusiasm	 as	“partisan	 mobilization	 by	 social	 movements	 provide	 an	 antidote	 to	 party	oligarchy	 by	 generating	 new	 party	 elites	 and	 producing	 popular	 candidates”	(Green	et	al.,	2001,	p.414)	that	can	threaten	their	privileged	position	within	the	party.	A	situation	that	is	particularly	visible	in	the	case	of	the	Tea	Party,	as	it	is	“not	 operating	 under	 the	 guidance	 of	 official	 GOP	 institutions.	 The	 Republican	National	 Committee	 is	 not	 in	 charge,	 and	 neither	 are	 state	 party	organs”(Williamson,	 Skocpol,	 &	 Coggin,	 2011,	 p.28),	 creating	 some	 division	inside	 the	 party	 that	 had	 had	 electoral	 consequences.	 So,	 either	 positive	 or	negative,	we	 cannot	 deny	 that	 the	 Tea	 Party	 had	 a	 big	 impact	 in	 the	 Republic	party	and	its	way	to	confront	elections.	Thus,		 The	 Tea	 Party’s	 impact	 was	 clearer	 within	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 Tea	Party	 mobilizations	 enabled	 insurgent	 primary	 candidates	 to	 overtake	and	 defeat	 a	 number	 of	 officially	 endorsed	 GOP	 candidates,	 including	incumbents.	 Many	 mainstream	 Republicans,	 including	 Bob	 Bennett	 in	Utah,	Charlie	Crist	 in	Florida,	Lisa	Murkowski	 in	Alaska,	Sue	Lowdon	 in	Nevada,	and	Mike	Castle	in	Del-	aware,	lost	their	primaries	to	Tea	Party	candidates.	 Some	Tea	Party	 insurgent	 candidates	went	 on	 to	 prevail	 in	the	 general	 2010	 election,	 but	 this	 holds	 true	 primarily	 in	 strongly																																																									17	Emphasis	added.		
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Republican	 states.	 In	 more	 competitive	 environments	 like	 Nevada,	Colorado	 and	 Delaware,	 Democrats	 benefitted	 from	 the	 Tea	 Party	candidates’	extreme	ideology	or	less	experienced	campaigns	(Williamson	et	al.,	2011,	p.35).		From	the	numbers	of	participation	(Green	et	al.,	2001),	 it	 seems	quite	possible	that	 the	 Tea	 Party	 has	 “contributed	 to	 the	 GOP	 gains	 in	 the	House,	 above	 and	beyond	those	that	might	have	been	expected	based	on	economic	conditions	and	normal	 cyclical	 trends”	 (Williamson	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 p.35).	 Besides	 the	 electoral	results	 what	 is	more	 relevant	 than	 the	 specific	 impacts	 is	 that	 “the	 Tea	 Party	revitalize	 right-wing	 activism	 in	 the	 lead-up	 to	 the	 2010	 midterm	 elections”	(Williamson,	Skocpol,	&	Coggin,	2011,	p.26).	But	the	fact	is	that	the	Tea	Party	did	much	 more	 as	 it	 was	 able	 to	 revitalize	 not	 just	 the	 activisms,	 but	 also	 the	Republican	 Party	 itself,	 activating	 its	 voters	 and	 having	 an	 important	 media	presence	 in	 its	 battle	 against	 the	 Patient	 Protection	 and	 Affordable	 Care	 Act	(PPACA)18 	and	 other	 Democratic	 policies	 (Williamson	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 All	 the	presence	of	Tea	Party	exponents	 creates	a	political	 impulse	 for	 the	Republican	Party	 that	had	 its	maximum	exponent	when	 it	was	able	 to	 take	 the	majority	of	the	 seats	 of	 both	 chambers	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Congress19.	 In	 conclusion,	“fashioned	at	 a	moment	of	 challenge	 for	 conservatives	 in	 and	around	 the	GOP,	when	the	“Republican”	label	was	tarnished,	the	Tea	Party	has	helped	to	sharpen	and	refocus	conservative	activism	in	our	time”	(Williamson	et	al.,	2011,	p.37).		Thus,	to	conclude,	the	impact	of	social	movements	on	politics	and	particularly	on	political	parties	in	history	is	crucial,	and	can	be	summarized	in	these	words:		 The	 greatest	 sort	 of	 impact	 is	 the	 one	 that	 provides	 a	 group	 with	continuing	 leverage	 over	 political	 processes	 and	 increases	 the	 political	returns	to	the	collective	action	of	a	challenger.	These	gains	are	usually	at	a	structural	 or	 systemic	 level	 of	 state	 processes	 and	 constitute	 a	 kind	 of	meta-collective	 benefit.	 Gains	 in	 the	 democratization	 of	 state	 processes,																																																									18	Commonly	called	Affordable	Care	Act	(ACA)	or	Obamacare.	19	The	2014	elections	gave	the	Republicans	control	of	the	Senate	and	the	House	of	Representatives.	
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such	as	winning	 the	right	 to	vote	by	a	nonfranchised	group,	 increase	 the	productivity	 of	 future	 state-directed	 collective	 action	 by	 such	 groups.	Many	of	the	most	prominent	social	movements	have	sought	this	basic	goal,	including	movements	 of	 workers,	 women,	 and,	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	civil	 rights	 movement	 (Rueschemeyer	 et	 al.	 1992,	 Banaszak	 1996,	McAdam	1999,	McCammon	et	al.	2001).	The	 formation	by	movements	of	established	political	parties	is	also	a	structural	political	change	(Schwartz	2000	and	more	below),	if	one	step	removed	from	transformations	in	states	(Amenta,	Caren,	Chiarello,	&	Su,	2010,	p.14.4).			
2.5	When	is	interaction	most	likely	to	happen?	Knowing	 more	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 goes	 through	 finding	 when	 interaction	 takes	 place	 or	 when	 its	probability	of	occurring	is	higher.	The	problem	is	that	the	exact	moment	of	the	interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 varies	 in	 every	specific	 case,	 as	 every	 situation	 has	 its	 particular	 features.	 Defining	 when	 an	interaction	 exactly	 happens	 is	 not	 easy	 as	 different	 forms	 and	 intensities	 of	interactions	 may	 make	 that	 task	 difficult.	 Especially	 because	 we	 are	 talking	about	an	action	that	is	not	a	single	point	in	time,	but	about	a	process.	Moreover,	the	story	behind	the	interaction	of	political	parties	and	social	movements	is	also	an	element	 to	consider.	Thus,	as	seen	before,	 the	 interaction	between	socialist	parties	and	trade	unions	that	started	in	the	19th	century	has	different	dynamics	than	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 Greens	 and	 the	 environmental	 movements	born	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	 Generally,	 actors	 that	 have	 just	appeared	in	the	political	arena,	like	new	parties	or	new	movements,	do	not	have	any	 story	 or	 previous	 relationship	with	 anyone	 else	 and	 have	 to	 start	 to	 find	collaborations	in	a	already	establish	political	system.	Meanwhile,	the	parties	and	movements	with	 long	 life	have	already	had	previous	contacts	creating	both	an	organization	cultural	and	personal	contacts	with	 leaders	of	both	sides,	making	the	interaction	easier.			For	those	reasons,	it	is	not	possible	to	specify	exactly	when	these	contacts	will	take	place.	However,	it	is	possible	to	define	the	circumstances	under	which	the	
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contacts	 have	 a	 higher	 probability	 to	 occur.	 Thus,	 Piccio	 (2016)	 defines	 three	conditions	when	that	interaction	is	more	likely:		 - Electoral	 vulnerability.	The	existence	of	electoral	 test	 increases	the	receptivity	of	political	parties	to	find	social	movements	support.	At	the	end,	 it	 is	 the	 moment	 when	 parties	 look	 for	 citizens’	 approval.	Consequently,	parties	try	to	be	backed	by	as	many	elements	they	can	to	be	 seen	as	 a	 trustful	 actor.	 For	 several	 authors	 (Goldstone,	 2003)	(Amenta	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 that	 interest	 would	 be	 higher	 when	 political	parties	are	expecting	bad	results	in	the	coming	elections.	That	is,	when	parties	 would	 be	 more	 open	 to	 put	 aside	 some	 of	 its	 traditional	policies	and	make	bigger	commitments	with	social	movements.	 “The	underlying	 logic	 is	 that	 parties	 will	 employ	 strategies	 that	 are	beneficial	for	the	maintenance	of	their	organizational	survival”	(Piccio,	2016,	 p.268).	 Thus,	 Piccio	 (2016)	 and	 Kriesi	 (Kriesi	 et	 al.,	 1995)	consider	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 electoral	 adversaries	 in	 a	 shared	ideological	space	increases	the	probability	of	parties	looking	for	social	movements	that	can	increment	positively	the	way	parties	are	seen	by	the	 voters	 of	 that	 space.	 A	 good	 example	 of	 that	 are	 the	 social	democratic	parties	when	they	have	had	competitors	on	its	left	(Kriesi	et	al.,	1995).			- Members’	cumulative	involvement.	As	we	have	seen	before	with	the	numbers	 of	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey,	 people	 involved	 in	 social	movements	 are	 more	 interested	 in	 politics	 and	 also	 trust	 political	parties	 more 20 .	 Political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 are	 two	different	 ways	 to	 participate	 in	 politics	 but	 they	 are	 not	 mutually	exclusive,	 in	 fact	 for	 a	 group	 of	 people	 this	 is	 cumulative	 (Norris,	2002).	 At	 the	 end,	 if	 those	 two	 actors	 shared	 goals	 or	 values,	 it	 is	logical	 that	 several	 of	 its	 members	 participate	 in	 both.	 Thus,	 when	political	 parties	 and	 movements	 share	 more,	 they	 will	 also	 have	 a	bigger	 number	 of	 shared	 members	 and	 thus	 the	 higher	 will	 be	 the																																																									20	Section	3	of	that	chapter.		
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possibility	to	interact.	Thereby,	social	movements’	members	that	join	a	 party	 will	 be	 particularly	 interested	 in	 the	movement’s	 line	when	debating	 new	 policies	 inside	 the	 party’s	 organs.	 Meanwhile	 party	members	 that	 join	 a	 movement	 will	 see	 the	 party	 as	 a	 way	 to	implement	institutionally	social	movement’s	goals.	So,	higher	levels	of	double	membership	increase	parties-movements	collaboration.			- Identity	 coherence.	 In	 order	 to	 have	 an	 established	 relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	it	is	necessary	to	have	some	 degree	 of	 shared	 identities	 (Piccio,	 2016).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	parties	 do	 not	 go	 to	 look	 for	 social	 movements’	 support	 if	 those	movements	 are	 ideologically	 opposed	 to	 the	 party’s.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 social	movements	 can	demand	 some	particular	behaviour	of	 a	party	 they	are	against	 to,	but	hardly	will	collaborate	with	 that	party.	“Parties	 will	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 open	 to	 those	 movements	 whose	cultural	 and	 ideological	 understandings	 of	 politics	 more	 closely	corresponds	 to	 their	own,	and	whose	 themes	do	not	contradict	 their	own	traditional	discourses	(Kriesi,	1993;	Rucht,	2004)”	(Piccio,	2016,	p268).	So,	the	higher	shared	values,	the	higher	are	levels	of	interaction	between	parties	and	movements.		But	apart	from	those	three	conditions	listed	by	Daniela	Piccio,	it	is	important	to	notice	other	elements	that	have	an	influence	on	the	interaction	between	parties	and	movements.	Thus,	based	on	the	rules	of	 internal	parties’	dynamics	and	 its	external	 influence	 developed	 by	Andrew	Appleton	 (1994),	we	 extrapolate	 the	following	dynamics	of	parties	and	movements:		 - Connection	between	elites21.	Political	parties	and	social	movements	are	at	the	end	organizations	ruled	by	some	specific	members	that	can	be	defined	as	the	elite	of	the	organization.	Those	persons	are	the	ones	who	 have	 the	 biggest	 initiative	 power	 to	 define	 organization’s	activities	 and	 goals	 and	 consequently,	 establish	 organizational	 links.																																																									21	Based	on	Appleton’s	rule	of	privileged	relationships.	
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Personal	 relationships	 make	 contacts	 between	 organizations	 less	costly.	“A	privileged	relationship	links	two	actors	in	the	political	arena	through	 a	 bond	 other	 than	 that	 formed	 through	 formal	 channels	 of	authority	 or	 competence,	 and	 allows	 one	 of	 those	 actors	 to	 short-circuit	 formal	procedures	through	contact	with	the	other”	(Appleton,	1994,	 p.48)	 When	 personal	 connections	 between	 party	 elites	 and	movement	 elites	 are	 higher,	 it	 gets	 easier	 to	 find	 common	 roads	 for	collaboration.		- Previous	 background.	 This	 is	 not	 about	 the	 influence	 of	 social	movements	on	the	creation	of	the	party	like	the	socialist	parties	or	the	Greens,	it	is	about	the	existence	of	a	collaborative	culture	between	the	two	 organizations.	 If	 a	 political	 party	 and	 a	 social	 movement	 have	previously	shared	other	projects,	their	connections	and	their	ways	to	work	help	new	approaches	between	them	(Lane	&	Bachmann,	1998).	So,	 if	 they	 have	 collaborated	 before,	 the	 probability	 to	 do	 it	 again	 is	higher.	Besides,	of	 course,	of	 the	goals’	 alignment	 that	happens	after	any	 common	 project	 and	 pushes	 the	 actors	 to	 replace	 their	 own	priorities	after	the	new	scenario.			 - Political	momentum.	The	existence	of	 a	window	of	opportunity	 for	which	 collaboration	 is	 crucial.	 Despite	 the	moments	 of	 the	 electoral	periods	 when	 collaboration	 has	 a	 more	 clear	 objective,	 parties	 and	movements	 can	 find	 many	 other	 situations	 when	 exploiting	 their	relationship	through	mutual	benefits	(Appleton,	1994).	That	is,	when	it	 is	 more	 convenient	 for	 both.	 Thus,	 for	 instance,	 the	 use	 of	 social	movements	 by	 opposition	 parties	 to	 attack	 some	 unpopular	government	 policies.	 Social	movements	 obtain	 institutional	 visibility	thanks	to	the	parties;	meanwhile	parties	obtain	public	support	to	their	activity,	as	well	as	a	higher	media	coverage	for	both	actors.	Therefore,	when	 there	 are	 potential	 mutual	 benefits	 for	 the	 partners,	 the	probably	 to	 have	 an	 interaction	 between	 parties	 and	movements	 is	higher.		
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2.6	 Ways	 of	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	
social	movements.	After	verifying	the	existence	of	an	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	and	seeing	how	important	their	interaction	has	been	for	politics,	it	is	important	 to	 identify	 the	 ways	 parties	 and	 movements	 interact.	 The	 potential	ways	 both	 actors	 interact	 are,	 theoretically	 speaking,	 infinite.	 However,	 it	 is	certain	that	it	is	possible	to	identify	some	common	patterns	when	that	interaction	takes	place.	That	 is,	 the	ways	 that	are	present	more	consistently	during	 time	 in	the	relationship	movements-parties.	Della	Porta	and	Chironi	specify	in	that	sense	that:		 Notwithstanding	 the	 fundamental	 differences	 in	 organizational	structures	 and	 forms	 of	 action	 adopted,	 leftist	 parties	 and	movements	interacted	 through	 mechanisms	 such	 as:	 overlapping	 membership,	 i.e.	double	 militancy	 in	 both	 movements	 and	 parties;	 the	 participation	 of	parties	in	the	movements’	main	initiatives	and	campaigns	and	vice	versa;	the	 efforts	 of	 parties	 to	 conquer	 the	 new	 electoral	 niches	 opened	 by	movement	 mobilization	 through	 the	 adaptation	 of	 their	 programs;	 the	positioning	 on	 some	 relevant	 issues	 raised	 by	 the	movements;	 and	 the	adoption	 of	 some	 less	 conventional	 political	 actions	 (Della	 Porta	 &	Chironi,	2015,	p.62).			Robert	 Rohrschneider	 (1993)	 talked	 about	 the	 areas	where	 social	movements	interact	more	with	parties	 in	order	 to	 challenge	 them:	programmatic,	 electoral	and	 organizational.	 Based	 on	 the	 problems	 of:	 being	 able	 to	 include	 demands	that	were	being	ignored	or	have	not	even	existed;	being	able	to	mobilize	under-represented	 social	 segments	 to	 express	 their	 preferences	 in	 the	 polls;	 and	 to	make	the	internal	decisional-making	process	of	the	parties	more	transparent	and	more	open	to	the	bases.	With	that	in	mind	it	seems	clear	that	the	presence	and	actions	 of	 social	 movements	 affect	 parties’	 strategies	 and	 can	 even	 shape	
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political	systems.	Social	movements	can	create	opportunities	and	situations	 for	the	parts	 involved	in	the	political	arena,	but	can	also	create	risky	situations	for	the	 parties	 and	 for	 movements	 itself.	 In	 that	 sense,	 in	 “Contentious	 Politics”	(2015)	Charles	Tilly	and	Sidney	Tarrow	argue:			- Social	movements	can	support	a	specific	political	party	with	which	the	movement	 has	 ideological	 affinity,	 shared	 ideals	 or	 common	 goals.	Social	 movements	 can	 mobilize	 its	 members	 either	 as	 voters	 or	 as	campaign	volunteers.	Movements	can	also	transfer	their	reputation	to	the	party,	blessing	it	with	the	same	values	citizens	perceive	within	the	movement.	In	a	similar	way	“as	the	American	trade	union	movement	did	with	the	Democratic	party	in	the	1940s	and	1950s”	(Charles	Tilly	&	Tarrow,	2015,	p.63)	or,	as	 seen	before,	 the	Tea	Party	did	with	 the	Republican	party	(Williamson	et	al.,	2011).		- Social	movements	can	decide	 to	challenge	party’s	position	or	party’s	leaders.	If	the	movement	does	not	agree	with	some	decisions,	they	can	have	 an	 aggressive	 behaviour	 against	 the	 party.	 Even	 ending	 up	confronting	movement’s	positions	with	the	party	in	the	elections.		 - Social	 movements	 are	 able	 to	 change	 political	 parties	 weight	 in	 the	party	system.	Either	to	increase	the	relevance	a	party	has	in	a	specific	political	environment	or	to	reduce	it.	The	authors	give	big	importance	to	that,	thus	“if	we	consider	major	turning	points	in	electoral	politics	in	the	United	States	(i.e.,	the	election	of	Abraham	Lincoln	in	1860	and	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	 in	1932)	 they	were	mainly	 the	 result	of	 the	intrusion	of	social	movements	into	electoral	politics”	(Charles	Tilly	&	Tarrow,	2015,	p.64).		- Social	movements	 can	 change	 political	 parties	 behaviour.	With	 their	social	 support,	 they	 can	 obligate	 parties	 to	 modify	 their	 positions	towards	 some	 issues	 and	 even	 to	 reshape	 party’s	 own	 internal	organization.	That	alteration	of	the	position	of	some	parties	regarding	
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some	issues	can	polarize	the	political	system	as	movements’	demands	tend	to	be	more	extremes	than	parties’	(Davis,	McAdam,	Scott,	&	Zald,	2005).		But	 social	 movements	 have	 to	 be	 aware	 that	 some	 ways	 of	 interaction	 like	deciding	to	join	party	positions	is	not	free	of	risk	for	them.	“Elections	can	weaken	or	strengthen	movements	when	they	become	 involved	 in	election	campaigns	or	align	 themselves	with	 parties’	 programs”	 (Charles	 Tilly	 &	 Tarrow,	 2015,	 p.64).	Thus,	 movements	 can	 lose	 popular	 support	 if	 they	 are	 seen	 as	 mere	 tools	 of	parties.	As	happened	when	 the	movement	against	 the	 Iraq	war	 took	clearly	 the	Democratic	 side	 and,	 due	 to	 that,	 it	 lost	 part	 of	 the	 citizens	 that	 supported	 the	antiwar	movement	previously	(Heaney	&	Rojas,	2015).		
	
2.7	 Types	 of	 relationship	 between	 parties	 and	
movements.	The	position	political	parties	can	adopt	toward	social	movements	and	vice	versa	are	 numerous	 and	 are	 based	 on	 the	 perceptions	 about	 the	 other	 organization.	Normally,	the	attitudes	of	parties	and	movements	towards	each	other	are	based	in	 a	 combination	 of	 two	 elements:	 a	 rational	 calculus	 of	 the	 utility	 of	 the	relationship	 towards	 the	 other,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 an	 ideological	 space	where	parties	and	movements	are	inserted	in.	But	both	elements	can	be	reduced	to	an	analysis	of	how	close	parties	and	movements	feel	about	each	other.	In	other	words:	we	have	to	define	if	the	actors	are	in	favour	or	against	each	other	and	the	degrees	 of	 that	 feeling.	 Therefore,	 with	 a	 scale	 of	 the	 intensity	 that	 goes	 from	totally	agreeing	with	the	other	organization	to	totally	disagreeing,	we	can	build	a	useful	classification	of	types	of	relationship	between	parties	and	movements	that	have	consequences	in	their	external	behaviour.			Thus,	based	on	the	previous	idea,	for	Michael	Hanagan	(1998,	p.4)	there	are	“five	basic	relationship	between	movements	and	parties”:	“articulation”,	“permeation”,	“alliance”,	“independence”	and	“competition”.	To	which	the	concept	“opposition”	can	 be	 added	 to	 complete	 the	 spectrum	 of	 collaboration	 between	 parties	 and	
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movements	 based	 on	 the	 intensity	 of	 that	 collaboration.	 Therefore,	 in	 an	imaginary	 line	 that	 goes	 from	 unconditional	 support	 represented	 by	 1	 in	 the	figure	1,	to	total	rejection	represented	by	0,	we	have:		 	Figure	1.	Types	of	relationships	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	
		 - Articulation.	 Social	 moments	 dependence	 on	 parties	 is	 extreme.	 In	fact,	they	act	as	a	section	of	the	party,	and	“are	organized	around	party	programs	 and	 articulate	 the	 policy	 positions	 of	 parties	 to	constituencies	 where	 parties	 hope	 to	 mobilize	 support	 and	 recruit	members”(Hanagan,	1998,	p.4).	Thus,	movements	are	basically	party	tools,	 used	 to	 active	 the	 own	 voters	 about	 some	 issues	 and	 to	 have	media	presence.	That	kind	of	relationship	implies	a	certain	delegation	of	 functions	 of	 the	 party	 towards	 the	 social	movement	 as	 it	 is	 clear	that	there	is	no	risk	for	the	party	as	“movement	activist	are	expected	to	 follow	 party	 guidelines	 and	 instructions”	 (Hanagan,	 1998,	 p.5).	However,	the	social	movement	impact	over	the	party	is	not	irrelevant	as	can	influence	it	in	certain	topics	-due	to	its	privileged	access	to	the	party’s	 structures-	 in	 a	 way	 the	 party	 did	 not	 anticipate.	 Either	introducing	 new	 approaches	 regarding	 established	 issues	 or	introducing	new	ones.		
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- Permeation.	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 linkage	 between	 the	 party	 and	 the	social	movements	either	for	ideological	reasons	or	because	both	share	similar	 goals.	 There	 is	 a	 stable	 collaboration	 but	 both	 organizations	keep	 their	 decision-organs	 independently.	 Political	 parties	 are	 very	permeable	 to	 social	 movements	 positions	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 lead	some	 issues	 in	 the	public	 debate.	 There	 is	 a	 previous	work	of	 social	movements	to	attract	the	party	to	its	cause,	which	is	seen	by	the	party	as	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 connect	with	 those	 citizens	 that	 are	 ideologically	close	 to	 the	 party	 but	 not	 fully	 active	 to	 vote	 in	 each	 election.	“Although	permeation	implies	that	the	party	is	not	as	fully	committed	to	 a	 particular	 goal	 as	 movement	 activist	 should	 wish,	 it	 also	necessarily	 involves	 social	 movement	 acknowledgement	 that	 they	share	a	broad	range	of	goal	with	the	political	party	of	which	they	are	members”	 (Hanagan,	 1998,	 p4).	 This	 creates	 a	 collaborative	relationship	 that	 has	 the	 characteristic	 of	 exclusivity	 for	 the	 social	movement.	 That	 is,	 the	 social	 movement	 will	 collaborate	 with	 one	single	party	and	will	remain	loyal	to	it.			- Alliance.	 In	this	case	social	movements	and	parties	share	part	of	the	same	 ideology	 but	 they	 just	 collaborate	 for	 specific	 projects.	 Both	organizations	 retain	 very	 important	 to	 keep	 a	 fully	 free	 structure	 to	act	independently	when	necessary,	and	for	that	reason	they	“negotiate	ad	 hoc	 alliances”(Hanagan,	 1998,	 p.4).	 Party	 and	 movement	 are	conscious	 that	 the	 other	 one	 is	 a	 natural	 ally	 but	 both	 act	 as	completely	 different	 actors.	 Those	 “coalitions	 imply	 that	 each	 side	expects	to	obtain	specific	and	concrete	benefits;	coalitions	dissolve	 if	these	 expectations	 are	 disappointed”	 (Hanagan,	 1998,	 p4).	 Widely	perceived	as	 free	actors,	 these	social	movements	are	seen	by	parties	as	a	good	 tool	 to	connect	with	citizens	of	 the	same	 ideological	 range	but	who	vote	for	other	parties.		 - Independence.	Social	movements	and	political	parties	are	completely	independent	without	any	structured	collaboration.	So	even	if	both	can	
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find	some	shared	positions	regarding	some	issues	at	some	particular	moment	in	time,	each	actor	will	develop	its	strategy	without	involving	the	other.	Moreover,	movements	will	pressure	parties	when	necessary	despite	 the	wear	parties	can	suffer.	 In	 fact,	movements	will	pressure	parties	 “to	 make	 concessions	 at	 the	 risk	 of	 losing	 voters	 who	supported	 the	movement”	 (Hanagan,	 1998,	 p.5).	 The	 interest	 of	 the	social	movement	for	its	own	goal	is	more	important	a	priori	than	any	other	 political	 consequence.	 If	 this	 goal	 is	 shared	 with	 the	 party,	collaboration	 can	 be	 built,	 otherwise	 the	 movement	 represents	 a	relevant	 risk	 to	 the	 party.	 “A	 willingness	 to	 inflict	 serious	 electoral	losses	 on	 those	 it	 wants	 to	 influence	 puts	 a	 social	 movement	 in	 a	strong	bargaining	position,	but,	if	actually	does	so,	it	risks	diminishing	its	 own	 prospects	 for	 achieving	 any	measure	 of	 reform	while	 at	 the	same	time	losing	support	within	the	party”	(Hanagan,	1998,	p.5).			- Competition.	 Even	 if	 social	movement	 and	 party’s	 ideology	 are	 not	necessarily	counter	posed,	positions	between	them	regarding	the	way	problems	 should	 be	 faced	 are	 clearly	 different	 if	 not	 even	 opposite.	Any	possible	collaboration	is	broken	and	the	party	faces	one	big	risk:	another	 electoral	 adversary.	 In	 that	 scenario	 the	 social	 movement	creates	a	new	political	party,	which	competes	 for	 the	same	potential	voters	of	the	party.	Maybe	they	share	the	final	goal	-or	not-,	but	clearly	not	the	way	to	achieve	it.	This	situation	of	confrontation	ends	up	in	an	open	competition	and	possible	big	electoral	losses	for	both	actors.	The	party	risk	to	lose	votes	and	to	have	a	big	mobilization	against	it;	and	the	movement	risks	to	be	even	farther	that	its	goal.		- Opposition.	 Social	 movement	 and	 political	 party	 belong	 to	 a	completely	 different	 ideological	 space.	 They	 are	 antagonists	 and	 the	main	goal	of	the	movement	is	the	opposition	to	the	public	policies	that	the	 party	 proposes	 and	 it	 will	 battle	 against	 their	 approval.	Consequently,	 party’s	 electoral	 defeat	 is	 important	 to	 avoid	 the	implementation	of	party’s	policies	and	the	movement	will	mobilize	its	
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resources	 to	 achieve	 it.	 The	 movement	 will	 use	 several	 actions	 to	achieve	 his	 goal,	 including	 supporting	 other	 political	 parties.	 No	collaboration	is	possible	as	both	actors	see	each	other	as	an	adversary	to	battle	against.		The	kind	of	relation	is	not	permanent,	through	time	the	relations	between	a	party	and	a	movement	can	vary	from	one	type	to	another.	Changing	from	one	kind	of	relationship	to	another	it	could	be	because	of	several	factors,	but	the	main	one	is	the	 presence	 of	 elections	 and	 its	 results.	 Elections,	 either	 if	 the	 party	 wins	 or	loses,	are	the	crucial	element	to	alter	the	kind	of	relationship	between	parties	and	movements,	because	it	is	in	that	moment	when	both	can	potentially	have	bigger	earnings.	An	expected	electoral	 victory	 can	produce	 social	movements	be	more	interested	 going	 “into	 closer	 relationship	 with	 political	 parties	 as	 the	 only	vehicles	capable	of	winning	benefits	for	them”	(Hanagan,	1998,	p.6).	On	the	other	hand,	 an	 electoral	 defeat	 can	 reduces	 party’s	 capacity	 to	 satisfy	 movement’s	demands	 and	 consequently	 be	 less	 appealing	 for	 the	 social	 movement.	 But	elections	 are	 not	 the	 only	 relevant	 element	 of	 change.	 The	 other	 important	element	 that	 can	 cause	 a	 realignment	 of	 the	 relations	 between	political	 parties	and	social	movements	 is	 the	commitment	of	 the	 last	with	their	maximum	goals.	The	way	the	movement	considers	how	the	party	 is	acting	to	achieve	the	shared	objectives.	 If	 the	movement	 is	 satisfied,	 it	 can	 go	 closer	 to	 the	 party	 because	 a	trustful	relationship	between	the	actors	has	been	created.	Otherwise,	movements	“can	 sunder	 existing	 bonds	 if	 a	 victorious	 party	 fails	 to	 make	 what	 a	 social	movement	considers	“adequate”	concessions”	(Hanagan,	1998,	p.6).		
2.8	Summary.	This	 chapter	 presented	 two	 actors	 widely	 studied	 in	 political	 science	 and	sociology:	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 However,	 despite	 to	 be	 two	relevant	parts	of	nowadays	politics	 the	 interaction	between	them	has	produced	seldom	works	 in	 the	academia.	The	chapter	pays	attention	 to	connection	of	 the	citizens	towards	both	actors,	highlighting	that	social	movements	are	much	more	appreciate	 and	 close	 to	 citizens	 than	political	 parties.	 After	 showing	 that	 social	movements	and	political	parties	represent	two	different	ways	to	be	involved	on	
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politics	in	the	section	3,	section	4	does	a	resume	of	the	history	of	the	interaction	between	 them	 stressing	 the	most	 relevant	moments	 of	 that	 history.	 Later,	 this	chapter	presented	when	and	how	the	interaction	occurs.	Finally,	it	was	presented	the	 various	 types	 of	 interaction	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 in	 the	 relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	and	what	represents	every	stage	of	 it.	 This	 classification	 theorized	 by	 Michael	 Hanagan	 will	 be	 used	 later	 to	analyse	the	cases	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	to	discover	the	elements	that	produce	alterations	in	these	types	of	relationship.				 	
Chapter	Three.	
Methodology.		The	general	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	highlight	the	elements	that	can	stimulate	or	 obstruct	 the	 cooperation	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements,	 a	link	 that	 is	 still	 very	 understudied.	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 methodology	followed	 to	 investigate	 this	 interaction,	 explaining	 the	 methods	 chosen	 to	address	 the	 issue,	 how	 the	data	 used	 for	 the	 study	was	 collected	 and	how	 the	analysis	 will	 be	 performed	 in	 the	 following	 chapters.	 In	 addition,	 this	 chapter	also	 presents	 the	 two	 examined	 cases:	 the	 last	 local	 elections	 in	 the	 cities	 of	Milan	and	Barcelona.			Assuming	 that	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 events	 under	 study	 are	 rational	 and	seeking	to	maximize	their	own	benefits	makes	it	possible	to	apply	the	approach	named	analytic	narratives.	The	analytic	narrative	 is	a	methodological	approach	that	 allows	 us	 to	 extract	 the	 common	 key	 elements	 from	 a	 series	 of	 specific	events	 and	 to	 analyse	 them	with	 the	 tools	 of	 game	 theory.	 Thus,	 “the	 analytic	narrative	approach	combines	a	commitment	to	rational	choice,	a	deep	interest	in	a	particular	case,	a	method	for	devising	a	generalizable	model	of	the	case,	and	a	means	of	providing	empirical	evidence,	even	in	unique	cases”	(Levi	&	Weingast,	2016,	 p4).	 It	mixes	 in-depth	 interviews	 to	 obtain	 the	 information	necessary	 to	frame	the	relationships	of	the	cases,	with	extensive-form	games	to	analyse	what	the	key	components	are	 that	define	whether	 the	 relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	moves	from	a	complete	collaboration	to	declared	adversaries.		For	a	better	understanding	of	 the	methodology	applied,	 this	chapter	contains	a	description	of	what	analytic	narrative	 is,	paying	particular	attention	to	 the	 two	parts	 in	which	 all	 research	 that	 opts	 for	 using	 this	method	 is	 divided:	 the	 one	that	define	the	crucial	elements	and	the	one	which	analyzes	them.	This	chapter	includes	also	the	game	theory	instruments	that	will	be	used	for	the	study.	Then,	a	description	of	the	instruments	used	to	collect	the	data	for	the	study	is	included.	
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Afterwards,	 the	 chapter	 moves	 to	 an	 overview	 about	 the	 way	 the	 in-depth	interviews	were	conducted.	In	the	next	section	the	explanation	about	the	reasons	for	choosing	Milan	and	Barcelona	as	case	studies	is	outlined.	Finally,	this	chapter	includes	the	way	the	data	will	be	treated	in	following	chapters.		
3.1	Research	design.	
3.1.1	The	selection	of	methodology.	The	 use	 of	 a	 specific	 methodology	 is	 always	 a	 big	 decision	 for	 any	 research.	According	to	Robert	Yin,	“different	social	science	research	methods	fill	different	needs	 and	 situations	 for	 investigating	 social	 science	 topics”	 (2009,	 p62).	Considering	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 approaches	 not	 as	 opposites,	 but	 as	different	 parts	 of	 a	 whole	 (Creswell,	 2013),	 it	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 the	 main	difference	 between	 these	 methods	 in	 mind:	 each	 of	 them	 is	 more	 suitable	 to	answer	a	certain	kind	of	questions.	The	long	debate	about	the	two	main	families	of	methods	and	the	debate	regarding	which	is	the	optimal	for	scientific	studies	in	social	 science	 are,	 however,	 already	 overcome	 and	 are	 not	 the	 object	 of	 this	dissertation.	 Both	 have	 proven	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 disciplines	that	 have	 used	 them,	 showing	 that	 they	 are	 not	 opposite	 but	 complementary.	This	is	proven	by	the	fact	that	it	is	increasingly	common	to	find	the	use	of	mixed	methods	 in	 several	 projects	 (Tashakkori	 &	 Teddlie,	 2010).	 If	 the	 research	 is	conducted	under	 scientific	parameters	and	done	accurately	and	 systematically,	there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 worry	 about	 the	 scientificity	 of	 the	 investigation.	 Both	approaches	 are	 equally	 academically	 recognized	 (Neuman,	 2006).	 Deciding	 for	one	approach	or	another	should	not	be	arbitrary	or	based	on	the	preferences	of	the	 researcher,	 but	 on	 the	 question	 that	 is	 faced	 and	 the	 knowledge	 and	 data	available	about	an	 issue.	 It	 is	equally	useless	 to	choose	quantitative	 techniques	without	previous	knowledge	about	a	topic,	as	is	to	use	qualitative	techniques	to	carry	out	verifications	based	on	big	number	of	cases	(Neuman,	2006).		Consequently,	 the	 choice	 in	 this	 research	 for	 a	 not	 very	 widespread	methodological	approach,	 such	as	analytic	narrative,	 is	due	 to	 the	object	of	 the	study	and	 the	 information	 that	 the	researcher	 tries	 to	obtain	 from	the	realities	
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analysed.	 The	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 is	undoubtedly	an	understudied	area	-as	seen	in	Chapter	Two.	Sadly,	the	few	works	that	 deal	 with	 this	 topic	 do	 it	 only	 tangentially	 to	 the	 main	 object	 of	 study	 –normally	political	parties	or	social	movements-	or	they	are	largely	exploratory	in	nature.	 Therefore,	 before	 we	 move	 to	 other	 more	 specific	 questions,	 it	 is	necessary	to	apply	a	method	that	allows	obtaining	the	crucial	components	of	this	relationship	directly	from	the	actors	involved	to	obtain	a	clearer	overview	of	the	topic.	This	is	a	task	for	which	qualitative	methods	are	best	prepared,	as	they	try	to	 find	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 facts	 and	 their	 meanings	 for	 the	 individuals	 that	intervene	in	them.	Actually,	the	very	features	of	this	research	require	profound	access	to	involved	actors’	thinking	and	unknown	facts	that	could	not	be	studied	through	 quantitative	 methods.	 Subsequently,	 it	 is	 of	 course	 still	 necessary	 to	analyse	 the	 acquired	 data	 with	 the	 correct	 tools	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 research	question	 of	 the	 present	 dissertation.	 As,	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 research	 is	 not	 to	measure	 or	 quantify	 something,	 but	 to	 improve	 the	 understanding	 of	 certain	interactions;	the	method	of	analytics	narratives	is	shown	to	be	suitable	precisely	for	 this.	 The	 advantage	 of	 this	 choice	 is	 that	 analytic	 narrative	 allows	 the	combination	of	deep	knowledge	of	the	case	with	the	construction	of	a	theoretical	model.	
	
3.1.2	Analytic	narratives.		Analytic	narratives	is	not	a	very	popular	methodology.	Hence,	it	has	to	be	defined	before	 moving	 to	 the	 specific	 used	 of	 it	 in	 this	 project.	 According	 to	 Alberto	Asquer,	professor	at	the	University	of	London	and	user	of	this	method,	analytic	narrative	 “is	 a	 methodological	 approach	 that	 combines	 historically	 oriented	research	with	 rational	 choice	models”	 (2014,	 p.79).	 This	 approach	 is	 based	 on	the	observation	of	a	 series	of	 facts	giving	 them	a	coherent	and	understandable	meaning.	 Those	 facts	 are	 presented	 in	 a	 narrative	 way	 and	 included	 in	 the	definition	 of	 the	 actors,	 the	 elements,	 their	 evolution	 and	 the	 interrelation	between	 them.	 Assuming	 rational	 behaviours	 of	 the	 actors	 involved,	 after	 the	narration	an	analysis	of	their	options	at	the	strategic	level	occurs	with	the	use	of	game	theory.	In	the	words	of	the	group	of	scholars	that	initiated	this	approach:		
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	 We	 call	 our	 approach	 analytic	 narrative	 because	 it	 combines	 analytic	tools	 that	 are	 commonly	 employed	 in	 economics	 and	 political	 science	with	 the	narrative	 form,	which	 is	more	commonly	employed	 in	history.	Our	approach	is	narrative;	it	pays	close	attention	to	stories,	accounts,	and	context.	 It	 is	 analytic	 in	 that	 it	 extracts	 explicit	 and	 formal	 lines	 of	reasoning,	which	facilitate	both	exposition	and	explanation	(Bates,	Greif,	Levi,	Rosenthal,	&	Weingast,	1998,	p.10).		The	 method	 of	 analytic	 narratives	 seeks	 to	 explain	 human	 conduct	 through	 a	series	of	steps.	It	aims	to	clarify	how	and	why	events	happen.	To	do	that,	analytic	narratives	focus	on	the	choices	and	decisions	of	the	actors	involved,	locating	the	elements	 that	 configure	 interactions.	The	overall	 goal	 is	 to	 “identify	 the	actors,	the	 decision	 points	 they	 faced,	 the	 choices	 they	 made,	 the	 paths	 taken	 and	shunned	and	the	manner	in	which	the	choices	generated	events	and	outcomes”	(Bates	et	al.,	1998,	p.13).	Analytic	narratives	attempt	to	explain	social	outcomes	on	the	basis	of	constraints,	incentives,	and	situations	of	equilibrium.	Using	game	theory	 tools,	 the	 method	 intends	 to	 connect	 unique	 (or	 apparently	 unique)	events	with	more	standard	social	science	methods	(Bates,	Greif,	Levi,	Rosenthal,	&	Weingast,	2000b).	It	works	through	identifying	a	puzzle	in	a	specific	place	and	time	 where	 the	 key	 actors	 interact	 strategically,	 identifying	 the	 key	 decision	points,	 and	modelling	 the	 interaction	 among	 them	with	 extensive-form	 games	while	searching	for	a	subgame-perfect	equilibrium.	Taking	the	actors	as	central	element	 of	 the	 approach,	 analytic	 narrative	 tries	 to	 “capture	 the	 influence	 of	history,	the	importance	of	uncertainty,	and	the	capacity	of	people	to	manipulate	and	strategize,	as	well	as	the	 limits	of	 their	ability	to	do	so”	(Bates	et	al.,	1998,	p.13).	In	summary,	this	method	is	based	on	a	profound	knowledge	of	a	particular	reality,	 aiming	 at	 the	 ability	 to	 highlight	 the	 key	 elements	 and	 to	 analytically	understand	all	the	options	of	the	actors.		Creating	an	analytic	narrative	 is	a	 complex	process	divided	 into	 two	separated	parts,	diverse	in	time,	in	goals	and	in	procedures.	The	first	step	entails	“the	use	of	narrative	 to	 elucidate	 the	principal	 players,	 their	preferences,	 the	key	decision	
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points	 and	 possible	 choices,	 and	 the	 rules	 of	 game,	 all	 in	 a	 textured	 and	sequenced	account”	(Levi	&	Weingast,	2016,	p1).	Once	there	is	a	big	familiarity	with	 the	 events	 and	 their	 features,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 start	 the	 second	 step,	“building	a	model	of	the	sequence	of	interaction,	including	predicted	outcomes”	(Levi	&	Weingast,	2016,	p1).	The	necessity	of	these	two	parts	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	 that	 a	 significant	 portion	of	 the	work	 is	 carried	out	 autonomously	 at	 each	stage.	Also,	the	techniques	that	are	applied	in	each	phase	are	different.	While	in	the	 narrative	 the	 tools	 used	 to	 obtain	 information	 are	 typically	 those	 that	 are	qualitative,	 such	 as	 interviews,	 the	 tools	 used	 in	 the	 analytic	 part	 are	 those	provided	by	game	 theory.	The	 two	processes	 are	 completed	 independent	 from	each	other,	while	still	remaining	analytically	linked:	the	second	step	is	subject	to	the	 findings	 of	 the	 first	 one,	 and	 the	 first	 one	 would	 have	 much	 less	 sense	without	 the	 second	 one.	 Thus,	 the	method	 needs	 this	 symbiosis	 between	 both	steps	to	be	useful,	as	one	part	has	no	sense	without	the	other.	The	conjunction	of	both	steps	creates	in	this	way	a	unit	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	parts.			Analytic	narrative	as	methodology	has	various	advantages.	The	first	one	is	that	it	provides	the	researcher	with	a	discipline	to	 face	the	 investigation	(Bates,	Greif,	Levi,	 Rosenthal,	 &	 Weingast,	 2000a).	 There	 is	 a	 theory	 behind	 the	 research,	which	is	guided	by	the	search	of	specific	elements.	This	allows	the	researcher	to	face	 an	 investigation	 with	 certain	 guidance	 and	 without	 being	 distracted	 by	whatever	he	or	she	 finds	first.	Starting	from	theory	the	researcher	can	face	the	narrative	with	a	better	 idea	of	 the	central	points	to	trace.	From	there	 it	 is	 then	possible	 to	 elaborate	 the	 narrative	 based	 on	 the	 theory	 and	 the	 elements	connected	to	it.	 	The	second	advantage	is	that	despite	the	existence	of	a	theory,	the	method	allows	starting	a	research	without	a	previous	deep	knowledge	of	the	topic.	This	is	because	the	narrative	part	allows	corrections	and	tools	to	uncover	elements	that	were	impossible	to	know	in	advance.	In	fact,	“only	after	acquiring	a	significant	understanding	of	the	phenomenon	-that	 is,	only	after	much	if	not	all	the	 research	has	been	concluded-	 can	a	 scholar	have	any	prospect	 for	defining	the	 larger	universe	of	 events”	 (Bates	et	 al.,	 2000b,	p696).	The	possibility	 to	go	backwards	to	a	previous	point	is	connected	to	that	and	emerge	thus	as	the	third	advantage.		Discovering	unexpected	elements	in	the	narrative	does	not	block	the	
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research	 or	 invalidate	 the	 theory	 but	 reinforces	 the	 model,	 because	 this	methodological	 approach	permits	 to	 revise	 the	 theory	and	 the	model	 and	 then	proceed	 further	 with	 the	 analysis.	 “Those	 implications	 force	 the	 scholar	 to	reconsider	the	narrative	and	then	to	reevaluate	the	extent	to	which	key	elements	of	 the	 narrative	 lie	 outside	 the	 proposed	 theory”	 (Bates	 et	 al.,	 2000a,	 p.687).	However,	 if	 the	 theory	 must	 be	 revised	 too	 many	 times	 by	 the	 existence	 of	external	elements,	there	is	a	problem	with	the	theory	that	not	even	the	method	can	 ignore.	 Another	 advantage	 is	 the	 possibility	 to	 analyse	 the	 viability	 of	 the	potential	options	that	have	not	materialized	but	with	another	circumstances	they	could	be	real.	That	is,	the	alternatives	that	were	not	chosen	but	could	have	been	chosen.	This	 is	because	the	method	allows	evaluating	all	the	possible	outcomes	based	on	the	changes	of	single	preferences	in	each	actor	involved	without	doing	new	research	or	new	models.	Finally,	another	advantage	of	analytic	narrative	is	the	 opportunity	 to	 identify	 processes	 or	 mechanisms	 that	 would	 not	 be	 so	obvious	with	other	methodologies.	The	use	of	extensive-form	games	permits	to	show	 institutions,	 links	 and	 preferences	 that	 lead	 to	 a	 specific	 outcome	which	otherwise	would	 be	 hidden.	 “The	 advantage	 of	 the	 game	 is	 that	 it	 reveals	 the	logic	 of	 why,	 in	 equilibrium,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 players	 to	 fulfill	 their	threats	 or	 promises	 against	 those	 who	 leave	 the	 equilibrium	 path”(Levi	 &	Weingast,	2016,	p.5).		
3.1.3	The	narrative	part.	The	 narrative	 is	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 which	 the	 analytic	 narrative	 approach	 is	divided	 into.	 This	 requires	 the	 researcher	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 a	 series	 of	 events	trying	to	discover	what	happened.	With	this	in	mind,	the	main	goal	of	this	part	is	to	form	a	unified	story	from	the	various	pieces	that	compound	the	reality	of	each	case.	Yet	not	any	story	will	suffice,	as	“narrative	is	the	story	being	told	[…]	as	a	detailed	and	textured	account	of	context	and	process,	with	concern	for	sequence,	temporality	 and	 key	 events”	 (Levi	 &	 Weingast,	 2016,	 p7).	 Narrative	 is	 a	combination	of	the	delimitation	of	the	elements	of	the	case	with	a	coherent	and	meaningful	presentation.	
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The	narrative	is	a	central	step	for	any	research	conducted	under	the	rules	of	the	methodology	 of	 analytic	 narratives.	 It	 is	 thanks	 to	 the	 narrative	 and	 the	exploration	connected	to	it	that	it	is	possible	to	know	about	the	components	with	which	to	work.	It	is	in	this	phase	when	the	investigators	delimit	“the	behavior	of	particular	actors,	clarify	sequences,	describe	structures,	and	explore	patterns	of	interaction”	(Bates	et	al.,	1998,	p10).	Moreover,	it	is	with	the	narrative	that	it	is	possible	to	observe	the	whole	picture	of	where	the	actions	take	place.	Through	techniques	 like	 in-depth	 interviews	 “the	 narrative	 of	 analytic	 narratives	establishes	 the	 principal	 players,	 their	 goals,	 and	 their	 preferences	 while	 also	illuminating	the	effective	rules	of	the	game,	constraints,	and	incentives”	(Levi	&	Weingast,	2016,	p7).	With	this,	narrative	places	all	the	elements	of	the	game	on	the	board.		Deciding	what	should	be	included	in	the	narrative	is	fundamental,	because	at	the	end	it	selects	on	what	is	going	to	be	analysed.	Immersed	in	an	environment	with	a	 multitude	 of	 inputs,	 the	 previous	 knowledge	 of	 the	 field	 and	 the	 personal	background	are	the	main	tools	of	the	researcher	to	elucidate	what	is	relevant	for	the	case	and	what	is	not.	It	is	important	to	notice	that	this	condition	is	not	always	as	obvious	as	 it	seems,	as	the	relevance	of	some	elements	can	be	veiled	at	 first	sight.	 A	 priori	 it	 is	 thus	 not	 possible	 to	 know	 the	 exact	 relevance	 of	 some	elements,	 as	 “some	 contextual	 changes	 may	 have	 clear	 and	 significant	consequences,	others	have	butterfly	effects,	and	others	little	or	no	effect”	(Levi	&	Weingast,	 2016,	 p12).	 The	 narrative	 part	 is	 the	 moment	 that	 defines	 what	 is	important	and	for	what	reason.	It	is	the	time	to	separate	the	wheat	from	the	chaff	in	colloquial	words.	But,	although,	the	election	of	the	key	elements	is	crucial	for	a	good	narrative	and	consequently	for	a	good	research,	it	is	not	enough	to	describe	a	series	of	events,	creating	a	report	of	what	happened.	It	is	also	important	to	put	the	elements	together	in	order	to	discover	their	sense	and	connections.	In	other	words,	“taken	together,	a	series	of	disparate,	seemingly	unconnected	happenings	can	 then	be	 constructed	 into	 longer	 event	 sequences.	Narratives	 thus	organize	chronologically	 linked	parts	 into	a	meaningful	analytic	whole”	(Pedriana,	2005,	p351).	 in	 this	 way,	 a	 unity	 with	 a	 meaning	 is	 created	 which	 not	 simply	 goes	
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beyond	the	elements	 that	compose	 it,	but	only	appears	as	a	whole	 through	the	narrative.		According	to	the	scholars	who	systematized	the	approach,	the	narrative	should	almost	 have	 a	 literary	 quality	 and	 should	 be	 able	 to	 convey	 the	 reader	 to	 a	position	where	it	is	possible	to	feel	as	part	of	the	story.	As	if	it	were	a	novel,	none	of	the	elements	are	constraint	to	be	static	and	can	thus	potentially	play	different	roles	 in	 the	 story	 which	 makes	 it	 more	 appealing	 for	 the	 reader	 and	 more	interesting	 for	 the	 researcher.	 These	 potential	 diverse	 conclusions	 are	 what	deserve	investigation,	as	without	different	possible	endings	there	is	no	analytic	interest	 in	 a	 situation.	 However,	 the	 solution	 to	 these	 potentialities	 of	 the	elements	 present	 in	 the	 narrative	 can	 just	 be	 fully	 solved	 in	 the	 analytic	 part.	Thus,	a	good	narrative	includes,	as	a	good	novel,	not	a	fixed	solution,	but	several:			 A	narrative	possesses	a	background	or	setting,	a	beginning,	a	sequence	of	scenes,	and	an	ending.	The	construction	of	an	analytic	narrative	involves	mastering	 the	 elements	 of	 the	drama.	Narratives	 fascinate,	 however,	 in	part	 because,	 like	 dramas,	 they	 can	 be	 elusive;	 many	 possible	explanations	 can	 exist,	 and	many	 possible	 interpretations	 (Bates	 et	 al.,	1998,	p14).		But	 the	narrative	 is	not	 just	an	enjoyable	story;	 it	 is	a	valuable	 instrument	 too.	For	James	Mahoney	it	is	“a	useful	tool	for	assessing	causality	in	situations	where	temporal	sequencing,	particular	events,	and	path	dependence	must	be	taken	into	account”	 (1999,	 p1164).	 And	 Levi	 goes	 beyond	 when	 she	 argues	 that	 the	“narrative	 offers	 a	 means	 to	 arbitrate	 among	 possible	 explanations	 for	observational	equivalences,	that	is,	two	distinct	processes	that	could	be	leading	to	the	same	outcome”	(2002,	p112).	Nonetheless,	the	relevance	of	narratives	for	the	 entire	 process	 is	 in	 the	 analytic	 stage	 where	 the	 capacity	 is	 stronger	 to	observe	the	potentialities	of	all	possible	outcomes.		
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3.1.4	The	analytic	part.	As	previously	mentioned,	the	narrative	part	is	the	phase	of	the	research	in	which	central	 elements	 are	 identified.	 When	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 the	 interactions	between	 the	 actors	 and	 some	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	 interactions.	However,	the	narrative	has	a	limited	analytical	power	and	often	cannot	arbitrate	between	 two	 alternative	 explanations.	 In	 addition,	 it	 is	 the	 theory	 through	 the	model	that	specifies	the	conditions	that	must	obtain	to	ascertain	which	is	correct	(Levi,	 2002).	 Despite	 the	 aim	 to	 create	 a	 pleasant	 reading	 of	 the	 events,	narratives	have	as	main	purpose	to	provide	the	key	elements	not	for	descriptive	reasons	 but	 to	 analyse	 it.	 Therefore,	 narratives	 in	 this	 methodology	 are	more	than	 simple	 stories;	 they	 are	 analytic	 narratives,	 that	 is,	 stories	with	 scientific	purpose.	Because	“by	modelling	 the	processes	 that	produced	 the	outcomes,	we	seek	 to	 capture	 the	 essence	of	 stories”	 (Bates	 et	 al.,	 1998,	 p12).	Hence	 a	 stage	when	 the	 analysis	 goes	 beyond	 narrative’s	 analytical	 capacities	 is	 necessary,	 a	stage	when	all	the	analysis	of	the	elements	highlighted	in	the	previous	step	are	combined.	Once	the	elements	of	the	case	have	been	underlined,	the	formulation	of	 “a	 rationalistic	 theory	 or	 theoretical	 model	 that	 fits	 this	 story”	 is	 possible	(Dessler,	2000,	p176).		The	 concept	 of	 analytic	 refers	 to	 the	 decomposition	 of	 complex	 processes	 into	simpler	elements,	with	the	goal	to	understand	the	causal	mechanisms	by	which	these	 are	 related.	 Additionally,	 it	 composes	 processes	 and	 phenomena	 of	enormous	 complexity	 through	 a	 process	 of	 analysis	 (Aguiar,	 De	 Francisco,	 &	Noguera,	2009).	To	analyse	means	to	make	what	appears	initially	complicated	in	front	of	ours	eyes,	easier.	In	others	words,	it	means	grasping	the	reality.	But	this	process	must	 be	 done	with	 tools	 that	 assure	 the	 systematization,	 replicability,	clarity	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 make	 a	 complex	 process	 easier.	 The	 tools	 and	 the	nature	of	the	analytical	part	are	well	explained	by	Levi,		 Analytics,	in	this	approach,	refers	to	the	building	of	models	derived	from	rational	 choice,	 particularly	 the	 theory	 of	 extensive	 form	 games.	 This	means,	 first,	 extracting	 from	 the	 narratives	 the	 key	 actors,	 their	 goals,	and	 their	 preferences	 and	 the	 effective	 rules	 that	 influence	 actors’	
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behaviors.	 Second,	 it	 means	 elaborating	 the	 strategic	 interactions	 that	produce	 an	 equilibrium	 that	 constrains	 some	 actions	 and	 facilitates	others.	The	emphasis	 is	on	 identifying	the	reasons	 for	 the	shift	 from	an	institutional	equilibrium	at	one	point	 in	 time	 to	a	different	 institutional	equilibrium	at	a	different	point	in	time	(Levi,	2002,p111).	
3.1.5	Strategic	actors.	Consequently	 with	 Levi’s	 definition,	 it	 is	 relevant	 for	 the	 method	 to	 take	 in	consideration	 the	 initial	 assumption	 of	 the	 method,	 that	 is,	 actors	 act	strategically.	Namely,	they	have	a	rational	behaviour.	Rational	actors	follow	one	premise:	 they	 “try	 to	 achieve	 optimal	 results	 within	 an	 incentive	 structure	 of	costs,	benefits,	and	available	alternatives	for	action”	(Pedriana,	2005,	354).	The	internal	pathway	of	building	a	preference	for	a	specific	choice	may	vary	among	different	 individuals,	 but	 the	 authors	 of	 the	 Theory	 of	 Choice	 are	 able	 to	synthesize	the	logical	debate	about	rational	actors	in	this	way,		 Each	option	has	cost	and	consequences.	When	consequences	are	certain	and	 cost	 are	 equals,	 a	 rational	 agent	 chooses	 by	 the	 measure	 of	 what	outcome	she	or	he	most	prefers.	Where	they	are	not,	 the	agent	chooses	among	 options	 by	 calculating	 the	 probable	 net	 benefits	 of	 each.	Rationality	 is	 thus	 a	 matter	 of	 means,	 not	 of	 ends.	 It	 is	 a	 relation	 of	consistency	 between	 preferences,	 information	 and	 action	 (Hargreaves	Heap,	Hollis,	Lyons,	Sugden,	&	Weale,	1992,	pvii).		Rational	actors	act	strategically,	that	is,	their	calculus	are	not	just	limited	to	their	behaviour,	but	to	the	rest	of	elements	and	actors	that	can	affect	the	outcome	of	their	actions.	When	a	rational	actor	decides	on	one	option,	he	or	she	takes	into	account	the	reactions	that	his	or	her	actions	have	on	the	other	actors	too.	Based	on	these	reactions,	he	or	she	will	modulate	his	or	her	final	choices.	Despite	the	possibility	to	individualize	behaviours,	in	a	real	environment,	the	actor’s	choices	are	 not	 isolated,	 but	 interconnected.	 There	 is	 no	 external	 imposition	 on	 the	actors	that	can	act	freely,	but	they	are	conscious	of	the	relevance	of	their	actions	on	other	 individuals.	They	are	aware	that	 	 “the	choices	of	one	actor	depend	on	
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the	choices	of	 the	other”	(Levi	&	Weingast,	2016,	p5).	This	means	 that	rational	actors	 do	 not	 limit	 the	 analysis	 to	 themselves	 as	 they	 take	 into	 account	 the	possible	 reactions	 of	 others	 when	 planning	 their	 course	 of	 action.	 Behaving	strategically	 also	 implies	 that	 the	 players	 try	 to	 find	 out	 what	 the	 others	 are	going	 do.	 Therefore,	 “rollback	 is	 crucial	 for	 strategic	 behaviour-	 thinking	strategically	means	looking	into	the	future	to	predict	how	others	will	behave	and	then	 using	 that	 information	 to	 make	 decisions”	 (Mathematics,	 2015).	 This	calculation	is	due	to	an	internal	process	to	optimize	the	players’	payoff	in	every	possible	outcome.	Knowing	that	the	actors	involved	have	this	kind	of	behaviour	allows	 the	 researcher	 to	 study	 the	 theoretically	 possible	 options	 and	 to	understand	which	option	is	chosen	in	each	situation	and	why.	William	Riker	saw	in	this	kind	of	behaviour	already	a	way	to	apply	powerful	analytic	tools	like	game	theory	 to	 social	 science	 research,	 to	 understand	 political	 behaviour	 and	 to	generate	 comportment	 laws	 (Riker,	 1962).	 The	 fact	 that	more	 than	 fifty	 years	later	social	analysts	still	are	using	it,	confirms	its	utility	in	several	circumstances.			
3.1.6	The	tools	used	in	the	analytic	part:	game	theory.	Once	we	have	made	 the	assumption	about	 the	 rational	behaviour	of	 the	actors	involved,	 it	 is	 time	to	take	a	 look	at	 the	tools	used	 for	 the	analysis.	These	tools	are	 taken	 from	 game	 theory,	 a	 technique	 that	 “has	 become	 an	 accepted	multidisciplinary	model	for	social	exchange	in	decision	making”	(Salkind,	2010,	p523)	 in	 several	 disciplines,	 among	 those	 political	 science.	 Game	 theory	 has	become	popular	among	 scholars	because	 it	provides	a	 framework	 for	 studying	behaviours	 under	 the	 assumption	 of	 rational	 actors.	 It	 could	 be	 defined	 as	 “a	model	of	decision	making	and	strategy	under	differing	conditions	of	uncertainty”	(Salkind,	2010,	p523).	The	interactions	among	involved	actors	receives	the	name	“games”	and	the	actors	are	called	“players”;	hence	the	name	of	game	theory	for	the	discipline.	The	use	of	game	theory	is	helpful	because	it	allows	the	researcher	to	 understand	 the	 reason	 of	 past	 events,	 but	 unlike	 other	 techniques,	 it	 also	permits	 to	predict	what	 strategy	each	player	will	 choose,	and	 to	predict	 future	outcomes	of	the	games	(Mathematics,	2015).	Assuming	that	each	player	acts	to	maximize	his	own	expected	pay-off	 (Watson,	2013)	 it	 is	possible	 to	 trace	 their	
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plan	 of	 action	 thanks	 to	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 games.	 In	 game	 theory	“strategy	 refers	 to	 a	 complete	 plan	 of	 action	 including	 all	 prospective	 play	options	as	well	as	the	player’s	associated	outcome	preferences”	(Salkind,	2010,	p523).	If	a	player	wants	to	achieve	his	or	her	goals,	he	or	she	has	to	do	it	based	on	 the	 movements	 produced	 or	 potentially	 produced	 by	 the	 other	 actors.	However,	a	dominant	strategy	is	one	that	works	best,	no	matter	what	the	other	player	does.	The	purpose	of	using	games	is	to	make	the	search	of	solutions	in	a	complicated	field	such	as	human	behaviour	simpler	and	easier	to	follow.	Players	are	 decision-makers	 and	 “the	 decision-maker	 is	 seen	 as	 choosing	 between	 a	range	 of	 options,	 which	 have	 consequences	 that	 are	 uncertain	 because	 they	depend	 on	 unknown	 states	 of	 the	 world”	 (Read,	 2009,	 p127).	 Game	 theory	makes	it	easier	to	explore	this	uncertainty	through	the	different	procedures	that	players	use	to	obtain	their	preferred	outcomes.		The	analysis	in	game	theory	is	based	on	an	important	concept:	the	equilibrium.	Equilibrium	refers	to	a	stable	situation	where	the	players	do	not	take	any	further	actions	 to	 modify	 the	 status	 quo.	 The	 Noble-prize	 winner	 John	 Forbes	 Nash	theorized	about	the	existence	of	a	“static	state,	such	that	all	players	are	solving	for	 optimization	 and	 none	 of	 the	 players	 benefit	 from	 a	 unilateral	 strategy	change”	(Salkind,	2010,	p524).	In	other	words,	“a	strategy	combination	is	a	Nash	equilibrium	 if	 no	player	 can	benefit	 from	altering	his	 or	her	 choices,	 given	 the	choices	of	 the	other	players”	 (Bates	et	al.,	1998,	p9).	This	concept	 is	extremely	useful,	as	it	means	that	if	there	is	no	alteration	of	the	external	factors	no	change	will	be	produced	in	the	players’	choices,	as	no	actor	would	unilaterally	chose	to	modify	his	or	her	behaviour.	This	permits	a	conscious	analysis	of	 the	elements	and	the	expected	behaviour	of	the	players.	Nevertheless,	to	keep	this	state	stable	the	 threats	 and	 promises	 need	 to	 be	 credible,	 otherwise	 players	might	 see	 an	opportunity	 to	 improve	 their	 situation	 if	 they	 know	 there	 would	 be	 no	consequences.	The	reason	is	that	“the	players	remain	on	the	equilibrium	path	of	play	because	 it	would	be	 in	the	best	 interests	of	others	to	 fulfil	 their	threats	or	promises	 should	 they	 stray	 off	 it”	 (Bates	 et	 al.,	 1998,	 p10).	 The	 possibility	 of	ending	up	in	a	worse	situation	than	before	is	what	causes	that	no	movement	will	be	produced.	The	player	knows	that	an	alteration	of	the	status	quo	produced	by	
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him	 or	 her,	 will	 also	 imply	 a	 new	movement	 by	 the	 other	 players.	 The	 same	premise	is	applied	to	all	the	players	and	as	a	consequence,	the	situation	remains	unaltered.		Game	theory	has	various	approaches	to	study	a	situation,	but	the	one	that	fits	the	most	with	the	methodology	used	in	this	dissertation	is	the	game-representation	trough	extensive-form	games.	For	the	scholars	working	with	analytic	narratives,	this	game-form	is	the	most	suitable,			Because	 we	 seek	 to	 explore	 concrete,	 historical	 cases,	 we	 wish	 to	examine	the	choices	of	individuals	who	are	embedded	in	specific	settings.	We	wish	to	trace	the	sequences	of	actions,	decisions,	and	responses	that	generate	 events	 and	 outcomes.	 The	 individuals	 we	 study	 possess	preferences	and	expectations;	they	are	not	isolated,	but	rather	are	locked	in	 patterns	 of	 strategic	 interdependence.	 The	 extensive	 form	 explicitly	highlights	these	features	(Bates	et	al.,	1998,	p9).		Extensive	form	games	are	those	that	represent	the	strategic	interaction	between	the	 actors	 in	 a	 graphical	 manner,	 making	 it,	 in	 this	 way,	 easier	 to	 follow	 the	possible	options	that	each	actor	has	in	every	moment.	This	method	of	displaying	the	games	visually	resembles	a	tree,	which	is	the	reason	why	the	various	actions	that	 players	 can	 choose	 from	 are	 called	 branches.	 The	 branches	 connect	 to	another	 element	 of	 the	 graph,	 the	 nodes,	 that	 are	 focal	 points	 “that	 represent	places	where	something	happens	in	the	game	(such	as	a	decision	by	one	of	the	players)”	(Watson,	2013	p10).	Each	node	is	connected	to	the	other	nodes	by	the	branches	in	form	of	arrows.	The	game	starts	with	an	initial	node	that	represents	the	 first	moment	 in	which	 a	 player	 has	 to	 decide	 between	 the	 various	 options	represented	as	arrows.	In	this	configuration	of	the	game	the	traceability	is	one	of	its	 strong	points,	as	 it	allows	 the	reader	 to	 jump	easily	 from	one	 focal	point	 to	another.	 “By	 tracing	 backward	 through	 the	 tree	 from	 a	 given	 node,	 you	 can	define	a	node’s	predecessors	and	immediate	predecessor”	(Watson,	2013,	p175).	This	way	 to	 present	 the	 various	 dilemmas	 that	 the	 actors	 face,	 allow	 us	 to	 go	back	and	forward	in	the	chain	of	actor’s	decisions,	making	it	possible	to	analyse	
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the	 reasoning	 of	 the	 actors.	 When	 such	 a	 directed	 graph	 “has	 been	 properly	constructed	and	 labelled”	 (Watson,	2013,	p175)	 it	 is	possible	 to	define	 it	as	an	extensive-form	game.		
3.1.7	The	use	of	aggregates	in	game	theory.	One	issue	to	 face	 in	studies	produced	under	the	postulates	of	rational	choice	 is	the	problem	of	treating	groups	of	persons	as	 individuals.	Game	theory’s	modus	operandi	 is	based	on	how	 individuals’	preferences	are	pursued,	 even	 though	 it	appears	that	groups	have	a	different	internal	way	to	establish	their	priorities	and	the	course	of	action	 to	achieve	 them.	Therefore,	 the	critics	of	 this	 tool,	 like	 Jon	Elster,	argue	that	the	behaviour	of	on	single	person	cannot	be	treated	equally	to	the	behaviour	of	the	collectives,	and	consequently,	game	theory	cannot	be	used	for	groups	of	people	(2000).	For	him,	 the	absence	of	an	external	homogeneous	behaviour	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 internal	 coherence	 would	 make	 it	 impossible	 to	follow	rational	 choice	 rules	and	 it	would	have	no	value	 to	use	game	 theory.	 In	fact,	 he	 asks	 if	 “aggregates	 can	 coherently	 be	 said	 to	 have	 preferences,	 at	 all”	(Elster,	2000,	p693).			Although	it	is	true	that	not	all	aggregates	can	be	studied	under	the	procedures	of	the	rational	choice	theory,	like	the	ones	who	correspond	to	abstract	concepts	as	the	“North”	or	the	“South”	22,	not	all	the	aggregates	have	this	level	of	abstraction.	It	 is	 also	possible	 to	 find	groups	 that	present	 a	homogenous	 internal	decision-making	 process	 and	 strategic	 calculations	 in	 their	 external	 behaviour	independently	of	the	actions	of	the	individuals	that	form	them.	Hence,	“whether	aggregation	is	 justified	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	the	problem	of	decision	making	 within	 the	 aggregated	 unit	 can	 be	 examined	 separately	 from	 the	interactions	among	such	units”	(Bates,	Greif,	Levi,	Rosenthal,	&	Weingast,	2000,	p698).	Thus,	the	specification	under	which	groups	can	be	studied	which	rational	choice	 and	 which	 ones	 cannot,	 should	 be	 placed	 on	 whether	 these	 actors	 are	“capable	 of	 formulating	 and	 pursuing	 coherent	 and	 sophisticated	 strategies”	(Bates,	 Greif,	 Levi,	 Rosenthal,	 &	Weingast,	 2000,	 p698)	 or	 not.	 Conditions	 that																																																									22	Or	others	like	the	“markets”	and	“the	elites”	(Elster,	2000).	
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both,	political	parties	and	social	movements	fulfil,	and	which	make	them	apt	to	be	studied	from	the	point	of	view	of	game	theory.			
3.2	Case	studies.	
3.2.1	The	use	of	case	studies.	This	dissertation	does	not	seek	to	normatively	evaluate	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	neither	 to	discuss	 the	potential	ways	of	interaction	 between	 them.	 This	 dissertation	 aims	 to	 analyse	 the	 specific	elements	that	shape	the	rapport	between	them	to	understand	how	these	actors	behave	in	their	connections.	To	achieve	this	goal,	it	is	necessary	to	stay	in	contact	with	 the	 reality	 to	 discover	 the	 crucial	 elements	 of	 the	 relationships.	 It	 is	essential	to	observe	specific	actors	in	specific	times	and	places,	that	is,	to	conduct	case	 studies.	 For	 Robert	 Yin,	 expert	 scholar	 in	 case	 studies,	 “as	 a	 research	method,	 the	 case	 study	 is	 used	 in	 many	 situations,	 to	 contribute	 to	 our	knowledge	 of	 individual,	 group,	 organizational,	 social,	 political,	 and	 related	phenomena”	 (2009,	 p.64).	 Thus,	 the	 analytic	 narrative	 method	 does	 not	 just	permit	the	study	of	actual	cases,	but	it	is	based	on	the	careful	observation	of	the	reality	 previous	 to	 the	 analysis.	 The	 aim	 of	 analytic	 narratives	 is	 to	 develop	systematic	 explanations	 through	 case	 studies	 (Bates	 et	 al.,	 2000b).	 Specific	events	 are	 the	 key	 of	 any	 research	 guided	 under	 that	 methodology.	 The	impossibility	 to	 work	 with	 big	 amounts	 of	 quantitative	 data	 should	 not	 be	 a	reason	 to	 disregard	 crucial	 events	 in	 politics.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 the	 authors	 of	
Analytic	Narratives,	“unique	events	are	too	important	to	leave	aside,	and	we	use	rational	 choice,	 particularly	 game	 theory,	 as	 a	 means	 to	 study	 unique	 events”	(Bates,	Greif,	Levi,	Rosenthal,	&	Weingast,	2000a,	p686).		The	use	of	case	studies	allows	a	profound	exploration	of	concrete	events.	A	deep	interest	in	a	particular	case	pushes	the	researcher	to	collect	detailed	information	about	it.	This	information	might	be	not	as	explicit	as	in	other	scientific	research,	but	 thanks	 to	 meticulous	 work	 of	 the	 researcher,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 achieve	 a	profound	knowledge	about	a	series	of	events	that	occurred	in	a	specific	period	of	time.	Unlike	other	situations,	analysts	are	not	required	to	use	a	unique	source	of	
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data,	but	 they	are	able	 to	work	with	a	variety	of	data	 collections.	Case	 studies,	therefore,	 draw	 from	 different	 sources	 of	 evidence	 such	 as	 documents	 and	interviews	 to	 develop	 the	 analysis	 (Yin,	 2009).	 The	 variety	 of	 data	 sources	permits	to	study	a	large	number	of	events,	however	not	all	cases	can	be	analysed	by	all	methodologies.	In	fact,	a	particular	feature	linked	to	the	rational	behaviour	of	actors	restricts	the	case	selection	under	the	rules	of	analytic	narratives.	Thus,	the	 facts	considered	adequate	to	be	analysed	are	only	those	 in	which	there	are	strategic	interactions	between	key	actors	(Levi,	2002).		The	 phenomenon	 studied	 in	 this	 research	 is	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	To	deep-dive	into	it,	 two	cases	were	analysed.	These	two	cases	are	linked	to	the	municipal	elections	of	the	cities	of	Milan	and	Barcelona.	Specifically,	they	regard	the	strategic	actions	carried	out	by	parties	and	movements	around	the	elections	of	2016	in	Milan,	and	around	the	elections	of	2015	in	Barcelona.	The	goal	of	choosing	these	two	cases	was	to	study	the	events	in-depth,	establishing	the	actors	involved,	the	decisions	they	took,	the	alliances	 they	 created	 and	 the	 elements	 that	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 their	preferences.	 All	 this	 because	 it	 is	 only	 after	 acquiring	 a	 meaningful	comprehension	of	 the	phenomenon	that	 it	 is	possible	 to	properly	analyse	what	had	 happened,	 and	 to	 understand	 the	 reasons	 that	 produced	 it.	 To	 create	 the	whole	picture	of	both	cases,	a	detailed	data	collection	with	a	variety	of	primary	and	secondary	sources	was	used,	including:	in-depth	interviews	with	key	actors,	the	 campaigns’	 documents,	 private	 and	public	documents	 –like	manifestos	 and	ethical	 codes-,	 documentary	 movies,	 books,	 newspaper	 coverage,	 campaign’	leaflets,	collaboration	agreements	and	surveys.			
3.2.2	The	choice	of	case	studies.	The	 choice	 of	 Milan	 and	 Barcelona	 as	 case	 studies	 to	 analyse	 the	 interactions	between	 social	movements	 and	 political	 parties	was	 not	made	 arbitrarily.	 The	election	was	based	on	several	factors	encouraging	the	use	of	these	two	particular	cities.	 The	 first	 of	 those	 factors	was	 the	 existence	 of	 interactions	 between	 the	relevant	actors	 in	both	cities.	The	object	of	 study	of	 the	present	dissertation	 is	
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thereby	given.	On	the	one	hand,	 in	Milan	 the	Movimento	Arancione	was	a	very	relevant	 actor	 in	 the	 primary	 elections	 of	 the	 Partito	 Democratico,	 as	 this	movement	 was	 behind	 the	 candidature	 of	 the	 elected	 mayor	 in	 2011.	 On	 the	other	 hand,	 in	 Barcelona	 several	 social	 movements,	 but	 in	 particular	 the	members	of	Plataforma	de	Afectados	por	la	Hipoteca,	were	the	ones	who	led	the	political	 project	 created	 with	 Podemos	 and	 Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	 Verds-Esquerra	Unida	i	Alternativa	that	won	the	local	elections	of	2015.		The	second	factor	concerns	the	prior	knowledge	of	the	two	environments	by	the	researcher.	 Seldom	are	 the	 occasions	when	 scholars	 chose	 to	 study	 a	 problem	absolutely	from	scratch	without	a	previous	familiarity	about	the	facts,	the	topic	or	the	techniques	used.	All	scholars	tend	to	choose	their	research	based	on	their	field	 of	 expertise	 or	 an	 initial	 knowledge	 of	 the	 elements	 that	 are	 going	 to	 be	studied.	 This	 is	 also	 the	 case	 here,	 since	 the	 researcher	 had	 a	 previous	knowledge	of	 the	political	 realities	of	 Italy	and	Spain,	and	with	 it,	of	 the	actors	who	 would	 play	 a	 relevant	 role	 in	 the	 subject	 under	 study.	 Additionally,	 the	knowledge	of	the	Spanish,	Italian	and	Catalan	languages	increased	the	access	to	information	 and	 enabled	 a	 close	 interaction	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	interviewed.	This	knowledge	proved	to	be	very	useful	to	conduct	the	interviews	since	several	of	 the	 interviewed	do	not	speak	English	or	 their	 levels	would	not	allow	them	to	express	themselves	comfortably	talking	about	complex	situations.	This	may	seem	secondary,	but	the	details	obtained	by	sharing	the	same	language	and	the	same	cultural	space	have	been	priceless.		 	The	 possibility	 of	 access	 to	 the	 key	 actors	 in	 each	 case	was	 the	 third	 factor	 in	choosing	Milan	and	Barcelona.	Political	parties	tend	to	be	obscure	about	political	negotiations	and	reluctant	to	open	up	about	their	 inside	knowledge	to	external	individuals.	 Further,	 accessibility	 to	 certain	 public	 figures,	 in	 particular	politicians,	 is	never	easy,	as	 they	are	busy	people	and	several	are	scared	of	 the	consequences	of	their	declarations.	Besides,	there	is	no	political	gain	in	spending	time	with	an	academic,	as	it	only	takes	time	away	from	other	activities.	Thus,	the	personal	connections	of	the	supervisor	and	the	researcher	himself	were	crucial	to	being	able	to	obtain	them	for	interviews.	Those	connections	made	it	possible	
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to	 either	 directly	 reach	 out	 to	 the	 actors	 or	 to	 do	 so	 through	 intermediaries.	Without	such	contacts	it	would	not	have	been	possible	to	carry	out	this	research	with	the	same	approach,	especially	with	so	little	time	available.			Finally,	Milan	and	Barcelona,	despite	their	inherent	differences,	are	comparable	realities.	 Both	 belong	 to	 Southern	 European	 countries	 with	 a	 Mediterranean	culture	 of	 understanding	 public	 social	 live	 (Meñaca	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Similar	 in	population,	 both	 cities	 have	 a	 rich	 political	 history	 and	 despite	 not	 being	 the	capital	 of	 their	 countries	 they	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 national	 politics.	 In	economics,	 both	 are	 important	 business	 centres	 at	 European	 and	 Global	 level.	Milan	and	Barcelona	host	several	universities	and	have	a	rich	social	fabric	with	several	social	movements	oriented	at	diverse	topics.	Politically	speaking,	in	both	cities	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 currently	 find	 winning	 coalitions	 between	 social	movements	 and	 political	 parties.	 In	 addition,	 the	 two	 cities	 have	 new	mayors	who	arrived	after	the	elections.	In	the	case	of	Milan	coming	from	the	same	party	that	previously	hold	the	mayoralty,	while	in	the	case	of	Barcelona,	from	the	new	coalition	that	overcame	the	incumbent	mayor.	At	the	same	time,	the	elections	in	Milan	and	Barcelona	are	held	under	different	electoral	rules.	This	element	alters	the	way	 actors	 interact	with	 each	 other.	 Nevertheless,	 all	 of	 the	 above	 factors	show	why	these	two	cases	were	chosen	and	outline	their	comparability.			
3.3	Data	collection.	
3.3.1	In-depth	interviews	as	a	research	tool.	In	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 necessary	 information	 on	 the	 two	 cases	 under	 study,	several	 in-depth	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	 persons	 involved	 in	 political	parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 The	 choice	 of	 using	 in-depth	 interviews	 is	motivated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 allows	 a	 proper	 exploration	 of	 the	 respondent’s	point	of	views,	experiences,	feelings,	and	perspectives.	The	nature	of	the	method	is	well-defined:	 “in-depth	 interviewing	 is	 a	 qualitative	 research	 technique	 that	involves	 conducting	 intensive	 individual	 interviews	 with	 a	 small	 number	 of	respondents	 to	 explore	 their	 perspectives	 on	 a	 particular	 idea,	 program,	 or	situation”	 (Boyce	&	Neale,	 2006,	p3).	Hence,	 an	 in-depth	 interview	 is	 an	open-
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ended,	 discovery-oriented	 method,	 which	 aims	 to	 obtain	 detailed	 information	about	a	topic	from	a	stakeholder.		The	interview	is	as	a	communicative	process	between	the	researcher	and	other	individuals	 from	 who	 he	 extracts	 valuable	 information	 about	 the	 object	 of	investigation.	 Interviews	 are	 thus,	 a	 process	 with	 a	 goal:	 the	 transmission	 of	knowledge	based	on	the	personal	experience	of	a	stakeholder.	That	knowledge	can	be	derived	from	various	origins,	like	years	of	study,	or	personal	experiences,	and	 its	 transmission	 allows	 the	 researcher	 to	 create	 or	 confirm	 a	 picture	 of	specific	 situations	 that	would	 otherwise	 not	 be	 possible.	 These	 interviews	 are	crucial	 for	 exploring	 new	 topics	 in	 depth	 since	 it	 permits	 identifying	 the	 key	stakeholders	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 studied	 events	 and	 other	 information	that	is	essential	to	understand	those	events.	The	interview	is	configured,	hence,	as	an	interaction	capable	to	create	new	material	for	the	analysis.	It	is	through	the	answers	 of	 the	 interviewed	 that	 new	 questions	 are	 generated,	 and	 so	 it	 is	possible	 to	 “explore	 fully	 all	 the	 factors	 that	 underpin	 participants'	 answers:	reasons,	 feelings,	 opinions	 and	 beliefs”	 (Legard	 et	 al.,	 2003,	 p141).	 Also,	 the	interaction	between	interviewer	and	interviewed	enables	both	parties	to	reflect	about	 issues	 and	 discover	 concepts	 that	 would	 not	 be	 present	 without	 their	mutual	collaboration.	But	using	in-depth	interviews	does	not	mean	leaving	all	to	the	 future.	 In-depth	 interviews	 have	 an	 objective	 and	 “carrying	 out	 good	 in-depth	fieldwork	requires	a	high	degree	of	planning,	both	about	the	overall	shape	or	structure	of	the	interview”	(Arthur	&	Nazroo,	2003,	p109).		In-depth	 interviews	 have	 several	 advantages,	 but	what	makes	 them	 especially	interesting	 is	 the	 amount	 of	 information	 that	 can	 be	 collected	 through	 them.	Moreover,	this	data	is	much	more	detailed	“than	what	is	available	through	other	data	collection	methods”	(Boyce	&	Neale,	2006,	p3).	In	fact,	one	of	the	limitations	of	the	technique	is	that	it	is	sometimes	difficult	swimming	in	such	big	quantities	of	 material	 deciding	 what	 is	 relevant	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 However,	 in-depth	interviews	 are	 very	 convenient,	 especially	 when	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 shape	 the	whole	 picture	 and	 the	 details	 of	 a	 case	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 This	 technique	 can	provide	 detailed	 information	 about	 a	 person’s	 thoughts	 and	 behaviours	
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otherwise	difficult	to	obtain.	Therefore,	interviews	were	also	very	suitable	in	the	present	 research	 as	 “interviews	 can	 provide	 insights	 that	 are	 not	 available	 to	researchers	working	with	 large	 survey	 samples	 and	are	known	 to	be	 the	most	suitable	approach	when	seeking	 rich	data	 illuminating	 individuals’	 experiences	and	attitudes”	(Gorra,	2007,	p101).		One	 of	 the	 features	 of	 in-depth	 interviews	 is	 that	 they	 combine	 structure	 and	flexibility,	 which	 allows	 the	 researcher	 to	 adapt	 to	 new	 information	 that	 is	appearing	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 the	 interview	 (Legard	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 This	 kind	 of	interview	 allows	 clarifications	 to	 the	 answers	 of	 the	 interviewed	 and	 to	 ask	spontaneous	 questions	 based	 on	 the	 new	 information	 appearing	 form	 those	answers.	 With	 this	 format,	 the	 respondents	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 open	 and	 to	provide	 more	 complete	 explanations	 (The	 Wallace	 Foundation,	 2007).	Interviewed	 are	 more	 accessible	 to	 explain	 sensitive	 issues	 when	 a	 trustful	environment	is	created	and	when	they	are	able	to	use	all	the	time	and	the	details	they	 consider	 necessary	 to	 describe	 complex	 situations.	 Explaining	 a	 story	 is	complicated	 enough	 when	 we	 try	 to	 frame	 it	 in	 previous	 assumptions	 as	researchers	 often	 try	 to	 do.	 For	 that	 reason,	 allowing	 the	 interviewed	 to	 use	nuances	 to	 make	 their	 points	 freely	 and	 clear	 can	 reveal	 valuable	 insights.	Finally,	 in-depth	 interviews	 are	 worthwhile,	 as	 they	 bring	 to	 light	 those	circumstances	that	were	previously	unknown.		
3.3.2	Conducting	the	interviews.	The	 interviews	 were	 held	 face-to-face	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	interviewed	with	a	semi-structured	format.	This	implies	that	the	interviews	were	based	 on	 previously	 prepared	 questions	 and	 on	 the	 introduction	 of	 other	questions	 grounded	 on	 the	 data	 collected	 through	 the	 answers	 of	 the	interviewed	(Leavitt,	2001).	As	the	previous	knowledge	of	some	issues	were	by	definition	 restricted	 to	 just	 the	 individuals	 involved	 on	 the	 acts	 –like	 private	meetings-,	it	was	required	to	provide	a	big	degree	of	freedom	to	the	interviewed	to	 respond	 the	way	 they	 considered	most	 appropriate.	 Consequently,	with	 the	goal	 of	 uncovering	 hidden	 information,	 the	 researcher	 tried	 to	 create	 a	 trust	
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environment	with	 the	 interviewed.	The	 interviews	were	held	 in	 relaxed	places	chosen	 by	 the	 interviewed,	without	 limitation	 of	 time	 and	without	 cutting	 any	answer	 even	 if	 topics	 were	 not	 directly	 relevant	 for	 the	 research.	 All	 the	interviews	 were	 recorded	 for	 academic	 reasons	 with	 the	 agreement	 of	 all	participants.	The	purpose	of	recording	the	interviews	was	re-listening	possible,	with	 the	objective	 to	highlight	 the	crucial	elements	and	 to	not	 lose	 importance	pieces	of	information.	Recording	the	interviews	allowed	the	researcher	to	devote	his	 full	 attention	 to	 listening	 to	 the	 interviewed	 and	 probing	 in-depth.	Furthermore,	 recording	 the	 interviews	 enables	 also	 others	 scholars	 to	corroborate	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 the	 interviews	 conducted	 by	 the	 researcher.	 In	addition	 to	 the	 registrations,	 the	 researcher	 also	 took	 notes	 during	 the	interviews	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 track	 of	 the	 conversations	 and	 to	 reask	 when	necessary.	 The	 use	 of	 notes	 was	 however	 limited,	 as	 “note-taking	 can	 give	participants	 unintended	 cues	 -	 that	 they	 should	 slow	 down	 or	 pause	 if	 the	researcher	is	writing;	that	they	have	said	enough	if	the	researcher	is	not”	(Legard	et	al.,	2003,	p167).	Various	quotes	from	the	interviews	are	presented	in	Chapters	Four	and	Five	to	contribute	and	support	the	points	in	discussion.	The	interviews	were	 held	 in	 Italian,	 Catalan	 and	 Spanish	 and	 for	 this	 reason,	 they	 are	 not	 –except	 in	 some	 cases-	 literally	 presented.	 However,	 the	 quotes	 used	 fully	preserve	the	intention	of	the	interviewed	in	all	the	cases,	and	can	be	consulted	in	the	Annex	in	form	of	audio	files.			The	Annex	I	and	the	Annex	II	contain	all	the	names	and	a	brief	description	of	the	persons	 interviewed.	 The	 individuals	 were	 chosen	 based	 on	 their	 capacity	 to	contribute,	 due	 to	 their	 knowledge	 and	personal	 experience,	 and	 to	 determine	the	elements	of	the	cases	of	Milan	and	Barcelona.	Some	of	them	were	personally	involved	 in	 the	 events	 under	 study	 and	 others	 had	 a	 deep	 knowledge	 of	 the	matters	 for	 professional	 or	 academic	 reasons.	 In	 both	 cases	 -	 Milan	 and	Barcelona-	the	interviewed	persons	include	politicians,	academics	and	activist.	A	total	of	sixteen	 in-depth	 interviews	were	conducted,	eight	 for	 the	case	of	Milan	and	eight	 for	Barcelona.	As	per	usual	 in	all	 investigations	using	 this	 technique,	the	 interviews	were	very	 laborious	to	organize	and	to	conduct.	Likewise	 it	was	as	 well	 arduous	 to	 extract	 the	 required	 information	 from	 the	 words	 of	 the	
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interviewed.	The	professional	or	political	positions	of	several	of	the	interviewed	made	it	quite	difficult	to	find	the	right	moment	to	proceed	with	the	interview	as	their	agenda	was	considerably	occupied.	For	almost	all	of	them	several	contacts	were	necessary	to	organize	a	personal	meeting,	as	for	them,	this	work	was	not	a	priority.	However,	 it	 is	 also	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 some	of	 the	 interviewed	were	very	open	 and	 accessible.	 Unfortunately,	 despite	 the	 personal	 contacts	 of	 the	researcher	 and	 his	 supervisor,	 it	was	 finally	 not	 possible	 to	 interview	 the	 two	current	mayors	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	after	several	attempts.			The	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 leaving	 room	 for	 the	 interviewed	 to	 express	their	 positions,	 nonetheless,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 researcher	 to	 know	 about	specific	events	made	it	necessary	to	prepare	a	script	to	channel	the	 interviews.	The	 risk	 in	 in-depth	 interviews,	 especially	 in	politics,	 to	 lose	 the	original	 track	cannot	be	ignored.	Thereby,	a	set	of	questions	was	prepared	in	advance,	always	with	the	aim	to	be	open	enough	to	dispense	them	when	they	were	clearly	useless	for	 a	 specific	 interview	 or	 to	 add	 new	 ones	 due	 to	 the	 feedback	 of	 the	interviewed23.	 Thus,	 those	 questions	 prepared	 on	 the	 prior	 knowledge	 of	 the	matter	 by	 the	 researcher	 -with	 the	 essential	 help	 of	 the	 supervisor	 of	 this	dissertation-	 were	 used	 to	 guide	 the	 conversations,	 always	 being	 aware	 that	those	questions	“should	be	used	flexibly	and	should	enhance	rather	than	inhibit	responsive	 questioning”	 (Arthur	&	Nazroo,	 2003,	 p136).	 Otherwise	 the	 risk	 of	losing	relevant	information	for	the	case	is	too	high.			Notwithstanding	having	a	common	core	and	one	single	purpose	–learning	more	about	 the	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements-,	 each	case-study	 was	 approached	 with	 a	 specific	 set	 of	 questions.	 Thus,	 both	 case	studies	 shared	 several	 questions	 and	 included	 exclusive	 questions	 for	 each	 of	them.	 The	 particularities	 of	 each	 case	 made	 it	 necessary	 to	 make	 some	adjustments	on	the	questions	to	obtain	the	maximum	of	information.	The	aim	of	the	research	was	to	obtain	general	 information	about	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	but	from	very	specific	dynamics:	the	ones	of	 Milan	 and	 Barcelona	 around	 the	 local	 elections.	 Consequently,	 due	 to	 this																																																									23	The	initial	questions	can	be	found	in	the	Annex	III	(Milan)	and	in	the	Annex	IV	(Barcelona).	
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specificity	and	despite	using	analogous	questions	the	interviewed	themselves	led	the	 talks	 towards	 the	 particular	 elements	 of	 each	 analysed	 relationship.	 From	there,	new	questions	were	born	from	responses	of	the	interviewed.	Despite	the	case	particularities,	the	questions	were	structured	in	similar	groups:		
• The	background	of	the	project	and	the	evolution	of	events.	
• The	role	of	social	movements	in	politics.	
• The	role	of	each	actor	in	the	collaboration.	
• The	political	campaign.		Additionally,	 the	 case	 of	 Milan	 included	 specific	 questions	 about	 the	 primary	elections	of	 the	Partito	Democratico,	 the	 importance	of	 the	groups	 that	did	not	win	 the	primaries,	 and	 the	capacity	of	 influence	of	 the	civic	 list	 in	 the	mayoral	elections.	 For	 Barcelona,	 the	 specificities	 of	 the	 questions	 were	 related	 to	 the	creation-process	of	the	coalition	and	the	designation	of	an	activist	as	a	mayoral	candidate.	Both	sets	of	specific	questions	in	which	the	interviews	were	based	are	available	in	the	Annex.			
3.3.3	Data	treatment.		Once	 the	 data	 is	 collected	 thanks	 to	 the	 interviews	 and	 the	 other	 sources,	 the	information	 needs	 to	 be	 analysed	 under	 game	 theory	 framework	 keeping	 in	mind	 the	 original	 objectives.	 The	 overall	 purpose	 of	 this	work	 is	 to	 contribute	with	more	 information	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements,	 specifically	 the	elements	 that	alter	 their	 framework	of	 interaction.	To	highlight	the	circumstances	that	makes	that	relationship	being	closer	or	more	distant.	Thus,	based	on	the	classification	made	by	Michael	Hanagan	(1998),	 the	two	 cases	will	 be	 analysed	with	 the	 ambition	 of	 discovering	 the	 key	 facts	 that	displace	the	rapport	between	the	actors	from	one	type	to	relationship	to	another.	That	 is,	 trying	 to	 discover	what	makes	 that	 the	 relationship	moves	 across	 the	axis	 that	 goes	 from	 articulation	 to	 opposition	 through	 permeation,	 alliance,	
independence	 and	 competition.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 test	 the	 crucial	 elements	 that	incentivize	the	agreement	between	the	various	parties,	and	evaluate	the	role	of	these	elements	in	the	dynamics	of	the	interaction.	The	use	of	game	theory	offers	
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an	interesting	approach	as	it	generates	propositions	through	the	model	that	are	refutable.	 Also,	 it	 permits	 to	work	with	 a	 variance	 on	 the	 players’	 preferences	and	to	adjust	 the	outcome	when	it	happens.	The	key	elements	will	be	analysed	under	the	rules	of	game	theory	using	the	extensive-form	games.		
3.4	Summary.		This	 chapter	 presented	 analytic	 narratives	 as	 the	methodology	 chosen	 for	 this	research,	 starting	 by	 introducing	 the	 method	 and	 explaining	 its	 two	 different	parts.	 After	 the	 exposition	 of	 the	 convenience	 of	 the	 method	 to	 face	 the	relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements,	 its	 tools	 are	explained.	That	is,	in-depth	interviews	for	the	narrative	part	and	game	theory	for	the	second	one.	Then,	 the	chapters	Four	and	Five	contain	 the	narrative	part	of	the	two	case	studies,	Milan	and	Barcelona.	The	chapter	Six	contains	the	analysis	of	the	findings.			 	
Chapter	Four.	
The	case	of	the	city	of	Milan.		After	analysing	the	 interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	this	chapter	focuses	on	one	specific	case	of	this	interaction,	namely	the	municipal	elections	of	the	city	of	Milan	in	the	year	2016.	In	particular,	this	case	looks	at	the	existing	relationship	between	the	social	movements	and	the	centre-left	coalition	that	 was	 able	 to	 win	 the	 2016	 local	 elections	 and	 the	 municipal	 government.	Already	in	2011,	a	big	centre-left	coalition	driven	by	a	social	movement	was	able	to	impose	their	project	in	Milan,	an	arduous	environment	for	leftist	positions.	It	is	 therefore	 significant	 to	 take	 a	 deeper	 look	 at	 the	 historical	 complex	relationship	 of	 a	major	 political	movement	 for	 the	 city	 such	 as	 the	Movimento	
Arancione	with	the	main	party	of	the	left,	the	Partito	Democratico.	In	this	context,	it	 is	 important	 to	 pay	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 processes	 of	 finding	 agreements	between	 both	 actors	 from	 the	 primary	 elections	 of	 the	 coalition	 until	 the	 last	round	of	the	municipal	elections.	These	findings	will	be	analysed	later	in	Chapter	Six	dedicated	to	the	strategic	decisions	of	the	actors	involved	in	the	case	of	Milan.			
4.1	The	background.	Milan	 is	 the	main	 industrial	 and	 financial	 centre	of	 Italy	 (Meijers,	Hollander,	&	Hoogerbrugge,	2012),	and	it	has	been	defined	as	a	bourgeois	city	focused	on	the	affaires	 and	 a	 stronghold	 for	 the	 right	 parties	 (Lerner,	 Gad	 Eitan;	 9th	 of	 June	2016;	 personal	 interview).	 Home	 and	 headquarters	 of	 the	 companies	 of	 Silvio	Berlusconi,	Milan’s	 electoral	 results	have	always	been	personally	very	 relevant	for	 the	 most	 successful	 politician	 of	 last	 decades	 in	 Italy.	 Due	 to	 this,	 he	 was	always	 very	 active	 both	 in	 the	 electoral	 campaigns	 of	 Milan,	 and	 those	 of	Lombardy,	 the	 Italian	 region	 of	 which	 Milan	 is	 capital24 .	 But	 despite	 this	dominance	 of	 right-parties,	 in	 the	 municipal	 elections	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Milan	 in	2011,	the	centre-left	coalition	was	able	to	win	against	the	incumbent	mayor	and	
																																																								24 	For	 instance:	 Berlusconi	 makes	 election	 in	 Milan	 all	 about	 him.	 NYTimes.	http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/europe/12italy.html	
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former	 minister	 of	 Berlusconi,	 Letizia	 Moratti.	 Until	 that	 moment,	 the	 centre-right	had	held	the	government	of	the	city	for	almost	twenty	years.	Traditionally	the	 victory	 of	 the	 centre-right	 was	 so	 secure,	 that	 Paolo	 Limonta,	 one	 of	 the	leaders	 of	 the	 social	 movement	Movimento	 Arancione,	 says	 that	 before	 2011	centre-left	 candidates	were	 just	working	 to	 lose	with	 some	 dignity	 and	 not	 to	win	 (24th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 Furthermore,	 Letizia	Moratti	was	not	a	new	and	inexperienced	politician	that	was	occupying	the	position	of	mayor	by	chance.	She	was	able	to	win	the	2006	elections	in	the	first	round	with	52%	of	votes.	Before	being	Milan’s	mayor,	she	had	had	a	long	professional	and	political	life25	and	she	was	well	known	for	the	citizens	of	Milan	also	due	to	her	marriage	with	 a	member	 of	 a	 popular	 and	 rich	 family	 dedicated	 to	 the	 oil	 business	 and	owners	 of	 the	 football-team	 “Inter	 de	 Milan”26.	 Thanks	 to	 her	 family	 wealth,	Moratti	was	able	to	do	very	powerful	electoral	campaigns	spending	a	substantial	amount	 of	 money	 more27	than	 her	 opponents	 in	 both	 municipal	 elections	 she	was	part	of28.	But	meanwhile	this	advantage	brought	her	a	notorious	success	in	2006;	 it	 was	 not	 enough	 against	 the	 candidate	 of	 the	 centre-left	 coalition,	Giuliano	Pisapia,	in	2011.			In	 2011	 Letizia	Moratti	was	 the	 incumbent	mayor	 and	 the	 left	 parties	 counted	twenty	years	of	electoral	defeats.	In	addition,	the	left	was	incapable	of	gaining	the	position	 of	 mayor	 since	 this	 one	 was	 established	 in	 the	 1993	 elections	 as	 an	independent	 vote	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 councillors.	With	 this	 situation	 in	mind,	 the	centre-left	 coalition	 prepared	 its	 primary	 elections,	 choosing	 its	 mayoral	candidate	for	Milan	in	the	battle	against	the	centre-right.	In	these	primaries,	four	candidates	 ran	 for	 the	 nomination,	 but	 it	 was	 Giuliano	 Pisapia,	 the	 candidate	supported	by	 two	small	parties,	Sinistra	Ecologia	Libertà	 (SEL)	and	Federazione	
della	 Sinistra	 (FdS),	 who	 won	 with	 45%	 of	 the	 votes	 against	 the	 candidate																																																									25	She	was	a	businesswoman	who	had	worked	in	the	insurance	and	telecommunications	sectors.	She	was	 president	 of	 the	 Italian	 state	 television	 company	 RAI	 and	 chairwoman	 of	 News	 Corp	Europe.	26	Moratti	family.		27	The	numbers	of	 the	 Italian	newspaper	 Il	Corriere	della	Sera	 points	out	 a	 record	budget	 for	 a	candidate	to	any	municipal	election	in	Italy	before.	Thus,	in	2006	Moratti	spent	6.335.000	euros	in	opposition	of	the	694.000	euros	spent	by	her	opponent.	For	the	Italian	newspaper	Repubblica	in	2011	she	spent	12	million	euros	in	confront	to	700.000	euros	of	her	opponent.		28	2006	and	2011.	
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supported	 by	 the	 main	 party	 of	 the	 coalition,	 the	 Partito	 Democratico	 (PD),	Stefano	 Boeri.	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	 is	 a	 known	 lawyer,	 son	 of	 another	 respected	lawyer	 of	 the	 city	 of	Milan,	who	was	 the	 author	 of	 the	 Italian	Code	of	 Criminal	Procedure.	As	a	lawyer	he	was	in	charge	of	some	famous	trials	but	he	had	also	a	long	political	 life:	 first	as	an	activist	and	defending	 in	court	his	party	colleagues	and	later	as	member	of	the	parliament.	His	defence	of	the	legality	beyond	political	believes	 –from	 within	 and	 from	 without	 the	 Parliament-	 made	 him	 a	 very	respected	 figure	also	between	his	political	 adversaries	 (Dalla	Chiesa,	Fernando;	13th	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	This	condition	of	person	of	common	sense	resulted	 in	the	 fact	 that	he	had	no	political	enemies	(Ibid.)	and	the	citizens	saw	him	 as	 a	 reflective	 and	 sensitive	 person	 (Lerner,	 Gad	 Eitan;	 9th	 of	 June	 2016;	personal	 interview).	 Additionally,	 belonging	 to	 a	 well-known	 family,	 placed	Pisapia	in	a	bourgeoisie	position	that	helped	him	to	be	accepted	also	by	the	more	centrist	members	of	the	coalition,	as	Piero	Bassetti,	former	mayoral	candidate	for	the	 Christian	 Democracy	 party,	 argues	 (5th	 of	 July	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	Thus,	 due	 to	 his	 family	 and	 financial	 background,	 the	 economic	 powers	considered	 him	 an	 equal	 and	 he	 did	 not	 have	 the	 inferiority	 complex	 that	 had	suffered	 several	 candidates	 from	 the	 left	 before	 him	 (Lerner,	 Gad	 Eitan;	 9th	 of	June	2016;	personal	interview).	Those	features	made	Giuliano	Pisapia	rapidly	an	accepted	candidate	by	the	members	of	the	coalition.		Pisapia	had,	already	from	the	beginning,	a	big	support	of	relevant	public	figures	from	outside	parties’	 environment.	 In	 fact,	 his	 candidature	was	presented	 as	 a	candidacy	 of	 the	 citizens,	 as	 an	 external	 candidacy	 to	 political	 parties	 (Dalla	Chiesa,	 Fernando;	 13th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 Several	 intellectuals	and	 notable	 people29	of	 the	 political	 and	 cultural	 elite	 of	 Milan	 sustained	 the	candidature	 (Dalla	 Chiesa,	 Fernando;	 13th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	However,	the	most	significant	difference	between	Pisapia	and	the	other	primary	candidates	was	the	existence	of	a	social	movement	supporting	and	boosting	his	candidature:	 the	Movimento	Arancione.	This	combination	created	a	candidature	of	a	party	but	without	the	party,	based	on	external	elements:	social	movements.	In	 fact,	 the	Movimento	Arancione	 proved	 to	 be	 very	 important,	 not	 just	 in	 the																																																									29	Around	40	people	according	to	Fernando	Dalla	Chiesa.	
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primary	 elections,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 municipal	 elections.	 This	 movement	 was	formed	by	a	group	of	active	citizens	who	believed	 in	a	different	concept	of	city	than	 what	 Moratti	 represented.	 These	 people	 recognized	 in	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	their	own	values	and	their	same	ideas	about	how	Milan	should	be.	They	had	the	feeling	that	the	candidate	they	had	been	waiting	for	was	finally	arrived	(Limonta,	Paolo;	 24th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 	 That	 commitment	 was	 crucial,	because	 at	 the	 end,	 they	 were	 the	 mobilizing	 factor	 that	 gave	 strength	 to	Pisapia’s	campaign	(Lerner,	Gad	Eitan;	9th	of	June	2016;	personal	interview).	The	
Movimento	Arancione	born	from	transforming	the	protest	movement	against	the	school	model,	into	a	movement	that	has	as	main	goal	making	the	implementation	of	a	more	participative	and	egalitarian	society	possible	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24th	of	June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 This	movement	 gave	 an	 important	 impulse	 to	Pisapia’s	 campaign	 based	 on	 to	 the	 hope	 for	 change	 of	 its	 members	 and	 its	capacity	to	mobilize	leftist	supporters.			Giuliano	Pisapia	became	the	chosen	one	by	the	centre-left	coalition	to	confront	Letizia	 Moratti,	 the	 centre-right	 candidate	 and	 maximum	 favourite30.	 Despite	starting	 from	 a	 position	 behind	 Moratti	 in	 the	 surveys,	 Pisapia’s	 campaign	started	to	mobilize	sectors	of	the	society	that	were	against	the	policies	developed	by	the	right	governments	at	national	and	local	level,	to	a	point	were	he	became	a	serious	threat	for	Moratti’s	chances	to	keep	being	the	mayor	of	Milan.	Moratti’s	term	has	had	 some	problems	 linked	 to	 transparency	and	 the	arrests	of	 figures	close	to	her	(Ambrosoli,	Umberto;	7th	of	June	2016).	Despite	this,	she	was	still	in	a	 good	 position	 to	 win	 again	 and	 she	 had	 a	 strong	 and	 organized	 campaign.	Additionally,	the	amount	of	money	she	was	able	to	spend	in	publicity	before	the	campaign	made	her	face	present	around	the	entire	city	(Bassetti,	Piero;	5th	of	July	2016).	Unfortunately	for	her	political	ambitions,	this	excess	of	public	presence31	made	her	the	target	of	several	jokes	and	she	started	to	be	seen	as	a	caricature	of																																																									30 	http://www.ilgiorno.it/milano/politica/2010/11/19/416828-comunali_moratti_favorita.shtml	http://www.bolognanotizie.com/news/2011/05/15/39483/elezioni-milano-la-quiete-dopo-la-tempesta-moratti-favorita-pisapia-cresce-nei-sondaggi/	31	Even	 too	much	 in	 the	 electoral	 campaign	 as	 she	 received	 a	 fine	 for	 this	 excess	 of	 publicity:	http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2011/05/24/milano-multata-letizia-moratti-per-occupazione-abusiva-degli-spazi-elettorali/113392/	
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herself32.	Furthermore,	this	excess	of	public	exposition	triggered	a	feeling	among	some	 moderated	 voters	 that	 understood	 that	 as	 too	 much,	 and	 activated	 the	centre-left	voters	to	fight	against	her	(Mangano,	Dario	Mangano,	&	Terracciano,	2012).	 Thus,	 for	 first	 time	 in	 several	 years,	 the	 left	was	 attending	 elections	 in	Milan	not	as	mere	guest,	but	as	a	contender.	At	 that	moment,	 the	mood	within	Pisapia’s	 campaign	 was	 confident	 that	 victory	 was	 possible.	 This	 was	demonstrated	by	the	feeling	of	hope	among	the	people	attending	Pisapia’s	final	campaign	 act	 on	 of	 May	 27th	 2011	 at	 Piazza	 Duomo,	 where	 despite	 rain	 the	square	was	completely	full	and	where	people	saw	a	rainbow	in	the	sky	that	was	interpreted	 as	 a	 sing	 of	 an	 inevitable	 victory	 (Lener,	 Gad;	 9th	 of	 June	 2016,	personal	interview).	That	iconic	moment	has	been	remembered	and	used	several	times	by	Pisapia’s	followers	as	a	way	to	legitimize	certain	persons	or	acts	during	Pisapia’s	term	(Dalla	Chiesa,	Fernando;	13th	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).		For	 Fernando	 Dalla	 Chiesa,	 former	 candidate	 of	 the	 left	 to	 the	 city	 of	 Milan,	Letizia	Moratti	was	not	able	to	build	the	necessary	consensus	around	her	figure	meanwhile	she	was	the	mayor	of	the	city	(13th	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	Despite	not	making	any	big	mistakes	her	 figure	was	not	very	appreciated	even	between	her	own	electorate	(Lener,	Gad;	9th	of	 June	2016,	personal	 interview).	Thus	 the	 centre-right	 voters	 were	 expecting	 something	 else	 different	 from	Moratti.	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	 was	 that	 something	 else,	 and	 his	 particular	 political	background	made	it	possible	for	those	centre-right	voters,	which	were	not	happy	with	Moratti,	to	support	him	(Dalla	Chiesa,	Fernando;	13th	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	 Pisapia	won	 unexpectedly	 already	 the	 first	 round	 of	 the	municipal	elections	 in	201133	(Corriere	della	Sera	16th	of	May	2011).	He	was	able	 to	beat	Moratti	with	48,04%	of	 the	votes	against	41,58%	of	his	opponent,	and	 then	he	confirmed	 these	 results	 in	 the	 second	 round	with	55,11%	 to	44,89%.	Thus,	he	became	mayor	of	the	city	of	Milan	carrying	the	feeling	of	a	political	change	and	big	social	excitement.	In	that	way,	Pisapia	became	the	first	leftist	mayor	in	Milan	taking	also	a	 leftist	majority	in	the	City	Council	(Dalla	Chiesa,	Fernando;	13th	of	
																																																								32 	http://espresso.repubblica.it/visioni/satira/2011/05/23/news/moratti-la-beffa-sucate-1.31673	33	https://archive.is/e6fD#selection-889.0-893.1	
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June	2016,	personal	 interview).	The	expectations	about	his	management	of	 the	city	were	hence	very	high.		Pisapia	held	his	position	as	a	mayor	with	high	 rates	of	 citizen	approval	during	the	5	years	of	his	mandate.	This	fact	made	many	believe	he	would	be	interested	in	 repeating	 candidature.	However,	 he	made	 clear	 already	one	 year	before	 the	elections	of	2016	that	he	would	just	be	mayor	for	one	term.	Thus,	the	centre-left	coalition	 had	 to	 confront	 the	 situation	where	 the	 only	 person	 able	 to	 beat	 the	centre-right	 after	 so	 many	 years	 would	 not	 run	 again	 for	 the	 position.	 The	centre-left	coalition	had	to	look	again	for	a	candidate	able	to	win	the	municipal	elections	meanwhile	 trying	 no	 to	 break	 the	 coalition	 trough	 internal	 battles	 of	placing	ideas	and	candidates	within	the	coalition.	Also	the	Movimento	Arancione	deprived	 of	 the	 figure	 that	 symbolized	 their	 fight	 against	 the	 right	 policies	 of	Moratti,	 had	 to	 figure	 out	 what	 to	 do,	 whether	 to	 continue	 supporting	 the	coalition	or	not.			
4.2	The	primary	elections.	Once	it	was	clear	that	Giuliano	Pisapia	would	not	run	again	for	a	second	term	as	mayor	 of	 Milan,	 the	 centre-left	 had	 to	 face	 choosing	 a	 candidate	 capable	 of	maintaining	 the	 city	 for	 the	 coalition.	 This	 problem	 was	 not	 easy	 to	 solve,	 as	Pisapia	 was	 very	 appreciated	 by	 the	 citizens	 of	 Milan34	and	 his	 victory	 in	 a	traditionally	 stronghold	 of	 the	 right,	 had	 been	 extremely	 symbolic	 (Ambrosoli,	Umberto;	7th	of	 June	2016,	personal	 interview).	 In	 the	words	of	Piero	Bassetti,	“Pisapia	 was	 a	 liberation	 flag,	 an	 emblem	 of	 honesty	 in	 a	 country	 where	politicians	 are	 seen	 as	 selfish	 and	 corrupts”	 (5th	 of	 July	 2016,	 personal	interview).	Thus,	Pisapia	was	an	important	element	that	had	to	be	replaced,	but	without	losing	the	forces	that	made	him	to	become	mayor.	With	this	in	mind,	the	centre-left	organized	the	primary	elections	that	would	have	to	end	with	choosing	the	 candidate	of	 the	 coalition	 for	 the	municipal	 government	of	Milan.	To	make	the	society	of	Milan	feel	part	of	that	process,	the	primaries	were	open	to	all	the	citizens	 of	 the	 city	 that	 would	 like	 to	 be	 candidate,	 except	 for	 those	 already																																																									34	An	example	of	Piasapia’s	numbers:	http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/02/19/news/ricerca_piepoli_sindaci-79037585/	
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members	of	 centre-right	parties	 (article	6	of	 the	primary	elections	 regulation).	The	 only	 requirement	 to	 become	 candidate	 was	 to	 submit	 at	 least	 2.000	signatures	of	 citizens	of	Milan	supporting	 the	candidature	 (art.7).	Moreover,	 to	increase	the	connection	of	the	process	with	the	youth	(Bussolati,	Pietro;	6	of	July	2016,	personal	 interview),	all	the	residents	of	the	city	that	were	going	to	be	16	years	old	at	 the	moment	of	 the	municipal	elections	had	the	right	 to	vote	at	 the	primaries	 (art.9).	 This	 included	 the	 European	 citizens	 and	 third	 countries	citizens	in	regular	situation	in	Italy.	The	primary	elections	took	place	the	6th	and	the	7th	of	February	2016,	in	150	station	polls	prepared	around	Milan.	To	attend,	it	was	 enough	 to	 go	 to	 the	 electoral	poll	 of	 the	 area	of	 residence	and	give	 two	Euros	 as	 a	 contribution	 to	help	paying	 the	 expenses	 of	 the	 organization	of	 the	primaries.			Four	candidates	decided	to	compete	for	the	nomination	of	the	centre-left	in	the	primary	elections.	The	four	candidates	were:	
• Francesca	 Balzani,	 deputy	 mayor	 of	 Milan	 and	 former	 European	 MP.	Explicitly	supported	by	the	mayor	Giuliano	Pisapia;		
• Giuseppe	Sala,	 former	municipal	manager	and	former	CEO	of	Expo	2015	(the	universal	exposition	held	in	Milan	in	2015).	Informally	supported	by	the	Prime	Minister	and	leader	of	the	Partito	Democratico	Matteo	Renzi;		
• Pierfrancesco	 Majorino,	 member	 of	 the	 City	 Council	 and	 the	 City	Government	of	Milan.	Supported	by	the	left	sectors	of	the	coalition;	
• Antonio	 Iannetta,	 manager	 and	 former	 president	 of	 USIP	 (Italian	 Sport	Union	 for	 Everyone)	 Milano.	 An	 unknown	 candidate	 at	 the	 time	 of	 his	presentation	 and	 who	 also	 did	 not	 have	 the	 support	 of	 relevant	 public	figures.		The	 profiles	 of	 the	 three	 principal	 candidates,	 Majorino,	 Sala	 and	 Balzani,	 are	rather	 different35.	 Firstly,	 Pierfrancesco	 Majorino	 was	 the	 first	 candidate	 to	announce	 that	 he	 would	 be	 running	 to	 become	 the	 candidate	 of	 the	 coalition	after	Pisapia	said	he	would	not	run	for	a	second	term	as	a	mayor.	Majorino	was																																																									35	Antonio	 Iannetta	 just	 had	 in	 the	 previous	 surveys	 less	 than	 1%	 of	 expected	 support	 by	 the	voters	of	the	primaries	elections.	
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very	well	liked	by	the	more	left	voters36,	especially	due	to	his	past	as	adviser	of	the	 Minister	 of	 Social	 Solidarity	 and	 his	 position	 in	 the	 City	 Government	 in	charge	 of	 Social	 Policies	 and	 Health	 Culture.	 He	 had	 had	 public	 relevance	managing	the	civic	unions	register,	the	opening	of	the	House	of	Rights	dedicated	to	 avoid	 any	 kind	 of	 discrimination,	 and	 the	 action	 plan	 that	 the	 city	implemented	 to	 improve	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 needy	 persons	 who	 arrived	 in	Milan	in	the	refugees	waves	of	2014	and	2015.		Secondly,	Giuseppe	Sala	arrived	to	politics	after	a	 long	and	successful	career	 in	the	private	sector.	Although,	he	was	not	a	stranger	in	the	public	sector,	in	which	he	also	worked	for	several	years	in	managerial	positions.	However,	the	fact	that	his	 professional	 life	 had	 been	 especially	 linked	 to	 business	 made	 the	 leftist	members	 of	 the	 coalition	 seeing	 him	 as	 not	 the	most	 appropriate	 to	 continue	with	Pisapia’s	project	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	For	them	 Sala	 was	 a	 person	 concerned	 about	 economic	 profits	 and	 not	 about	common	benefits.	Undoubtedly,	the	time	he	spent	in	the	private	sectors	occupies	the	largest	part	of	his	career,	but	he	had	also	spent	time	working	for	the	public	sector	 from	where	 he	 jumped	 into	 politics.	 After	 his	 degree	 in	 economics	 and	commerce,	 he	 stared	 to	work	 for	 the	 chemical	 company	Pirelli,	where	 he	 held	various	positions	for	10	years.	Later,	he	worked	as	Chief	Financial	Officer	of	the	telecommunication	 company	TIM	and	as	CEO	of	Telecom	 Italia	Wireline.	Then,	he	 founded	and	worked	 in	consulting	 firms	until	Letizia	Moratti	appointed	him	municipal	 manger	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Milan37	in	 2009.	 One	 year	 later	 he	 started	working	as	head	of	 the	universal	exposition	Milan	2015,	until	 the	closure	of	 it,	when	in	December	of	that	year	he	announced	his	candidature	for	the	primaries.		Finally,	 Francesca	Balzani	had	an	 intense	political	 career	 very	 related	with	 the	public	 finances.	However,	 she	had	also	a	private	occupation	as	 she	worked	 for	several	years	as	a	 lawyer	before	she	assumed	her	first	relevant	public	position.	Born	 in	 Genoa,	 her	 first	 political	 appointment	 was	 in	 her	 hometown	 as	 a	responsible	for	the	budget.	After	two	years	in	that	office,	she	entered	in	the	list	of																																																									36 	http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politica/2016/2/6/PRIMARIE-PD-MILANO-2016-Sala-occhio-a-Renzi/676889/	37	Direttore	generale	del	Comune	di	Milano.	
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the	 Partito	 Democratico	 to	 become	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 a	position	that	she	was	able	to	achieve.	Her	time	as	European	parliamentary	was	also	 very	 linked	 with	 budget	 policies,	 as	 she	 was	 part	 of	 the	 economic	committees	 as	 the	 committee	 to	 study	 and	 accept	 the	 Multiannual	 Financial	Framework	of	the	European	Union,	crucial	to	approve	the	annual	budget	of	the	EU.	 With	 that	 background,	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	 invited	 her	 in	 2013	 to	 be	 the	responsible	 of	 the	 City	 Government	 of	 Milan	 for	 the	 areas	 of	 budget,	 public	heritage	and	taxes.	Additionally,	in	2015	she	was	also	appointed	deputy	mayor	of	Milan.	The	 ideology	of	her	potential	 voters	would	be	 in-between	Majorino	and	Sala’s	 voters	 as	 the	 survey	 of	 the	 POMLAB	 (Public	 Opinion	 and	 Media	Laboratory)	showed	us.		Giuseppe	 Sala	 was	 the	 expected	 candidate	 by	 the	 media 38 	and	 the	establishment39 	of	 the	 Partito	 Democratico.	 His	 name	 came	 into	 play	 after	Giuliano	 Pisapia	 confirmed	 he	 would	 not	 run	 again	 for	 a	 second	 term.	 The	success	in	terms	of	organization	and	public	of	the	Universal	Exposition	of	Milan	in	2015	managed	by	Sala,	put	him	in	a	position	of	high	popularity.	He	appeared	to	be	a	good	manager	able	to	deal	with	complex	situations	and	to	work	with	a	big	number	 of	 people.	 Sala	 was	 seen	 for	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 Partito	 Democratico,	Matteo	Renzi	as	the	right	choice	to	beat	the	centre-right	in	the	elections40.	This	idea	was	based	on	the	central	political	positions	of	Sala	and	the	perceptions	that	the	citizens	had	about	his	managerial	capacities	(Bassetti,	Piero;	5th	of	July	2016).	However,	 the	 fact	 that	 he	was	 perceived	 for	 several	 centre-left	 voters41	as	 the	chosen	 candidate	 by	 the	 rulers	 of	 the	Partito	Democratico	 -especially	 Renzi42-	already	 before	 the	 celebration	 of	 the	 primaries,	 and	 his	 positions	 that	 those	voters	considered	far	away	for	the	traditional	left	ideology	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	June	 2016,	 personal	 interview);	made	 that	 the	 primaries	 were	 held	without	 a																																																									38 	http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/05/25/il-sindaco-dellexpo-io-dopo-pisapia-non-ci-penso-proprio-19.html	39 	http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/09/02/news/renzi_milano_sala_sindaco_expo-122053645/	40 	http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politica/2016/2/6/PRIMARIE-PD-MILANO-2016-Sala-occhio-a-Renzi/676889/	41	Some	surveys	show	that	up	to	84%	believed	he	would	be	the	final	candidate	of	the	centre-left.	42 	http://it.blastingnews.com/milano/2016/01/primarie-milano-2016-candidati-centrosinistra-e-pd-quando-e-dove-si-vota-00751257.html	
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clear	 candidate	 to	win.	 In	 fact,	 the	 critics	 towards	 Sala	 started	 even	 before	 he	announced	 his	 candidature.	 The	 argument	 was	 based	 on	 the	 delay	 of	 the	celebration	of	 the	primaries	 to	 favour	 that	Sala	 could	 finish	 its	participation	 in	Expo	2015	in	the	most	appropriate	way.	This	argument	appeared	because	there	was	 a	 pre-candidate,	 Pierfrancesco	 Majorino,	 that	 already	 announced	 his	intention	 to	 run	 for	 the	 candidacy	 and	 was	 more	 appreciated	 by	 the	 lefties	members	of	the	coalition	but	with	less	initial	support	from	the	rest	of	the	centre-left	voters.		Once	 it	was	clear	 that	Sala	was	 the	 favourite	 to	win	 the	nomination,	Francesca	Balzani	also	decided	to	run	 for	 the	candidacy	with	 the	support	of	 the	mayor	at	that	 moment,	 Giuliano	 Pisapia43 .	 Pisapia	 was	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 Sala	 in	 the	primaries,	as	they	come	from	different	worlds	(Bassetti,	Piero;	5th	of	July	2016).	Thus,	Pisapia	went	to	Rome	with	Balzani	to	an	interview	with	Renzi	to	show	that	she	would	be	a	good	candidate	 for	 trying	 to	 retain	 the	city	 in	 the	hands	of	 the	centre-left.	Renzi	 agreed	 that	 she	 could	be	 a	 good	 candidate	when	he	met	her,	and	decided	that	he	would	not	support	explicitly	any	candidate,	despite	being	in	favour	 of	 Sala	 (Lerner,	 Gad	 Eitan;	 9th	 of	 June	 2016;	 personal	 interview).	Nevertheless,	Rezi’s	 support	 for	Sala	was	clear	as	 several	high	members	of	 the	
Partito	Democratico	belonged	to	Sala’s	campaign	staff44.	Pisapia’s	active	support	for	Balzani	made	her	the	favourite	for	the	leftist	sector,	but	the	lack	of	agreement	to	join	forces	with	Majorino	reduced	her	possibility	of	victory.	The	leftist	voters	were	consequently	divided	between	to	candidates.	Also,	 the	decision	of	Balzani	to	candidate	was	probably	too	late	as	almost	all	 the	City	Government	members	had	 already	 given	 their	 support	 to	 Sala	 or	Majorino.	Notwithstanding	 this	 late	arrival,	 this	 did	 not	 suppose	 fewer	possibilities	 to	win	 the	primaries	 as	 all	 the	electoral	 campaign	 took	place	without	a	 clear	winner.	Moreover,	 the	 campaign	issues	were	 quite	 common	 among	 the	 candidates	 and	 despite	 Balzani	was	 the	
																																																								43 	http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/01/28/primarie-milano-2016-pisapia-balzani-mia-preferita-vorrei-che-prossimo-sindaco-fosse-donna/2415217/	44 	http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/08/primarie-milano-2016-sala-candidato-sindaco-col-42-dei-voti-harakiri-della-sinistra-maggioritaria-ma-divisa/2441539/	
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one	who	played	more	explicitly	the	card	of	Pispaia’s	project	45,	all	three	tried	to	be	seen	as	the	heirs	of	the	centre-left	term.		The	final	results	of	the	primary	elections	produced	the	designation	of	Giuseppe	Sala	 as	 candidate	 for	 the	 centre-left	 coalition.	 He	won	with	 42%	 of	 the	 votes,	followed	by	Francesca	Balzani	with	34%	and	Pierfrancesco	Majorino	with	23%46.		The	 fact	 that	 Balzani	 and	 Majorino	 represented	 similar	 kinds	 of	 voters,	 those	more	 worried	 about	 social	 issues	 or	 more	 leftist,	 made	 some	 say	 that	 both	candidates	 together	 would	 have	 been	 able	 to	 defeated	 Sala47.	 This	 claim	 was	based	on	the	premise	that	left	positions	were	majoritarian	within	the	electorate	of	the	coalition48.	However,	 the	survey	conducted	by	Luciano	Fasano	and	Paolo	Natale	for	the	POMLAB	(Public	Opinion	and	Media	Laboratory)	with	over	3.000	persons	voting	in	the	primaries	denies	that	victory	of	one	single	candidate	over	Sala.	The	survey	shows	that	Sala	would	have	won	the	primary	elections	anyway,	even	with	 just	 one	 adversary.	 The	 POMLAB	 group	 asked	 about	 voters’	 second	preference,	and	the	result	of	analysing	them,	shows	that	Sala	would	receive	a	lot	of	 these	 second	preferences,	whether	 candidate	Balzani	 or	Majorino	 [see	 table	15].																																																																				45 	http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Milano/2016/2/7/BALZANI-Chi-e-Programma-del-candidato-Sindaco-di-Milano-Oggi-mi-rilasso-coi-miei-bimbi-primarie-PD-Milano-2016-7-febbraio-2016-/675594/	46	Antonio	Iannetta	received	0,73%	of	the	primary	voters.		47 http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/02/07/news/primarie_milano_risultati_sala_balzani_majorino-132924308/	48 	http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/08/primarie-milano-2016-dietro-gli-abbracci-a-sala-la-resa-dei-conti-della-sinistra-e-ora-con-il-candidato-ci-saranno-problemi/2442232/	
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Table	15.	Balzani’s	and	Majorino’s	voters’	second	preference.	
	Source:	POMLAB.		This	data	prove	that	it	is	not	automatic	that	the	voters	of	one	of	those	candidates	would	have	gone	directly	 to	 the	other.	The	 lack	of	automatic	 transfer	of	voters	between	those	two	candidates	is	also	shown	by	the	existence	of	some	hostilities	among	their	voters.	Thus,	several	of	Majorino’s	supporters	said	that	he	was	the	truly	candidate	for	the	left	and	that	Balzani	just	arrived	later	to	make	Majorino’s	campaign	 harder,	 consequently	 they	 would	 have	 not	 voted	 for	 her	 under	 any	circumstance 49 .	 Those	 supporters	 claim	 that	 her	 attempt	 to	 become	 the	candidate	 of	 the	 coalition	 was	 just	 because	 Pisapia	 did	 not	 like	 Majorino	 as	candidate.	The	numbers	so,	end	with	the	discussion	about	the	dispersion	of	the	leftist	 vote	 and	 the	 idea	 that	 either	 Balzani	 or	 Majorino,	 would	 have	 better	represented	the	members	of	the	coalition	than	Sala.			The	 profile	 of	 the	 voters	 of	 each	 candidate	 reveals	 different	 priorities	 and	interests.	The	crucial	point	was	whether,	knowing	these	differences,	it	would	be	possible	to	keep	the	centre-left	coalition	together	after	the	primaries.	The	people	that	voted	for	Sala	in	the	primaries	defined	themselves	in	the	majority	as	centre-																																																								49 	http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/08/primarie-milano-2016-dietro-gli-abbracci-a-sala-la-resa-dei-conti-della-sinistra-e-ora-con-il-candidato-ci-saranno-problemi/2442232/	
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left50,	meanwhile	the	people	who	voted	for	Majorino	and	Balzani	identified	them	as	left	wing	[see	table	16].			Table	16.	Political	identification	of	voters	by	candidates.	
	Source:	POMLAB.		When	asked	about	the	Renzi	government,	considered	in	Italy	as	centre-left,	90%	of	 Sala’s	 voters	 had	 a	 positive	 opinion	 about	 it.	 The	 numbers	 on	 the	 same	question	reduces	up	to	50%	within	Balzani	and	Majorino	voters	[see	table	17].										
																																																								50	Also	according	the	survey	of	elaborated	by	POMLAB.	
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	Table	17.	Judgement	about	Renzi’s	government.	
	Source:	POMLAB.		This	numbers	show	clear	two	different	groups	of	voters,	but	when	asked	about	whether	they	would	support	 the	wining	candidate,	 in	case	their	own	candidate	lost,	 the	 fidelity	 is	 high	 among	 the	 voters	 of	 all	 three	 candidates.	 However,	according	to	this	survey,	in	case	of	Sala	being	the	final	candidate,	he	would	have	to	convince	around	30%	of	the	voters	of	the	other	two	candidates	[see	table	18].	Those	voters	were	still	doubting	about	giving	him	their	final	support	or	not.	This	lack	of	confidence	by	some	members	of	the	left	highlights	the	importance	for	Sala	of	 the	 negotiations	 post-primaries	 to	 attract	 towards	 his	 figure	 that	 type	 of	voters.	 Hence,	 some	 kind	 of	 agreement	 or	 collaboration	 with	 the	 more	 leftist	sectors	to	sustain	the	centre-left	coalition	together	was	necessary.	Otherwise	the	electoral	system	facilitates	for	the	losers	of	the	primaries	to	build	a	new	political	project	to	confront	Sala’s	candidature.						
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	Table	18.	Fidelity	of	the	voters	towards	the	coalition	by	candidates.	
	Source:	POMLAB.		Once	 designated,	 the	 candidate	 of	 the	 centre-left	 coalition	 had	 to	 face	 the	organization	of	the	electoral	campaign.	But	before	that	Sala	had	to	work	on	the	stability	of	the	coalition	threatened	by	his	designation	as	candidate.	He	was	seen	as	too	liberal	for	the	leftist	sectors	of	the	coalition,	which	were	not	sure	whether	to	support	the	centre-left	project	with	this	candidate.	Nevertheless,	just	after	the	primaries	Sala	expressed	his	will	 to	continue	with	the	basis	of	Pisapia’s	project	fighting	for	the	same	principles	and	including	al	the	groups	of	people	that	were	present	 in	 Pisapia’s	 coalition.	 Likewise,	 as	 a	 gest	 of	 commitment	 towards	 the	lefties	members	of	the	coalition,	he	refused	to	include	centre-right	actors	into	his	candidacy51	-at	 that	 time	 the	 Partito	 Democratico	 was	 in	 a	 coalition	 in	 the	national	government	with	Nuovo	Centrodestra,	a	centre-right	party.			
4.3	Electoral	system.		
																																																								51 	http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/04/primarie-milano-2016-cinesi-pronti-a-votare-sala-lultimo-tarocco-delle-elezioni/2439634/	
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The	municipal	elections	of	the	city	of	Milan	in	2016	were	held	under	the	complex	rules	of	the	Italian	electoral	municipal	law52.	Under	this	normative,	the	voters	of	the	city	of	Milan	elect	the	city	council	and	directly	the	mayor	at	the	same	time,	in	a	two-round	election.	This	is	possible	because	the	electoral	law	allows	the	voters	to	 cast	 various	 votes	 and	 preferences	 at	 the	 time	 of	 voting.	 Additionally,	 it	permits	the	existence	of	lists	of	independent	candidates	for	the	City	Council,	even	if	 those	 lists	 support	 the	mayor	 candidates	 from	 other	 lists.	 The	 possibility	 of	supporting	candidates	from	other	lists	opens	the	door	to	a	different	kind	of	pacts	between	 the	 various	 social	 and	political	 groups.	Moreover,	 the	 electoral	 law	 is	just	 partially	 proportional,	 as	 it	 reserves	 –despite	 the	 actual	 number	 of	 votes-	more	than	the	absolute	majority	of	the	City	Council	seats	to	the	list	that	supports	the	elected	mayor	in	order	to	guarantee	the	city’s	governability.			Thus,	 each	 voter	 when	 going	 to	 the	 polls	 has	 the	 right	 to	 express	 various	preferences	at	the	moment	of	the	first	round:	
• One	vote	to	express	the	direct	preference	for	the	mayoral	candidate.	
• One	 vote	 to	 express	 the	 preference	 towards	 a	 list	 of	 candidates	 for	 the	City	Council.		
• A	maximum	of	two	votes	for	two	candidates	of	different	gender	within	the	chosen	City	Council	list.		The	 mayoral	 candidate	 that	 obtains	 more	 than	 50%	 of	 the	 votes	 in	 the	 first	round	 is	 automatically	 elected	 mayor	 of	 the	 city.	 In	 case	 that	 no	 mayoral	candidate	obtains	more	 than	50%	of	 the	votes	 in	 the	 first	 round,	 the	 two	most	voted	mayoral	 candidates	 go	 to	 a	 second	 round	 of	 voting,	where	 the	 one	with	more	votes	is	elected	mayor.	In	this	second	round	the	voters	just	have	to	express	their	preferences	for	one	of	the	two	candidates	to	become	the	mayor	of	the	city,	and	 not	 anymore	 for	 the	 City	 Council	 members.	 Except	 in	 very	 exceptional	cases53,	the	lists	linked	to	the	elected	mayor	receive	-with	an	electoral	threshold																																																									52	Decreto	legislativo	18	agosto	2000,	n.	267	–	“Testo	unico	delle	leggi	sull'ordinamento	degli	enti	locali”.	53	There	 are	 two	 scenarios	 when	 that	 rule	 is	 not	 applied:	 either	 the	 citizens	 give	 an	 absolute	majority	to	a	different	coalition	from	that	of	the	elected	mayor;	or	the	mayor	is	elected	in	the	first	round	but	his	coalition	obtains	a	fraction	less	than	two-fifths	of	the	valid	votes.	
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of	 the	 3%	 of	 the	 votes	 for	 each	 list-	 a	 majority	 bonus	 of	 three	 fifths	 of	 the	members	of	the	City	Council.	The	most	voted	candidates	within	the	lists	linked	to	the	 elected	 mayor	 are	 elected	 into	 the	 City	 Council.	 In	 case	 that	 some	 of	 the	elected	members	resign	from	their	post,	places	would	be	covered	with	the	next	most	voted	candidate	of	the	linked	lists,	keeping	the	mayor's	political	majority	in	the	 City	 Council	 intact.	 The	 rest	 of	members	 of	 the	 City	 Council	 are	 appointed	proportionally	 -following	 the	 D’Hondt	 method54-	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 lists.	Therefore,	it	is	crucial	to	know	in	advance	the	name	of	the	mayor,	as	the	number	of	 seats	 that	correspond	 to	each	 list	 it	 is	 contingent	 to	 the	majority	bonus	 that	the	 elected	 mayor	 receives.	 That	 way	 an	 important	 opportunity	 window	 for	pacts	and	negotiations	between	the	first	and	second	round	is	created,	as	between	them	it	is	possible	to	link	new	lists	to	the	mayoral	candidate.		Every	 mayoral	 candidate	 has	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 one	 or	 more	 electoral	 lists.	 The	candidates	 for	 the	 City	 Council	 compose	 these	 lists.	 This	 link	 is	 important,	because	 in	 case	 of	 victory	 of	 a	 mayoral	 candidate;	 his	 or	 her	 list	 receives	 an	electoral	premium.	However,	 it	 is	possible	 to	vote	 for	a	mayor	and	at	 the	same	time	for	a	list	that	not	support	him	or	her	or	to	not	vote	for	any	list	at	all.	But	if	the	 voter	 expresses	 a	 preference	 for	 a	 list	 and	 not	 for	 a	 mayor,	 the	 mayoral	candidate	 receives	 the	 vote	 in	 any	 case.	Thus,	 the	 Italian	municipal	 law	allows	and	 even	 stimulates	 (Dalla	 Chiesa,	 Fernando;	 13th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	interview)	 the	 presence	 of	 independent	 lists	 that,	 although	 supporting	 the	candidate	 for	mayor	 of	 another	 list	 (normally	 party’s	 lists),	 do	 not	want	 to	 be	integrated	into	that	list.	In	big	towns,	this	system	allows	the	civic	lists	to	have	an	independent	 profile	 of	 the	 main	 list.	 Meanwhile	 civic	 lists	 in	 small	 towns	 are	forced	 to	 exist	 by	 the	 electoral	 law,	 and	 in	 those	places,	 the	parties	 are	within	those	lists	(Dalla	Chiesa,	Fernando;	13th	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	Civic	lists	 are	 either	 interested	 in	 clearly	 delineating	 that	 there	 is	 not	 a	 complete	agreement	with	the	policies	of	the	main	list,	or	in	remarking	the	kind	of	persons	or	 ideas	 that	 represent	 the	 list	 and	 support	 explicitly	 the	 candidate	 for	mayor.	Civic	 lists	 allow	 critic	 movements	 towards	 political	 parties	 to	 express	 their																																																									54 	The	 D’Hondt	 method	 is	 a	 technique	 of	 distribution	 of	 seats	 based	 on	 the	 creation	 of	coefficients.	It	divides	the	votes	each	list	has	received	by	full	numbers	up	to	the	number	of	seats	to	be	distributed.		
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concerns	and	try	to	change	part	of	the	society	through	political	influence	(Dalla	Chiesa,	 Fernando;	 13th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 But	 the	 presence	 of	these	 independent	 lists	allows	the	possibility	of	an	open	collaboration	between	the	 candidate	 and	 the	different	 lists,	without	 losing	 voters	 for	 the	mayor,	 as	 it	would	be	in	the	case	of	completely	separated	lists.	Reducing	the	potential	losses	for	 the	 mayoral	 candidate	 means	 that	 he	 has	 to	 do	 efforts	 to	 include	 the	members	in	the	coalition	but	not	necessarily	within	a	specific	list,	leaving	bigger	capacity	 of	 arrangements,	 as	 full	 agreements	 are	 not	 necessary.	 This	 situation	allows	the	presence	of	several	independent	lists.	For	example	in	the	elections	of	Milan	 in	 June	2016,	 there	were	9	 candidates	 for	 the	position	of	mayor	but	 the	number	of	lists	rose	up	to	17.		The	 electoral	 law	 permits	 to	 establish	 pacts	 between	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	round.	The	article	72.7	of	 the	 law	says	that	successful	candidates	on	the	ballot,	despite	 having	 run	 for	 an	 established	 coalition	 of	 lists,	 have	 the	 right,	 within	seven	 days	 from	 the	 first	 vote,	 to	 declare	 the	 connection	with	 other	 lists	 than	those	with	which	 they	were	 connected	 in	 the	 first	 round.	 This	 allows	 the	 two	contenders	in	the	second	round	to	look	for	the	support	of	other	candidates	not	able	 to	achieve	passing	 to	 the	second	round.	Also,	 it	permits	 the	existence	of	a	negotiation	time	between	the	two	rounds	of	the	elections,	possibly	enlarging	the	electoral	 coalition.	Thus,	 those	newcomers	will	be	 considered	 in	 the	 same	way	than	the	previous	lists	in	the	distribution	of	the	seats	in	the	City	Council,	in	case	their	mayoral	candidate	wins	the	second	round.			The	City	Council	is	jointly	elected	with	the	mayor	every	five	years.	It	is	the	top-tier	administrative	body	of	the	municipality	of	Milan,	and	the	mayor	of	Milan	and	48	members	composes	it.	It	is	in	charge	of	the	legislatives	acts	of	the	city	as	well	as	 the	 control	 of	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 City	 Government.	 The	 governing	 coalition	always	has	29	seats	of	 the	48,	and	despite	 the	mayor	not	being	member,	he	or	she	has	the	right	to	attend	all	sessions	and	to	vote.	Additionally,	all	the	defeated	mayoral	candidates	that	obtained	over	3%	of	the	votes	are	automatically	elected	members	 of	 the	 City	 Council.	 Its	 political	 relevance	 is	 high,	 because	 the	 City	Council	can	remove	the	mayor	from	his	or	her	functions	through	a	motion	of	no	
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confidence,	if	necessary.	In	this	case	also	the	City	Council	seizes	all	activities	and	new	elections	are	being	called.		
4.4	The	elections.		The	first	round	of	the	municipal	elections	in	the	city	of	Milan	were	held	the	5th	of	June	 2011,	 and	 counted	 with	 the	 9	 mayoral	 candidates	 and	 17	 lists	 linked	 to	those	 candidates.	 Each	 of	 the	 candidates	 was	 linked	 to	 one	 single	 list	 except	Giuseppe	Sala	who	was	linked	to	four	and	Stefano	Parisi	linked	to	six	lists.		The	mayoral	candidates	were:	
• Nicoló	Mardegan.	
• Natale	Azzaretto.	
• Marco	Cappato.	
• Basilio	Vincenzo	Rizzo.	
• Luigi	Santambrogio.	
• Gianluca	Corrado.	
• Maria	Teresa	Baldini.	
• Stefano	Parisi.	
• Giuseppe	Sala.		The	surveys	conducted	before	the	elections	were	consistently	featuring	Giuseppe	Sala	 in	a	preeminent	position.	Since	his	declaration	as	the	centre-left	candidate	he	had	been	leading	the	polls	in	front	of	the	candidate	of	the	centre-right	and	the	other	 favourite	 for	 the	 elections,	 Stefano	 Parisi.	 However,	 Sala’s	 initial	 lead	constantly	reduced	as	the	election	day	was	arriving	[see	table	19].		Table	19.	Opinion	polling	Milan	local	elections	2016.	
Date Poll ing f irm Sala Parisi  Corrado 
Other
s Lead 
9–17 May 2016 Demos&Pi 39.2 35.8 13.3 11.7 2.4 
11 May 2016 Tecnè 37.5 37.0 18.2 1.9 0.5 
5–6 May 2016 Quorum 38.5 35.2 14.1 12.2 3.2 
4–6 May 2016 Index Research 38.5 38.0 16.0 7.5 0.5 
2–5 May 2016 ScenariPolitici 38.5 37.0 15.5 9.0 1.5 
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2 May 2016 Tecnè 38.0 37.5 16.5 8.0 0.5 
27 Apr 2016 Tecnè 38.0 37.9 15.0 3.3 0.1 
20–22 Apr 
2016 ScenariPolitici 39.5 37.0 15.0 8.5 2.5 
18 Apr 2016 Tecnè 38.0 38.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 
16 Apr 2016 SWG 47.0 36.0 12.0 5.0 11.0 
16 Apr 2016 Ipsos 38.8 37.1 16.5 7.6 1.7 
4–8 Apr 2016 Index Research 37.0 36.0 14.0 13.0 1.0 
12 Apr 2016 Eurometra 33.0 30.0 19.0 18.0 3.0 
7 Apr 2016 Demopolis 40.0 37.0 14.0 9.0 3.0 
1 Apr 2016 Termometropolitico 40.5 35.5 12.0 12.0 5.0 
29 Mar 2016 Tecné 38.0 35.0 18.0 16.0 3.0 
17 Mar 2016 Tecné 38.0 34.0 6.0 23.0 4.0 
10–11 Mar 
2016 Index Research 42.0 35.0 N/A 23.0 7.0 
25 Feb 2016 Tecné 37.0 33.0 17.0 13.0 4.0 Source:	sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it	(Governo	Italiano).		The	results	of	the	mayoral	candidates	were	very	diverse.	Some	of	them	were	able	to	achieve	a	considerable	popular	support,	like	Parisi	and	Sala,	meanwhile	others	did	not	even	arrive	to	1%	of	the	votes.	Giuseppe	Sala	received	224.156	votes	for	the	 position	 of	 mayor,	 that	 is,	 41,7%	 of	 the	 total	 votes,	 and	 finishing	 in	 first	position,	although	not	reaching	the	absolute	majority	of	the	votes.	Those	results	of	 the	 vote	made	 it	 necessary	 for	 the	 centre-left	 coalition	 and	 its	 candidate	 to	prepare	 for	 the	 second	round	of	 the	municipal	elections.	 In	 that	 second	round,	they	 were	 facing	 Stefano	 Parisi,	 the	 centre-right	 candidate,	 who	 received	219.218	votes,	representing	40,78%	of	the	total	votes.	The	surveys	predicted	the	victory	of	Sala,	however,	the	two	top	contenders	were	much	closer	in	votes	than	the	 surveys	 were	 predicting	 before	 the	 election.	 Thus,	 without	 a	 mayoral	candidate	 reaching	 the	absolute	majority	of	 the	votes,	 the	 second	 round	of	 the	elections	to	decide	who	would	be	the	mayor	of	Milan	became	necessary.		The	other	candidates	received	the	following	results:		
• Gianluca	Corrado:	54.099	votes,	10,06%.	
• Basilio	Vincenzo	Rizzo:	19.143	votes,	3,56%.	
• Marco	Cappato:	10.104	votes,	1,88%.	
• Nicoló	Mardegan:	6.018	votes	1,12%.	
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• Natale	Azzaretto:	2.220	votes,	0,41%.	
• Luigi	Santambrogio:	1.483	votes,	0,28%.	
• Maria	Teresa	Baldini:	1.143	votes,	0,21%.		As	mentioned	before,	the	electoral	law	favours	the	existence	of	broad	coalitions	around	 the	 more	 strong	 candidates	 for	 the	 position	 of	 mayor.	 Using	 this	possibility,	four	lists	supported	Giuseppe	Sala’s	candidature.	Those	lists	were:		
• Partito	Democratico	per	Beppe	Sala	Sindaco.	
• Italia	Dei	Valori	Per	Beppe	Sala	Sindaco.	
• Sinistra	X	Milano.	
• Beppe	Sala	Sindaco	Noi	Milano.		The	electoral	support	of	these	lists	was	quite	different.	Meanwhile	the	list	of	the	Partito	Democratico	reached	almost	29%	of	the	votes,	the	list	of	Italia	dei	Valori	received	 less	 than	 0,70%	 of	 popular	 support.	 The	 two	 lists	 not	 directly	 linked	with	 any	 political	 party,	 Sinistra	 per	 Milano	 and	 the	 list	 Beppe	 Sala	 Sindaco,	received	3,83	and	7,68%	of	 the	votes,	both	clearly	with	more	support	 than	 the	list	 supported	 by	 a	 party,	 such	 as	 Italia	 dei	 Valori.	 Consequently	 with	 those	results,	all	 the	 lists	 that	supported	Giuseppe	Sala	as	candidate,	except	 for	 Italia	dei	 Valori,	 reached	 the	 electoral	 barrier	 of	 3%	 of	 the	 votes	 indicated	 in	 the	electoral	law	as	necessary	to	allow	members	in	the	City	Council.		The	two	weeks	between	the	first	and	the	second	round	of	elections	allowed	the	candidates	to	look	for	extra	support	from	the	defeated	candidates.	The	fact	that	the	 distance	 between	 Sala	 and	 Parisi	 was	 so	 small	 made	 those	 contacts	 even	more	 important.	 Sala	was	able	 to	 retain	 the	 support	of	Marco	Cappato	and	his	Radicals,	as	well	as	Basilio	Rizzo.	The	second	round	of	the	elections	took	place	on	the	19th	of	June,	and	ended	with	the	election	of	Giuseppe	Sala	as	mayor	of	Milan	with	 a	 total	 of	 264.481	 of	 the	 votes	 against	 247.052	 of	 Stefano	 Parisi,	 that	 is,	51,7%	over	48,3%.			
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4.5	The	Movimento	Aracione.		The	Movimento	Arancione	is	a	movement	interested	in	the	active	participation	of	the	 citizens	 in	 public	 matters	 (Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	interview).	It	is	concerned	with	issues	like	the	environment,	the	egalitarianism,	a	sustainable	 and	 habitable	 city,	 the	 involvement	 of	 people	 in	 managing	 the	common	 goods,	 and	 decent	 public	 services	 for	 all	 citizens.	 Originally,	 it	 was	founded	and	driven	by	a	group	of	people	who	were	previously	 fighting	 for	 the	survival	 of	 the	 public	 education	 system.	 The	 debates	 generated	 within	 the	“Committee	 for	 the	 Defence	 of	 the	 Public	 School”	 end	 up	 generating	 the	conviction	among	the	members	of	the	committee	that	something	had	to	change	in	Milano	 (Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 They	wanted	the	 regeneration	 of	 the	 civic	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 city	 and	 for	 that	 they	jumped	 from	 their	 initially	 limited	 protest	 to	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 project	(Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 They	 saw	 in	 Giuliano	Pisapia	the	right	candidate	to	implement	those	ideals	and	when	they	started	to	encounter	people	interested	in	participating	in	the	transformation	of	the	city,	the	school	movement	 shaped	 from	 its	 original	 purpose	 into	 an	 electoral	 machine,	that	is,	into	the	Movimento	Arancione	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	 Fighting	 for	 their	 idea	 of	 community	 the	 movement	 significantly	boosted	Pisapia’s	 campaign.	Being	very	active,	 the	movement’s	members	acted	as	volunteers	 in	 the	2011	elections	to	help	switching	the	political	colour	of	 the	city	 after	 twenty	 years.	 People	 were	 so	 convinced	 about	 the	 possibility	 to	implement	their	ideals,	that	the	“Committee	for	the	Defence	of	the	Public	School	of	 the	 area	3	 of	Milan”	was	 automatically	 transformed	 into	Pisapia’s	 campaign	committee	 for	 that	area	 (Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	 June	2016,	personal	 interview).	They	 passed,	 in	 a	 very	 natural	 way,	 from	 being	 one	 thing	 to	 being	 another,	because	they	felt	that	transforming	themselves	in	an	electoral	tool	was	the	best	way	to	help	the	feeling	of	change	growing	all	over	the	city	(Ibid.).			Since	it	was	very	linked	to	Pisapia’s	project,	the	Movimento	Arancione	had	to	face	a	 big	 dilemma	when	 he	 decided	 not	 to	 run	 for	 the	 position	 of	mayor	 of	Milan	again.	Potentially	a	very	active	movement	in	Milan’s	local	politics,	the	Movimento	
Arancione	lacks	a	formal	organization	and	in	the	words	of	Dalla	Chiesa:	“the	only	
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social	movements	that	survive	in	time,	are	those	that	are	organized	and	have	a	structure”	(13th	of	June	2016,	personal	interview).	An	undeniable	fact	for	him	is	that,	 “with	 a	 permanent	 structure	 the	 possibilities	 of	 success	 from	 social	movements	 exist,	 without	 it	 no”	 (13th	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 The	members	 of	 the	 movement	 were	 aware	 that	 with	 the	 negative	 of	 Pisapia	 to	continue	 as	 a	 candidate	 they	 were	 facing	 a	 critical	 point	 and	 they	 needed	 to	decide	 the	 options	 they	 had	 (Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	interview).	 Thus,	 an	 internal	 debate	 about	 continuing	 their	 activities	 arose,	 as	there	were	members	that	they	did	not	feel	recognized	in	the	new	project	of	the	centre-left	 coalition.	 The	 continuity	 of	 the	 Movimento	 Arancione	 was	 no	 not	assured,	 but	 if	 social	 movements	 are	 temporal,	 there	 is	 no	 possible	accountability	 regarding	 the	 promises	 expressed	 by	 the	 candidate	 they	 are	supporting.	 Moreover,	 without	 a	 detailed	 monitoring	 of	 the	 activities	 of	politicians	 by	 social	 entities,	 there	 is	 no	 future	 electoral	 penalization	 over	candidates	that	have	broken	their	promises	(Dalla	Chiesa,	Fernando;	13th	of	June	2016,	 personal	 interview).	 The	 continuity	 of	 the	 movement,	 was	 so,	 required	necessary	by	 its	members,	 but	 they	 still	 needed	 to	decide	 the	way	 they	would	participate.			In	the	interview	with	Gad	Lerner	he	highlights	that	the	Movimento	Arancione	 is	not	composed	of	many	people,	but	they	are	nevertheless	very	active	(9th	of	June	2016;	personal	 interview).	They	are	a	group	of	people	able	 to	activate	political	campaigns	mobilizing	citizens	and	attracting	a	lot	of	attention	(Lerner,	Gad	Eitan;	9th	 of	 June	 2016;	 personal	 interview).	 According	 to	 him,	 the	 Movimento	
Arancione	is	built	on	three	different	components,	which	allows	it	to	be	a	group	of	people	inspired	by	leftist	ideals	and	at	the	same	time	an	inclusive	movement	able	to	incorporate	persons	beyond	any	ideology.	Each	component	corresponds	to	a	specific	group	of	people	with	defined	features.	The	first	component	corresponds	to	the	group	of	the	former	communists	and	former	socialists	that	do	not	accept	the	moderation	of	the	rest	of	the	left.	Inspired	by	the	partisan	ideals	of	resistance	and	egalitarianism,	they	are	ready	to	fight	against	what	they	consider	unfair.	This	group	 is	 the	 one	 that	 gives	more	 importance	 to	 the	 social	 policies,	 as	 it	 is	 the	component	 of	 the	 traditional	 left.	 They	 do	 not	 consider	 that	 its	 political	
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principles	have	to	be	left	behind	despite	not	being	so	popular	nowadays	as	they	were	 in	 other	 times.	 The	 second	 component	 corresponds	 to	 the	 people	 with	strong	 libertarian	 ideals.	 It	 is	 basically	 fed	 by	 the	 new	 ideals	 of	 a	 community,	where	 working	 as	 a	 volunteer	 means	 working	 for	 the	 common	 goods.	 These	people	want	 to	be	 free	and	not	 constrained	by	 the	 institutional	powers.	At	 the	same	 time,	 they	 are	 open	 to	 involve	 themselves	 in	 solving	 problems	 of	 the	society	 in	which	 there	are	 living.	The	 last	 component	 is	 the	 solidarity	with	 the	members	of	the	judiciary	that	fights	against	the	institutional	corruption	and	the	mafias55.	 The	 people	 from	 this	 group	 follow	 the	 ideal	 of	 a	 republican	 society	where	 the	 rules	have	a	meaning	and	not	 following	 it	 have	 consequences.	They	believe	 in	 the	 meritocracy	 where	 the	 people	 can	 freely	 live	 and	 prosper	 in	relation	with	their	capacities	and	their	work,	without	being	worried	to	suffer	a	state	 on	 bribes	 and	 dark	 loyalties.	 This	 one	 is	 a	 very	 bourgeois	 component,	composed	of	 intellectuals	 and	members	 from	 the	universities	who	believe	 that	the	respect	for	the	legality	must	be	a	goal	to	be	pursued	in	Italia.	Those	all	three	components	are	what	give	to	the	Movimento	Arancione	its	particular	features	of	a	movement	based	on	the	free	common	city.		At	 the	 moment	 of	 choosing	 the	 candidate	 for	 the	 centre-left	 coalition	 for	 the	municipal	 elections	of	2016	 in	Milan,	 the	majority	of	 leaders	of	 the	Movimento	
Arancione	 supported	 Francesca	 Balzani	 because	 she	 best	 represented	 the	continuity	of	 the	social	project	started	with	Pisapia	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	 June	2016,	 personal	 interview).	 The	 final	 designation	 of	Giuseppe	 Sala	 as	 candidate	thus	 produced	 several	 tensions	 within	 the	 movement	 and	 with	 the	 PD.	 The	
Movimento	Arancione	expected	someone	as	candidate	of	the	centre-left	coalition	who	 was	 from	 within	 the	 original	 project,	 and	 Sala	 was	 clearly	 an	 outsider	(Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 This	 new	 situation	necessitated	a	reflection	within	the	movement	to	decide	the	next	steps	to	follow.	Also,	the	relationship	with	the	PD	had	to	be	reevaluated	as	the	chosen	candidate	had	a	different	political	profile	than	Pisapia	and	was	not	anymore	so	close	to	the	ideals	 of	 the	 movement.	 For	 the	 Paolo	 Limonta,	 one	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	movement,	Sala	had	too	liberal	positions	in	several	political	issues	and	was	thus																																																									55	Like	for	instance	the	judges	of	Mani	Pulite.	
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initially	considered	not	good	enough	to	represent	the	ideals	of	the	movement	(24	of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 This	 made	 it	 complicated	 to	 create	 an	agreement	of	 collaboration	between	 the	PD	and	 the	Movimento	Arancione.	 The	last	ones	were	 finally	 contemplating	various	options,	 from	 integration	 in	Sala’s	list,	 to	 creating	 their	 own	 candidature	 to	 compete	 with	 him,	 passing	 from	different	kinds	of	external	alliance	like	giving	him	public	support	or	just	to	some	of	his	political	proposals.			After	talking	several	times	with	the	chosen	candidate	of	the	centre-left	coalition,	the	majority	 of	 the	Movimento	Arancione	 decided	 to	 support	 Giuseppe	 Sala	 as	their	mayoral	 candidate.	 Both	parties	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 know	each	other	better	and	to	arrive	to	the	conclusion	that	an	understanding	was	the	best	for	all,	and	the	best	option	to	maximize	the	electoral	results.	In	these	talks	the	arancione	could	observe	the	personal	interest	of	the	candidate	to	keep	working	the	social	aspects	of	the	project	of	Pisapia	which	they	perceived	as	very	important	for	their	concept	of	the	city:	a	big	interaction	between	politics	and	the	politicians	with	the	citizens	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	 June	2016,	personal	 interview).	Some	leaders	of	the	movement	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 despite	 Sala	 not	 being	 their	 candidate	 of	choice,	once	they	decided	to	support	a	candidate	 for	the	primaries,	 they	had	to	be	 loyal	 and	 available	 for	 the	 final	 winner	 (Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	personal	interview).	The	electoral	calculus	helped	also	to	achieve	an	agreement	between	both	parts	as	for	the	members	of	the	movement;	Giuseppe	Sala	was	the	only	real	alternative	to	beat	the	centre-right	candidate,	Stefano	Parisi	(Limonta,	Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 Moreover,	 the	 manifesto	 of	 the	candidature	 was	 made	 collectively,	 including	 the	 ideas	 of	 several	 encounters	with	 citizens	 that	 wanted	 to	 discuss	 it.	 This	 led	 the	 program	 being	 fully	supported	 by	 all	members	 of	 the	 coalition	 and	 consequently	 all	 of	 them	were	capable	to	defend	it	(Ibid.).	It	is	important	to	notice	the	existence	of	the	previous	collaborative	culture	between	the	movement	and	the	parties,	which	was	crucial	to	achieve	this	 final	agreement.	The	fact	that	both	parties	knew	each	other	and	their	modus	 operandi	was	 a	 powerful	 incentive	 to	 reduce	 the	 uncertainties	 of	future	 behaviours.	 The	 relationships	within	 the	 coalition	were	 very	 good,	 and	five	years	working	together	helped	to	recognize	the	work	done	by	the	different	
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members,	 parts	 and	 personalities	 (Limonta,	 Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	interview).		The	final	configuration	of	the	agreement	was	that	the	members	of	the	Movimento	
Arancione	would	have	 their	own	 list	but	supporting	Sala	as	mayoral	candidate.	This	list	was	called	“Sinistra	per	Milano”,	and	was	formed	by	several	figures	that	had	previously	been	working	in	Pisapia’s	project.	For	Limonta,	“the	list	allowed	some	people	to	vote	for	Sala	that	otherwise	would	not	have	done	it”	(24	of	June	2016,	 personal	 interview).	 For	 him,	 the	 list	 Sinistra	 per	Milano	was	 necessary	because	Sala	was	not	seen	well	by	the	leftist	citizens	(Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	June	2016,	personal	interview)	and	with	this	list	the	movement	wanted	to	include	the	voters	 they	 thought	 they	could	represent.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	at	 the	 time	of	the	 negotiations	 Sala	 was	 clearly	 leading	 the	 surveys	 over	 Parisi,	 made	 both	parts	 believe	 that	 the	 collaboration	was	not	 crucial	 from	 the	 electoral	 point	 of	view,	 as	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 surveys	 was	 much	 greater	 of	 what	 the	 Movimento	
Arancione	 could	a	priori	 contribute	 (Limonta,	Paolo;	24	of	 June	2016,	personal	interview).	 The	 final	 results	 of	 the	 elections,	 where	 Sala	 and	 Parisi	 were	separated	by	less	than	1%	of	the	votes,	showed	that	the	reached	agreement	was	more	important	that	the	parties	thought	at	the	time	of	the	negotiations	(Limonta,	Paolo;	 24	 of	 June	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 Therefore,	 the	 list	was	 especially	useful	for	the	second	round,	as	a	lot	of	leftist	voters	were	pushed	to	vote	for	Sala	due	 to	 the	 support	 and	 the	 public	 acts	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 list	 Sinistra	 per	Milano	(Ibid.).		
4.6	The	Partito	Democratico.	The	Partito	Democratico	(PD)	was	founded	on	October	14th	2007	as	a	result	of	a	merger	 of	 various	 centre-left	 parties.	 The	 project	 started	 after	 a	 previous	partnership	in	several	electoral	coalitions	between	centre-left	parties	under	the	name	of	“Ulivo”	or	“L'Unione”,	creating	a	collaboration	culture	between	the	elites	of	the	various	parties.	The	two	main	parties	that	lead	the	creation	of	the	PD	were	the	 “Margherita”	 a	 social-Christian	party	heirs	of	 the	 left-wing	members	of	 the	once	hegemonic	“Democrazia	Cristiana”;	and	the	“Democratici	di	Sinistra”,	heirs	
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of	the	powerful	Italian	Communist	Party56.	The	PD	was	the	main	centre-left	party	in	 Italy	at	 the	moment	of	 the	municipal	elections	of	2016.	The	PD	was	not	 just	member	of	the	coalition	that	was	ruling	the	city	of	Milan	with	Giuliano	Pisapia,	but	 it	was	 also	 the	party	 in	 Italy	with	most	 voters	 and	members	 in	 the	 Italian	Parliament	 at	 that	 time57.	 At	 national	 level	 the	 PD	 was	 leading	 a	 coalition	government	with	the	New	Center	Right	and	the	Centrists	for	Italy.	The	PD	leader	Matteo	Renzi,	elected	national	secretary	in	2013,	was	the	Italian	Prime	Minister	and	the	most	important	political	figure	at	that	moment.			The	PD	was	leading	the	centre-left	coalition	in	the	city	of	Milan	in	2016,	not	just	from	the	political	point	of	view,	but	also	in	terms	of	organization.	The	PD	was	the	main	supplier	of	campaign	resources	to	the	centre-left	project.	The	organization	of	 the	electoral	 campaign	 in	2016	was	very	different	 from	the	one	 in	2011.	On	the	one	hand,	the	campaign	lead	by	Pisapia	in	2011	included	much	more	external	actors,	such	as	social	movements	like	the	Movimento	Arancione,	in	the	campaign	structure.	Pietro	Bussolati,	head	of	 the	PD	 in	Milan58,	defined	 it	as	a	“campaign	with	 parties,	 but	without	 using	 the	 parties’	 structures”	 (Bussolati,	 Pietro;	 6	 of	July	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 Instead,	 Sala’s	 campaign	 in	 2016	 used	more	 of	the	 personal	 resources	 of	 the	 PD.	 The	 PD	 was	 very	 involved	 in	 the	 mayoral	campaign;	putting	its	electoral	resources	to	win	the	mayoral	competition	instead	of	running	a	specific	campaign	for	its	own	list	(Bussolati,	Pietro;	6	of	July	2016,	personal	interview).	The	members	of	Sala’s	campaign	core	were	almost	entirely	members	 of	 the	 PD;	 meanwhile	 with	 Pisapia’s	 campaign	 the	 members	 were	mainly	 external	 (Bussolati,	 Pietro;	 6	 of	 July	 2016,	 personal	 interview).	 In	 fact,	this	 close	 interrelationship	between	Sala’s	 campaign	and	 the	PD	was	 so	 strong	that	it	was	not	possible	anymore	to	distinguish	between	the	campaign	structure	and	the	party	structure.	Moreover,	 the	PD	headquarters	were	effectively	 inside	Sala’s	 campaign	 offices	 during	 the	 electoral	 period	 (Bussolati,	 Pietro;	 6	 of	 July	2016,	personal	interview).	
																																																								56 	The	 other	 parties	 were:	 Southern	 Democratic	 Party	 (centrist);	 Sardinia	 Project	 (social-democratic);	European	Republicans	Movement	(social-liberal);	Democratic	Republicans	(social-liberal);	Middle	Italy	(centrist);	and	Reformist	Alliance	(social-democratic).	57	Chamber	of	Deputies	and	Senate.	58	Secretary	of	the	PD	of	the	metropolitan	area	of	Milan.	
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		Despite	the	PD	being	strongly	 involved	 in	Sala’s	electoral	campaing,	 it	was	also	running	with	its	own	list	for	the	City	Council.	Pierfrancesco	Majorino,	the	rival	of	Sala	 in	 the	 primaries	 elections,	 headed	 this	 list.	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 rival	 of	 the	mayoral	candidate	had	such	a	relevant	position	was	seen	as	a	way	to	win	back	leftist	voters	for	the	coalition	(Comincini,	Eugenio;	28th	of	June	2016).	Using	the	figure	of	Majorino	was	a	way	to	create	a	link	for	them	with	Pisapia’s	project	and	to	highlight	the	left	essence	of	the	new	project.		
4.7	Basilio	Rizzo	and	“Milano	in	Comune”.	After	the	first	round	of	the	elections	the	campaign	of	Sala	started	conversations	with	another	candidate,	Basilio	Rizzo,	to	obtain	his	support	in	the	second	round.	Basilio	Rizzo	had	been	the	president	of	the	City	Council	of	Milan	between	2011	and	2016	and	member	of	the	Movimento	Arancione.	He	was	supported	by	the	list	“Milano	in	Comune”	in	2016,	a	mix	of	people	from	the	Communist	Refoundation	Party,	 and	 some	 people	 from	 the	Movimento	 Arancione	 that	 did	 not	 consider	Giuseppe	 Sala	 as	 the	 right	 candidate	 to	 keep	 working	 on	 the	 citizen	 project	started	by	Giuliano	Pisapia.		Rizzo	was	originally	part	of	the	Movimento	Arancione	and,	despite	being	loyal	to	the	mayor	Pisapia	and	his	 city	government;	he	was	shaping	his	own	profile	by	criticizing	 certain	 decisions	 of	 Pisapia’s	 government.	 In	 that	 respect,	 he	 had	 a	leftist	profile	and	he	considered	that	the	coalition	was	turning	too	much	towards	the	centre.	So,	instead	of	deciding	to	run	along	with	the	majority	of	the	members	of	 the	movement	 in	 the	 list	 “Sinistra	 per	Milano”,	 he	 created	 his	 own	 list	with	himself	 as	 mayoral	 candidate.	 The	 list	 and	 the	 project	 of	 “Milano	 in	 Comune”	were	defined	by	its	own	members59	as	heirs	of	the	change	that	started	in	2011.	That	 is,	 the	 citizen	movement	 that	 supported	 Giuliano	 Pisapia:	 the	Movimento	
Arancione.	Milano	in	Comune	is,	in	its	own	words,	a	new	plural	proposal	from	the	left:	secular,	civic	and	environmental.	However,	the	project	is	described	more	as	a	common	space	than	as	a	party,	putting	special	emphasis	on	the	participation	of																																																									59	http://milanoincomune.it/milano-in-comune/	
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the	citizens.	Their	members	want	to	“collect	the	best	of	2011’s	experience”	and	go	beyond	in	what	was	still	unfinished	of	that	project.	In	fact,	they	used	in	their	electoral	advertisements	 the	mythical	meeting	of	Piazza	Duomo	 in	2011,	when	the	citizen’s	support	for	Giuliano	Pisapia	seemed	unstoppable.	Its	motto	was	“the	hope	 for	 change60”.	Using	 this	 slogan	 as	 a	way	 to	 connect	with	 the	 voters	 that	saw	Pisapia’s	project	as	a	way	to	change	the	traditional	policies	implemented	by	the	right	parties.			In	the	first	round	of	the	mayoral	elections	of	2016	Rizzo	received	19.143	votes	in	the	first	round,	up	to	3,56%	of	the	total.	Consequently,	he	was	unable	to	go	to	the	second	round	as	two	other	candidates	received	more	votes.	Even	thought	3,56%	could	seem	a	small	number	compared	to	the	40%	of	Sala	and	Parisi,	Rizzo	got	a	bigger	percentage	of	public	support	than	the	gap	between	Sala	and	Parisi	in	the	first	 round	 (0,9%).	He	was	 the	 fourth	most	 voted	 candidate	 after	 the	 two	 that	would	 pass	 to	 the	 second	 round	 and	 the	 candidate	 of	 the	 5	 Stars	 Movement	(Movimento	5	Stelle).	Thus,	the	quantity	of	votes	he	received,	the	fact	that	the	5	Stelle	decided	to	not	endorse	any	other	candidate	and	the	equilibrium	of	forces	between	 the	 two	 principal	 candidates,	made	Rizzo	 an	 important	 and	 the	most	desired	piece.	The	fact	that	Rizzo	had	collaborated	in	the	past	with	the	centre-left	coalition	made	him	a	potential	ally	in	the	second	round	of	the	elections	for	Sala,	but	the	endorsement	was	not	taken	for	granted.	Few	days	after	the	first	round,	both	 teams	 had	 a	 meeting	 to	 make	 the	 endorsement	 of	 Rizzio	 towards	 Sala	possible,	but	the	result	was	not	very	satisfactory	for	any	party.	In	fact,	Rizzo	said	that	“non	do	indicazioni	di	voto	per	la	lista,	ho	sempre	detto	che	gli	elettori	sono	liberi”	 (Corriere	 della	 Sera,	 17th	 of	 June	 201661)	 denying	 any	 possible	 public	endorsement	of	Sala.	Howerver,	he	pointed	out	that			 “non	 vi	 sarà	 alcuna	 trattativa	 e	 tanto	 meno	 apparentamento	 e	 che	 la	conquista	del	 voto	 libero	degli	 elettori	di	Milano	 in	Comune	 resta	nella	capacità	 di	 sussumere	 nel	 ballottaggio	 parte	 delle	 proposte	 già	 note	 in	tema	 di	 valorizzazione	 del	 lavoro	 pubblico	 e	 della	 qualità	 dei	 servizi																																																									60	Electoral	leaflet	for	the	2016	Milan	municipal	elections.	61 	http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml	
Chapter	Four.	The	case	of	the	city	of	Milan.		
	 112	
comunali,	 salvaguardia	 del	 patrimonio	 comunale,	 impegni	 di	 spesa	concreti	sulle	periferie	e	sulla	casa,	l’attenzione	alla	salute	dei	cittadini	e	come	 rendere	 amichevole	 e	 attrattiva	 Milano	 per	 studenti	 e	 giovani	lavoratori.”62		At	 the	 time	 of	 negotiations	 Rizzo	 had	 already	 assured	 his	 presence	 in	 the	 City	Council	under	the	rule	that	any	mayoral	candidate	that	receives	more	than	3%	of	the	votes	and	is	not	elected	mayor,	becomes	part	of	it.	Thus,	in	the	possible	pact	with	 Sala	 between	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	 rounds	 of	 the	 elections,	 the	appointments	 were	 not	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 Rizzo.	 However,	 he	 was	 indeed	interested	 in	 reaching	 an	 agreement	 about	 the	 future	 implementation	 of	 some	social	 policies	 by	 the	 new	 City	 Government.	 This	 was	 a	 clear	 case	 of	 policy	seeking	over	office	seeking.	His	statement	opened	a	door	to	achieve	an	agreement	between	both	parts	only	if	Sala	accepted	some	of	the	ideas	defended	by	Milano	in	Comune.	 Sala	 stressed	 the	 following	 days	 his	 positive	 position	 about	 some	 of	Rizzo’s	claims	and	Rizzo	ended	saying	that,		 “Non	 voglio	 che	 ritorni	 a	 governare	 il	 centrodestra	 nella	 nostra	 città.	Parisi	 è	 il	 candidato	 del	 centrodestra	 e	 quindi	 per	 me	 è	 meglio	 che	governi	 Sala,	 al	 quale	 sarò	 comunque	 all’opposizione,	 piuttosto	 che	 il	centrodestra	 che	 ho	 conosciuto	 e	 non	 voglio	 tornare	 alla	 situazione	precedente	 il	 2011.	 Quindi	 voterò	 Sala.”	 (Repubblica,	 17th	 of	 June	2016).63		That	was	 a	 public	 endorsement	without	 asking	 his	 voters	 explicitly	 to	 vote	 for	Sala,	as	he	said	that	“in	quanto	lista	non	prendiamo	una	posizione”	(Corriere	della	Sera,	 17th	 of	 June	 201664).	 Sala	was	 pleased	 about	 Rizzo’s	 decision,	meanwhile	Sala’s	 opponent	 in	 the	 second	 round,	 Stefano	 Parisi,	 attacked	 Sala	 for	 that	endorsement	 trying	 to	make	 him	 seem	 allied	with	 the	 left:	 “la	 sinistra	 radicale	
																																																								62	http://milanoincomune.it/milano-in-comune-il-voto-e-gli-orientamenti/	63	http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/06/17/news/elezioni_milano_rizzo-142213118/	64 	http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml	
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vota	Sala”	(Corriere	della	Sera,	17th	of	June	201665).	Furthermore,	the	centre-right	candidate	linked	Rizzo’s	endorsement,	with	personal	appointments;	suggesting	a	classic	votes	for	offices	pact	between	Sala	and	“Milano	in	Comune”.	Parisi	claimed	that	 the	 endorsement	 of	Rizzo	was	 produced	due	 to	 the	 future	 appointment	 of	Gherardo	Colombo	as	a	president	of	a	committee	to	look	for	the	transparency	and	legality	 in	 Milan	 announced	 by	 Sala.	 In	 Parisi’s	 words:	 “Ora	 capisco	 perché	 ha	messo	Gherardo	Colombo:	non	perché	vuole	la	legalità	ma	perché	vuole	i	voti	di	Rizzo”	 (Corriere	 della	 Sera,	 17th	 of	 June	 201666).	 Gherardo	 Colombo	 a	 former	magistrate	was	 a	well-known	 public	 figure	 in	 defence	 of	 the	 legality67	and	was	asked	to	be	the	mayoral	candidate	for	part	of	the	left.	Rizzo	appreciated	publically	that	 announcement	 made	 by	 Sala,	 as	 for	 him	 Gherardo	 Colombo	 would	 have	already	been	the	candidate	of	the	left:	“Io	avrei	voluto	Colombo	come	sindaco.	È	ovvio	 che	 questo	 coinvolgimento	 rappresenta	 una	 garanzia	 più	 che	 per	 la	 mia	parte	 politica	 per	 tutti	 i	 cittadini	 milanesi”	 (Corriere	 della	 Sera,	 10th	 of	 June	2016)68.			
4.8	Summary.		This	chapter	presented	the	story	behind	the	creation	of	the	Movimento	Arancione:	from	where	it	comes,	the	importance	of	the	original	candidate	and	its	relationship	with	 the	 Partito	 Democratico.	 It	 continues	 explaining	 how	 both	 created	 an	agreement	for	a	mutual	collaboration	and	how	the	alteration	of	the	candidate	of	the	 centre-left	 coalition	 produced	 internal	 tensions	 within	 the	 Movimento	
Arancione.	 Despite	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Movimento	 Arancione	 decided	 to	collaborate	with	Giuseppe	Sala	 sharing	 the	 same	project,	part	of	 the	movement	decided	 to	create	 its	own	candidature.	The	 interests	of	 those	 two	groups	of	 the	movement	 were	 different	 and	 consequently	 their	 bargaining	 position	 was	different	too.	In	Chapter	Six	the	analysis	will	try	to	explain	using	game	theory,	the	
																																																								65 	http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml	66 	http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml	67	He	participated	in	the	anti-mafia	process	known	as	Mani	Pulite.	68 	http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/politica/16_giugno_11/colombo-dice-si-giuseppe-sala-d0b1e802-2f3a-11e6-bb6d-75d636c22361.shtml	
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different	situation	of	both	groups	and	why	one	decide	to	join	Sala	meanwhile	the	other	created	its	own	list.			 	
Chapter	Five.	
The	case	of	the	city	of	Barcelona.		After	 analysing	 the	 interaction	 existing	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	in	the	municipal	elections	of	the	city	of	Milan	in	the	year	2016,	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	events	that	took	place	in	the	elections	of	June	2015	in	the	city	 of	 Barcelona.	 In	 particular,	 the	 following	 focuses	 on	 the	 leftist	 coalition	named	“Barcelona	en	Comú”	and	its	 internal	dynamics.	This	multipart	coalition	formed	by	political	parties	and	social	movements	was	able	to	win	the	municipal	elections	 in	Barcelona	defeating	the	 incumbent	mayor.	The	project	was	 lead	by	Guanyem,	a	civic	platform	created	by	the	activist	of	“The	Plataforma	de	Afectados	por	 la	 Hipoteca”,	 a	 social	 movement	 against	 the	 housing	 eviction	 of	 needed	families	born	out	of	the	social	struggles	caused	by	the	economic	crisis.	Moreover,	the	 mayoral	 candidate	 of	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú,	 Ada	 Colau,	 was	 the	 leader	 and	spokesperson	 of	 this	 social	 movement.	 Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 the	 coalition	included	 three	 relevant	 political	 parties,	 “Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	 Verds”,	“Esquerra	 Unida	 i	 Alternativa”	 and	 “Podemos/Podem”,	 which	 accepted	 the	leading	 role	 of	 the	 social	 movement	 instead	 of	 being	 the	 main	 players	themselves,	makes	this	case	particularly	interesting.		
5.1	The	background.	The	city	of	Barcelona	is	a	major	cultural	and	economic	centre	in	south-western	Europe	 and	 known	 for	 being	 an	 open	 city	 to	 new	 trends	 (Bakici,	 Almirall,	 &	Wareham,	2013).	Barcelona	is	a	powerful	brand69	and	is	“modern,	efficient,	and	cosmopolitan”	 (McNeill,	 2005,	 p.	 1).	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world's	 leading	tourist,	economic,	trade	fair	and	cultural	centres	70.	Its	leadership	in	broad	areas	such	 higher	 education,	 entertainment	 and	 all	 kind	 of	 arts	 and	 business																																																									69 	https://web.archive.org/web/20130927073641/http://www.citymayors.com/marketing/city-brands.html	70	http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2016t.html	https://web.archive.org/web/20131010004859/http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2010t.html	
Chapter	Five.	The	case	of	the	city	of	Barcelona.		
	 116	
contribute	 to	 its	 condition	 as	 one	 of	 the	 world's	 major	 global	 cities	 (GaWC,	2012).	 The	 largest	 city	 on	 the	Mediterranean	 Sea	 is	 very	popular	 thanks	 to	 its	social	 dynamism	 and	 its	 particular	modernist	 architecture	 that	makes	 the	 city	easily	recognizable.	All	of	that	places	Barcelona	as	model	for	other	cities	that	try	to	 imitate	 its	 successful	 model.	 But	 despite	 being	 considered	 socially	 and	politically	 progressive,	 it	 has	 been	 defined	 also	 as	 very	 bourgeois	 with	 an	important	role	of	the	traditional	economic	powers	(Permanyer,	2008).		Since	the	reestablishment	of	the	democracy	in	Spain,	Barcelona	had	been	almost	exclusively	ruled	by	the	left.	The	“Partit	dels	Socialistes	de	Catalunya”	(PSC)71	has	led	 the	 coalition	governments	 in	 the	 city	 for	32	years,	 from	 the	 first	municipal	elections	 in	 1979	 until	 2011.	 During	 this	 period,	 various	 persons	 held	 the	position	of	mayor,	nonetheless	all	of	them	belonging	to	the	PSC.	Moreover,	since	the	restitution	of	 the	right	to	vote	the	PSC	had	been	the	most	voted	party	until	2011,	when	for	the	first	time	“Convergència	i	Unió”	(CiU)72	was	able	to	break	the	hegemonic	 position	 of	 the	 PSC.	 Barcelona,	 a	 city	 defined	 as	 progressive	 and	traditionally	 leftist	 from	the	sociological	point	of	view	(Balibrea,	2001),	had	for	the	first	time	a	nationalist	mayor	with	a	liberal	agenda.			In	the	first	municipal	elections	following	the	approval	of	the	Spanish	Constitution	after	the	dictatorship	of	Francisco	Franco	on	the	3rd	of	April	1979,	the	PSC	was	the	 most	 voted	 party	 in	 Barcelona	 and	 its	 candidate	 was	 able	 to	 achieve	 the	position	 of	mayor	 thanks	 to	 a	 pact	with	 the	 communist	 Catalan	 party	 PSUC73.	Narcis	Serra	was	 the	candidate	at	 that	 time,	but	 in	1982,	after	 three	and	a	half	years	as	mayor	of	Barcelona,	he	left	his	position	to	become	Minister	of	the	first	national	 government	 of	 Felipe	 Gonzalez.	 His	 substitute	 was	 Pascual	 Maragall.	Pascual	 Maragall	 was	 the	 mayor	 of	 Barcelona	 for	 15	 years	 until	 1997,	 being	crucial	 in	 the	 substantial	 transformation	 of	 the	 city	 and	 becoming	 an	 iconic	
																																																								71	Catalan	 social-democratic	 party	 linked	 with	 the	 national	 social-democratic	 party	 Partido	Socialista	Obrero	Español	(PSOE).	72	Nationalistic	party	traditionally	considered	from	the	centre-right	despite	their	interest	in	being	defined	 just	 as	 catalanistic	 and	 being	 considered	 by	 several	 of	 its	 voters	 as	 centre-left	 (Culla,	2001).	73	Partit	Socialista	Unificat	de	Catalunya	(Unified	Socialist	Party	of	Catalonia).	
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figure	for	his	successors,	no	matter	the	political	party74.	Under	his	management,	the	city	prepared	and	celebrated	the	symbolic	Olympic	Games	of	Barcelona	92’,	one	of	Maragall’s	personal	projects	that	put	him	in	a	position	of	being	considered	a	high-profile	politician,	ending	up	allowing	him	to	be	President	of	Catalonia.	His	balance	as	mayor	of	Barcelona	 included	an	 important	city	renovation	based	on	“urban	reforms,	improvement	of	the	historic	centre	and	suburbs,	construction	of	nodal	 points	 to	 decrease	 the	 traffic,	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 city's	 forgotten	 areas	such	 as	 Montjuïc,	 construction	 of	 museums,	 theatres	 and	 cultural	 centres...”	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).		After	 two	 other	 mayors	 belonging	 to	 the	 PSC	 followed	 Maragall,	 finally	 one	candidate	of	CiU	was	able	to	become	mayor	of	Barcelona	in	2011:	Xavier	Trias.	But	 breaking	 the	 dominant	 position	 of	 the	 PSC	was	 not	 an	 easy	 path	 for	 him.	Trias	was	announced	as	candidate	for	the	first	time	on	17th	of	May	2002	starting	an	electoral	campaign	that	ended	up	with	him	in	the	City	Council	 in	June	2003.	He	was	however	not	able	to	be	mayor	until	July	2011,	after	his	third	election	as	mayoral	candidate.	Only	in	2011	CiU	was	the	most	voted	party	and	was	able	to	achieve	 1575	City	 Council	members	 against	 only	 11	 of	 the	 incumbent	mayor	 of	the	PSC.	At	the	moment	to	vote	for	the	various	mayor	candidates	within	the	City	Council,	Trias	received	the	support	of	17	of	its	41	members,	more	than	any	other	candidate.	 In	 addition	 CiU’s	 15	 votes,	 the	 pro-independence	 party	 “Esquerra	Republicana	 de	 Catalunya”	 (ERC)	 with	 two	 councillors	 also	 supported	 Trias’	candidature.	 Thus	 with	 the	 minority	 support	 of	 the	 City	 Council,	 Trias	 was	elected	mayor	of	Barcelona.		Xavier	 Trias	was	 not	 a	 newcomer	 to	 politics,	 as	 he	 had	 a	 long	 political	 career	before	 his	 attempts	 to	 becoming	mayor	 of	 Barcelona.	 Trias	 had	 been	 regional	minister	 from	 1988	 to	 2000,	 and	 four	 years	 national	 MP.	 Medical	 doctor	 in	profession,	 when	 he	 entered	 politics	 in	 1981	 was	 appointed	 to	 direct	 the	construction	of	the	Catalan	public	health	system.	The	fact	that	the	Catalan	health																																																									74	For	instance,	Ada	Colau,	knowing	the	power	of	Maragall’s	figure	for	the	citizens	of	Barcelona,	said	in	the	electoral	campaign	that	he	had	been	the	best	mayor	of	the	city.	75	Originally	there	were	15	councillors	but	after	a	judicial	sentence	of	the	Spanish	Constitutional	Court	they	were	reduced	to	14.	
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system	 was	 universally	 based76	and	 internationally	 recognized	 as	 a	 model77	(Comin,	 Antoni,	 press	 interview	 in	 La	 Vanguardia;	 26th	 of	 July	 2016)78,	 made	Trias	be	known	as	the	social	democrat	of	CiU	a	label	that	he	would	never	shied	away	79.	That	reputation	was	very	useful	as	mayoral	candidate	 in	a	progressive	city	as	Barcelona.	However,	the	leftist	parties	considered	his	policies	as	mayor	as	very	liberal,	business-friendly	and	found	that	he	ignored	the	traditional	workers	neighbourhoods	 (Gomà,	 Ricard;	 personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	 2017).	Therefore,	Trias	was	perceived	by	a	big	part	of	the	citizens	as	the	mayor	of	cuts	in	the	social	policies	budget	and	of	privatizations	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016)	despite	not	 being	 necessary	 for	 budget	 reasons	 as	 the	 city	 of	 Barcelona	 had	 the	 best	financial	situation	among	the	big	cities	in	Spain	(Cid,	David;	personal	interview;	2th	February	2017).	This	situation	was	the	reason	why	several	people	from	social	movements	and	 the	 left	 started	 to	be	more	active	against	his	policies,	 thinking	about	possible	political	alternatives	 to	his	government	 (Martín,	Lucía;	personal	interview;	28th	January	2017).			
5.2	The	electoral	system.	The	Spanish	local	electoral	system	is	less	complex	than	the	Italian	one	in	terms	of	electoral	 lists	 and	 the	 elections	 have	 just	 one	 round.	 However,	 in	 Spain	 the	election	of	the	mayor	is	indirect,	that	is,	the	mayor	is	not	elected	directly	by	the	voters,	 but	 by	 the	 members	 of	 the	 City	 Council	 in	 their	 first	 meeting.	 Every	electoral	 list	 has	 the	 same	 number	 of	 positions	 in	 the	 City	 Council80	and	 is	headed	by	the	person	who	is	that	list’s	candidate	for	mayoral.	In	other	words,	the	citizens	elect	the	City	Council	and	its	members	elect	the	mayor	among	them.	This	creates	two	interesting	periods	to	achieve	pacts	between	the	various	actors:	the	first	one	before	the	elections	to	create	a	pre-electoral	coalition;	and	the	second	one	after	the	elections	to	impulse	the	formation	of	the	City	Government.																																																										76	The	system	guarantees	healthcare	to	everyone	regardless	his	or	her	personal	contributions.	77 	Recognized	 even	 for	 the	 European	 Commission:	 http://aquas.gencat.cat/en/detall/detall-noticia/Catalonia_ReferenceSite_Eng	78 	http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160726/403488086908/siete-consellers-de-salud-defienden-la-calidad-del-sistema-sanitario-catalan.html	79 	He	 openly	 defined	 himself	 as	 a	 social	 democrat:	http://www.vozbcn.com/2011/01/13/51761/trias-me-siento-socialdemocrata/	80	Barcelona’s	City	Council	has	41	members,	and	each	electoral	list	is	composed	by	41	councillors	candidates.	
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	The	Spanish	municipal	elections	are	mainly	held	under	the	rule	of	two	laws:	the	one	regarding	the	holding	of	the	elections81,	including	the	specific	procedures	for	voting	 in	 the	 local	elections;	and	 the	one	 that	specifies	 the	configuration	of	 the	municipalities82,	like	the	number	of	members	to	be	elected	and	the	procedure	of	electing	the	mayor.	Under	the	guidelines	of	the	Spanish	Constitution	the	system	pursues	the	representation	of	the	diversity	of	the	society	within	the	municipality.	Consequently,	 the	 electoral	 law	 foresees	 a	 proportional	 distribution	 of	 seats	based	 on	 the	 votes	 of	 every	 candidature.	 Besides,	 contrarily	 to	 the	 Italian	municipal	 law,	 the	 Spanish	 rules	 do	 not	 contemplate	 an	 extra	 prize	 for	 the	wining	 party	 or	 wining	 pre-electoral	 coalition.	 Nevertheless,	 often	 an	 exact	proportionality	 is	 not	 possible	 because	 these	 divisions	 produce	 fractional	numbers	 of	 seats	 (Benoit,	 2000).	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	mathematical	 formula	 to	translate	 the	 votes	 to	 the	 seats	 is	 not	 perfectly	 proportional	 and	 follows	 the	D’Hondt	 method	 which	 despite	 aiming	 to	 preserve	 proportionality	 as	 far	 as	possible	 (Schuster,	 Pukelsheim,	 Drton,	 &	 Draper,	 2003),	 partially	 favours	 the	most	voted	 lists	 to	help	 the	government’s	 formation.	The	 total	votes	casted	 for	each	party	is	divided	by	the	number	of	seats	to	distribute,	creating	thus	a	series	of	coefficients.	Posteriorly,	the	seats	are	assigned	to	the	biggest	numbers.	In	case	of	a	tie	in	these	coefficients,	the	seat	in	question	is	assigned	to	the	list	with	more	votes.	 Additionally,	 any	 candidature	 that	 overcomes	 5%	 of	 the	 votes	 in	 the	elections	is	able	to	be	part	of	the	distribution	of	seats	under	the	D’Hondt	method.	This	use	of	this	electoral	method	encourages	pre-electoral	agreements	between	parties	to	join	in	a	common	candidature.	Otherwise,	the	votes	for	each	formation	counted	separately	with	a	 logical	diminution	of	seats.	Additionally,	the	D’Hondt	method	favours	the	two	most	voted	list,	another	incentive	to	run	in	the	elections	with	 a	 pre-electoral	 coalition.	 I	 fact,	 in	 the	 elections	 of	Barcelona	 in	 2015,	 just	three	 out	 of	 seven	 formations	 that	 had	 seats	 in	 the	 City	 Council	 were	 single	parties83.		
																																																								81	Ley	Orgánica	5/1985,	de	19	de	junio,	del	Régimen	Electoral	General	(LOREG).	82	Ley	7/1985,	de	2	de	abril,	reguladora	de	las	Bases	del	Régimen	Local	(LRBRL).	83	Ciudadanos,	Partido	de	los	Socialistas	de	Catalunya	and	Partido	Popular.	
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The	 entire	 municipality	 is	 the	 same	 electoral	 constituency;	 there	 is	 no	distribution	 of	 seats	 based	 on	 the	 votes	 of	 the	 districts	 or	 neighbourhoods	despite	 Barcelona	 being	 a	 big	 city.	 Each	 candidature	 is	 composed	 by	 a	 list	 of	people	 equal	 in	 number	 of	 seats	 to	 cover	 in	 the	 City	 Council.	 These	 lists	 are	closed	and	blocked	–that	is,	it	is	not	possible	to	add	names	or	to	change	the	order	of	names-	and	the	position	of	each	person	on	the	list	is	very	relevant.	Hence,	the	first	person	of	the	list	is	by	law	the	candidate	to	the	mayoral	position	of	this	list.	If	for	any	reason	he	or	she	leaves	the	City	Council,	the	second	person	of	the	list	would	be	the	candidate;	successively	going	down	in	the	order	of	the	positions	on	the	list.	To	be	more	precise,	it	is	not	possible	to	appoint	the	number	three	of	the	list	as	mayor	meanwhile	the	persons	that	hold	place	one	and	two	are	still	in	the	City	Council.			Barcelona’s	City	Council	 is	 the	 top-tier	 administrative	body	of	 the	municipality	and	has	forty-one	members	with	a	four	years	term.	It	has	several	functions,	like	being	in	charge	of	the	legislative	acts	of	the	city	and	controlling	the	activity	of	the	City	Government.	However,	its	first	task	is	to	elect	the	mayor	and	to	do	that,	its	members	 have	 to	 choose	 amongst	 themselves.	 Candidates	 that	 can	 be	 elected	mayor	 are	 all	 the	 councillors	 that	 lead	 their	 list84.	 To	 become	 mayor,	 the	candidate	 has	 to	 achieve	 the	 absolute	majority	 of	 the	 votes	 of	 the	 councilmen,	that	 is,	 21	 out	 of	 41.	 In	 case	 that	 no	 candidate	 is	 able	 to	 achieve	 this	 absolute	majority,	the	councilman	that	led	the	most	voted	list	by	the	citizens,	is	appointed	as	 mayor85.	 Thus,	 despite	 being	 a	 proportional	 system	 with	 indirect	 mayoral	election	this	tiebreaker	rule	strengthens	the	importance	of	being	the	most	voted	list	to	be	able	to	hold	the	position	of	mayor.	This	rule	allows	the	municipality	to	elect	a	mayor	even	in	hang	City	Council	when	there	is	not	an	absolute	majority	support	 for	 any	 candidate.	 A	 minority	 local	 government	 is	 not	 blocked	 in	 its	activities,	 as	 in	 the	Spanish	 system	 the	mayor	has	 important	 competences	 that	allow	him	or	her	to	govern	in	minority	with	the	support	of	 the	other	groups	 in	the	City	Council	in	specific	matters.	The	time	elapsed	between	the	elections	and	the	first	meting	of	the	City	Council	shows	to	be	the	proper	period	to	discuss	the																																																									84	As	seen	before,	 that	post	can	be	 filled	by	other	members	of	 the	 list	 in	case	 that	 the	previous	members	are	not	anymore	in	the	City	Council.	85	This	procedure	is	regulated	in	the	article	196	of	the	LOREG.	
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support	in	the	mayoral	election	and	to	receive	in	exchange	political	positions	or	the	support	for	certain	policies.	Thus,	the	existence	of	this	transactional	moment	configures	the	investiture	as	the	authentic	second-round	of	the	mayoral	election	according	to	the	political	science	professor	Gabriel	Colomé	(personal	interview,	18th	of	May	2017).			The	mayor	is	still	part	of	the	City	Council	when	he	or	she	is	elected,	and	chairs	its	meetings.	 This	 function	 can	 however	 be	 delegated.	 The	 City	 Council	 has	 the	possibility	to	remove	the	mayor	from	his	or	her	position,	in	which	case	no	new	elections	 are	 called,	 as	 in	 the	 same	 vote	 a	 new	 mayor	 is	 also	 elected.	 The	connection	 between	 the	 Council	 and	 the	 Government	 is	 high	 and	 goes	 beyond	the	mayor’s	figure.	The	members	of	the	City	Council,	which	the	mayor	decides	to	appoint	 into	 some	 managing	 functions,	 compose	 the	 City	 Government.	 The	councilmen	do	not	lose	their	place	in	the	City	Council	when	they	are	appointed	for	these	offices	so	they	must	combine	both	positions.	Additionally,	the	mayor	is	responsible	for	appointing	deputy	mayors	that	can	directly	help	him	or	her	and	can	 coordinate	 certain	 municipal	 areas,	 creating	 important	 political	 positions	with	big	media	relevance	which	are	very	appreciated	at	the	time	of	negotiating	pre	and	post	electoral	coalitions	(Matas	Dalmases,	2015).		
5.3	The	elections.	The	last	elections	in	Barcelona	were	held	on	the	24th	of	May	2015.	That	day	the	forty-one	City	Council	members	were	elected.	703.590	residents	in	the	city	went	to	 the	 polls	 to	 express	 their	 preferences,	 representing	 about	 60,6%	 of	participation.	Barcelona	en	Comú,	the	list	led	by	the	former	activist	and	speaker	of	the	social	movement	against	the	evictions	PAH,	Ada	Colau,	was	the	most	voted	list.	This	list	received	25,21%	of	the	total	votes	from	the	citizens	of	Barcelona86	against	22,75%	of	votes	received	by	the	list	of	CiU87,	led	by	the	incumbent	mayor,	Xavier	 Trias.	 This	 difference	 in	 votes	 between	 the	 two	 most	 voted	 list	represented	11	seats	in	the	City	Council	for	Barcelona	en	Comú	and	10	seats	for																																																									86	176.612	votes.	All	the	numbers	according	the	Ministerio	del	Interior	validated	by	the	electoral	authority:	the	Junta	Electoral	Central.	87	159.393	votes.	
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CiU.	The	 former	hegemonic	party	 in	 the	city	of	Barcelona,	 the	PSC	 fell	until	 the	fifth	position	with	only	9,63%	of	the	votes	and	4	seats	in	the	City	Council88.	Other	four	political	parties	also	achieved	seats	in	the	City	Council	[see	table	20]	making	it,	with	seven	political	groups,	the	City	Council	with	the	biggest	number	of	them	since	 the	 return	 of	 the	 democracy.	 This	 political	 reality	 created	 a	 difficult	situation	 for	 the	 future	 mayor,	 since	 any	 agreement	 needs	 the	 approval	 of	several	parties.			Table	20.	Results	of	the	local	elections	in	the	Barcelona	in	2015.	
Candidatures 
 
Logo Votes % City 
Council  
members 
Barcelona en Comú 
 
176 612 25,21 11 
Convergencia i Unió 
 
159 393 22,75 10 
Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía 
 
77 272 11,03 5 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
Moviment d'Esquerres Barcelona Ciutat Oberta 
Avancem-Catalunya Sí Acord Municipal  
77 120 11,01 5 
Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña 
 
67 489 9,63 4 
Partido Popular 
 
61 004 8,71 3 
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular 
 
51 945 7,42 3 
Source:	Ministry	of	interior.		After	the	local	elections,	the	City	Council	met	to	chose	the	mayor.	The	election	of	the	mayor	was	held	the	13th	of	June	2015,	and	Ada	Colau	received	the	support	of	21	from	41	of	the	members	of	the	City	Council,	-the	minimum	absolute	majority-,	and	was	elected	the	first	female	mayor	of	Barcelona.	She	received	the	11	votes	of	her	group,	Barcelona	en	Comú,	the	5	of	the	Esquerra	Republicana	de	Catalunya	(ERC)	–a	leftist	independentist	party-,	the	4	of	the	PSC,	and	1	-of	the	3-	from	the	CUP	–an	anti-capitalist	party.	The	other	two	councilmen	of	the	CUP	voted	null	to	show	 symbolic	 options89.	 Ada	 Colau	 was	 not	 the	 only	 candidate;	 also	 other																																																									88	67.489	votes.	89	One	councilman	voted	for	the	workers	of	a	telecom	company,	and	the	other	for	the	liberation	of	the	anti-fascist	protesters	arrested.	
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candidates	 received	 votes	 from	 councillors,	 but	 simply	 the	 votes	 of	 their	 own	political	parties	[see	table	21].											Table	21.	Number	of	votes	per	mayoral	candidate	(Barcelona	2015).	
Candidate	 Votes	
Ada	Colau	(BeC)	 21	
Xavier	Trias	(CiU)	 10	
Carina	Mejías	(C’s)	 5	
Alberto	Fernández	Díaz	(PP)	 3	
Non	valid	votes	 2			The	 ceremony	 of	 election	 of	 Colau	 generated	 a	 lot	 of	 expectation	 among	 the	citizens	 and	 social	movements	 and	 it	 became	 necessary	 to	 install	 a	 big	 screen	outside	the	town	hall	to	broadcast	 it.	As	a	novelty	in	the	municipal	 institutions,	Ada	Colau	invited	various	social	movements	–such	the	PAH-	to	the	main	hall	to	show	her	intentions	to	include	social	movements	as	new	interlocutors	with	the	local	institutions	and	to	“give	visibility	to	entities	that	do	not	have	protocol	rank”	(Colau,	Ada;	La	Vanguardia;	9th	of	June	2015).			
5.4	The	pact	with	the	PSC.	When	 Ada	 Colau	 became	 mayor	 she	 had	 to	 form	 the	 government,	 a	 more	complicated	task	that	it	seems,	since	all	the	members	of	the	government	have	to	be	members	of	the	City	Council.	Initially	she	formed	a	single-party	government,	and	 just	 the	 eleven	 members	 of	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 formed	 part	 of	 it.	 That	represented	 a	 difficult	 task,	 because	 in	 addition	 of	 the	 government	responsibilities,	each	councilman	or	councilwoman	of	Barcelona	en	Comú	had	to	be	in	charge	of	one	district.	The	mayor	is	not	linked	with	any	district,	hence,	as	there	are	ten	districts	in	Barcelona,	each	member	of	the	city	Government	had	to	be	 also	 linked	 with	 one	 district,	 creating	 some	 difficulties	 in	 the	 councillors’	agendas.	 Additionally,	 the	 councillors	 are	 also	 the	 heads	 of	 several	 public	
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companies,	 the	 metropolitan	 area	 of	 Barcelona90,	 public-private	 partnership…		Thus,	 BeC	 had	 big	 problems	 to	 rule	 the	 city	 with	 so	 little	 number	 of	 city	councillors,	 and	 they	 soon	 realised	 that	 they	 needed	 more	 people	 in	 the	 City	Government	(Colomé,	Gabriel;	personal	interview;	18th	of	May	2017).			Later,	the	25th	of	May	2016,	this	situation	partially	changed	with	a	pact	between	Barcelona	en	Comú	and	the	PSC.	The	PSC	had	already	voted	for	Colau	as	mayor	almost	one	year	before,	and	with	a	compatible	ideology	and	with	a	long	expertise	within	 institutions,	 they	were	 the	 ideal	 candidates	 to	 enter	 in	 the	 government	(Andrés,	 Carmen;	 personal	 interview;	 17th	 of	 May	 2017).	 The	 PSC	 was	 not	interested	 in	 supporting	 the	 government	 of	 BeC	 from	 the	 City	 Council;	 they	wanted	to	be	included	in	the	government.	For	Gabriel	Colomé,	former	president	of	 the	 PSC	 in	 the	 City	 Council,	 this	would	 give	 them	 the	 necessary	 visibility	 to	face	 the	 elections	 and	 would	 reinforce	 their	 position	 as	 alternative	 to	 CiU	(personal	 interview;	 18th	 of	May	 2017).	 For	 the	members	 of	 the	 PSC	 the	 local	executive	is	where	it	 is	possible	to	implement	real	changes,	and	for	that	reason	they	wanted	to	run	offices	as	Carmen	Andrés	one	of	the	members	of	the	PSC	in	the	City	Government	maintains	(personal	interview;	17th	of	May	2017).			Thus,	the	four	councilmen	of	the	PSC	accepted	to	join	the	City	Government	with	Barcelona	 en	Comú.	 In	 addition,	 its	 leader,	 Jaume	Collboni,	 became	 the	 second	deputy	mayor,	 an	 important	 position	 in	 the	 City	 Government’s	 structure.	 This	agreement	 entailed	 a	 power	 redistribution	 within	 the	 government	 as	 three	deputy	mayors	of	Barcelona	en	Comú,	had	to	descend	in	the	ranking	(El	País,	10th	of	 May	 2016)	91.	 However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 entry	 of	 PSC	 into	 the	 City	Government	also	meant	having	more	room	for	manoeuvre	 for	BeC,	as	with	 the	pact	three	of	the	ten	councilmen	were	released	from	their	duties	in	the	districts.	But	 more	 important,	 the	 numbers	 of	 the	 government	 in	 the	 City	 Council	 rose	from	11	to	15.	This	still	meant	being	far	away	from	the	absolute	majority	of	21,	but	with	more	 capacity	 to	 arrive	 to	 specific	 pacts	with	 the	 rest	 of	 parties	 and	giving	more	stability	to	the	City	Government.	This	political	decision	was	seen	as																																																									90	The	Metropolitan	Area	is	an	entity	that	includes	several	municipalities	around	Barcelona	and	that	is	in	charge	of	some	relevant	policies	such	transport,	urbanism	or	economic	development.	91	http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/05/10/catalunya/1462872678_853476.html	
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an	important	step	towards	the	consolidation	of	the	leftist	project	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	An	 impulse	that	was	necessary,	since	the	City	Government	was	until	 the	entrance	of	 the	PSC	the	one	with	 the	 least	number	of	councillors	 in	democracy	(El	País,	27th	of	May	2016)92.	The	agreement	also	included	some	commissioners	in	specific	areas	and	some	other	senior	positions	in	the	city	administration93.		
5.5	The	elements	that	constitute	Barcelona	en	Comú.		Barcelona	en	Comú	is	a	citizen	platform,	formed	for	various	political	parties	and	social	movements.	Its	leaders	avoid	using	the	term	“coalition”	and	prefer	to	use	the	term	“confluence”	to	define	it.	The	document	signed	by	the	various	members	that	created	BeC	 is	named	“Agreement	of	Confluence”94	to	reinforce	 the	 idea	of	being	part	of	a	political	subject	different	to	a	political	party.	However,	despite	the	intentions	of	its	leaders	BeC	was	legally	configured	as	a	pre-electoral	coalition	to	compete	in	the	elections	of	2015	in	Barcelona.	Its	activity	started	approximately	one	 year	before,	 in	2014,	with	 the	negotiations	between	 the	 actors	wanting	 to	know	if	a	common	project	was	possible.	Barcelona	en	Comú	is	mainly	formed	by:	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	Verds,	Guanyem,	Esquerra	Unida	i	Alternativa,	Podemos,	and	 the	 support	 of	 Equo95	and	 Procés	 Constituent96 .	 But	 before	 analysing	Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 as	 uniform	 actor,	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 analyse	 the	 elements	conforming	it,	to	understand	its	internal	dynamics.		
																																																								92	http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/05/25/catalunya/1464163819_843765.html	93	Some	former	PSC	members	had	been	already	appointed	for	Barcelona	en	Comú	in	managerial	positions	before	the	pact.	For	instance	the	City	Manager,	Jordi	Martí.	94	Available	in	the	Annex.	95	Equo	is	the	result	of	joining	forces	between	various	Spanish	green	parties	in	one	single	party.	Its	 aim	 is	 to	 be	 "the	 seed	 and	 source	 of	 debate	 about	 political	 ecology	 and	 social	 equity,	originating	 a	 socio-political	 movement"	 (http://partidoequo.es).	 In	 Catalonia	 the	 referent	 of	Equo	is	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	Verds.	96	Proces	Constituent	is	a	Catalan	social	movement	that	was	created	to	promote	a	change	of	the	political,	 economic	 and	 social	 model	 implying	 the	 end	 of	 capitalism	 and	 the	 independence	 of	Catalonia.	 Some	 of	 its	 members	 were	 also	 members	 of	 Guanyem	 and	 is	 going	 to	 be	 analysed	within	this	actor.	
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5.5.1	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	Verds-	Esquerra	Unida	i	
Alternativa.	Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	 Verds-Esquerra	 Unida	 i	 Alternativa97	(ICV-EUiA)	 is	 a	leftist	 Catalan	 electoral	 coalition	 formed	 mainly	 by	 two	 parties,	 Iniciativa	 per	Catalunya	Verds	and	the	brand	of	Izquierda	Unida98	in	Catalonia,	Esquerra	Unida	i	Alternativa.	ICV-EUiA	is	formed	by	various	sectors	of	the	left	with	an	important	weight	of	the	ecology	on	its	ideals.	It	has	been	involved	in	the	Catalan	institutions	since	 its	 formation,	 being	 part	 of	 several	 municipal	 governments	 around	Catalonia	and	also	 two	 terms	–between	2003	and	2010-	 in	 the	 coalition	of	 the	Government	of	Catalonia.	In	Barcelona,	ICV-EUiA	–or	its	predecessors-	have	been	the	small	partner	of	the	coalition	that	ruled	the	city	together	with	the	PSC	since	the	 80’s	 and	 until	 the	 victory	 of	 Xavier	 Trias.	 When	 its	 time	 in	 the	 City	Government	 ended,	 and	 despite	 being	 the	 fourth	 out	 of	 five	 parties	 in	 the	number	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 City	 Council	 of	 Barcelona99,	 ICV-EUiA	 was	 the	 real	opposition	to	Xavier	Trias	and	the	CiU	municipal	Government	between	2011	and	2015	 (Gomà,	 Ricard;	 personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	 2017).	 The	 reason	 of	holding	this	role	is	due	to	the	fact	that	all	other	political	groups	eventually	ended	up	reaching	relevant	collaboration	agreements	with	CiU	and	backing	its	actions	in	 the	 government.	 This	 particular	 background	 of	 ICV-EUiA	 was	 a	 distinctive	feature	within	BeC.	Of	 all	 the	members	 of	Barcelona	 en	Comú,	 ICV-EUiA	 is	 the	only	 element	 that	 had	 been	 in	 the	 public	 institutions	 before	100 ,	 giving	 its	members	an	important	knowledge	and	an	advantage	that	other	members	lacked.	This	advantage	was	recognized	by	the	rest	of	actors	of	Barcelona	en	Comú	that	did	 not	 hesitate	 exploiting	 it	 in	 the	 initial	 moments	 of	 the	 City	 Government	(Segovia,	Susana;	personal	interview;	15th	March	2017).		ICV-EUiA	 is	 the	 result	 of	 an	 evolution	 of	 various	 parties	 inspired	 by	 the	 post-communist	 ideals.	 The	 first	 step	 of	 ICV-EUiA,	 was	 taken	 when	 Iniciativa	 per	Catalunya	 Verds	was	 formed	 in	 1987	 out	 of	 the	 fusion	 of	 the	 Partit	 Socialista																																																									97	In	English:	Initiative	for	Catalonia	Greens-United	and	Alternative	Left.	98	Spanish	leftist	party	born	from	the	Spanish	Communist	Party	among	others.	99	With	the	10,39%	of	the	votes	and	5	out	of	41	seats.	100	Podemos	had	 five	European	MP’s	 at	 the	moment	of	 the	 creation	of	Barcelona	en	Comú,	but	none	of	them	were	Catalans,	had	any	relation	with	the	creation	of	Podem,	would	be	part	of	the	electoral	list	or	was	member	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.		
Chapter	Five.	The	case	of	the	city	of	Barcelona.		
	 127	
Unificat	de	Catalunya	(PSUC)	with	other	small	 communist	and	socialist	parties.	The	 objective	 of	 this	 grouping	 was	 to	 put	 together	 the	 maximum	 possible	number	of	forces	with	a	similar	ideology,	to	modernize	political	parties	that	were	created	 for	another	reality,	and	 to	redefine	 the	 ideology	of	 the	parts	 towards	a	more	eurocommunist	position.	The	communist	 space	was	 fragmented	between	various	parties	and	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	was	the	attempt	to	group	all	of	them	under	the	same	name	(Rius,	2005).		The	more	relevant	of	those	parties	was	the	PSUC.	 The	 PSUC	 was	 created	 in	 1936	 and	 had	 been	 the	 central	 party	 of	 the	communists	 in	 Catalonia.	 It	 was	 iconic	 for	 the	 population	 beyond	 its	 political	ideals	as	was	an	essential	component	of	the	anti-Franco	fight	in	Catalonia	(Molas,	2000).	 Despite	 being	 communist,	 the	 PSUC	 fought	 for	 the	 return	 of	 the	democracy	in	Spain,	in	line	of	what	was	called	the	eurocommunism	in	the	same	way	 as	 the	 PCI	 of	 Berlinguer101	(Molas,	 2000).	 PSUC’s	 internal	 organization	beyond	 the	 traditional	 circles	 of	 other	 communist	 parties	highlights	 its	 goal	 to	reach	more	citizens	and	ultimately	to	become	a	mass	party	(Molas,	2000).		Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	 was	 born	 from	 the	 impulse	 of	 various	 elements:	 the	PSUC,	 the	 Partit	 dels	 Comunistes	 de	 Catalunya	 (PCC)	 -	 created	 by	 members	expelled	 from	 the	PSUC	 in	 1982-	 and	 the	Entesa	dels	Nacionalistes	 d’Esquerra	(ENE),	 plus	 independent	 public	 figures	 and	 social	movements’	members	 (Rius,	2005).	 Those	 parties	 thought	 that	 despite	 the	 values	 of	 communism	 still	were	perfectly	 alive	 and	 necessary,	 the	 approach	 to	 achieve	 the	 implementation	 of	these	values	had	to	change.	The	revolution	of	the	proletarians	was	not	anymore	an	option	for	them.	For	the	founders	of	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	was	necessary	to	work	within	institutions	to	reform	the	system	instead	of	breaking	it.	Also,	there	was	the	crisis	of	the	communist	parties	around	Western	Europe,	but	its	birth	was	related	to	the	 intention	of	having	different	discourses	and	political	approaches,	thus,	 it	 was	 “not	 an	 urgent	 product	 to	 built	 an	 electoral	 brand	 that	 blurs	 the	former	bonding	with	the	sunken	communist	space”	(Rius,	2005).	At	that	moment	Iniciativa	had	a	confused	ideology	and	was	looking	for	its	own	identity	that	step	by	 step	was	 being	 clarified	 towards	 the	 eco-socialism	 (Rius,	 2005).	 Gradually,																																																									101	The	PCI	opted	for	the	position	of	making	changes	from	within	the	system	not	breaking	it	in	opposition	to	the	traditional	communist	positions.	
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Iniciativa	positions	tended	to	go	more	towards	post-materialisms	ideals,	which	is	what	their	members	define	as	“eco-socialism”.	Its	ideology	is	based	on	the	ideals	of	the	social	democracy	of	the	XXI	century,	pacifism	and	environmentalism.	This	last	part	was	especially	strengthened	with	 the	agreement	of	collaboration	with	the	 Greens,	 which	 ended	 up	 forming	 one	 single	 party.	 After	 that,	 the	 party	changed	its	name	from	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	to	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	Verds	to	show	clearly	its	positions	in	environmental	issues.	The	battle	for	social	rights,	the	pacifism	and	feminism	played	also	an	important	role	in	the	political	action	of	ICV.	The	choice	for	the	feminism	is	shown	in	the	decision	of	having	two	heads	of	the	party	with	the	same	power,	one	man	and	one	woman.			The	other	part	of	the	ICV-EUiA	is	Esquerra	Unida	i	Alternativa,	a	party	born	from	the	members	of	the	communist	Spanish	and	Catalan	parties	that	at	the	moment	of	 the	 creation	 of	 Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	were	 against	 the	 collaboration	with	other	 non-communist	 parties	 and	 contrary	 to	 redefining	 the	 communist	ideology102	(Molas,	2000).	Some	of	the	communists	and	post	communist	parties	of	 that	 time	 did	 not	 support	 the	 ideology	 and	 organizational	 turn	 that	 was	implied	with	the	creation	of	 Iniciativa	per	Catalunya.	They	thought	that	the	old	political	 parties	 of	 the	 communist	movement	 should	be	preserved	 and	did	not	want	 the	 existence	 of	 Iniciativa	 as	 a	 party,	 but	 just	 as	 an	 electoral	 platform	 to	connect	 all	 the	already	existing	 communist	parties	 (Rius,	2005).	Thus,	 some	of	those	 individuals	 decided	 not	 to	 join	 the	 project	 and	 to	 keep	 the	 pacts	 just	between	communist	parties,	meanwhile	at	the	same	time	they	started	talks	with	the	Spanish	party	Izquierda	Unida	to	have	a	closer	 interaction	with	them.	Thus	Esquerra	Unida	i	Alternativa	was	created	in	1998	and	contrarily	to	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya,	EUiA	is	the	brand	of	the	communist	Spanish	party	in	Catalonia	(Molas,	2000).	However,	despite	this	opposite	approach	between	ICV	and	EUiA,	in	2003	both	parties	decided	to	join	together	in	an	almost	permanent	electoral	coalition.	A	possible	 unification	between	 them	 in	 one	 single	party	was	postponed	 to	 the	future	 and	 nowadays	 both	 parties	 still	 maintain	 their	 independent	organizational	structures.	EUiA	ideology	is	closer	to	the	traditional	communists	positions,	as	 for	 its	members	 the	story	of	 the	class	 fight	and	 the	social	gains	 is																																																									102	Col·lectiu	Roig,	Verd	i	Violeta,	PCC,	PSUC	Viu	and	others	small	collectives	and	parties.	
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very	relevant.	Consequently	with	those	believes	the	party	holds	the	principles	of	socialism,	secularism,	anti-capitalisms	and	the	 federation	between	the	different	regions	of	Spain103.			
5.5.2	Podem/Podemos.	Podem	 is	 the	 brand	 of	 the	 Spanish	 party	 Podemos	 in	 Catalonia.	 Podemos	was	founded	 in	2014,	 and	became	notorious	 already	 in	 its	 first	 elections	due	 to	 its	significantly	high	 results	 for	 a	newborn	party.	The	party	was	originated	under	the	 spirit	 and	 with	 the	 antiestablishment	 ideas	 of	 the	 Indignados	 movement	(15M),	that	rejected	the	policies	of	the	two	Spanish	bigger	parties	–PP	and	PSOE	(Iglesias	Turrión	&	Monedero,	2011).	Its	start	is	marked	by	a	manifest104	signed	by	 30	 intellectuals,	 social	 activist,	 and	 other	 public	 figures	 in	 a	 Spanish	newspaper105,	which	highlighted	the	necessity	to	build	an	electoral	candidature	for	 the	 European	 elections	 to	 show	 the	 discontent	 towards	 how	 the	 European	Union	was	 facing	 the	economic	crisis.	Podemos	was	born	 in	 January	2014,	and	just	 after	 its	 foundation	 it	 started	 to	 prepare	 for	 the	 European	 elections,	 held	four	months	 after	 its	 establishment.	 Podemos	 emerged	 in	 the	 Spanish	political	system	with	almost	8%	of	popular	support	in	the	elections,	large	numbers	if	we	considerer	that	as	a	new-born	party	was	not	entailed	of	free	electoral	spaces	in	the	 media	 as	 the	 other	 consolidated	 parties	 did.	 To	 understand	 its	 social	relevance,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 in	 its	 first	 20	 days	 of	 existence	 it	was	already	the	third	largest	Spanish	party	by	number	of	members,	and	nine	moths	after	its	formation,	it	was	already	the	second	biggest106.	On	February	23rd	2017	the	number	of	members	 counted	480.466,	 although	 it	 is	 important	 to	mention	that	the	membership	in	Podemos	does	not	imply	the	payment	of	a	membership	fee,	which	is	voluntary	for	the	ordinary	members.		The	significant	electoral	support	 in	the	European	elections,	with	8%	of	popular	support	and	five	European	MP’s,	strengthened	the	project	and	the	conviction	of																																																									103	From	EUiA	webpage:	http://www.semprealesquerra.cat/valors/	104	Named:	Mover	ficha:	convertir	la	indignación	en	cambio	politico.	105	Público.	13th	of	January	2014.	106	http://www.elboletin.com/nacional/106784/podemos-psoe-segunda-fuerza-militantes.html	
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the	 citizens	and	 its	own	members	about	 its	 viability.	However,	 the	 situation	 in	Catalonia	needs	a	separate	analysis.	Meanwhile	Podemos	was	the	fourth	largest	party	in	Spain	by	number	of	votes;	it	was	just	the	seventh	largest	in	Catalonia107.	Its	 results	 in	Catalonia	 clearly	 show	 its	meagre	vigour	 in	 that	 region,	 as	 it	was	over	 there,	 where	 Podemos	 received	 the	 lowest	 percentage	 of	 votes	 in	 all	 of	Spain	[see	figure	2].	The	existence	of	a	specific	party	system	in	Catalonia	(Culla,	2017)	 was	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 leading	 to	 those	 particular	 results	(Bertomeus,	Marc;	personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).	Firstly,	there	are	more	 parties	 competing	 in	 Catalonia	 than	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 Spain	 and	 the	 Catalan	parties	face,	apart	from	the	traditional	left-right	axis,	another	axis	that	contrasts	nationalism	versus	no	nationalism	(Aragonès,	2014)	 (Balcells	 i	Ventura,	2007).	This	 particular	 situation	 creates	 problems	 for	 all	 the	 political	 parties	 that	 are	present	in	all	Spain.	Additionally,	the	fact	that	Podemos’	electoral	campaign	was	almost	 exclusively	 addressed	 to	 media	 based	 in	 Madrid	 and	 was	 almost	inexistent	in	the	Catalan	media,	did	not	help	to	its	success	in	this	region	(Gomà,	Ricard;	 personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	2017;	 and	Bertomeus,	Marc;	 personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).			Figure	2.	Percentage	of	vote	for	Podemos	in	the	European	elections	of	2014	by	region.	
																																																								107	Fount:	Boletin	Oficial	del	Estado.	Ministry	of	Interior.		
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	Source:	Tarantino,	Saulo.		Regarding	the	ideology	of	Podemos,	its	leaders	avoid	defining	the	party	with	the	traditional	labels	of	“left”	and	“right”.	They	reject	to	be	included	in	the	left-right	axis,	instead	trying	to	move	the	debate	towards	a	people-elites	axis.	The	party’s	leader,	 Pablo	 Iglesias,	 even	 claims	 that	 the	 debate	 is	 about	 democracy	 against	dictatorship108.	Since	Podemos	is	such	a	novelty	phenomenon,	there	is	yet	to	be	written	 academic	 works	 that	 deeply	 analyse	 its	 ideology.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	important	to	instead	pay	evaluate	to	the	way	the	general	population	sees	it.	The	Spanish	 public	 office	 dedicated	 to	 surveys,	 the	 Centro	 de	 Investigaciones	Sociológicas	 (CIS),	 has	 conducted	 several	 surveys	 where	 the	 Spanish	 citizens	
																																																								108 http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2014/02/16/pablo-iglesias-entrevista-podemos_n_4787408.html	
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place	Podemos	between	2	and	3	on	a	scale	of	1	to	10109,	where	1	represents	the	extreme	 left	 and	 10	 the	 extreme	 right.	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 intention	 of	 their	leaders,	Podemos	 is	clearly	seen	as	a	 leftist	option	and	 increasely	so,	as	can	be	seen	 in	 the	 history	 of	 these	 surveys110.	Moreover,	 in	 the	European	Parliament,	Podemos	 is	 part	 of	 the	 European	 United	 Left/Nordic	 Green	 Left	 (GUE/NGL)	sharing	a	group	with	the	French	Communist	Party,	Die	Linke,	the	Sinn	Féin	or	the	Coalition	 of	 the	 Radical	 Left	 of	 SYRIZA,	 reinforcing	 in	 that	way	 its	 profile	 as	 a	leftist	party.	However,	it	is	true	that	its	classification	is	not	entirely	obvious.	For	instance,	despite	belonging	 to	 the	GUE/NGL,	Podemos	has	displayed	a	 singular	behaviour	in	this	group	by	not	following	the	options	of	the	majority	of	the	other	members	 in	 some	 votes.	 Thus,	meanwhile	 some	newspapers	 like	 the	 Financial	Times111 ,	 ABC112 ,	 The	 Economist 113 	or	 The	 Wall	 Street	 Journal 114 ,	 define	Podemos	 as	 “extreme	 left”;	 the	New	York	Times115	or	 Público116	point	 out	 that	Podemos	 is	 a	 “new	 reality”	 in	 Spanish	 politics	 based	 on	 ideals	 of	 anti-establishment,	 anti-austerity,	 and	 the	 increase	 of	 young	 and	 female	 citizens	 in	politics	as	main	ideals.			Gero	 Maass,	 political	 researcher	 and	 director	 of	 the	 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s	Madrid	 office117,	 sees	 Podemos	 as	 a	 “populist	 left-wing	 movement”	 (Maass,	2017).	However,	the	complexity	of	the	internal	relations	of	Podemos,	displaying	various	 political	 streams,	 leads	 to	 the	 internal	 moderates	 trying	 to	 avoid	 left	
																																																								109	For	 instance:	 2,29	 in	 April	 2015;	 2,	 18	 in	 October	 2016;	 2,02	 in	 February	 2017	 [Complete	surveys	available	in	the	annex].		110	Ibid.	111	https://www.ft.com/content/783e39b4-e4af-11e3-9b2b-00144feabdc0#axzz32oj7FqqR	112	http://www.abc.es/espana/20140318/abci-villarejo-podemos-201403171921.html	113 	http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21603040-socialist-leader-quits-after-humiliating-election-defeat-exit-rubalcaba	114 	https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304811904579585834108798694?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304811904579585834108798694.html	115 	https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/world/europe/spanish-upstart-party-said-it-could-and-did-now-the-hard-part-begins.html?_r=1	116	http://www.publico.es/politica/cuatro-vias-izquierda-elecciones-europeas.html	117 	The	 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung	 (FES)	 is	 a	 non-profit	 German	 foundation	 funded	 by	 the	Government	 of	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany	 and	 is	 named	 after	 Germany's	 first	democratically	elected	President.	The	FES	is	the	oldest	political	foundation	in	Germany.	
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labels	 to	 be	 more	 competitive	 within	 the	 social	 democratic	 traditional	 voters	pool.	But	despite	the	effort	of	these	moderates,	Podemos		 Is	 closely	 involved	 in	 left-wing	 populist	 organisations	 and	 debates	 in	Europe	and	Latin	America.	They	certainly	fit	the	definitions	of	populism	developed	 by	 the	 late	 Ernesto	 Laclau,	 the	 intellectual	 grandfather	 of	left-wing	 populism.	 In	 Laclau’s	 theory,	 democratic	 demands	 form	 a	“chain	of	equivalence”	 that	 leads	 to	a	 collective	progressive	will	being	formulated	that	aims	to	create	“a	people”	opposed	to	the	ruling	caste	or	elite	(Maass,	2017).			The	way	Podemos	sees	itself	is	not	always	the	same	way	in	which	the	rest	of	the	people	sees	 them:	“Podemos	sees	 itself	as	a	new	type	of	party	 that	does	not	 fit	the	 old	 categories”	 (Maass,	 2017).	 This	 was	 for	 example	 the	 case	 in	 the	negotiations	 with	 Guanyem,	 who	 saw	 Podemos	 as	 a	 party	 meanwhile	 the	members	of	Podemos	did	not	see	themselves	as	members	of	the	party	system,	as	argued	 by	 Marc	 Bertomeus	 the	 head	 of	 Podemos	 in	 Barcelona	 (personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).	In	this	conflict,	the	followers	of	Pablo	Iglesias,	less	 moderate,	 wanted	 “Podemos	 to	 retain	 its	 character	 as	 an	 extra-parliamentary	social	movement.	They	say	politics	should	be	worked	out	in	“the	streets””	(Maass,	2017).		Podemos	decided	to	not	participate	directly	in	the	Spanish	municipal	election	of	2015118.	 The	 party	 decided	 that	 even	 if	 their	 members	 could	 form	 part	 of	candidatures	 for	 the	 municipal	 elections	 and	 the	 party	 itself	 could	 support	specific	 electoral	 options,	Podemos	would	not	be	directly	part	 of	 the	 elections.	That	meant	that	the	brand	Podemos	would	not	head	any	candidature	in	any	city.	This	 decision	was	motived	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 Podemos	was	 still	 non-existent	 in	some	 parts	 of	 Spain,	 and	 the	 leaders	 were	 worried	 that	 including	 local	 free-riders	in	the	party’s	electoral	lists	to	expand	the	party’s	presence	could	damage	party’s	image	at	national	level.	It	is	important	to	highlight	that	the	party	started																																																									118 	http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Podemos-candidaturas-generalizadas-elecciones-municipales_0_286622050.html	
Chapter	Five.	The	case	of	the	city	of	Barcelona.		
	 134	
to	 be	 organized	 just	 after	 the	 European	 elections.	 Therefore	 Podemos’	 leaders	began	the	construction	of	a	 the	party	around	Spain,	out	of	what	was	until	 then	little	more	than	an	electoral	platform	supported	by	external	movements.	Thus,	in	2015	 the	 party	was	 still	 under	 construction	 and	with	 an	 important	 number	 of	new	arrived	people	after	the	good	electoral	results.	This	created	several	doubts	among	Podemos’	leaders	about	the	capacity	of	these	new	members	to	meet	the	ethical	 requirements	 and	 to	 follow	 the	 national	 party’s	 strategy.	 Under	 this	situation	 the	 rulers	 of	 the	 party	 decided	 to	 not	 to	 risk	 the	 brand	 and	 just	 to	participate	 in	 the	 regional	 elections,	which	were	held	 the	 same	day,	where	 the	risk	of	outsiders	was	lower.	The	position	to	avoid	risks	in	the	local	elections	was	approved	 in	 an	 assembly	 where	 the	 party	 decided	 to	 not	 prepare	 any	 local	candidature	to	save	the	prestige	of	the	brand.	With	this,	the	still	small	structure	of	the	party	had	the	possibility	to	focus	on	the	main	goal,	which	was	the	national	election119.	Instead,	the	party	agreed	to	join	forces	with	other	parties	in	citizens’	platforms	–like	the	ones	in	Madrid	or	Barcelona-	or	to	go	for	citizens	lists	where	those	pacts	were	not	possible120.			When	Podemos	decided	not	to	run	with	its	own	name	in	the	local	elections	at	the	national	 level,	 Podem	 looked	 for	 another	 way	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 municipal	elections	of	Barcelona.	The	most	convenient	way	to	participate	was	to	join	forces	in	a	project	with	other	political	actors,	but	the	fact	that	other	actors	knew	about	the	 limited	 capacity	 of	 Podem	 to	 participate	 alone,	 left	 the	 formation	 with	restricted	capacity	of	bargaining.	This	common	knowledge	among	the	actors	had	limited	 Podem’s	 capacity	 to	 pressure	 or	 negotiate	 with	 the	 other	 actors	especially	 those	 from	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú.	 This	 was	 because	 the	 other	 actors	knew	that	if	Podem	did	not	accept	the	deal,	it	would	finish	with	almost	nothing,	and	 consequently	 Podem	 was	 very	 weak	 at	 the	 time	 when	 the	 coalition	agreements	and	power	distribution	were	made.	Thus,	a	bad	deal	for	Podem	was	expected,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 main	 reason	 why	 Podem	 is	 the	 smallest	 party	 in	 the	
																																																								119 	http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2014-12-03/podemos-no-quemara-a-sus-lideres-en-las-municipales-y-las-bases-preparan-lista-propia_533016/	120 	http://www.vozpopuli.com/actualidad/nacional/Podemos-Pablo_Iglesias-Regeneracion-Elecciones_24M-Circulos-Siglas-elecciones-municipales-siglas-marca-regeneracion-Ganemos_0_758024196.html	
Chapter	Five.	The	case	of	the	city	of	Barcelona.		
	 135	
coalition	 -in	 terms	 of	 institutional	 representation-	 that	 formed	 Barcelona	 en	Comú	 (Bertomeus,	 Marc;	 personal	 interview;	 14th	 of	 February	 2017).	 Despite	knowing	this,	91%	of	the	citizen	assembly	of	Barcelona	of	Podem	-where	all	the	members	of	 the	party	 residing	 in	 the	 city	 can	express	 their	opinions	and	vote-	decided	to	join	the	project	of	Barcelona	en	Comú121.		
5.5.3	The	Plataforma	de	Afectados	por	la	Hipoteca.	The	 Plataforma	 de	 Afectados	 por	 la	 Hipoteca	 (PAH)122 	is	 a	 Spanish	 social	movement	dedicated	to	fight	for	decent	and	affordable	living	space	as	a	common	right	for	all	citizens.	Born	in	Barcelona	in	2009	as	a	consequence	of	the	economic	crisis	of	2008,	it	rapidly	became	very	known	by	the	Spanish	society	due	its	most	notorious	 modus	 operandi:	 organizing	 groups	 of	 citizens	 to	 stop	 housing	evictions.	 With	 a	 strong	 grassroots	 organization,	 the	 PAH	 rapidly	 expanded	around	all	of	Spain	becoming	very	present	in	the	media	for	their	numerous	acts	defending	 the	people	 that	could	not	continue	paying	 the	mortgage,	even	 if	 that	meant	 facing	 the	 police.	 Its	 spokesmen	 became	 a	 well-known	 figure,	 not	 only	because	 they	 were	 in	 front	 of	 the	 crowds	 trying	 to	 stop	 evictions,	 but	 also	because	 they	were	 the	public	 figures	who	proposed	alternative	policies	 to	deal	with	 economic	 austerity.	 The	 best	 known	 of	 all	 activist	 was	 Ada	 Colau,	 real	leader	of	the	PAH	and	the	person	who	would	become	the	mayor	of	Barcelona	in	2015.		The	PAH	formed	as	a	consequence	of	 the	burst	Spanish	real	estate	bubble.	The	movement	was	born	confronting	the	reality	of	several	families	that	were	not	able	to	 pay	 their	 mortgage	 due	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 and	 remained	without	a	place	 to	 live	and	still	 in	debt,	despite	having	given	their	home	to	 the	bank123.	 The	 public	 reputation	 of	 the	 financial	 entities	 suffered	 from	 these	actions,	but	without	apparent	real	consequences	as	they	were	receiving	a	lot	of																																																									121	Source:	own	numbers	of	Podem.	Can	be	consulted	in:		http://www.podembcn.cat/index.php/confluencies/eleccions-municipals-podem-barcelona-en-comu/193-barcelona-en-comu-eleccions-municipals-de-maig-de-2015	122	In	English:	Platform	for	People	Affected	by	Mortgages.	123	This	 situation	was	 treated	 in	 a	 different	way	 in	 other	 countries	 that	 also	 suffered	 the	 same	problem.	For	instance,	in	the	USA	the	debt	with	the	bank	was	cancelled	with	the	delivery	of	the	house	(Marco,	Ernest	in	the	documentary	La	Plataforma).	
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money	 from	 the	 public	 budgets	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Thereby,	 given	 the	 lack	 of	solutions	 from	 the	 public	 institutions	 that	 kept	 treating	 this	 situation	 as	individual	problems	when	it	had	already	grown	into	a	social	problem,	a	group	of	persons	 with	 no	 party	 affiliation	 but	 with	 personal	 experiences	 in	 social	activisms124	started	a	movement	to	provide	support	 to	those	 in	need.	Thus,	 the	PAH	tried	to	provide	help	 in	different	ways	to	those	who	difficulties	to	pay	the	mortgage	or	who	were	going	to	be	evicted	due	to	the	massive	job	loss	in	Spain.		The	 PAH	 defines	 itself	 as	 a	 horizontal	 movement,	 non-violent,	 organized	 by	deliberative	 assemblies	 and	 not	 linked	 to	 any	 party125.	 Their	 members	 are	organized	 to	 support	 people	 regarding	 their	 needs,	 going	 from	 legal	 advice	 to	emotional	 care.	 Thus,	 the	 PAH	 works	 in	 various	 ways,	 which	 made	 the	movement	being	appreciated	by	diverse	kinds	of	people	with	different	problems,	regardless	of	their	political	ideas.	For	Ada	Colau,	the	PAH	“è	stata	sicuramente	il	movimento	 sociale	 più	 trasversale	 degli	 ultimi	 anni,	 o	 forse	 decadi”	 (Spena	 &	Forti,	2016,	Kindle	position	180).	One	of	the	activities	is	the	mobilization	to	stop	housing	evictions.	The	movement	uses	non-violent	resistance	to	confront	actions	of	the	police	forces.	When	the	PAH	is	trying	stop	evictions,	it	calls	on	its	members	to	 gather	 at	 the	 door	 of	 the	 homes	 of	 people	 who	 have	 been	 notified	 with	eviction.	 The	 objective	 is	 to	 protect	 those	 people	 from	 the	 law	 officers	 forcing	them	to	withdraw	from	the	eviction.	The	public	numbers	of	the	PAH	show	that	the	 movement	 has	 been	 able	 to	 stop	 2.045	 evictions	 until	 March	 3rd	 2017126,	directly	 helping	 people	 from	 losing	 their	 houses	 (Colau	 &	 Alemany,	 2013).	 To	show	the	citizens’	support	to	the	PAH’s	fight,	the	social	movement	organized	in	41	cities	in	Spain	the	25th	September	2011	manifestations	that	confirmed	PAH’s	views127.	The	campaign	for	the	nonrecourse	loan	is	another	example	of	the	effort	of	 the	 PAH	 for	 placing	 the	 evictions	 problem	 in	 the	 public	 agenda.	 In	 this																																																									124	Several	of	 its	members,	as	 for	example	Ada	Colau,	came	 from	the	Observatorio	de	Derechos	Económicos	y	Sociales	(Desc)	(Observatory	of	Economic,	Social,	and	Cultural	Rights),	a	“group	of	individuals	 and	 organizations	 created	 in	 1998	with	 the	 objective	 to	 show	 that	 civil	 and	politic	rights-	freedom	of	speech,	the	right	to	life,	to	vote	etc.-	are	not	the	only	fundamental	rights,	but	that	economic,	social,	cultural,	environment	rights-	the	right	to	housing,	work,	education,	health,	food-	are	just	as	fundamental”.	Source:	DESC	website.	125	From	its	website:	http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com	126Source:	webpage	of	the	PAH.	http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com	127	http://elpais.com/diario/2011/09/26/espana/1316988013_850215.html	
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campaign	 the	 PAH	 tried	 to	 lobby	 the	 Spanish	 Parliament	 to	 regulate	 the	cancelation	of	debts	with	banks	after	the	transfer	of	a	house,	annulling	any	other	possible	extra	compensation	due	to	the	decrease	of	value	of	the	house.	When	the	Spanish	 Parliament	 rejected	 this,	 the	 PAH	 started	 a	 campaign	 to	 collect	signatures	to	force	political	parties	to	debate	again	and	to	legislate	about	it.	They	were	able	 to	 collect	more	 than	1,4	millions	 signatures	of	people	demanding	 to	debate	 and	 to	 regulate	 the	 issue128.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 its	 former	 speaker	 and	current	 national	 MP,	 Lucía	 Martín,	 the	 PAH	 changed	 the	 life	 of	 thousands	 of	people	 and	 was	 able	 to	 have	 an	 important	 impact	 in	 the	 Spanish	 society	(personal	interview;	28th	January	2017).	For	her,	the	PAH	changed	not	just	legal	aspects,	also	the	mentality	of	some	people	who	were	emotionally	destroyed	and	then	 better	 able	 to	 recuperate	 hope	 for	 things	 to	 be	 done	 in	 a	 better	 way	(personal	interview;	28th	January	2017).	So	relevant	was	the	activity	of	the	PAH	for	 keeping	 the	 wellness	 of	 the	 people	 in	 risk	 of	 losing	 their	 homes,	 that	 the	social	movement’s	 task	has	been	recognized	 for	various	collectives.	Among	 the	recognitions	 of	 the	 work	 done,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 two:	 the	 Spanish	National	 Award	 for	 Human	 Rights	 delivered	 by	 the	 Asociación	 pro	 Derechos	Humanos	 de	 España	 in	 January	 2013	 and	 the	 European	 Citizens'	 Prize	 by	 the	European	Parliament	in	2013.			Due	to	its	work	done	trying	to	solve	the	problems	of	what	was	seen	as	an	unfair	situation,	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 PAH	 among	 the	 society	 was	 very	 high129.	 For	instance,	 the	citizens’	 initiative	regarding	the	nonrecourse	 loan	that	of	 the	PAH	had	90%130	of	public	support,	regardless	the	ideology	or	party	preferences	of	the	citizens.	 Moreover,	 the	 PAH	 received	 more	 credit	 than	 political	 parties	 and	institutions	 -like	 the	 Government-	 in	 all	 the	 advances	 that	 Spain	 has	 lived	 to	solve	 housing	 problems	 linked	 to	 the	 economic	 crisis131.	 Besides	 that,	 through	what	the	movement	called	“Obra	Social”,	various	social	 initiatives	 implemented																																																									128 	http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1725145/0/dacion-pago/desahucio-hipotecas/iniciativa-legislativa-popular/	129	Survey	done	by	Metroscopia	the	17th	of	February	2013	for	the	newspaper	El	Pais.	Available	at:	http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/02/16/actualidad/1361053281_008924.html		130	Ibid.	131	The	 citizens	 consider	 with	 the	 70%	 that	 the	 PAH	 has	 been	 the	 actor	 who	 has	 had	 more	relevance	to	solve	the	problem	for	29%	that	consider	that	the	Government	has	had	relevance	in	that	issue.		
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by	 the	 PAH	 and	 directed	 at	 problems	 of	 families	 not	 able	 to	 avoid	 eviction,	helped	 the	 movement	 to	 be	 seen	 with	 an	 unselfish	 attitude.	 The	 program	therefore	 tried	 to	 use	 empty	 housing	 to	 give	 a	 place	 to	 stay	 to	 those	 evicted	families	with	no	place	to	 live.	This	 initiative	pressured	the	banks	to	offer	social	rents	to	some	families	to	avoid	the	bad	publicity	that	entails	an	eviction	process.	Thus,	 the	number	of	persons	that	had	been	reallocated	thanks	to	this	program,	2.500	 according	 to	 the	 PAH,	must	 be	 added	 to	 the	 number	 of	 hosing	 eviction	stopped	 as	 an	 achievement	 of	 the	 PAH132.	 Additionally,	 the	 work	 done	 by	 the	PAH	to	change	the	dimension	of	the	problem	was	very	recognized	by	the	citizens	too.	The	PAH	was	 able	 to	 show	 that	 the	 responsibility	 of	 not	being	 able	 to	pay	 the	mortgage	 was	 not	 from	 the	 families	 themselves,	 but	 from	 the	 financial	 and	banking	system	(Martín,	Lucía;	personal	interview;	9th	February	2017).	Thereby,	the	problem	transformed	from	having	individual	cause,	to	being	understood	as	a	collective	problem.	Consequently,	 the	 solutions	 that	 should	be	applied	 to	 solve	the	problem	would	have	to	be	different,	and	thinking	more	about	people	needs	(Martín,	 Lucía;	 personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	 2017).	 Hence,	 this	 level	 of	acknowledgment	towards	the	task	of	the	PAH	put	the	movement	in	a	privileged	situation	to	connect	with	the	citizens	during	the	elections.			
5.5.4	Guayem	Barcelona.	After	years	of	seeing	several	of	their	demands	ignored	by	the	existing	parties,	the	activists	of	 the	PAH	realized	that	 if	 they	wanted	to	achieve	their	goals,	another	approach	was	necessary.	For	them,	doing	more	with	the	PAH	was	not	possible,	as	the	social	movement	had	showed	 its	 limitations	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).	The	big	public	demonstrations	and	 the	 singular	PAH’s	 acts	were	not	 enough,	 and	 so,	 it	became	necessary	to	make	a	leap	into	politics	to	change	the	balance	of	power	in	the	institutions	that	until	then	had	overlooked	them	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).	Their	fight	showed	to	the	activists	the	importance	of	social	movements,	but	also	their	weaknesses:																																																									132	Numbers	 are	published	 in	 the	PAH	website:	 http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com.	 (Consulted:	3th	of	March	2017)	
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	 When	 the	PAH	was	 in	 its	 higher	 rates	 of	 popularity,	 active	 around	 all	Spain,	everyday	on	 the	news,	 in	prime	 time	programs,	meaning,	when	the	PAH	was	a	very	strong	and	present	movement,	able	to	pressure	like	no	one	had	done	before,	political	parties	in	institutions	still	blocked	any	possibility	 for	real	change.	Of	course,	 the	pressure	created	by	the	PAH	was	indispensable,	otherwise	those	issues	would	not	have	ended	up	in	the	on	the	political	agenda	and	in	the	citizens	debates.	But	at	the	end	it	is	still	the	institutions	that	create	the	legal	norms.	Consequently,	if	you	want	to	change	the	world,	that	is	where	you	have	to	be	(Martín,	Lucía;	personal	interview;	9th	February	2017).		Thus,	 based	 on	 the	 support	 they	 knew	 they	 had	 from	 several	 citizens	 PAH-activists	decided	to	form	a	new	political	subject:	Guanyem133.	Guanyem	was	the	civic	platform	which	the	members	of	several	social	movements	-mainly	 formed	by	people	 of	 the	PAH134-	 used	 to	 organize	 their	 political	 project	 for	Barcelona.	Reflecting	about	this,	Ada	Colau	said	that	“si	è	passati	dall’indignazione	di	piazza	ad	 una	 proposta	 politica:	 volevamo	 far	 parte	 della	 soluzione	 e	 attuare	 il	cambiamento	 grazie	 al	 protagonismo	 cittadino”	 (Spena	 &	 Forti,	 2016,	 Kindle	position	77).	Hence,	motivated	by	the	feeling	of	being	left	aside,	the	former	social	activist	 decided	 to	 jump	 into	 the	 electoral	 competition	 against	 those	 political	parties	 that	 previously	 had	 not	 attended	 to	 their	 demands.	 Thus,	 not	 being	attentive	enough	to	the	social	movement’s	demands	generated	a	new	adversary	for	the	establish	parties.			The	decision	to	form	Guanyem	was	not	an	isolated	choice	of	its	founders.	It	was	located	 in	 the	 feeling	 of	 some	 citizens	 that	 the	 street	 fight	 had	 to	 have	 a	translation	 into	 institutional	 politics.	 The	 Indignados	 movement	 played	 an	importance	role	in	the	decision	of	the	activists	of	the	PAH	to	decide	to	use	other	channels	 to	participate	 in	politics.	The	social	movements	 that	shaped	Guanyem	already	had	enormous	political	relevance,	but	its	members	saw	the	demands	of																																																									133	In	Catalan:	Let’s	win!	134	Also	members	from	l’Observatori	Desc,	Proces	Constituent,	and	other	social	movements	of	the	city	of	Barcelona	joined	the	project	lead	by	the	members	of	the	PAH.	
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the	 citizens	 that	 the	 15M	 raised	 and	were	 still	 unsatisfied.	 Analysing	 this	 lack,	they	decided	that	a	new	kind	of	political	interaction	was	necessary	in	the	Spanish	society.	For	Colau	“senza	 la	mobilitazione	del	15M	non	ce	 l’avremmo	mai	 fatta.	Quel	 movimento	 ha	 politicizzato	 la	 crisi	 e	 ha	 portato	 nella	 società	 un	cambiamento	della	coscienza	e	della	mentalità	della	gente”	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016,	Kindle	 position	 204).	 The	 political	 parties	 “sanno	 che	 devono	 contare	 sui	movimenti	 dopo	 l’esplosione	 degli	 Indignados;	 sono	 coscienti	 che	 si	 devono	trovare	 punti	 di	 incontro,	 ma	 allo	 stesso	 tempo	 sono	 gelosi	 della	 propria	autonomia”(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).	But	the	members	of	Guanyem	were	not	afraid	of	 the	 relevance	 of	 social	 movements	 in	 politics.	 For	 them,	 there	 must	 be	 a	permanent	dialogue	between	social	movements	and	 the	rest	of	political	actors.	Colau	 believes	 that	 now	 “è	 il	 momento	 di	 aggiornare	 le	 nostre	 istituzioni,	renderle	 più	 trasparenti	 e	 aprire	 a	 nuove	 modalità	 di	 cogestione:	 dobbiamo	esplorare	 oltre	 la	 dicotomia	 pubblico/privato,	 investendo	 su	 una	 terza	 gamba	che	è	il	“comunitario”	nel	quale	ci	si	“corresponsabilizza””	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016,	Kindle	position	136).	Due	to	this	mind-set	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	first	people	interested	in	the	project	of	Guanyem,	apart	from	the	social	movements	activist,	were	the	ones	who	had	been	involved	in	the	15M.	These	people	approached	the	new	project	because	they	knew	about	the	job	previously	done	by	the	activist.	The	founders	of	Guanyem	believe	that	these	people	were	approaching	them	because	the	PAH	had	built	a	credible,	 serious	and	consistent	path	especially	recognized	by	the	social	activists	of	every	movement	in	Spain	(Colau,	Ada	in	Spena	&	Forti,	2016).				The	good	rates	of	approval	towards	the	PAH	actions135	and	public	notoriousness	of	Colau	fighting	in	defence	of	what	was	perceived	as	an	unfair	social	situation,	made	 her	 a	 respected	 figure	 and	 a	 coveted	 political	 instrument	 for	 political	parties.	Based	on	this,	in	previous	local	elections,	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	Verds	and	 the	 Candidatura	 d’Unitat	 Popular	 (Cup)	 tried	 to	 include	 Colau	 in	 their	electoral	 lists	 (Spena	 &	 Forti,	 2016).	 Even	 though	 she	 rejected	 to	 join	 those	projects,	 these	 proposals	 highlighted	 the	 potential	 of	 Ada	 Colau	 as	 political	figure.	 For	 her,	 those	 projects	 were	 however	 too	 closely	 linked	 to	 traditional																																																									135	See	the	PAH	numbers	in	the	previous	section.	
Chapter	Five.	The	case	of	the	city	of	Barcelona.		
	 141	
parties	 and	 were	 constructed	 by	 ignoring	 the	 citizens’	 real	 concerns.	Consequently,	with	their	past	as	social	activist,	the	role	of	the	social	movements	in	 the	 dialogues	 between	 citizens	 and	 institutions	 was	 crucial	 for	 them.	 They	believed	 that	 the	 social	 movements	 are	 the	 key	 of	 social	 and	 political	 change	playing	an	essential	role	in	renewing	the	forms	and	practices	of	politics	(Colau,	Ada	 in	 Spena	 &	 Forti,	 2016).	 But	 being	 a	 social	movement	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	being	a	political	party.	So	they	reflected	about	how	to	built	a	new	political	actor	to	 comply	with	 the	 citizens’	 demands.	 “Ci	 siamo	 chiesti:	 come	 si	 costruisce	 un	movimento	popolare	 fino	a	 farlo	diventare	un’opposizione	 sociale	 e	politica	 ad	un	 governo	 complice	 della	 finanza?”	 explained	 Lucía	 Delgado,	 one	 of	 the	founders	 of	 Guanyem	 (Spena	&	 Forti,	 2016	 Kindle	 position	 399).	 To	 built	 this	project,	 they	began	with	restricted	meetings	with	 just	 twenty	or	 thirty	persons	from	the	PAH	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).	Step	by	step	the	number	of	people	grew	and	started	 to	 include	activists	 from	other	 social	movements	and	well-know	public	figures	linked	to	academia.	After	the	project	seemed	viable,	the	formal	contacts	with	political	parties	started,	and	Barcelona	en	Comú	was	born.		
5.6	Barcelona	en	Comú.	Barcelona	en	Comú	was	the	final	configuration	of	the	political	project	shared	by	Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	 Verds,	 Guanyem,	 Esquerra	 Unida	 i	 Alternativa	 and	Podemos	to	contest	the	local	elections	of	2015	in	Barcelona.	It	was	presented	to	the	 public	 the	 10th	 of	 February	 2015,	 less	 than	 four	 months	 before	 the	elections136,	with	the	objective	to	win	the	post	of	mayor.	The	project	started	one	year	 before,	 driven	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 Guanyem	 and	 the	 demands	 of	 social	activist	that	raised	the	hypothesis	that	there	is	an	opportunity	window	to	solve	the	democratic	crisis	Spain	was	suffering	(Bertomeus,	Marc;	personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).	They	had	 the	 feeling	 that	 the	crisis	was	bigger	at	 local	level	and	decided	that	they	had	to	focus	on	the	cities,	in	particular	on	Barcelona.	To	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 conversations	 with	 several	 actors	 started	 to	 create	 a	confluence	 between	 them	 to	 remove	 the	 government	 of	 Xavier	 Trias	 from	 the	
																																																								136	24th	of	May	2015.	
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municipality.	The	initial	idea	of	the	founders	was	to	create	a	new	political	subject	with	political	parties,	but	without	being	controlled	by	political	parties.		The	formal	contacts	between	Guanyem	and	the	already	existing	political	parties	started	immediately	after	the	emergence	of	the	first.	However,	the	cause	of	these	formal	contacts	was	mainly	 the	existence	of	several	previous	 informal	contacts	between	 the	members	of	 the	various	organizations.	Ricard	Gomà,	 the	 leader	of	the	 Iniciativa	 per	 Catalunya	 Verds-Esquerra	 Unida	 i	 Alternativa	 in	 the	 City	Council	 of	 Barcelona	 for	 three	 terms	 and	 one	 of	 the	 persons	 who	 started	 the	contacts	of	 the	parties	with	 the	social	movements	and	Guanyem,	says	 that	 “the	importance	of	existing	personal	connections	between	various	actors	was	crucial	for	the	confluence,	as	they	realize	that	they	were	talking	about	the	same	thing	in	different	 spaces:	 the	 parties,	 social	 movements	 and	 community	 and	neighbourhood	 associations”	 (personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	 2017).	 The	analysis	 done	 by	 ICV-EUiA	 showed	 that	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 repeat	 a	government	with	the	PSC	because	there	was	the	feeling	that	it	was	an	exhausted	model	 (Cid,	 David;	 personal	 interview;	 2th	 February	 2017).	 But	 to	 attract	 the	former	 PSC	 voters	 ICV-EUiA	 explored	 if	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 create	 a	candidature	that	goes	beyond	ICV-EUiA	and	could	connect	with	a	broader	space	(Cid,	David;	personal	interview;	2th	February	2017).	After	forming	a	few	contacts,	they	realized	that	others	have	had	similar	reflections	about	the	situation	of	 the	city,	 and	 the	name	of	Ada	Colau	started	 to	appear	and	with	her	 the	 rest	of	 the	people	of	PAH	and	Guanyem.	Thus,	the	potential	partners	started	to	talk	about	a	possible	 collaboration.	 But	 despite	 the	 discussions	 about	 the	 same	 issues,	 the	groups	 had	 heterogeneous	 backgrounds	 that	 would	 have	 to	 be	 managed.	 The	various	 actors	were	politically	 socialized	 in	 different	 spaces	 and	 realities,	with	different	ways	 to	adress	problems,	potentially	 creating	 internal	 tensions	 in	 the	negotiations	(Sanz,	Janet;	personal	interview;	25th	January	2017).	On	the	positive	side	 however	 the	 final	 goals	 were	 the	 same	 from	 beginning	 on	 (Sanz,	 Janet;	personal	interview;	25th	January	2017).			The	 initial	 idea	of	 the	 former	activist	of	 the	PAH	was	 that	 all	 the	actors	would	join	 together	 under	 the	 brand	 that	 they	 had	 created,	 that	 is,	 Guanyem.	 They	
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believed	 that	 this	way,	 they	would	be	able	 to	better	 control	 the	 fusion	process	between	 the	 various	 actors	 and	 would	 avoid	 the	 traditional	 fights	 that	 have	characterized	 the	 internal	 life	 of	 political	 parties	 (Segovia,	 Susana;	 personal	interview;	 15th	 March	 2017).	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 actors	 involved	 did	 not	 see	 this	option	as	viable	as	it	would	leave	them	in	a	clear	subordinate	position	compared	to	 the	 activists	 that	 created	 Guanyem	 (Cid,	 David;	 personal	 interview;	 2th	February	2017).	The	parts	were	still	debating,	when	they	heard	that	a	member	of	a	right-wing	party	had	recently	registered	in	the	Spanish	public	office	the	brand	Guanyem	 as	 his	 own.	 Julià	 de	 Fabián	 López	 was	 a	 councillor	 in	 a	 small	municipality	 close	 to	Barcelona	 and	 had	manoeuvred	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	situation.	His	confessed	objective	was	not	to	create	a	proper	party,	but	to	hinder	the	existence	of	Guanyem137.	The	talks	with	him	to	reach	an	agreement	to	release	the	 brand	 were	 not	 satisfactory	 and	 the	 search	 for	 a	 new	 electoral	 brand	started138.	 What	 was	 seen	 at	 that	 moment	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 survival	 of	 the	project	was	instead	used	as	a	way	of	bringing	all	the	parties	together	under	the	new	political	subject	with	all	of	them	entering	in	an	equal	position.	The	parties	that	were	reluctant	to	enter	in	a	project	clearly	lead	by	social	activist	felt	in	that	moment	 much	 more	 confortable	 with	 the	 new	 configuration	 (Gomà,	 Ricard;	personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	2017).	 Consequently,	 the	 confidence	between	the	 parts	 grew	 and	 also	 the	 feeling	 that	 all	 of	 them	were	 deciding	 and	 jointly	building	a	new	political	subject.	Barcelona	en	Comú	was	born.		For	 Ada	 Colau	 the	 purpose	 behind	 the	 creation	 of	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	was	 to	rethink	political	parties	as	concept,	making	it	more	horizontal,	less	bureaucratic	and	less	depended	on	electoral	triumphs	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).	The	members	of	Guanyem	were	 not	 interested	 in	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 left	 under	 one	 single	 brand,	neither	 to	 create	 additions	 between	 the	 various	 members,	 but	 to	 create	something	 new	 and	 different	 (Spena	 &	 Forti,	 2016).	 For	 Colau,	 the	 aim	 was	“ripartire	 dal	 protagonismo	 delle	 persone	 e	 realizzare	 una	 rivoluzione	democratica	con	nuove	forme	del	fare	politica,	più	trasparenti,	che	impedissero																																																									137		http://www.eldiario.es/politica/persona-disputa-marca-Guanyem_0_336667236.html	138	Posteriorly,	after	several	bureaucratic	impediments,	the	members	of	Guanyem	regain	the	use	of	the	brand.	
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la	corruzione	e	mettessero	al	centro	le	priorità	della	cittadinanza,	non	quelle	dei	partiti”	 (Spena	&	Forti,	2016,	Kindle	position	97).	But	despite	 their	 goal	of	not	being	dependent	on	electoral	results,	Barcelona	en	Comú	had	a	clear	ambition:	removing	 Xavier	 Trias	 as	 mayor.	 Its	 raison	 d’etre	 was	 the	 victory	 in	 the	 local	elections,	 not	 just	 putting	 some	 issues	 on	 the	 public	 agenda.	 “Sì,	 bisognava	vincere.	Non	volevamo	fare	un	partito	politico	per	ottenere	una	rappresentanza	testimoniale	col	6-7	per	cento,	per	 far	questo	potevamo	aggregarci	a	una	 forza	già	 esistente”	 (Cola,	 Ada	 in	 Spena	 &	 Forti,	 2016,	 Kindle	 position	 95).	 This	approach	created	a	lot	of	tensions	with	another	party,	the	Candidatura	d'Unitat	Popular	(CUP),	which	initially	was	also	part	of	the	negotiations	but	left	because	its	 goal	 was	 not	 the	 victory	 in	 the	 local	 elections,	 just	 the	 protest	 (Segovia,	Susana;	personal	interview;	15th	March	2017).	The	aim	of	Barcelona	en	Comú	on	the	other	hand,	was	going	further	than	the	traditional	leftist	voters,	it	wanted	to	involve	 the	 people	 that	 despite	 not	 being	 leftist	 voters	 were	 involved	 in	 the	association	 tissue	 of	 the	 city.	 Guanyem’s	 manifesto	 when	 it	 was	 presented	showed	clearly	those	values,		 That’s	 why	 we	 are	 launching	 this	 citizen	 platform.	 To	 build	 a	 joint	candidacy	that	represents	the	majority,	with	the	aim	to	win.	A	candidacy	that	 excites,	 that	 is	 based	 in	 neighbourhoods,	 workplaces,	 the	 cultural	community,	and	that	allows	us	to	transform	institutions	for	the	benefit	of	the	people.	We	 don’t	 want	 a	 coalition	 or	 an	 alphabet	 soup	 of	 political	 parties.	We	want	 to	avoid	 the	old	 logic	of	parties	and	build	a	new	space	 that,	while	respecting	 the	 identity	of	 everyone	 involved,	 are	more	 than	 the	 sum	of	the	parts	that	make	it	up139.			The	 formal	 negotiations	 between	 the	 various	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 project	started	with	debates	about	how	politicians	have	to	behave	in	public	institutions.	One	of	the	reasons	motivating	several	of	the	individuals	that	initiated	Barcelona	en	 Comú	 was	 their	 concern	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 “real	 democracy”	 and	 proper																																																									139	Available	at		https://guanyembarcelona.cat/lets-win-barcelona/	
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accountability	in	Spain140.	“Democratic	regeneration”	was	one	of	the	terms	most	used	by	the	Indignados	and	other	social	movements	and	it	was	a	very	demanded	issue	 for	part	of	 the	Spanish	citizens	(Iglesias	Turrión	&	Monedero,	2011).	The	feeling	 between	 the	 members	 of	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 that	 corruption	 was	 a	constant	in	political	parties	made	this	one	the	first	topic	to	face	(Segovia,	Susana;	personal	 interview;	 15th	 March	 2017).	 Before	 agreeing	 on	 what	 to	 do,	 it	 was	necessary	to	see	if	all	of	the	potential	memebers	shared	the	same	idea	about	how	politics	have	to	be	(Sanz,	Janet;	personal	interview;	25th	January	2017).	For	that	reason,	 the	first	meetings	were	dedicated	not	to	possible	policies	to	 implement	but	to	the	creation	of	an	ethical	code	that	all	 future	candidates	of	Barcelona	en	Comú	would	have	to	follow.	The	ethical	code	was	“intended	to	be	a	step	forward	in	carrying	out	 the	democratic	revolution”141,	which	 the	members	of	Barcelona	en	 Comú	 considered	 that	 was	 necessary	 in	 Spanish	 politics.	 The	 ethical	 code,	named	 “Governing	 by	 obeying”	 “comprises	 a	 code	 of	 practice	 and	 concrete	actions	 that	 people	 holding	 elected	 and	 appointed	 political	 positions	 must	respect	 in	 order	 for	 the	 political	 system	 to	 be	 responsible	 and	 responsive	 to	citizens”.	Further,	 “It	also	 includes	a	range	of	commitments	and	measures	with	the	aim	of	guaranteeing	that	everyone	can	dedicate	the	necessary	time	to	public	service	and,	at	the	same	time,	putting	an	end	to	the	privileges”.		The	elaboration	of	 the	ethical	 code	 lasted	 two	months,	a	 significant	part	of	 the	formal	negotiations	time142.	But	apart	 from	the	original	goal	of	the	ethical	code	regarding	democratic	regeneration,	 it	also	had	other	utilities.	 It	was	a	powerful	tool	for	the	Barcelona	en	Comú’s	members	cohesion	too,	helping	to	get	to	know	each	member	and	their	different	work	cultures	(Sanz,	Janet;	personal	interview;	25th	January	2017).	For	one	of	the	two	campaign	managers,	David	Cid,	working	together	 every	 day	 side	 by	 side	 and	 sharing	 space,	was	 an	 important	 element	that	 strengthened	 the	will	 of	 keeping	 together	 and	 deciding	 together	 between	the	 members	 of	 the	 project	 (personal	 interview;	 2th	 February	 2017).	 Marc	
																																																								140	In	March	of	2017	the	people	that	answer	with	a	no	to	the	question	“are	you	satisfied	with	the	functioning	of	our	democracy?"	was	still	a	65%.	Survey	available	at:	http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/04/08/actualidad/1491668182_128365.html	141	Governing	by	obeying,	the	ethical	code	of	Barcelona	en	Comú	(available	in	the	annex).	142	Between	4	and	6	months.		
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Bertomeus,	one	of	the	persons	in	charge	of	the	negotiations	for	Podem	said	that	starting	with	 the	 code	of	 ethics	was	useful	 from	 two	point	of	views:	externally	and	internally.	On	the	one	hand,	it	was	useful,	to	make	the	project	public	and	to	explain	 its	 essential	 objectives	 to	 the	 citizens.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 and	 more	relevant	 for	Bertomeus,	 it	was	useful	 to	create	 internal	collaborative	synergies.	Those	previous	works	 helped	 to	 create	 an	 environment	 of	 trust	 and	helped	 to	facilitate	 the	 subsequent	 discussions	 about	 the	 most	 delicate	 issues	 with	 a	confident	attitude		(personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).	Thus,	the	code	of	ethics	 was	 a	 valuable	 tool	 to	 achieve	 the	 agreement	 between	 the	 various	members	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.		Barcelona	en	Comú	is	the	result	of	the	addition	of	various	groups	of	people	with	difference	priories	and	different	personal	path.	Consequently,	they	have	different	visions	that	must	be	handled	correctly	to	allow	the	parties	to	continue	working	together;	otherwise	the	risk	of	breakage	is	high.	Nevertheless,	that	difference	has	shown	to	be	a	great	opportunity	too,	especially	in	the	campaign.	Meanwhile	the	coordination	unit	had	to	work	hard	to	keep	the	electoral	machine	working	due	to	the	discussions	about	how	to	face	campaign	decisions	-like	the	use	of	the	face	of	Ada	 Colau	 in	 the	 electoral	 ballots-	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 time	 all	 groups	 were	surprised	 about	 the	 quality	 and	 approaches	 of	 the	 other	 groups	 (Cid,	 David;	personal	interview;	2th	February	2017).	Thus	the	people	of	ICV-EUiA	contributed	with	 experienced	 elites,	 the	 knowhow	of	working	within	 institutions,	 electoral	campaign	 experience	 and	 a	 big	 background	 of	 all	 the	 municipal	 issues.	 For	Bertomeus	ICV-EUiA	was	a	base	from	which	to	start	building	the	project	either	from	 the	 political	 cadres,	 or	 electoral	 platform	 as	 they	 had	 previous	representation	and	with	that,	access	to	electoral	free	advertisements,	or	financial	support	(personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).	Guanyem	contributed	with	an	important	amount	of	people	that	knew	how	to	connect	with	the	citizens	and	how	 to	use	all	 the	media	and	 social	networks	 to	 communicate	 the	 ideas	of	 the	confluence	(Cid,	David;	personal	interview;	2th	February	2017).		They	had	a	very	clear	strategy	in	mind,	and	an	activist	army	to	activate	the	society,	thanks	to	the	close	links	with	the	neighbourhoods	and	the	social	movements.	The	fact	that	the	members	 of	 Guanyem	 have	 been	 doing	 politics	 before	 but	 far	 away	 from	 the	
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institutions	 entailed	 that	 they	 arrived	 with	 different	 mental	 frameworks	 that	supposed	to	see	new	solutions	to	old	problems	(Sanz,	Janet;	personal	interview;	25th	 January	 2017).	 For	 Janet	 Sanz	 the	 only	 member	 of	 the	 government	 of	Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 that	 had	 been	 member	 of	 the	 City	 Council	 before	 and	 in	charge	 of	 the	 transition	 team,	 Podem	 contributed	with	 its	momentum.	 At	 that	time,	Podem	had	the	powerful	image	of	its	national	leader	Pablo	Iglesias	and	the	feeling	of	the	existence	of	an	alternative	that	could	really	win.	Moreover,	thanks	to	 them,	 it	was	 possible	 to	 reach	 some	 popular	 city	 districts	with	 high	 labour	voters	and	new	voters	that	had	never	felt	attracted	by	politics	before	and	were	not	 connected	with	 social	movements	 (personal	 interview;	25th	 January	2017).	Podem’s	leader	in	Barcelona	thinks	that	they	were	the	reason	of	the	mobilization	in	 some	areas	 rather	 than	 the	 figure	of	Colau,	who	was	not	 able	 to	 connect	by	herself	(Bertomeus,	Marc;	personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).			Meanwhile,	 the	external	 social	movements	–that	 is,	 the	ones	 that	were	not	 the	PAH,	Guanyem	and	the	connected	to	them-	also	played	a	big	role	in	Barcelona	en	Comú.	 By	 nature,	 the	members	 of	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 put	 a	 lot	 of	 trust	 in	 the	function	of	 social	movements	not	 just	 for	 effective	democracy,	 but	 also	 for	 the	management	of	the	decisions	of	the	city.	Ricard	Gomà,	linked	for	a	long	time	with	a	political	 party143	and	now	without	managerial	 party	duties,	 had	 analysed	 the	project	 he	 helped	 to	 create	 from	 his	 current	 position	 as	 a	 political	 science	professor	 stating	 that	 “without	 the	 social	movements	Barcelona	 en	Comú	does	not	 make	 sense,	 moreover,	 it	 would	 not	 existed”	 (personal	 interview;	 9th	February	2017).	For	him,	in	Barcelona	“social	movements	are	doing	things	that	political	 parties	 do	 not	 do,	 like	 connecting	 with	 people,	 caring	 about	 their	concerns,	 and	 trying	 to	 solve	 citizens	 problems.	 In	 summary,	 they	 build	 a	community”	 (personal	 interview;	 9th	 February	 2017).	 Further,	 the	 Spanish	MP	Lucía	 Martín	 believes	 that	 “it	 is	 impossible	 to	 have	 the	 existence	 of	 feedback	from	 the	 institutions	 unless	 there	 are	 strong	 social	 movements”	 (personal	interview;	 28th	 January	 2017).	 For	 her,	 the	 people	 from	 social	 movements	contribute	with	 a	 different	 personal	 experience	 from	 those	 of	 political	 parties.	The	activists	“have	spent	a	lot	of	time	touching	the	street,	debating	in	assemblies																																																									143	ICV.	
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every	week,	feeling	peoples’	bad	experiences	as	if	those	were	their	own	personal	experiences”	 (Ibid).	 Martín	 firmly	 believes	 that	 living	 others	 people’s	 reality	changes	 your	 conception	 of	 life,	 and	 that	 is	 how	 activists	 learned	 new	approaches	about	how	public	policies	should	be	done,	especially	social	policies	(Ibid).	 Marc	 Bertomeus	 also	 support	 this	 when	 he	 explained	 that	 social	movements	supplied	the	project	with	ideas	and	arguments	to	defend	it,	and	a	big	part	 of	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 party’s	 manifesto	 (personal	 interview;	 14th	 of	February	 2017).	 Additionally,	 Gomà	 believes	 that	 Barcelona	 is	 not	 an	 isolated	case,	as	now	social	movements	are	interested	in	being	active	in	politics	and	are	more	present	than	ever	in	Spanish	institutions.		Finally,	 the	 figure	 of	 Ada	 Colau	 is	 an	 important	 element	 to	 understand	 the	existence	of	the	Barcelona	en	Comú.	She	was	a	very	known	and	respected	person	for	her	past	as	activist,	and	her	political	potential	was	clear	for	all	the	members	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	Her	 leadership	of	 the	 list	was	not	under	discussion	as	a	big	majority	 firmly	 believed	 that	 she	 should	be	 the	public	 face	 of	 the	 common	project	(Gomà,	Ricard;	personal	interview;	9th	February	2017).	According	to	Joan	Herrera,	 the	former	leader	of	Iniciativa	per	Catalunya	Verds,	no	one	denied	the	political	and	moral	leadership	of	Ada	(Spena	&	Forti,	2016).	In	fact,	her	presence	in	 the	 project	 encouraged	 some	 other	 actors	 to	 join	 it.	 The	 main	 objective	 of	Podemos	once	it	was	clear	they	would	not	run	under	their	own	brand	in	the	local	elections	was	to	associate	the	figure	of	Colau	to	the	Podemos	project	(Bertomeus,	Marc;	personal	interview;	14th	of	February	2017).	For	Podem	there	was	no	other	person	 with	 the	 same	 degree	 of	 approval	 from	 the	 citizens	 and	 her	 mere	presence	 in	 the	 project	 assured	 that	 several	 citizens	 would	 feel	 attracted	 to	Barcelona	 en	 Comú.	 Despite	 she	 could	 be	 consider	 an	 extremist	 and	 not	 a	politician	 by	 her	 past	modus	 operandi,	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 her	 early	 followers,	 this	should	 not	 be	 a	 problem	 for	 citizens	 to	 vote	 for	 her,	 since	 it	 was	 not	 an	impediment	 for	 the	 political	 parties	 to	 approach	 her.	 In	 fact,	 these	 followers	believe	 that	 “the	parties	came	 to	us	 for	Ada,	not	despite	her”	 (Segovia,	Susana;	personal	 interview;	 15th	 March	 2017).	 David	 Cid,	 the	 leader	 of	 Iniciativa	 per	Catalunya	Verds	and	at	 the	moment	of	 the	negotiations	 in	charge	of	discussing	the	participation	of	his	party	in	the	project	stated	that,	
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	 “Ada	 Colau	 was	 the	 face	 of	 the	 most	 interesting	 social	 movement	 in	reaction	 to	 the	 economic	 crisis.	 She	was	very	known,	 and	with	 a	high	legitimacy	for	her	acts	to	confront	the	economic	powers.	Consequently,	her	leadership	was	the	most	natural	and	least	complicated	issue	in	the	negotiations.	We	have	 to	 be	 aware	 that	 her	 degree	 of	 knowledge	was	very	high,	even	before	the	presentation	of	the	project,	between	70	and	80%	therefore	higher	than	the	majority	of	politicians.	She	was	a	person	that	was	every	week	present	in	the	TV	channels.	And	of	course	that	was	a	plus	to	the	project”	(Personal	interview;	2th	February	2017).		
5.7	Summary.		This	chapter	presented	the	story	behind	the	creation	of	“Barcelona	en	Comú”	a	joint	venture	between	social	movements	and	political	parties.	It	focuses	in	the	situation	that	finalized	in	the	decision	of	different	actors	to	create	a	new	political	 subject.	 It	 continues	 explaining	 the	 construction	 process,	 its	difficulties	and	the	profile	of	the	actors	involved	in	its	creation.	It	the	chapter	it	is	possible	to	observe	crucial	elements	for	the	process,	as	the	existence	of	a	strong	 candidate	 and	 an	 ethical	 code	 to	 define	members’	 public	 behaviour.	Additionally	it	is	highlighted	the	influence	of	the	new	political	subject	on	the	local	 elections	 of	 Barcelona	when	 it	was	 created	 and	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	project	by	the	social	movements	members.	Finally,	it	presents	the	later	pact	between	BeC	and	the	PSC	in	the	City	Government.	In	Chapter	Six	the	analysis	will	try	to	explain	using	game	theory,	why	the	agreement	between	the	parties	was	possible	 and	 the	 effect	 of	 some	 elements	 over	 the	 kind	 of	 relationship	between	the	actors	involved.				 	
Chapter	Six.	
Analysis	of	the	elements	that	affect	the	
interaction.		This	chapter	represents	the	second	part	of	the	analytical	narrative	approach:	the	analysis.	It	builds	on	the	narrative	of	two	specific	series	of	events	that	involve	the	interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 presented	 in	 the	previous	chapters.	Thus,	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	analysis	of	the	elements	that	have	been	extracted	from	those	chapters:	the	elements	identified	through	the	in-depth	study	of	the	events	that	occurred	around	the	municipal	elections	in	Milan	and	 Barcelona.	 The	 specific	 roles	 these	 elements	 play	 in	 influencing	 the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	will	be	highlighted	to	 determine	 each	 one	 importance.	 To	 achieve	 this	 I	will	 use	 tools	 from	 game	theory,	since	they	permit	the	systematic	presentation	of	the	events	based	on	the	strategic	choices	of	the	actors	involved.	Using	Michael	Hanagan’s	categorization	of	 the	 various	 types	 of	 relationships	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements,	 this	 chapter	 will	 try	 to	 give	 insight	 into	 how	 some	 elements	 are	capable	to	alter	these	relationships	from	one	type	to	another.		
	
6.1	The	six	types	of	interaction.	This	 work	 attempts	 to	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 some	 elements	 in	 shaping	 the	interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 To	 do	 this,	 the	research	 takes	 into	 consideration	 various	 possible	 configurations	 of	 this	interaction.	 The	 classification	 of	 the	 stages	 I	 use	 here	 is	 based	 on	 Michael	Hanagan’s	(1998)	five	types,	plus	one	additional	type	I	added	to	complete	the	full	range	 of	 possible	 stages	 between	 these	 actors.	 This	 classification,	 as	 seen	 in	Chapter	 Two,	 is	 grounded	 in	 showing	 how	 close	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 feel	 about	 each	 other.	 Thus,	 depending	 on	 the	 degree	 of	collaboration	 that	 actors	 are	 interested	 in,	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	
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parties	 and	 social	 movements	 can	 vary	 from	 various	 stages 144 .	 From	 an	unconditional	 support	 of	 the	 social	 movements	 towards	 a	 political	 party,	 to	becoming	 a	 complete	 ideological	 adversary,	 there	 are	 6	 stages:	 “articulation”,	“permeation”,	“alliance”,	“independence”,	“competition”	and	“opposition”.	Figure	3	 displays	 the	 classification	 graphically.	 Here,	 the	 spectrum	 of	 relationship	ranges	 from	 totally	 agreeing	 with	 the	 other	 part,	 represented	 by	 1;	 to	 totally	contrary,	represented	by	0:		Figure	3.	Types	of	relationships	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	
		A	brief	reminder	of	the	various	types	of	interactions145:		
• Articulation.	 In	 this	 scenario	social	movements	are	political	parties’	tools	and	follow	completely	the	parties’	orders.	Movements	may	even	be	 created	 by	 parties,	 and	 they	 act	 as	 a	 channel	 to	 impulse	 some	 of	party’s	ideas.		
• Permeation.	 Both,	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 act	independently,	 however,	 their	 level	 of	 connection	 is	 so	 strong	 that	there	 is	 a	 relation	 of	 exclusivity	 between	 them.	 Hence,	 the	 social	movement	will	not	collaborate	with	another	political	party.																																																									144	See	“7.	Types	of	relationship	between	parties	and	movements”	in	Chapter	Two.	145	For	a	more	extended	explanation	see	“7.	Types	of	relationship	between	parties	and	movements”	in	Chapter	Two.	
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• Alliance.	 Political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 are	 each	 other	natural	 allies.	 They	 negotiate	 each	 collaboration	 autonomously,	 and	they	expect	to	obtain	specific	benefits	from	every	agreement.			
• Independence.	 Social	 movement’s	 highest	 priority	 is	 achieving	 its	own	goal.	If	this	goal	is	shared	with	the	party,	collaboration	can	exist.	Otherwise	 the	 movement	 will	 act	 without	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	political	consequences	for	the	party.		
• Competition.	The	social	movement	decides	 to	create	a	new	political	organization	to	compete	in	the	elections	against	the	political	party.		
• Opposition.	 Social	 movement	 and	 political	 party	 are	 ideologically	contrarian.	 They	 see	 each	 other	 as	 political	 adversaries	 and	 the	intentions	of	both	actors	include	the	defeat	of	the	other’s	ideas.		It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 two	 extremes	 of	 the	 classification,	 that	 is,	“articulation”	 and	 “opposition”,	 can	be	 found	 in	 every	political	 system	and	are,	thus,	 no	 ideal	 types	 included	 for	 theoretical	 reasons.	However,	 for	 the	 present	dissertation	 their	 utility	 is	 limited.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 social	movement	 follows	completely	 the	 lines	of	one	specific	political	party	 -as	 in	 the	case	 of	 “articulation”-	 limits	 the	 possible	 choices	 of	 the	 movement	 as	 an	independent	 actor.	 In	 practice,	 in	 situations	 of	 “articulation”,	 there	 is	 just	 one	decision	centre,	despite	the	existence	of	two	different	actors.	Hence,	the	political	party	has	all	the	power,	no	existing	a	credible	threat	from	the	social	movement,	and	consequently,	there	is	no	possible	strategic	behaviour	that	we	can	observe.	On	the	other	hand,	“opposition”,	the	other	extreme,	is	very	useful	to	define	when	collaboration	between	actors	is	possible.	The	analysis	of	the	element	“ideology”	in	section	6.4	highlights	this,	showing	that	when	two	actors	are	in	this	stage,	no	collaboration	is	possible.	Nevertheless,	the	fact	that	when	two	actors	are	in	this	stage	 it	 is	not	 easy	 for	 them	 to	move	 to	another	 stage,	 limits	 its	utility	 for	 this	dissertation	beyond	 the	point	of	 establishing	when	 it	 is	possible	 to	 collaborate	
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and	when	not.	Therefore,	 the	other	 four	 types	of	 interactions	are	 the	ones	 that	are	going	to	be	the	most	used	in	this	dissertation.		
6.2	Preliminary	assumptions.	In	all	works	that	use	game	theory	as	analytical	tool,	it	is	important	to	accurately	define	 the	kind	of	actors	under	study	and	 the	conditions	 in	which	 these	actors	are	inserted	before	starting	the	analysis.	This	dissertation	is	not	different	in	this	aspect.	Thus,	the	analysis	considers	that	the	actors	fulfil	the	following	features:		
• All	actors	are	rational	in	their	behaviour	and	decisions.	I	assume	that	they	act	 in	 their	 own	 self-interest,	 but	 they	 not	 necessarily	 seek	 immediate	benefits	since	they	can	plan	long-term.		
• The	actors	know	their	own	preferences	and	these	can	be	ranked.	The	fact	that	the	preferences	can	be	ranked	does	not	exclude	the	possibility	of	a	tie	between	two	or	more	options.	
• The	actors	are	assumed	to	maximize	their	expected	utility.	
• The	actors	know	who	is	playing	the	game,	that	is,	who	other	actors	are.	
• It	is	common	knowledge	to	all	actors	that	other	players	are	rational	too.		
• The	 actors	 are	 aware	 of	 their	 actions	 and	 of	 their	 decisions,	 including	their	consequences.		
• The	actors	know	and	are	able	to	evaluate	all	possible	alternatives.	
• The	 actors	 act	 strategically.	 Through	 strategic	 decision-making,	individuals	 seek	 to	anticipate	 the	effect	 that	 their	own	actions	will	have	on	 the	behaviour	 of	 others.	Given	 this	 expectation,	 each	 individual	 then	determines	 his	 or	 her	 optimal	 response	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 most	desirable	outcome.		Additionally,	 in	 the	 games	 used	 to	 analyse	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 elements,	 I	consider	that	 there	 is	a	sequence	of	actions	executed	by	the	actors.	That	 is,	 the	decisions	 of	 the	 actors	 are	 taken	 one	 after	 the	 other,	 not	 all	 at	 the	 same	 time.	Consequently,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 choice,	 the	 actors	 know	 what	 others	 have	decided	previously	 and	 they	 act	 according	 to	 this	 knowledge.	 In	 this	 situation,	
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players	are	capable	of	observing	the	actions	of	other	players	before	deciding	on	their	optimal	 response.	 In	 this	kind	of	 games,	players	 can	 thus,	 condition	 their	optimal	actions	based	on	what	other	players	have	done	in	the	past	or	anticipate	what	they	will	do	in	the	future	based	on	their	rational	behaviour.	This	 is	called	conditional	 strategy,	 describing	 how	 one	 player	 conditions	 his	 or	 her	 actions	upon	the	actions	of	other	players	in	the	game.		Concerning	 the	 amount	of	 information	which	 actors	have,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	situations	of	complete	information	and	situations	of	incomplete	information.	It	is	said	 to	 have	 complete	 information	 if	 all	 players’	 payoff	 functions	 are	 common	knowledge.	This	means	 that	everyone	knows	everyone’s	payoffs,	 and	everyone	knows	 everyone	 knows	 this,	 and	 so	 on.	 In	 contrast,	 incomplete	 information	means	 that	players	are	not	sure	about	other	players’	payoffs.	Unless	otherwise	stated,	 the	 games	 used	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 considered	 to	 have	 complete	information.		In	some	moments	of	this	chapter	Barcelona	en	Comú	will	be	treated	as	if	it	were	a	social	movement,	even	though	political	parties	and	social	movements	form	it.	So	far,	 the	exact	nature	of	BeC	is	not	clear.	 It	 is	not	a	classic	political	party,	but	nevertheless	 participates	 in	 institutional	 politics.	 But	 since	 their	 leaders	 are	former	activists	and	the	strategic	decisions	are	made	by	the	former	members	of	the	PAH,	their	behaviour	is	more	similar	to	a	social	movement	than	to	a	classical	political	 party.	 The	 analyst	 and	 scholars	 that	 have	 followed	 this	 new	 political	phenomenon,	 like	 Gabriel	 Colomé 146 ,	 believe	 that	 “BeC	 is	 undoubtedly	 a	movement,	 and	 the	 parties	 that	 integrate	 BeC	 apart	 from	 ICV,	 are	 also	movements.	Moreover,	it	acts	as	a	movement	not	as	a	political	party”	(personal	interview;	 18th	 of	 May	 2017).	 Consequently,	 especially	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	relationship	between	the	PSC	and	BeC	in	sections	6.7.2,	and	6.9.1,	and	Podemos	and	 BeC	 in	 section	 6.5.3,	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	 will	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 social	movement.		
																																																								146	Political	science	professor	at	the	Autonomous	University	of	Barcelona.	
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6.3	The	elements	to	analyse.	By	creating	an	account	of	the	events	surrounding	the	local	elections	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	it	has	been	possible	to	identify	some	key	elements	that	 influence	the	relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 Emerging	 from	both	the	interviews	and	the	other	sources,	these	elements	have	to	be	tested	and	examined	 to	 establish	 their	 role	 in	 the	 alteration	 of	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	between	the	actors	object	of	the	present	study.	These	elements	can	for	example	make	 the	actors	more	 likely	 to	opt	 for	a	 stronger	 collaboration	or	 to	decide	 to	look	for	a	more	independent	kind	of	relationship.		First,	 the	 interviewees	 indicated	 some	 elements	 that,	 for	 them,	 had	 a	 relevant	role	in	helping	or	obstructing	the	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	 Those	 elements	 deserve	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 and	 properly	analysed.	However,	there	are	also	elements	that	just	appeared	after	creating	the	narrative	 of	 the	 events	 through	 connecting	 the	 dots	 from	 different	 sources.	Those	 elements	 are	 normally	 hidden	 for	 those	who	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 events	and	 can	 only	 be	 properly	 observed	 from	 a	more	 objective	 point	 of	 view.	 Both	types	 elements,	 those	 more	 visible	 and	 those	 more	 hidden	 will	 be	 analysed	accordingly	to	their	importance	for	the	relationship	under	observation.		The	 individualized	 analysis	 of	 each	 of	 these	 elements	 allows,	 in	 addition	 to	observing	 their	 joint	 role	 as	 done	 in	 the	 narrative	 part,	 to	 evaluate	 the	 real	relevance	of	each	one	of	them.	This	delimitation	consents	to	separate	the	crucial	elements	from	those	that	have	little	or	no	influence	on	the	determination	of	the	relationship	 between	 the	 actors.	 To	 do	 this,	 this	 dissertation	 makes	 use	 of	models	 of	 game	 theory.	Reality	 is	 always	 complex	 and	 through	models	we	 can	simplify	 it,	 making	 it	 more	 approachable	 for	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 researchers.	Additionally,	 the	analysis	permits	 to	extract	 specific	 features	of	 these	elements	that	we	were	not	possible	to	observe	just	with	the	narrative	part.	Undoubtedly,	the	use	of	modelling	to	simplify	the	reality	entails	the	 loss	of	some	parts	of	the	object	of	study.	However,	it	is	a	necessary	price	to	pay,	since	otherwise	the	use	of	models	would	be	useless,	as	they	would	just	reproduce	the	entire	reality.	Thus,	the	 creation	 of	 good	 modelling	 lies	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 include	 all	 the	 essentials	
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while	 suppressing	 the	 superfluous	 to	 build	 a	 complete	 picture	 of	 the	 elements	that	have	a	crucial	role.		The	elements	that	are	going	to	be	analysed	are:			
• The	ideology.		
• The	figure	of	the	candidate.		
• The	capacity	of	influence	in	the	elaboration	of	public	policies.		
• The	electoral	system.	
• The	capacity	of	making	public	appointments.		
• The	existence	of	trust	among	the	actors.			This	 list	 does	 not	 intend	 to	 be	 a	 comprehensive	 list	 of	 all	 the	 elements	 that	influence	 the	 relationship	between	political	parties	 and	 social	movements.	The	existence	of	other	elements	is	more	than	possible,	in	fact,	almost	certain.	As	such,	the	 elements	 included	 in	 this	 analysis	 are	 specifically	 and	 only	 those	 which	appeared	 as	 relevant	 after	 in-depth	 studies	 of	 the	 events	 surrounding	 the	 two	last	local	elections	of	the	cities	of	Milan	and	Barcelona.		
6.4	Ideology.	Ideology	 is	 the	 first	 element	 we	 discuss	 that	 shapes	 the	 relationship	 between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	The	role	of	the	ideology	is	particular	and	different	from	the	other	elements	since	it	displays	its	influence	in	a	sort	of	stage	zero,	 that	 is,	 before	modelling	 the	 type	of	 relationship	 that	will	 be	 established.	Previously	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 other	 elements	 that	 will	 define	 the	 type	 of	relationship	 between	 the	 actors,	 ideology	 acts	 as	 a	 gatekeeper	 allowing	 or	denying	 the	 existence	 of	 collaboration.	 Since	 we	 understand	 ideology	 as	 the	collection	of	 ideas	about	how	the	society	should	be	organized	(North,	1990),	 if	the	 actors	 do	 not	 recognize	 each	 other	 as	 at	 least	 ideologically	 compatible,	 no	collaboration	 is	 possible.	 Thus,	 instead	 of	 shaping	 the	 relationship,	 ideology	impacts	by	allowing	collaboration	or	by	impeding	it.		
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Both	 actors,	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 have	 ideologies	 (Inglehart,	1990).	Although	 it	 tends	 to	 be	 easy	 to	 frame	 a	 political	 party	within	 a	 specific	ideology	as	“parties	organize	themselves	around	ideologies,	not	policy	positions”	(Hinich	&	Munger,	1996,	p.3),	it	is	not	so	obvious	with	social	movements.	Social	movements	 tend	 to	be	 interested	 in	changing	a	 specific	part	of	 the	society	and	they	do	not	necessarily	need	to	have	a	project	for	the	whole.	They	are	interested	in	certain	issues,	and	their	acts	tend	to	be	focused	on	producing	transformations	in	 these	 issues	 not	 in	 developing	 a	 complete	 ideology.	 However,	 normally	 the	core	 of	 social	 movements’	 demands	 can	 be	 framed	 within	 the	 ideology	 of	 a	specific	political	party’s	family	(Tucker,	1989).	For	instance,	the	demands	of	the	environmental	 movement	 tend	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 ideology	 of	 left-wing	 parties,	whereas	the	demands	of	the	pro-life	movement	tend	to	be	part	of	the	ideology	of	right-wing	 parties.	Obviously,	 these	 assumptions	 have	 to	 take	 in	 consideration	the	 specificities	 of	 each	 political	 reality	 and	 each	 State,	 since	 each	 political	environment	has	its	own	particularities	and	its	own	ideological	alignment.	Thus,	some	 issues	 can	 be	 accepted	 across	 the	 entire	 political	 spectrum	 of	 a	 specific	country,	as	it	is	for	example	the	case	of	social	security	in	the	Nordic	countries.			Even	 though	 social	 movements’	 demands	 are	 normally	 transversal	 to	 parties’	voters,	 the	 possibility	 of	 including	 the	 demands	 of	 social	movements	within	 a	particular	political	 ideology	results	very	useful	because	 it	allows	to	understand	why	some	social	movements	tend	to	collaborate	more	with	one	group	of	parties	rather	 than	 others.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 use	 a	 similar	 classification	regarding	 the	 political	 positions	 of	 both	 types	 of	 actors.	 However,	 the	 specific	ideology	 of	 the	 actors	 is	 not	 crucial	 for	 their	 interaction,	 since	 the	 important	thing	 is	 that	 both	 actors	 recognize	 each	 other	 as	 a	 valid	 potential	 partner,	 as	“ideological	beliefs	are	often	concerned	more	with	feelings	and	values	than	with	verifiable	facts”	(Goertzel,	1992,	p51).	On	the	one	hand,	if	both	actors	recognize	each	 other	 by	 sharing	 the	 same	 ideology,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 define	 this	 as	 an	ideological	identity.	For	instance,	if	both	actors	recognize	each	other	as	left-wing,	they	share	an	ideological	identity.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	actors	recognize	each	other	as	bearers	of	a	contrary	ideology,	they	are	ideologically	incompatible.	For	instance,	if	one	actor	identifies	as	leftists	and	the	other	as	rightist,	and	they	agree	
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on	 that,	 they	 are	 ideologically	 incompatible,	 and	 they	 recognize	 it	 in	 this	way.	However,	 since	 there	 are	 several	 ideologies	 and	 they	 are	 not	 necessarily	 all	contrary	to	others,	actors	can	also	feel	that	they	are	in	an	intermediate	position	ideologically	 speaking.	 In	 those	 cases,	 when	 the	 actors	 do	 not	 share	 the	 same	ideology	and	neither	the	contrary,	 it	 is	possible	to	talk	about	the	existence	of	a	compatible	ideology	between	them.	Thus,	meanwhile	contrary	ideology	prevents	collaboration	 between	 actors	 since	 the	 only	 possible	 type	 of	 relationship	 is	“opposition”;	 identical	 or	 compatible	 ideologies	 make	 collaboration	 possible.	Consequently,	 actors	pay	special	attention	 to	 ideology	 in	 the	 firsts	moments	 to	assure	this	is	compatible.	Once	this	filter	is	passed,	ideology	becomes	secondary.	The	definitive	type	of	relationship	between	the	actors	is	still	to	be	established	by	other	elements,	but	sharing	a	compatible	ideology	opens	a	door	to	collaboration.	The	 reason	why	actors	use	 ideology	 to	decide	which	other	 actors	 they	 are	not	going	to	collaborate	with,	is	because,	as	Anthony	Downs	argues,	ideology	serves	as	a	means	of	reducing	the	costs	of	collecting	information	(1957).	Acting	as	a	sort	of	 reputation,	 if	 the	actors	know	 that	 the	 ideology	of	a	potential	partner	 is	not	compatible	with	their	own,	they	are	not	willing	to	collaborate.	However,	unless	the	own	ideology	clearly	conflicts	with	some	political	position	of	the	other	party,	actors	 will	 try	 to	 reach	 agreements	 with	 the	 maximum	 possible	 numbers	 of	actors	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 “ideologies	 are	more	 about	 future	 potentialities	than	current	realities”	(Goertzel,	1992,	p51).		When	 political	 parties	 interact	with	 a	 social	movement	 both	 actors	 have	 their	own	 ideology,	 which	 is	 configured	 previously	 to	 their	 first	 contact.	 When	analysing	the	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	in	the	games,	their	political	positions	can	be	expressed	in	three	different	ways:		a) Ideology	X.		b) Ideology	Z,	contrary	to	X.		c) Ideology	 Y,	 a	 position	 in	 between	 of	 X	 and	 Y	 and	 consequently	 sharing	part	of	both.		Each	actor	can	have	one	of	these	kinds	of	ideologies,	X,	Z	or	Y,	and	can	interact	with	 another	 actor	 with	 the	 same	 range	 of	 ideological	 options	 X,	 Z	 or	 Y.	 This	
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creates	a	series	of	multiple	combinations	that	are	possible	to	be	observed	in	the	figure	4.			Figure	4.	Ideological	combinations	of	the	actors.	
		Firstly,	when	both	actors	share	the	same	ideology,	that	is,	when	the	combination	is	XX,	ZZ	or	YY	it	can	be	described	as	a	case	of	identical	ideology	[see	figure	5].	In	this	 scenario,	 collaboration	 is	possible	because	 the	actors	have	 similar	ways	of	understanding	the	society.	However,	it	is	important	to	highlight	that	even	though	common	ideology	allows	collaboration,	it	does	not	guarantee	it.	The	actual	type	of	 relationship	will	 be	 determined	 by	 other	 elements,	 which	 are	 not	 ideology.	Ideology,	 thus,	 acts	 as	 a	 pre-emptive	 element	 able	 to	 foster	 or	 obstruct	 the	collaboration	before	it	begins.	Sharing	the	same	ideology	does	therefore	not	lead	to	 an	 immediate	 agreement	 between	 the	 actors.	 In	 fact,	 two	 organizations	sharing	 the	 same	 ideology	 should	 not	 be	 confused	 with	 two	 organizations	sharing	the	same	goals.	Despite	the	existence	of	an	identical	ideology,	the	actors	can	be	electoral	adversaries	competing	for	the	support	of	the	same	kind	of	voter.	The	 types	 of	 relationship	 possible	 to	 find	 between	 actors	 that	 share	 the	 same	ideology	 are	 thus	 all	 but	 “opposition”.	 Therefore,	 the	 type	 can	 vary	 form	“articulation”	to	“competition”.	
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	Secondly,	when	the	interacting	parties	have	contrary	ideologies,	that	is	XZ,	or	ZX,	it	can	be	described	as	a	case	of	 ideological	 incompatibility	[see	figure	5].	When	the	 ideologies	 of	 the	 actors	 are	 in	 opposite	 parts	 of	 the	 ideological	 spectrum,	collaboration	is	very	difficult.	This	implies	that	the	type	of	relationship	between	the	 actors	 is	 going	 to	 be	 “opposition”.	 The	 ideology	 places	 the	 actors	 in	 facing	positions,	defining	each	other	as	adversaries.	This	 setting	determines	a	kind	of	relationship	 that	 can	 hardly	 be	 altered,	 since	 it	 would	 require	 a	 complete	modification	of	the	positions	of	one	of	the	actors	or	the	existence	of	exceptional	circumstances	 that	 foster	 the	 collaboration	 between	 them.	 Therefore,	 ideology	reveals	 itself	as	 such	a	crucial	element	 for	 relationships	 that	Norman	Schofield	holds	 that	 “strong	 ideological	 disagreement	within	 one	of	 the	 two	 [actors]	 can	lead	to	collapse”	of	any	potential	agreement	(2008).	It	is	at	the	end	the	definition	of	 “opposition”	 itself,	 when	 social	 movement	 and	 political	 party	 belong	 to	 a	completely	different	ideological	space.	They	are	antagonists	and	the	main	goal	of	the	movement	 is	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 public	 policies	 that	 the	 party	 proposes,	battling	 against	 their	 approval.	 Hence,	 ideology	 is	 an	 element	 that	 in	 some	circumstances	it	can	prevent	any	possible	collaboration	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.			Finally,	when	one	of	the	actors,	either	the	political	party	or	the	social	movement,	has	an	ideology	defined	as	Y,	it	creates	the	potential	combinations	XY,	YX,	YZ,	and	ZY.	 Since	 ideology	 Y	 is	 not	 contrary	 to	 X	 nor	 Z,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 talk	 about	 the	existence	of	a	compatible	 ideology	between	the	actors	 [see	 figure	5].	This	does	not	mean	that	they	share	a	common	ideology,	but	they	are	close	enough	to	allow	them	to	collaborate	on	common	projects.	In	these	combinations	of	ideology,	this	one	does	not	preconfigure	the	type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	 Ideology	might	 facilitate	or	obstruct	understanding	between	the	actors,	but	it	does	not	determine	the	type	of	relationship	between	them,	since	with	the	same	ideological	assumptions,	the	type	of	relationship	can	vary	among	various	stages.	Like	 in	 the	cases	of	 identical	 ideology,	 there	are	other	elements	that	 will	 configure	 the	 type	 of	 relationship.	 Thus,	 when	 the	 ideologies	 do	 not	
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coincide	among	 the	actors,	but	 remain	compatible,	 the	 type	of	 relationship	can	vary	between	“alliance”	and	“competition”.		Figure	5.	Outcomes	of	ideological	combinations	in	a	two-actors	game.	
	
	
6.	4.1	The	role	of	ideology	in	the	cases	of	Milan	and	Barcelona.	In	the	two	case	studies	of	this	dissertation,	ideology	played	a	relevant	role	in	the	interaction	between	the	various	actors.	 In	the	cities	of	Milan	and	Barcelona	the	collaboration	between	 the	actors	 involved	was	possible	due	 to	 the	existence	of	an	identical	or	compatible	ideology	between	them.	The	ideology	did	not	produce	the	collaboration,	but	it	allowed	it.	Hereinafter,	to	observe	the	role	of	ideology	it	is	convenient	to	use	the	traditional	political	spectrum	left-right,	emphasizing	the	centre	 as	 the	 political	 space	 that	 shares	 ideas	 with	 the	 other	 two	 ideologies	(Heywood,	 2015).	 As	 it	 is	 a	 common	 scale,	 actors	 can	 usually	 recognize	themselves	and	recognize	other	actors	in	this	typology.	This	makes	it	possible	for	them	to	know	whether	they	are	facing	an	ideological	adversary	or	an	actor	that	shares	at	least	part	of	their	ideas.			
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Thus,	 in	Milan	 the	main	studied	 interaction	 is	 the	one	between	 two	actors:	 the	Movimento	Arancione	 (MA)	and	 the	Partito	Democratico	 (PD).	The	Movimento	Arancione	is	a	social	movement	born	with	a	left-wing	ideology,	defending	leftist	policies.	 The	 Partito	 Democratico	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 a	 political	 party	 born	from	the	union	of	leftist	and	centrist	parties.	The	political	orientation	of	the	PD	depends	on	 the	actors	who	define	 it,	 but	normally	 it	 is	 considered	as	 leftist	 or	centre-left.	 Therefore,	 the	 possible	 equilibriums	 of	 the	 game	 of	 ideology	involving	 these	 actors	 are,	 the	 one	where	 the	 political	 party	 is	 either	 “left”	 or	“centre”,	and	the	social	movement	is	“left”	[see	figure	6].	In	both	equilibriums	the	final	outcome	represents	 the	existence	of	 a	possible	 collaboration	between	 the	actors147.	If	both	actors	are	“left”	there	is	an	identical	ideology,	while	if	the	actors	are	 “centre”	 “left”	 the	 result	 is	 a	 compatible	 ideology.	 Once	 shown	 that	 the	collaboration	 is	 possible,	 the	 type	 of	 interaction	 that	 is	 finally	 implemented	depends	on	other	elements,	not	on	the	ideology	of	the	actors.			Figure	6.	Game	of	ideology:	Milan.	
		
																																																								147	In	figure	6	the	possible	options	are	highlighted	in	bold	to	facilitate	the	observation.	
PD
Left
Right
Centre
MA
MA
MA
Left
Left
Left
Centre
Centre
Centre
Right
Right
Right
[Opposition]
[Opposition]
[Collaboration is possible]
[Collaboration is possible]
[Collaboration is possible]
[Collaboration is possible]
[Collaboration is possible]
[Collaboration is possible]
[Collaboration is possible]
Chapter	Six.	The	analysis	of	the	elements.		
	 163	
In	 Barcelona,	 ideology	 also	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 fostering	 the	collaboration	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 There,	 the	interactions	 studied	 are	 those	 that	 involve	 the	 Plataforma	 de	 Afectados	 por	 la	Hipoteca	 (PAH)	 and	 the	 political	 parties	 that	 wanted	 to	 collaborate	 with	 this	movement.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 PAH	 is	 a	 social	movement	with	 clear	 policy-goals	 and	 despite	 being	 a	 transversal	 organization148,	 its	 ideology	 could	 be	defined	 as	 “centre”	 or	 “left”.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 political	parties	 involved	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “left”	 or	 “centre”149,	 too.	 This	 disposition	 of	ideologies	 among	 the	various	 actors	 created	 four	possible	outcomes,	 as	 can	be	seen	in	figure	7150.	Two	of	these	outcomes	imply	an	identical	 ideology	between	the	 actors	 and	 the	 other	 two	 a	 compatible	 ideology.	 All	 options	 make	collaboration	possible.	However,	 as	 in	 the	case	of	Milan,	 the	actual	 type	of	 this	collaboration	depends	on	other	elements.		Figure	7.	Game	of	ideology:	Barcelona.	
		
																																																								148	To	see	more	about	the	PAH	go	to	Chapter	Five.	149	This	is	the	case	of	the	PSC.	150	In	the	figure	7	the	possible	options	are	highlighted	in	bold	to	facilitate	the	observation.	
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Ideology	 has	 shown	 to	 be	 an	 important	 element	 in	 the	 interaction	 between	political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 since	 the	 set	 of	 ideas	 defended	 by	 the	organizations	 facilitate	 or	 hinder	 possible	 collaborations	 between	 them.	 Thus,	while	opposite	ideologies	prevent	any	kind	of	collaboration	between	the	actors,	identical	or	similar	ideologies	allow	collaboration	without	configuring	it.	Hence,	ideology	 is	 a	 particular	 element	 that	 acts	 as	 a	 necessary	 but	 not	 sufficient	condition	 for	 defining	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	social	movements.		
6.5	The	figure	of	the	candidate.	Another	 relevant	 element	 capable	 to	 alter	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 existing	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	is	the	figure	of	the	candidate	and	the	dynamics	that	produces	his	or	her	choice.	The	election	of	a	specific	person	to	hold	this	role	is	critical	because	it	challenges	the	power-balance	between	actors.	Externally,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 minor	 decision,	 and	 the	 parties	 are	 aware	 of	 it.	 But	 its	internal	 relevance	might	 even	be	more	 important	 for	 the	 parties	 (King,	 2002).	Choosing	the	candidate	has	important	consequences	for	the	viability	of	a	project,	even	if	the	actors	have	previously	collaborated.	Thus,	although	the	actors	are	the	same,	the	choice	of	one	specific	person	over	another	to	lead	the	project	can	make	the	project	vastly	different.	There	is	the	conviction	among	the	parties	that	being	able	 to	 place	 your	 candidate	 is	 the	 greatest	 guarantee	 you	 can	 have	 that	 your	project	 would	 be	 properly	 pondered.	 As	 public	 face	 of	 a	 political	 project,	 the	candidate	represents	 the	connection	with	a	certain	political	option	 through	his	or	 her	 personal	 story	 and	 ideas.	 Additionally,	 the	 candidate	 usually	 has	 the	ultimate	 decision-power	 over	 controversial	 issues,	 as	 nowadays	 the	 electoral	campaigns	 are	 more	 candidate-centred	 (Webb	 &	 Poguntke,	 2005).	 The	 final	choice	 of	 one	 or	 another	 person	 lead	 actors	 to	 feel	more	 inclined	 to	 have	 one	type	 of	 relationship	 over	 another.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 if	 all	 parties	 accept	 the	candidate,	the	type	of	collaboration	that	is	going	to	be	produced	is	likely	to	be	a	closer	 one.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 the	 candidate	 is	 not	 considered	 as	 the	 right	choice	 to	 lead	 the	project	by	an	 involved	party,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	parties	will	have	a	weaker	collaboration.		
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The	primacy	of	political	parties	at	the	time	of	choosing	a	candidate	is	due	to	the	fact	that	legally	they	are	the	ones	who	present	the	candidate.	Political	parties	are	those	 that	 organize	 the	 procedures	 of	 choosing	 the	 candidate.	 Using	 their	administrative	structure,	which	social	movements	may	 lack,	parties	can	opt	 for	choosing	 the	 candidate	 through	 primaries	 or	 other	 more	 restricted	 methods.	Political	 parties	have	 an	 electoral	 and	pre-electoral	 infrastructure	dedicated	 to	prepare	 elections,	 and	on	of	 the	main	 tasks	 is	 the	 election	of	 the	 leader	 of	 the	electoral	 list.	 Consequently,	 the	 first	 move	 in	 the	 game	 is	 the	 choice	 of	 the	candidate	by	 the	political	party.	The	party	has	 to	choose	between	two	or	more	candidates	 and	 after	 that	 the	 social	 movement	 has	 to	 decide	 between	 staying	with	 the	 party	 or	 not.	 In	 figure	 8	we	 can	 observe	 the	 options	 of	 both	 players	resulting	of	this.		Figure	8.	Electoral	candidate	game.	
		When	 the	 candidate	 is	 elected	 through	 primaries,	 the	 political	 party	 has	 no	control	 over	 the	 choice	 of	 one	 particular	 person.	 Some	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	establishment	might	have	preferences,	but	the	party	as	an	entity	acts	neutrally.	In	that	scenario,	the	social	movement	cannot	influence	the	decision	of	the	party	since	it	is	no	the	party	who	choses	the	person,	it	just	presents	it.	Thus,	once	the	party	chooses,	 the	social	movement	has	 to	decide	whether	 the	candidate	 is	 the	
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right	one	for	its	interest	or	not,	and	chose	between	staying	with	the	party	or	not.	Figure	 9	 represents	 the	 candidate	 game	 with	 letters,	 each	 representing	 the	specific	 payoff	 of	 the	 actors.	 When	 the	 payoff	 A	 is	 higher	 than	 B,	 the	 social	movement	will	stay.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	payoff	B	is	higher	than	A,	the	social	movement	will	not	stay.	The	payoffs	for	the	political	party	are	here	represented	by	 C	 and	 D	 and	 are	 equal	 for	 each	 candidate,	 showing	 that	 the	 party	 has	 no	preference	 for	 any	 specific	 candidate,	 because	 as	 organizer	 of	 the	 primaries	 it	has	to	keep	a	neutral	position.	However,	for	the	party	C	is	always	higher	than	D	as	the	party’s	main	preference	is	for	the	social	movement	to	stay.		Figure	9.	Electoral	candidate	game	with	literal	payoffs.	
		When	 the	 candidate	 is	 not	 chosen	 through	 primary	 elections	 but	 somehow	designated	by	the	party,	the	social	movement	can	influence	this	choice.	Assuming	that	 the	 social	 movement	 is	 a	 relevant	 actor	 for	 the	 political	 party,	 and	 its	presence	 in	 the	 project	 is	 important	 for	 the	 party,	 the	 social	 movement	 can	threaten	to	defect	when	the	party	proposes	a	candidate	that	is	not	considered	as	suitable	 by	 the	 social	 movement.	 In	 figure	 10	 this	 situation,	 is	 depicted	 and	payoffs	have	been	added	for	clarification.	The	party	can	anticipate	the	decision	of	the	 movement	 and	 propose	 a	 candidate	 that	 assures	 the	 presence	 of	 the	movement	 in	 the	project.	This	can	 lead	to	a	candidate	 that	 is	not	 the	preferred	
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one	 of	 the	 party.	 Therefore,	 the	 party	will	 chose	 a	 less	 preferred	 candidate	 in	prevision	 that	 if	 the	 chosen	 one	 would	 be	 rejected	 by	 the	 movement,	 the	movement	 would	 not	 stay.	 If	 the	 party	 considers	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 social	movement	to	leave	if	the	party	choses	the	candidate	Y	as	credible,	the	party	has	to	chose	the	candidate	X	even	if	it	is	not	its	optimal	choice.	Thus,	the	equilibrium	in	figure	10	is	the	one	where	the	party	choses	the	candidate	X,	anticipating	the	decision	of	the	movement,	and	then	the	movement	decides	to	stay.	This	situation	creates	 de	 facto	 a	 potential	 veto	 capacity	 of	 the	 social	 movement	 over	 the	candidate	of	the	party	when	the	weight	of	the	movement	is	significant.			Figure	10.	Electoral	candidate	game	with	number	payoffs.	
		In	the	case	of	Milan	the	election	of	 the	candidate	of	 the	centre-left	coalition	for	the	local	elections	of	2016	altered	the	type	of	relationship	existing	between	the	PD	and	the	Movimento	Arancione.	The	decision	of	 the	 incumbent	mayor	to	not	continue	 as	 candidate,	 created	 two	 different	 reactions	 within	 the	 Movimento	Arancione	that	deserve	to	be	analysed.	To	understand	better	the	two	options	of	the	Movimento	 Arancione,	 the	 following	 sections	 use	 the	 name	 of	 the	 leaders	that	 headed	 those	 choices:	 Basilio	 Rizzo	 and	 Paolo	 Limonta.	 Meanwhile,	 the	
PP
SM
SM
Candidate X
Candidate Y
Stay
Stay
No stay
No stay
[5, 5]
[2, 4]
[6, 4]
[4, 5]
Chapter	Six.	The	analysis	of	the	elements.		
	 168	
existence	 of	 a	 strong	 possible	 candidate	 in	 Barcelona	 in	 the	 local	 elections	 of	2015	became	crucial	 for	 the	very	existence	of	BeC.	The	possibility	 to	have	Ada	Colau	 as	mayoral	 candidate	was	 a	 solid	 incentive	 for	 some	 parties	 –especially	Podemos/Podem-	to	be	involved	in	BeC.		
6.5.1	The	case	of	Basilio	Rizzo	and	his	followers.	An	 example	 for	when	 a	 candidate	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 crucial	 element	 shaping	 the	relationship	 between	 movement	 and	 party	 can	 be	 founded	 in	 the	 mayoral	candidate	 choice	 for	 the	 elections	 of	 2016	 in	 Milan.	 There,	 two	 groups	 with	different	political	goals	within	the	Movimento	Arancione	could	be	observed.	This	duplicity	 of	 goals	 and	 loyalties	 implied	 different	 behaviours	 when	 facing	 the	choice	of	 the	electoral	candidate	and	 finally	produced	a	rupture	 in	 the	unity	of	action	 within	 the	 movement.	 In	 this	 section,	 the	 choices	 of	 the	 group	 led	 by	Basilio	Rizzo,	one	of	the	public	faces	of	the	original	movement,	are	analysed.			After	 four	 years	 of	 the	 first	 term	 of	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	 as	 mayor	 of	 Milan,	 the	centre-left	 coalition	 had	 to	 decide	 if	 he	 would	 repeat	 being	 the	 mayoral	candidate	or	not.	Even	 though	he	 said	when	 running	 for	his	 first	 term,	 that	he	would	just	be	mayor	for	one	single	term,	the	PD	was	hoping	to	convince	him	to	run	again.	At	the	same	time,	also	the	Movimento	Arancione	had	to	face	what	to	do:	still	being	part	of	 the	project	or	not.	The	movement	was	very	 linked	 to	 the	figure	of	Pisapia	for	what	he	represented	as	a	politician	and	as	committed	citizen	with	the	civic	values.	Both,	the	movement	and	Pisapia,	shared	the	same	political	goals	 creating	 an	 important	 association	 between	 them.	 However,	 sharing	 the	same	 goals	 does	 not	 mean	 accepting	 every	 political	 act	 of	 the	 other	 and	renouncing	 to	 your	 own	 political	 views.	 Thus,	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Movimento	Arancione	 closer	 to	 Basilio	 Rizzo	 built	 his	 own	 profile	 during	 Pisapia’s	 term,	openly	expressing	 some	disagreements	with	 some	governmental	decisions	and	also	voting	independently	in	certain	issues	within	the	City	Council.	Therefore,	if	the	 PD	 had	 to	 decide	 about	 the	 candidate,	 the	 activists	 closer	 to	 Rizzo	 had	 to	decided	 whether	 they	 wanted	 to	 remain	 part	 of	 the	 political	 project	 of	 the	centre-left	or	to	abandon	it.	
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	Pisapia	repeating	as	mayoral	candidate	meant	three	important	things	for	the	PD:	having	 the	 incumbent	 mayor	 with	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 office	 and	 with	 good	citizens	 evaluations;	 a	 candidate	 that	 had	 already	 proven	 to	 have	 the	 citizens	support	 in	 the	 elections;	 and	 the	 figure	 that	 assured	 the	 permanence	 of	 the	centre-left	coalition	of	2011.	Choosing	another	candidate	would	open	questions	about	whether	he	or	she	would	be	able	to	visualize	the	job	done	by	the	centre-left	 government	 in	 the	 city	 and	whether	 he	 or	 she	would	 be	 able	 to	 receive	 a	majoritarian	 support.	 Nevertheless,	 what	 the	 PD	 knew	 for	 sure	 was	 that	 the	relationship	with	Rizzo’s	group	would	not	be	as	fluent	with	another	candidate	as	it	would	 be	with	 Pisapia.	 Therefore	 the	 PD	was	 interested	 in	 the	 continuity	 of	Pisiapa.	 Additionally,	 the	 PD	 also	wanted	 the	 continuity	 in	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	whole	 Movimento	 Arancione,	 including	 Rizzo	 and	 his	 group	 of	 activists.	Unfortunately	 for	the	PD,	that	would	only	happen	if	Pisiapia	would	continue	as	mayoral	 candidate.	Thus,	 the	order	of	preferences	 for	 the	PD	was:	 first	Pisapia	continuing	 and	 Rizzo	 remaining,	 followed	 by	 another	 candidate	 and	 Rizzo	remaining,	followed	by	Pisapia	repeating	and	the	movement	leaving,	and	finally	the	choice	of	another	candidate	and	the	movement	leaving.	The	PD	was	the	one	who	had	to	decide	on	the	first	move:	appointing	Pisapia	as	candidate	or	opting	for	another	person.	However,	Pisapia's	firm	stance	on	not	repeating	the	mayoral	candidature	left	the	party	without	much	bargaining	power.		Once	 the	 PD	 decided	 on	 its	 first	 move,	 the	 social	 movement	 had	 to	 decide	between	leaving	or	remaining	inside	the	coalition.	Since	Pisapia	proved	to	be	the	right	 candidate	 to	 defend	 their	 ideas	 in	 the	 institutional	 arena,	 they	 preferred	outcome	was	a	continued	collaboration	with	Pisapia.	However,	if	Pisapia	were	to	decide	to	not	run	again,	their	preference	was	to	leave	the	coalition.	Given	that	the	main	party	of	the	coalition	was	at	that	time	lead	by	Matteo	Renzi	at	the	national	level,	 whose	 political	 positions	 they	 felt	 far	 away,	 they	 considered	 that	 their	ideas	would	not	be	properly	defended.	Consequently	with	the	identification	wof	the	 movement	 with	 Pisapia,	 the	 worst	 outcome	 for	 the	 movement	 would	 be	leaving	while	him	continues	as	candidate.	Thus,	the	order	of	preferences	of	this	group	of	the	Movimento	Arancione	led	by	Basilio	Rizzo	was:		
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1. Pisapia	is	the	candidate	and	the	social	movement	remains,	followed	by,		2. Another	candidate	and	the	movement	leaving,		3. A	different	candidate	and	the	movement	remaining,	and		4. Finally,	Pisapia	as	candidate	and	the	movement	leaving.		An	overlook	of	the	complete	options	for	the	players	can	be	observed	in	figure	11.		Figure	11.	Candidate	game	Rizzo-PD.	
		Knowing	that	the	movement	would	leave	in	case	of	a	different	candidate,	the	PD	had	a	big	incentive	to	choose	Pisapia	again.	With	a	simple	backwards	induction	-that	 is,	 anticipating	 the	 consequences	 that	 the	own	actions	will	 produce	 in	 the	choices	of	the	other	actors-	the	PD	knew	that	their	optimal	choice	was	Pisapia	as	a	 candidate,	 since	 that	 implied	 that	 the	 response	 of	 Rizzo	 would	 be	 to	 stay.	Unfortunately	 for	 both	 actors,	 staying	 together	 was	 not	 anymore	 possible151	when	it	was	confirmed	that	Pisapia	would	not	repeat	as	candidate	of	the	centre-left	coalition.	Then,	the	PD’s	only	option	was	to	choose	another	candidate,	and	as	a	result	the	movement	decided	to	leave	the	coalition,	as	they	did	not	consider	it	anymore	 as	 the	 same	 political	 project	 they	 previously	 shared	 with	 Pisapia.	Meanwhile,	 the	other	group	of	 the	Movimento	Arancione,	 the	one	 led	by	Paolo	
																																																								151	Despite	that	option	would	be	the	outcome	where	both	actors	maximize	their	payoff.	
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Limonta,	decided	to	wait	to	know	who	would	be	the	candidate	of	the	centre-left	coalition	to	make	a	decision	about	their	role	in	the	coalition.		The	various	possible	outcomes	 lead	to	different	 types	of	relationships	between	the	 two	 actors.	 Firstly,	 as	 seen	 in	 figure	 11,	 the	 outcome	 of	 Pisapia-Remain	conducts	to	a	situation	of	“permeation”.	The	Movimento	Arancione	stays	and	acts	as	a	loyal	partner	of	the	PD,	who	is	the	one	leading	the	institutional	action.	The	movement	was	born	parallel	to	Pisapia’s	candidacy	and	that	implies	that	despite	having	differences	 it	was	created	an	exclusively	relationship	between	the	party	and	 the	 movement.	 Secondly,	 either	 in	 the	 outcome	 that	 Pisapia	 repeats	 as	 a	candidate	 and	 the	 movement	 leaves,	 and	 the	 outcome	 that	 there	 is	 another	candidate	and	the	movement	decides	to	stay,	 the	type	of	relationship	would	be	for	different	 reasons	 “alliance”.	 	 The	 stage	of	 “alliance”	means	 that	both	 actors	would	still	collaborate,	but	just	for	specific	projects.	They	felt	that	they	would	be	each	other	natural	allies,	but	both	would	have	their	own	agendas.	In	the	case	that	the	movement	decided	to	stay	with	a	different	candidate	of	Pisapia,	the	degree	of	connection	 could	not	 be	 the	 same	 than	with	Pisapia,	 a	 person	 that	 fulfils	 their	ideals.	At	the	same	time,	if	Pisapia	would	be	the	candidate	of	the	coalition	but	the	movement	 would	 decide	 to	 leave,	 the	 story	 and	 the	 personal	 connections	between	 Pisapia	 and	 Rizzo	 would	 make	 them	 allies	 despite	 not	 being	 in	 the	coalition.	Finally,	 the	outcome	of	Other	candidate-Leave	conducts	to	a	situation	of	 “independence”.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 most	 important	 thing	 for	 the	 social	movement	is	to	achieve	the	implementation	of	their	demands,	without	taking	in	consideration	a	possible	electoral	cost	for	the	political	party.		
6.5.2	The	case	of	Paolo	Limonta	and	his	followers.	Also	in	Milan	but	later	in	time,	another	part	of	the	Movimento	Arancione	had	to	face	the	same	dilemma	that	Rizzo	and	his	followers	faced	before.	If	Rizzo’s	group	had	to	decide	whether	remaining	or	leaving	the	centre-left	coalition,	depending	on	 the	 person	 who	 would	 lead	 the	 project,	 this	 problem	 was	 later	 presented	again	 to	 the	 rest	 the	movement’s	 activists.	 Therefore,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 person	holding	 the	 coalition’s	 candidacy	became	again	 a	 crucial	 element	 for	 the	 social	
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movement	to	decide	about	the	type	of	relationship	they	wanted	to	establish	with	the	other	members	of	the	coalition.	However,	contrary	to	what	Rizzo’s	group	did,	this	part	of	the	movement	waited	to	make	their	final	decision	until	knowing	who	would	be	the	final	candidate,	and	not	when	Giuliano	Pisapia	decided	to	not	run	again	as	a	mayoral	candidate.	This	group	had	 in	Paolo	Limonta	-a	closer	 friend	and	collaborator	of	Pisapia-	its	more	known	face,	and	it	included	the	majority	of	the	activist	of	the	Movimento	Arancione.		After	 the	 decision	 of	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	 of	 no	 repeating	 as	 a	 candidate	 became	clear,	the	coalition	started	the	process	to	choose	the	mayoral	candidate	for	Milan.	The	 way	 to	 find	 the	 person	 for	 this	 role	 was	 through	 a	 process	 of	 primaries	elections	 open	 to	 all	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 city	 over	 16	 years.	 Finally,	 three	candidates	with	 possibilities	 to	 be	 elected152	run	 for	 the	 nomination:	 Giuseppe	Sala,	 Francesca	 Balzani	 and	 Pierfrancesco	 Majorino.	 The	 activist	 of	 the	Movimento	 Arancione	were	 closely	 identified	with	Majorino	 and	 Balzani,	 both	members	of	Pisapia’s	City	Government,	and	recognized	by	their	leftist	positions.	At	 the	same	 time,	 they	were	rather	sceptical	about	 the	 suitability	of	Sala	being	the	candidate	of	the	coalition	due	to	his	past	as	a	business	manager.	 Internally,	the	 initial	 tie	between	Majorino	and	Balzani	was	broken	 for	 the	support	of	 the	incumbent	 mayor	 to	 Francesca	 Balzani.	 Thus,	 following	 Pisapia's	 backing	 to	Balzani,	the	movement	accepted	her	as	the	natural	heir	of	the	centre-left	project	and	also	endorsed	Balzani	in	the	primaries.		In	 this	 context,	 the	 first	 decision	 corresponded	 to	 the	 centre-left	 coalition	 that	had	to	appoint	one	of	the	three	contenders	as	candidate.	That	choice	was	made	through	primary	elections,	over	which	the	party	apparatus	had	not	real	control,	especially	because	 the	vote	was	not	 restricted	 to	 the	members	of	 the	coalition,	but	open	to	all	citizens	of	the	city153.	The	interest	in	using	this	kind	of	primaries	is	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 citizens	 choose	 their	 favourite	 candidate	 and,	consequently,	 that	 person	will	 subsequently	 have	more	 chances	 to	 win	 in	 the	municipal	election.	Given	that	the	main	objective	of	the	coalition	leaders	is	to	win																																																									152	Four	candidates	were	running	for	the	nomination	but	Antonio	Iannetta	had	not	support	of	any	relevant	figure,	neither	more	than	1%	of	the	expected	votes	in	the	surveys.	153	With	certain	restrictions	like	the	age.	
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the	 mayoral	 election,	 the	 coalition	 will	 support	 the	 elected	 person	 as	 if	 the	leaders	of	 the	coalition	had	appointed	him	or	her.	Hence,	 the	organizers	of	 the	process	 -the	 leaders	 of	 the	 PD-	 adopted	 a	 position	 of	 neutrality	 without	favouring	any	candidate.		Once	 decided	 the	 person	 who	 had	 to	 be	 the	 candidate	 of	 the	 coalition,	 the	Movimento	 Arancione	 had	 to	 make	 its	 decision:	 choosing	 between	 leaving	 or	remaining.	 A	 decision	 that	 had	 the	 potentiality	 to	 alter	 the	 type	 of	 the	relationship	 they	 had	 with	 the	 PD.	 The	 ranking	 of	 preferences	 about	 the	candidates	 for	 the	movement	was:	 first	Balzani,	 then	Majorino	and	 finally	Sala.	Consequently,	if	the	coalition	finally	chooses	Balzani	or	Majorino	the	movement	had	more	interest	in	remaining	than	leaving,	but	with	Sala	as	candidate,	that	was	not	so	clear.	Since	Sala	was	the	favourite	person	to	win	the	primaries,	a	debate	within	the	movement	was	generated	about	which	would	be	the	right	decision	in	case	Sala	would	eventually	win.		The	 final	 nomination	 of	 Giuseppe	 Sala	 as	 candidate	 of	 the	 coalition	 created	 a	problem	 for	 the	 actors.	 Clearly	 the	 coalition,	with	 the	 PD	 in	 front,	wanted	 the	movement	to	stay,	however,	the	activist	did	not	please	the	choice	of	Sala	and	felt	more	towards	leaving.	In	the	internal	debate	of	the	movement,	there	were,	from	one	side,	voices	which	supported	the	option	of	remaining	within	the	coalition	for	loyalty	 to	 the	 project	 and	 because	 they	 already	 participated	 in	 the	 primaries	endorsing	 another	 candidate.	 Meanwhile,	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 there	 were	 those	claiming	 that	 they	 were	 unable	 to	 recognise	 Sala	 as	 their	 own	 candidate	 and	wanted	to	leave	the	coalition.	Though,	in	the	middle	of	this	debate	a	third	option	emerged	with	 the	 aim	 of	 uniting	 together	 all	 positions.	 This	 option	 aspired	 to	accept	 Sala,	 but	 also	 to	 revaluate	 the	 terms	of	 the	existing	agreement	between	the	movement	and	the	party.	This	new	agreement	was	intended	to	give,	-always	being	 loyal	 to	 the	 coalition-	more	 independence	 to	 the	movement	 about	 some	issues.	Finally,	this	option	was	understood	as	a	fair	compromise	between	the	two	initial	positions	and	therefore	transferred	to	the	party.			
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Once	 the	move	 of	 the	 social	movement	was	 done,	 party	 leaders	 had	 to	 decide	whether	 or	 not	 to	 accept	 the	 new	 kind	 of	 relationship	 with	 the	 Movimento	Arancione.	 As	 the	 main	 preference	 for	 the	 party	 was	 to	 keep	 the	 movement	within	 the	 political	 project,	 they	 accepted	 the	 proposal	 of	 the	 Movimento	Arancione	 despite	 it	 meant	 to	 have	 a	 lover	 control	 about	 some	 political	initiatives	 in	 the	 City	 Council.	 The	 complete	 sequence	 of	 decisions	 can	 be	observed	in	the	figure	12.		Figure	12.	Candidate	game	Limonta-PD.	
		What	can	be	observed	from	the	analysis	of	the	situation	and	the	posterior	game	is	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 specific	 person	 had	 consequences	 in	 the	 relationship	between	the	PD	and	the	Movimento	Arancione.	Thus	in	case	that	the	PD	chooses	Balzani	 or	 Majorino	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 would	 be	 “permeation”.	 The	movement	would	continue	existing	as	such	but	having	an	exclusive	relationship	with	 the	 party	 as	 the	movement	 felt	 that	 its	 goals	 are	 reasonably	 shared	 and	defended	by	the	party.	In	case	of	the	election	of	Sala	the	type	of	the	relationship	would	be	“alliance”.	The	acceptance	by	the	PD	of	changing	their	relationship	to	give	 more	 independence	 to	 the	 movement	 to	 disagree	 would	 have	 not	 been	
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necessary	with	other	candidates.	This	new	agreement	kept	 the	actors	as	closer	allies	sharing	projects	but	with	the	capacity	of	deciding	their	own	goals.		
6.5.3	Podemos	and	Ada	Colau.	Another	 situation	 when	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 candidate	 was	 a	 crucial	 element	 to	shape	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 social	 movement	 and	 a	 political	 party	happened	 in	 Barcelona	 in	 2015.	 The	 importance	 of	 deciding	 the	 name	 of	 the	candidate	became	visible	 for	 the	parties	when	 it	was	necessary	 to	 choose	who	would	 lead	the	candidature	of	Barcelona	en	Comu	(BeC)	 for	 the	 local	elections.	The	social	movement	PAH	was	leading	the	negotiations	among	the	various	actors	involved	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 BeC,	 and	 despite	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 project	was	undisputed,	 the	 name	 of	 the	 candidate	 was	 still	 undecided.	 Ada	 Colau	 was,	nevertheless,	 the	 favourite	 to	 become	 the	 mayoral	 candidate.	 She	 had	 at	 that	moment	an	80%	of	popular	knowledge	among	Barcelona	citizens,	and	she	was	also	very	recognized	 for	her	accomplishments	as	activist.	These	numbers	were	superiors	to	several	of	the	candidates	of	other	political	parties	that	had	already	competed	 before	 in	 previous	municipal	 elections.	 Considering	 the	 relevance	 of	the	 figure	of	Colau,	 the	 intention	of	Podemos	was	 to	 link	 its	name	with	hers	 in	Catalonia.	At	that	time,	Podemos	was	a	party	with	difficulties	to	achieve	the	same	popular	support	in	Catalonia	than	in	the	rest	of	Spain.	Thus,	the	strategy	to	grow	in	Catalonia	was	to	be	identified	with	the	media	figure	of	the	speaker	of	the	PAH.	So,	one	of	the	main	goals	of	the	political	project	of	BeC	for	the	Spanish	leadership	of	Podemos	was	to	have	Colau	as	candidate	of	BeC.	Hence,	Podemos	was	open	to	enter	in	BeC,	but	just	if	Coalu	was	the	public	face	of	the	project.	Without	Colau	as	candidate	the	interest	of	collaboration	with	the	rest	of	BeC	was	much	lower.		In	terms	of	the	game,	the	order	of	preferred	outcomes	for	Podemos	were:	1. BeC	choses	Ada	Colau	as	candidate	and	Podemos	enters	BeC,	followed	by,		2. BeC	choses	another	candidate	and	Podemos	leaves,	followed	by,		3. BeC	choses	another	candidate	and	Podemos	enters,	and	finally,		4. BeC	choses	Colau	and	Podemos	does	not	enter	in	BeC.			
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For	BeC	the	best	outcome	was	the	same	one	that	Podemos,	that	is,		1. BeC	choses	Ada	Colau	as	candidate	and	Podemos	enters	BeC,	followed	by,	2. BeC	choses	Colau	and	Podemos	does	not	enter	in	BeC,	followed	by,	3. BeC	choses	another	candidate	and	Podemos	enters,		4. Being	the	worst	outcome	the	one	that	BeC	choses	another	candidate	and	Podemos	leaves.			On	 the	one	hand,	 for	BeC	 the	best	outcome	 is	explained	because	BeC	has	both,	Colau	as	 candidate	 that	ensures	a	big	knowledge	of	 the	project	by	 the	citizens,	and	the	votes	of	Podemos.	The	second	preference	it	is	explained	because	BeC	still	has	Colau	as	a	candidate	with	her	electoral	power.	The	third	preference	is	based	on	the	fact	that	even	if	BeC	has	not	Colau	as	a	candidate,	Podemos	is	at	least	part	of	 the	 project.	 The	 worst	 possible	 outcome	 is	 the	 one	 when	 BeC	 has	 neither,	Colau	or	Podemos.	On	the	other	hand,	for	Podemos	the	worst	possible	outcome	is	explained	because	despite	being	Colau	the	candidate	they	are	not	able	to	link	the	brand	of	the	party	to	her	figure.	In	the	case	that	there	is	another	candidate,	Podemos	 prefers	 to	 not	 staying	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 preserving	 the	independence	 of	 the	 brand,	 than	 entering	 and	 being	 constrained	 to	 share	 the	decisional	power	without	having	the	figure	of	Colau	as	benefit.		Observing	the	representation	of	 the	game	in	 figure	13,	 it	 is	possible	 to	observe	that	 BeC	 had	 to	 decide	 in	 the	 first	 place	 between	 choosing	 Colau	 or	 another	person	as	 the	candidate	of	 the	project.	After	 this	decision	of	BeC	regarding	 the	candidate,	 Podemos	 had	 to	 chose	 between	 entering	 in	 the	 project	 or	 not.	 The	payoff	in	every	outcome	reveals	that	if	BeC	would	chose	Colau,	Podemos	would	join	the	project.	However,	if	BeC	decided	for	another	candidate	Podemos	would	choose	to	not	enter	finally	 in	the	project.	This	situation	of	the	determination	of	Podemos	 for	 Colau	 as	 candidate	 was	 known	 for	 BeC	 and	 was	 also	 another	incentive	 to	 choose	 her.	 In	 any	 case,	 BeC	 considered	 that	 she	 was	 the	 best	candidate	and	with	her	they	had	the	higher	possible	payoffs.			
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Figure	13.	Candidate	game	BeC-Podemos.	
		Each	outcome	has	its	own	consequences	for	the	relationship	that	is	established	between	the	actors.	In	case	of	Colau	as	candidate	and	Podemos	deciding	to	stay	within	 the	 project	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 them	 would	 enter	 in	 the	stage	of	“alliance”.	They	would	be	part	of	the	same	project	with	mutual	benefits	–the	 votes	 of	 Podemos	 for	 BeC	 and	 the	 figure	 of	 Colau	 linked	 to	 them	 for	Podemos-	and	despite	keeping	their	decisions	organs	independent	they	would	be	each	 other	 natural	 allies	 sharing	 the	 same	 goals.	 In	 any	 outcome	 of	 Podemos	deciding	to	leave	BeC,	the	type	of	relationship	between	the	two	actors	would	be	of	“competition”.	It	 is	 important	to	notice	that	Podemos	is	at	the	end	a	political	party	and	despite	Podemos	indented	to	not	use	its	brand	in	the	local	elections,	its	members	 were	 decided	 to	 compete	 under	 other	 brands	 or	 jointly	 with	 other	allies,	 but	 nevertheless	 compete.	 Finally,	 if	 BeC	 choses	 another	 candidate	 and	Podemos	 decides	 to	 stay	 their	 type	 of	 relationship	 would	 be	 “independence”.	Both	actors	have	a	common	ideology,	however,	the	fact	of	not	having	the	benefits	of	being	associated	with	the	powerful	 figure	that	 is	Ada	Colau,	makes	Podemos	helps	BeC	just	while	it	is	in	its	own	benefit.	If	there	were	a	better	way	to	achieve	its	goals,	Podemos	would	not	doubt	in	breaking	with	BeC.		
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The	three	cases	analysed	in	this	section	show	the	important	role	of	the	figure	of	the	 candidate	 in	 altering	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements.	Thanks	to	the	extended-form	game	it	is	possible	to	observe	the	full	relevance	of	this	element.	Thus,	choosing	one	specific	person	or	another	implies	an	alteration	in	the	terms	of	the	interaction	between	the	actors.	Some	candidates	will	 foster	 a	 closer	 collaboration,	 while	 others	 will	 make	 the	 actors	 to	 keep	 a	more	 independent	profile.	Consequently,	 remaining	all	 the	rest	of	 the	elements	stable,	 the	 alterations	 in	 the	 candidacy	 imply	 alterations	 in	 the	 type	 of	relationship.			
6.6	The	influence	on	the	elaboration	of	public	policies.	One	 of	 the	 main	 objectives	 of	 governing	 is	 deciding	 on	 the	 actions	 of	 public	institutions	(Müller	&	Strøm,	1999).	Public	polices	are	one	of	the	most	relevant	component	 of	 these	 actions.	 Thus,	 the	 influence	 over	 the	 elaboration	 of	 public	policies	is	very	appreciated	among	any	political	actor.	Such	relevant	is	the	search	for	 the	 influence	over	 the	elaboration	of	public	policies,	 that	 there	are	political	actors	 that	 can	be	defined	as	policy-seekers	 (Adams	&	Merrill	 III,	2009).	As	an	object	 of	 desire	 by	 the	 actors,	 the	 possibility	 to	 decide	 on	 policies	 it	 is	 an	important	 element	 that	 is	 also	 able	 to	 shape	 the	 relationship	 between	 parties	and	movements.	The	influence	on	policies	moves	the	actors	to	look	for	partners	with	 who	 they	 can	 achieve	 that	 goal.	 Thereby,	 if	 one	 of	 the	 parts	 is	 able	 to	introduce	its	own	ideas	in	form	of	policies	to	implement,	that	part	is	more	open	to	an	agreement	with	the	other	parts.	On	the	other	hand,	if	there	is	no	room	for	introducing	 their	own	 ideas,	hardly	 the	agreement	 is	possible	as	 the	 that	party	decreases	their	feeling	of	being	in	their	own	project.	Thus,	the	option	the	actors	take	will	 vary	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 them.	 If	 any	 of	 the	 actors	 can	influence	 on	 policies	 they	will	 be	more	 likely	 to	 look	 for	 a	 closer	 relationship	with	the	other	actors.		When	the	political	parties	demand	some	kind	of	public	collaboration	in	exchange	of	some	 influence	on	the	elaboration	of	public	policies	 they	are	doing	 it	 from	a	privileged	 position	 for	 two	 reasons.	 The	 first	 reason	 is	 because	 there	 is	 an	asymmetry	in	the	amount	of	information	each	actor	has.	Just	for	the	fact	to	work	
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within	 institutions	 political	 parties	 have	 a	 big	 knowledge	 on	 public	 issues.	Political	 parties	 can	 use	 this	 privileged	 position	 to	 have	 an	 opportunistic	behaviour	 and	 transform	 the	 initial	 demands	 of	 the	 social	movements	without	suffering	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 pact.	 The	 alterations	 can	 come	 from	 such	 a	different	 ways	 as	 other	 public	 administrations	 to	 budget	 constrictions.	 The	second	reason	is	based	on	the	fact	that	the	public	support	of	social	movements	is	given	partially	blinded.	The	support	is	not	in	exchange	of	an	instant	profit,	but	on	the	 basis	 on	 the	 promise	 of	 forthcoming	 actions.	 Thus,	 social	 movements	 are	investing	 in	 future	 benefits,	 despite	 they	 risk	 of	 being	 ignored	 by	 the	 political	party.			The	general	representation	of	the	situation	can	be	seen	in	figure	14.	There	it	 is	possible	 to	 see	 that,	 normally,	 the	 first	move	 corresponds	 to	 the	 candidate	 -or	party-,	 who	 is	 trying	 to	 build	 the	 possible	 biggest	 coalition.	 The	 offer	 of	 the	candidate	or	party	can	vary	in	different	forms	but	is	based	on	future	rewards	in	case	of	victory.	Then,	it	corresponds	to	the	social	movement	to	decide	to	support	the	political	party	or	not.	The	support	of	the	social	movement	will	not	receive	an	immediate	action	from	the	political	party,	but	will	be	an	expected	future	action	with	 no	 guaranties.	 The	 guaranties	 can	 be	 introduced	 in	 case	 of	 more	 than	 a	single	 collaboration.	That	 is,	 a	 repeated	 game.	 If	 the	political	 party	 knows	 that	the	 support	 of	 the	 social	 movement	 will	 be	 necessary	 again	 in	 the	 future	 it	became	 important	 that	 the	 party	 fulfils	 its	 promises,	 otherwise	 the	 social	movement	will	hardly	accept	another	agreement.	A	repeated	game	reduces	 the	possibility	of	an	opportunistic	behaviour	from	the	political	party.		
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Figure	14.	Policies	game.	
		The	 combination	 of	 options	 of	 the	 players	 in	 this	 game	 creates	 two	 possible	equilibriums:	one	suboptimal	and	the	other	one	optimal	or	Pareto	efficiency	[see	table	 22].	 The	 suboptimal	 equilibrium	 occurs	 when	 both	 actors	 decide	 to	 not	collaborate.	 That	 is,	when	 the	 political	 party	 considers	 that	 is	 better	 to	 not	 be	linked	 to	 the	 social	 movement	 and	 hence,	 does	 not	make	 an	 offer,	 and	 at	 the	same	 time	 the	 social	movement	 prefers	 also	 to	 stay	 on	 its	 own	without	 being	linked	 to	 the	 political	 party	 and,	 hence,	 rejects.	 Political	 party	 chooses	 to	 not	offer,	when	 it	 is	 in	 its	 own	 interest	 to	 not	 collaborate,	 normally	 because	being	associated	 with	 the	 social	 movement	 would	 not	 improve	 party’s	 potential	electoral	benefits	or	because	it	could	mean	being	ideology	constrained	by	social	movement’s	 demands.	 Equally,	 the	 social	movement	 chooses	 to	 reject	when	 it	considers	that	an	agreement	with	that	party	would	be	contrary	to	its	interests,	as	it	could	block	potential	agreements	with	other	political	parties.	Both	actors	are,	thus,	interested	in	pursue	their	goals	independently	in	this	moment	of	time.	This	scenario	is	an	equilibrium	situation	because	no	actor	is	interested	in	changing	its	choice	by	itself,	because	its	payoff	would	decrease.	This	combination	of	choices	is	a	stable	outcome	unless	the	circumstances	change.				
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Table	22.	Normal-form	interaction	pp-sm.		 	 Social	Movement		 	 Accept	 Reject	
Political	
Party	 Offer	
	 10,10	 0,5	
Not	offer	 5,0	 7,7		However	 although	 not	 offer-reject	 is	 an	 equilibrium	 situation,	 with	 the	 other	coordinated	 choices	between	 the	 actors,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 improve	 their	payoffs	and	reach	a	situation	of	Pareto	efficiency.	This	optimal	equilibrium	occurs	when	the	political	party	is	interested	in	the	elaboration	of	an	agreement	with	the	social	movement	and	consequently	it	makes	an	offer,	while	the	offer	is	interesting	for	the	 social	 movement	 and	 consequently	 it	 accepts	 the	 offer.	 Therefore,	 when	actors	decide	to	collaborate	and	reach	an	agreement,	 it	 is	possible	to	maximize	their	 payoffs.	 The	 possible	 equilibriums	 are	 thus,	 coordinated	 choices:	 both	actors	 deciding	 to	 collaborate	 or	 both	 deciding	 to	 not	 collaborate.	 These	 two	equilibrium	 situations	 are	 useful	 to	 explain	 different	 kinds	 of	 behaviours	 from	the	actors	 in	 scenarios	with	more	 than	one	potential	period	of	negotiation,	 for	instance	 two-round	 elections.	 While	 in	 the	 first	 period	 actors	 prefer	 to	 mark	their	own	profile	without	being	associated	to	others,	in	the	second	period,	with	different	circumstances,	it	is	possible	to	reach	agreements,	since	actors	are	more	open	to	collaborate.			The	two	other	possible	outcomes,	that	is,	“not	offer-accept”	and	“offer-reject”	are	not	equilibrium	situations	as	any	actor	can	improve	its	payoff	changing	its	own	choice.	Offering	and	accepting	describe	situations	when	the	social	movement	do	not	 consider	 the	 offer	 good	 enough	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement,	 meanwhile	 not	offering	and	accepting	describe	situations	where	the	political	party	believes	that	a	collaboration	with	the	movement	entails	relevant	costs.		
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6.6.1	The	attempt	to	include	the	PAH	in	the	electoral	
candidature.	One	situation	when	the	influence	on	the	elaboration	of	public	policies	has	been	revealed	especially	important	to	define	the	type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	is	the	events	surrounding	the	interest	of	Iniciativa	per	 Catalunya	 Verds-Esquerra	 Unida	 i	 Alternativa	 (ICV-EUiA)	 to	 include	 some	members	of	the	Plataforma	de	Afectados	por	la	Hipoteca	(PAH)	in	the	electoral	list	 of	 the	 municipal	 elections	 in	 Barcelona	 in	 2011.	 That	 year,	 ICV-EUiA	considered	 about	 the	 possibility	 to	 include	 in	 its	 electoral	 list	 members	 from	outside	of	the	party.	This	strategy	was	motivated	for	the	purpose	to	be	seen	by	the	voters	as	an	 inclusive	party,	near	 to	 the	citizens	and	not	an	elitist	body.	By	including	 some	 relevant	 social	 figures	 ICV-EUiA	wanted	 to	 attract	more	 voters	and	have	more	relevance	on	the	media.	Therefore,	they	contacted	with	the	PAH	to	 offer	 their	 most	 known	 member	 to	 join	 ICV-EUiA	 candidature	 for	 the	municipal	elections:	Ada	Colau.	Colau	was	the	public	figure	of	a	social	movement	known	by	its	fights	for	citizens’	rights,	in	particular,	to	avoid	home	evictions.	ICV-EUiA	considered,	hence,	that	having	her	in	the	candidature	would	make	the	party	more	friendly	and	appealing	to	voters.			ICV-EUiA	was	the	first	player	to	move.	It	had	to	decide	to	propose	or	not	to	the	PAH	 to	 join	 the	 candidature.	 Two	 options,	 any	 of	 them	 with	 advantages	 and	disadvantages.	The	main	advantage	was	that	if	ICV-EUiA	included	the	PAH	in	the	party’s	 list,	 that	 meant	 counting	 with	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 known	 figure	 with	associated	values	of	defences	of	the	common	citizens	that	the	party	wanted	to	be	identified	with.	The	disadvantages	were	that	if	Colau	was	included	in	the	list,	 it	meant	 having	 fewer	 places	 for	 the	members	 of	 the	 party.	 Reducing	 safe	 seats	always	creates	internal	tensions	within	the	parties,	a	problem	that	party	leaders	would	have	to	deal	with	in	case	of	including	members	of	the	PAH.	Thus,	choosing	not	 to	propose	 to	 the	PAH	to	 join	 the	 list	with	Colau	as	a	representative	of	 the	movement,	would	 suppose	 to	 avoid	 internal	 problems	within	 ICV-EUiA,	 but	 at	the	 same	 time	 it	would	also	 suppose	 to	not	be	able	 to	use	her	powerful	 figure	neither	the	values	of	the	movement	for	the	benefit	of	the	coalition.	The	approach	to	address	this	dilemma	was	to	consider	Colau’s	presence	on	the	roster	as	a	way	
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to	 increase	the	amount	of	votes	and	seats,	so	without	a	 loss	of	places	 for	party	members.	Thus,	reducing	the	theoretical	 internal	risks,	 the	best	option	 for	 ICV-EUiA	was	to	propose	Ada	Colau	to	become	part	of	the	candidature.				If	 ICV-EUiA	makes	the	offer	to	the	PAH,	the	second	movement	corresponded	to	the	movement.	 They	 had	 to	 decide	 if	 joining	 or	 not	 the	 ICV-EUiA	 candidature.	One	 option	 was	 to	 accept	 the	 offer	 of	 ICV-EUiA	 and	 become	 part	 of	 the	candidature.	This	choice	implied	to	jump	from	the	typical	activities	of	the	social	movements	to	 institutional	politics.	But	the	advantage	of	having	voice	and	vote	in	the	institutions	had	the	disadvantage	of	not	being	able	to	decide	the	policies	to	implement	and	to	be	subject	to	the	discipline	of	a	municipal	group	with	its	rules.	These	conditions	were	 too	harsh	 for	 the	social	movement	 to	accept.	Therefore,	instead	of	joining	the	candidature	the	movement	asked	to	renegotiate	the	terms	of	the	agreement	making	possible	for	the	movement	to	include	the	possibility	to	have	more	weight	in	deciding	the	policies	of	the	candidature.				Thus,	ICV-EUiA	had	to	make	again	a	decision.	ICV-EUiA	had	two	possible	options:	accept	 to	 renegotiate	 the	 offer	 giving	more	 power	 to	 the	 PAH	 to	 decide	 about	policies,	 or	 to	 not	 renegotiate	 and	 discard	 the	 pact	with	 the	 social	movement.	After	 evaluating	 the	 possible	 consequences	 of	 this	 choice,	 ICV-EUiA	decided	 to	not	accept	to	renegotiate.	Applying	backwards	induction	from	the	options	of	the	PAH	in	case	of	ICV-EUiA	decided	not	to	renegotiate,	they	considered	that	the	best	option	 was	 to	 not	 renegotiate.	 The	 leaders	 of	 ICV-EUiA	 knew	 that	 after	 their	decision	of	not	renegotiate	the	agreement	the	PAH	had	three	possible	options	as	it	is	possible	to	see	in	the	figure	15:			
• Giving	 public	 support	 to	 ICV-EUiA	 in	 the	 new	 coming	 elections.	Despite	not	being	fully	 identified	with	the	policies	of	 ICV-EUiA,	 the	 ideal	policies	of	 the	 PAH	were	 closer	 to	 the	 ones	 proposed	 by	 other	 political	 parties.	This	 support	 would	 help	 the	 PAH	 to	 have	 a	 type	 of	 institutional	representation	 closest	 to	 their	 ideals	 despite	 not	 sharing	 the	 entire	party’s	manifesto	and	that	its	demands	had	been	rejected.	
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• Adopting	 a	 position	 of	 neutrality	 towards	 the	 elections.	 That	 is,	 do	 not	support	 ICV-EUiA	 or	 any	 other	 party.	 This	 option	 allowed	 the	 social	movement	 to	 work	 towards	 the	 implementation	 of	 specific	 policies	without	 worrying	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 demands	 on	 the	electoral	results	of	any	political	party.	
• Deciding	 to	 create	 their	 own	political	 project	 and	 run	 for	 the	municipal	elections.	This	option	meant	to	be	able	to	defend	their	own	manifesto	but	also	could	mean	competing	for	the	same	voters.			Figure	15.	Policies	game	PAH-ICV-EUiA.	
		The	 reason	 why	 ICV-EUiA	 decided	 to	 not	 renegotiate	 was	 because	 they	 just	considered	the	neutrality	or	the	public	support	of	the	PAH	as	a	realistic	outcome.	The	threat	of	creating	a	new	electoral	adversary	was	not	credible	at	the	eyes	of	ICV-EUiA.	ICV-EUiA	did	not	believe	that	the	PAH	could	decided	to	jump	in	politics	by	 themselves	 and	 dispute	 the	 votes	 of	 ICV-EUiA.	 But	 the	 leaders	 of	 ICV-EUiA	were	 wrong	 in	 their	 calculus.	 They	 were	 wrong	 about	 the	 actual	 value	 of	 the	payoff	of	 the	PAH	in	each	outcome.	The	PAH	considered	much	more	 important	than	ICV-EUiA	thought,	the	capacity	to	change	some	policies	that	they	had	been	fighting	 for	 some	 many	 years	 in	 the	 streets.	 That	 clear	 case	 of	 information	asymmetry	produced	the	consideration	of	not	credible	threat	and	the	final	result	
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that	 ICV-EUiA	 did	 not	 wanted	 neither	 the	 PAH	 that	 preferred	 ICV-EUiA	 to	renegotiate.		ICV-EUiA	decided	to	renegotiate	the	agreement	that	they	had	initially	offered	to	the	 PAH.	 As	 they	 do	 not	 consider	 that	 the	 PAH	 would	 run	 the	 elections	 they	thought	 that	one	was	 the	best	option	 for	 the	party.	 ICV-EUiA	believed	 that	 the	PAH	was	not	 going	 to	 support	 other	 parties	 as	 the	PAH	preferred	 them	ahead	other	 parties	 since	 the	 policies	 proposals	 were	 the	 ones	 closest	 to	 the	 PAH.	Hence	ICV-EUiA	was	confident	that	the	PAH	would	give	public	support	to	them,	or,	in	the	worst-case	scenario,	that	the	PAH	would	opt	for	a	position	of	neutrality.	This	would	mean	not	having	to	assume	any	cost	for	the	party.	However,	despite	what	 ICV-EUiA	expected,	 the	 final	decision	of	 the	PAH	was	 to	 create	 their	own	political	project	and	to	run	for	the	elections.	For	the	PAH,	becoming	part	of	the	candidature	in	the	terms	of	ICV-EUiA,	carried	the	risk	of	being	labelled	as	a	social	movement	associated	with	a	particular	party.	This	at	 the	eyes	of	 the	 leaders	of	the	PAH	would	have	complicated	the	actions	of	the	movement	and	especially	the	way	some	sectors	of	the	population	would	see	those	actions.	This	would	imply	to	loss	 the	 connection	 with	 part	 of	 the	 citizens,	 and	 that	 was	 not	 price	 the	movement	was	willing	 to	 pay,	 especially	without	 being	 able	 to	 implement	 the	policies	 that	 the	movement	 believed	were	 necessary.	 For	 the	 PAH	 the	 offer	 of	ICV-EUiA	 in	 the	 terms	 it	 was	 formulated	 meant	 to	 assume	 the	 costs	 without	being	able	to	obtain	satisfactory	benefits.	Consequently,	once	ICV-EUiA	decided	to	not	renegotiate,	the	option	with	the	best	payoffs	for	the	PAH	was	to	create	a	new	electoral	adversary.	If	ICV-EUiA	had	given	credibility	to	“run	elections”	they	would	have	chosen	to	renegotiate,	as	it	is	possible	to	see	in	the	figure	16.		
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Figure	16.	Outcomes	of	the	policies	game	PAH-ICV-EUiA.	
		The	decisions	of	the	actors	had	consequences	in	terms	of	type	of	relationship	as	seen	 in	 the	 figure	 16.	 The	 final	 choice	 of	 the	 two	 players	 configured	 their	relationship	 in	 a	 specific	way	 that	would	not	 occurred	 if	 the	 actors	would	had	chosen	differently	their	options.	The	possibility	to	have	a	relevant	impact	in	the	elaboration	of	the	political	program	is	an	element	that	produces	broad	possible	solutions.	Thus,	if	the	PAH	accepted	the	proposal	of	ICV-EUiA	either	in	first	place	or	after	the	renegotiation,	the	relationship	between	the	actors	would	be	defined	as	“permeation”.	Accepting	to	be	inside	the	list	meant	also	to	accept	certain	rules,	as	 the	 exclusivity	 relationship	 between	 the	 movement	 and	 the	 party,	 or	 the	internal	rules	of	voting	that	implies	a	strong	discipline.	That	strong	commitment	with	 a	 specific	 political	 project	 prevents	 other	 possible	 agreements	with	 other	parties	 creating	 an	 exclusive	 relationship	 between	 both	 actors.	 If	 the	 PAH	decided	 to	 reject	 the	 proposal	 of	 ICV-EUiA	 the	 movement	 had	 three	 possible	options	 that	would	 conduct	 to	 a	 three	 different	 types	 of	 relationship	 between	them.	Thus,	 if	 the	PAH	opted	 for	 adopting	 a	position	of	 neutrality	 towards	 the	candidature	 of	 ICV-EUiA	 their	 relationship	 would	 enter	 in	 a	 stage	 of	“independence”.	Despite	being	 ideologically	close,	 the	PAH	would	show	that	 its	priority	is	the	implementation	of	polices	over	anything	else.	For	the	members	of	the	movement	feeling	free	to	criticize	what	they	do	not	consider	suitable	polices	it	is	important.	If	the	PAH	chose	to	give	public	support	to	the	candidature	of	ICV-
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EUiA	but	without	being	part	of	it,	their	relationship	would	become	an	“alliance”.	The	 public	 commitment	 towards	 a	 political	 project	 identifies	 you	 with	 that	candidature	 at	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 citizens	 reducing	 the	possibility	 of	 being	 a	 non-partisan	movement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 the	 PAH	 doing	 this,	 also	 expects	 some	kind	 of	 especial	 treatment	 about	 their	 policies	 demands.	 Finally,	 if	 the	 PAH	decides	to	test	their	own	political	project	at	the	polls	against	ICV-EUiA	they	are	going	 to	 be	 in	 a	 stage	 of	 “competition”.	 If	 the	 movement	 considers	 that	 their	positions	are	not	well	represented	in	the	political	arena	by	any	existing	party	and	those	positions	deserve	to	be	an	opportunity	that	someone	defends	them	in	the	institutions	in	the	same	way	the	movement	did	it	in	the	streets	and	media,	they	will	jump	into	politics.	No	matter	if	that	means	competing	with	ICV-EUiA,	as	the	PAH	 feels	 that	 their	 ideas	 are	 not	well	 represented	 by	 the	 political	 party.	 The	PAH	negotiated	to	reach	an	agreement	with	ICV-EUiA,	however,	the	party	did	not	accepted	the	terms	and	consequently	had	to	face	a	new	adversary	in	the	electoral	arena.	The	decision	of	the	leaders	of	the	PAH	allowed	them	to	confront	their	own	ideas	and	test	the	citizen	support	about	theses	ideas.		
6.6.2	The	search	for	the	support	of	Milano	in	Comune.	The	 second	 situation	 analysed	where	 the	 element	 of	 the	 capacity	 to	 influence	public	 policies	 has	 a	 big	 impact,	 occurred	 in	 Milan,	 between	 the	 first	 and	 the	second	round	of	the	local	elections	of	2016.	More	precisely,	 it	 is	the	core	of	the	negotiations	between	Giuseppe	Sala	and	Basilio	Rizzo	and	his	followers	from	the	original	Movimento	Arancione154.	After	the	vote	of	the	first	round	of	the	mayoral	elections,	Basilio	Rizzo	was	unable	to	pass	to	the	second	round	as	he	was	not	one	of	 the	 two	 most	 voted	 candidates.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 amount	 of	 votes	 he	received	 and	 the	 small	 gap	 of	 votes	 between	 Sala	 and	 Parisi,	 he	 became	 a	relevant	figure	for	the	mayoral	election.	His	decision	about	who	would	endorse	the	movement	-if	anyone-	was	very	expected.			
																																																								154	The	other	part	of	the	members	of	the	movement	formed	the	list	Sinistra	X	Milano	linked	to	Sala.	
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Looking	 for	his	 support	 and	knowing	 that	 the	movement	had	more	 ideological	similarities	 in	 common	with	 the	centre-left	 than	with	 the	centre-right,	 Sala	did	the	first	movement.	He	asked	to	the	leader	of	Milano	in	Comune	for	his	support	for	the	second	round	of	the	elections.	However,	at	that	time,	Rizzo	and	the	rest	of	the	movement	decided	to	not	endorse	him.	Rizzo	and	his	people	considered	that	the	political	program	of	Sala	was	too	far	away	from	their	ideas	and	consequently	they	could	not	endorse	him.	They	considered	Sala’s	positions	too	similar	to	the	ones	of	the	centre-right.	Nevertheless,	after	some	gestures	of	Sala155	showing	his	availability	 towards	 the	 policy	 demands	 of	 the	 movement,	 they	 decided	 to	express	 publicly	 their	 decision	 to	 vote	 for	 Sala	 in	 the	 second	 round	 of	 the	elections.		In	figure	17	is	possible	to	observe	the	sequence	of	actions	in	an	extensive-form	game.	 In	 the	game	 it	 is	possible	 to	observe	the	options	Sala	and	the	movement	behind	Rizzo	 had	 in	 the	 various	moments	 of	 the	 negotiation	 period.	 The	most	relevant	points,	regarding	the	preferences	of	the	actors,	are	on	the	one	hand,	that	Sala	wanted	their	endorsement	even	if	he	had	to	make	some	concessions.	On	the	other	hand,	for	the	people	of	Rizzo	the	worst	possible	outcome	was	the	victory	of	Parisi	and	they	were	convinced	-at	some	point-	 to	work	to	avoid	 that	scenario.	Thus,	after	the	concessions	Sala	did,	Rizzo	had	to	decide	between	three	possible	options:	 to	stay	neutral	without	giving	support	 to	any	candidate,	 to	give	public	support	to	Sala	or	to	give	public	support	to	Parisi.	The	payoff	for	Sala	in	case	of	neutrality	of	Rizzo	and	his	people	is	higher	than	if	Sala	decided	not	to	ask	for	the	endorsement	because	just	for	the	fact	to	show	some	interest	in	the	leftist	voters	could	 attract	 them	 to	 Sala	 despite	 Rizzo	would	 not	 endorse	 him.	 For	 strategic	reasons,	 it	 is	 important	to	know	that	Sala	and	the	rest	of	his	candidature	knew	that	Rizzo	did	not	want	at	any	cost	Parisi’s	victory,	especially	once	Sala	agreed	on	some	public	policies.	But	they	also	know	that	the	endorsement	would	be	neither	easy	nor	free.		
																																																								155	See	Chapter	Four	for	more	information.	
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Figure	17.	Policies	game	Sala-Rizzo.	
		The	 fact	 to	 renegotiate	 or	 not	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 final	 outcome.	 After	 Sala’s	decision,	Rizzo	and	his	mates	have	always	the	same	three	options,	but	the	payoff	of	 these	options	are	different	 if	Sala	opts	 for	a	new	offer	or	not	[see	figure	18].	The	option	to	endorse	Parisi	is	in	any	scenario	the	one	that	Rizzo	wants	the	least,	but	 the	 rest	of	options	have	different	payoff	depending	of	 Sala’s	behaviour.	On	the	one	hand,	if	Sala	decides	to	not	renegotiate,	for	Rizzo	the	option	of	neutrality	has	 the	 higher	 payoff	 and	 it	 is	 preferred	 to	 the	 option	 to	 endorse	 Sala.	 That	would	 imply	 that	 any	 of	 Rizzo’s	 policies	 proposals	 would	 have	 been	 taken	 in	consideration	and	consequently,	that	Rizzo	and	his	people	would	feel	that	Sala’s	political	project	is	strange	to	them	and	cannot	shared.	In	Milano	in	Comune	eyes,	without	some	 leftist	policies,	Sala’s	candidature	would	not	be	so	different	 from	the	one	of	Parisi,	and	according	to	their	conscience,	they	could	not	endorse	Sala.	On	the	other	hand,	if	Sala	decides	to	renegotiate,	for	Rizzo	the	option	of	endorse	Sala	has	the	higher	payoff	and	it	is	preferred	to	the	neutrality	option.	That	would	be	because	Sala	would	assume	some	of	 the	policies	hold	by	 the	movement.	So,	despite	not	being	completely	 for	Sala’s	candidature	they	would	recognize	some	of	 their	policies	 in	Sala’s	 candidature,	 and	 consequently	 they	would	 like	 to	 see	the	implementation	of	those	policies.	Sala,	aware	of	all	of	the	above,	decided	to	renegotiate	 and	made	 some	 gestures	 of	 approach	 towards	Milano	 en	 Comune	
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and	 Rizzo156	to	 facilitate	 them	 to	move	 from	 neutrality	 to	 public	 support.	 The	final	outcome	was,	therefore,	that	Rizzo	gave	public	support	to	the	candidature	of	Sala.		Figure	18.	Outcomes	of	policies	game	Sala-Rizzo.	
		The	existence	of	the	second	period	when	to	negotiate	allowed	the	actors	to	reach	an	agreement	and	with	it,	an	optimal	equilibrium	situation.	On	the	one	hand,	Sala	receives	the	endorsement	of	Rizzo	and	his	followers,	and	on	the	other	hand	Rizzo	obtain	the	policies	he	wanted.	This	agreement	would	not	be	possible	in	the	first	round	of	the	elections	with	other	circumstances.	Thus,	While	Sala	could	not	offer	an	agreement	to	Rizzo	due	to	the	risk	of	losing	the	centre	voters,	Rizzo	could	not	join	 someone	 who	 has	 been	 so	 linked	 so	 much	 to	 the	 business	 interest.	Consequently,	 both	 actors	 decided	 to	 look	 for	 their	 goals	 separately.	However,	when	the	choice	is	between	Sala	accepting	Rizzo’s	policies	or	the	candidate	of	the	right	Parisi,	the	new	circumstances	make	possible	the	coordination	between	Sala	and	Rizzo	to	reach	the	new	equilibrium	situation.	This	 is	a	Pareto	efficiency,	as	both	actors	reach	their	maximum	possible	payoffs.		
																																																								156	As	seen	in	Chapter	Four.	
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The	consequences	for	the	type	of	relationship	between	the	two	actors	depend	of	the	outcome.	That	decision	of	both	actors	to	renegotiate	and	accepted	to	endorse	to	 Sala,	 situated	 their	 stage	 of	 relationship	 in	 “independence”.	 Both	 were	interested	 in	a	mutual	 collaboration	 in	 some	areas	 such	 the	 implementation	of	specific	 policies,	 but	 neither	 of	 them	 considered	 that	 they	 owed	 each	 other	anything.	 Moreover,	 if	 the	movement	 considers	 that	 Sala	 is	 not	 doing	 what	 is	expected	to	do	to	achieve	the	shared	goals,	it	would	not	hesitate	to	oppose	him	or	 to	 re-compete	 against	 him	 in	 the	 elections.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 movement	endorse	Sala	just	after	he	decided	to	renegotiate	shows	that	the	priorities	of	the	movement	are	clearly	the	policies	and	not	whit	whom	the	movement	pact.	If	Sala	decided	 to	 not	 ask	 for	 the	 endorsement	 of	 Rizzo	 and	 his	 followers	 the	 type	 of	relationship	between	 them	would	be	 “competition”.	They	competed	 in	 the	 first	round	of	the	elections	and	nothing	would	change	as	the	movement	still	felt	Sala’s	positions	 too	 similar	 to	 the	 ones	 of	 Parisi.	 If	 Rizzo	 decided	 to	 accept	 the	 first	proposal	of	Sala,	 their	 type	of	 relationship	would	be	 “alliance”.	That	 is	because	despite,	 Sala	 would	 not	 offer	 anything	 the	 movement	 would	 support	 him,	highlighting	that	Sala	 is	the	natural	ally	of	the	movement.	Showing	that,	 for	the	movement	 the	 only	 possible	 collaboration	 with	 institutional	 politics	 happens	through	Sala	and	the	PD,	as	Parisi	and	the	right	is	a	close	door	for	Rizzo	and	his	followers.	 Both	 actors	 could	 collaborate	 with	 projects	 but	 knowing	 that	 is	difficult	 for	 the	 movement	 to	 collaborate	 with	 other	 candidates.	 In	 the	theoretically	possible	but	unlikely	case	that	Rizzo	decided	to	endorse	Parisi,	the	relationship	 between	 the	 movement	 and	 Sala,	 would	 be	 “opposition”.	 This	endorsement	would	show	that	the	political	positions	of	two	actors	would	be	very	different.		
6.7	Institutional	constrictions:	the	electoral	system.	Institutions	 and	 the	 way	 they	 are	 organized	 are	 an	 important	 factor	 that	determines	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 relate	 between	 the	 actors.	 The	electoral	 system	 is	 one	 of	 these	 institutions	 and	 its	 different	 configurations	produce	 diverse	 consequences.	 Thus,	 the	 electoral	 system	 is	 another	 element	that	 influences	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements.	The	manner	in	which	the	different	regulation	affects	the	interaction	
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between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 is	 not	 unique,	 since	 the	regulation	of	 the	nature	of	 actors	 that	 can	 run	 in	 the	 elections,	 the	quantity	of	actors	allowed	to	participate,	 the	existence	or	not	of	an	electoral	threshold,	the	number	of	rounds	of	each	election,	or	the	types	of	the	elections	of	the	individual	positions,	either	direct	or	indirect,	are	examples	of	how	the	electoral	system	can	affect	it.		Political	 actors	 are	 not	 acting	 completely	 free	 in	 their	 interactions,	 the	institutions	in	which	the	actors	are	immersed	have	an	important	impact	in	their	behaviour,	as	 the	scholars	of	 the	 institutionalism	argue	(March	&	Olsen,	1989).	The	 electoral	 system,	 one	 of	 these	 institutions,	 is	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 designed	 to	produce	 a	 specific	 result	 such	 as	 promoting	 governance	 or	 the	 correct	representation	of	the	different	positions	of	citizens	in	the	City	Council.	However,	despite	 the	 original	 intentions	 of	 the	 legislators	 at	 the	 time	 of	 configuring	 the	institutions,	 those	 can	 also	 produce	 unintended	 consequences	 (Powell	 &	DiMaggio,	 1991)	 as	 it	 is	 the	 case	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 electoral	 system	 in	 the	relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 Ultimately,	institutions	 limit	 the	 free	will	 to	 the	actors	and	create	a	path	where	to	channel	their	 contacts.	 In	 the	 interaction	 between	 institutions	 and	 actors	with	 rational	behaviour,	 institutions	 are	 a	 crucial	 factor	 to	 shape	 the	 strategic	 context	 since	those	 limit	the	possible	strategic	actions	of	 the	actors	 in	their	 fight	 for	the	best	possible	 outcome	 (Romero,	 1999).	At	 the	 end,	 actors’	 actions	 are	not	 the	 ideal	ones,	but	those	that	are	feasible	within	a	context.	In	fact,	actors’	decisions	are	“an	optimal	 adaptation	 to	 an	 institutional	 environment”	 (Tsebelis,	 1991).	 In	 other	words,	 actors	 choose	 among	 the	 best	 possible	 options	 based	 on	 the	 actual	circumstances.		
6.7.1	The	Movimento	Arancione’s	options	based	on	the	Italian	
electoral	system.	A	 good	 example	 of	 how	 the	 institutional	 constraints	 affect	 the	 relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	is	the	one	lived	in	Milan	with	the	Movimento	 Arancione.	 The	 Italian	 municipal	 electoral	 system	 allows	 electoral	
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lists	that	support	the	same	mayoral	candidate	jointly	with	other	lists.	Thus,	this	possibility	opens	various	ways	for	the	actors	to	participate	in	the	local	elections.	In	particular,	 the	Movimento	Arancione	had	 three	possible	ways	 regarding	 the	relationship	with	the	PD:		
• Be	part	of	a	joint	list	integrated	by	the	PD	and	the	Movimento	Arancione.		
• Create	an	independent	list,	but	supporting	the	PD	mayoral	candidate.	
• Create	an	independent	list	supporting	another	mayoral	candidate.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 another	 electoral	 system	 like	 those	 based	 on	 the	 principle	that	 every	 list	 present	 its	 own	mayoral	 candidate,	 it	would	 not	 have	 the	 same	outcomes	 for	 the	 actors	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 types	 of	 relationship	 that	 can	 be	established	between	them.	Thus,	assuming	that	the	actors	will	participate	in	the	elections,	those	kind	of	electoral	systems	produce	just	two	possible	options:		
• Being	in	the	same	list,	or		
• Being	in	another	list	supporting	a	different	mayoral	candidate.		In	 figure	19	 it	 is	possible	 to	observe	a	representation	of	 the	various	options	 in	the	two	types	of	electoral	systems.			Figure	19.	Options	with	different	electoral	systems	for	the	MA.	
		The	choice	of	one	electoral	system	or	another	shapes	the	interaction	between	the	social	movement	and	the	political	party,	because	the	existence	of	a	bigger	range	of	 outcomes	 increases	 also	 the	 final	 number	 of	 possible	 types	 of	 relationships.	
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Thus,	 if	 the	 social	 movement	 decides	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 same	 list,	 the	 type	 of	relationship	between	the	two	actors	is	going	to	be	“permeation”.	In	that	situation	both	actors	share	completely	the	same	procedure	despite	keeping	their	decision	organs	 totally	 independent.	 However,	 if	 the	 Movimento	 Arancione	 decides	 to	build	its	own	list	supporting	Giuseppe	Sala,	the	type	of	relationship	is	going	to	be	more	 towards	 “alliance”.	 In	 that	 scenario	 both	 actors	 are	 interested	 in	 sharing	particular	 projects	 and	 they	 know	 that	 both	 are	 natural	 allies.	 Finally,	 if	 they	decide	 to	 have	 a	 list	 supporting	 another	 mayoral	 candidate,	 their	 type	 of	relationship	would	finish	in	the	stage	of	“competition”.	They	have	to	compete	for	the	 votes	 and	 support	 of	 the	 citizens	 despite	 that	 before	 could	 be	 allies.	Therefore,	 the	 Italian	electoral	 system	allows	 three	variants	 in	 the	relationship	between	 social	 movements	 and	 political	 parties.	 Observing	 figure	 20	 it	 is	possible	 to	 see	 that	 the	 final	 outcome	 depends	 on	 the	 value	 of	 A,B	 and	 C	 that	represents	the	preferences	of	the	player	in	the	electoral	systems	like	the	Italian.	If	the	value	of	A	is	higher	than	B	and	C,	the	movement	will	be	part	of	the	same	list	of	the	party.	If	the	value	of	B	is	higher	than	A	and	C,	the	movement	will	have	its	own	list	but	linked	with	the	same	candidate	of	the	party.	Finally,	if	the	value	of	C	is	higher	than	A	and	B,	the	movement	will	have	its	own	list	supporting	another	mayoral	candidate	–a	one	just	exclusively	of	the	movement	or	shared	with	other	parties-.			Figure	20.	Consequences	of	different	types	of	electoral	system	for	the	MA.	
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In	electoral	systems	like	those	based	on	the	principle	that	every	list	present	 its	own	 mayoral	 candidate,	 just	 two	 types	 of	 relationship	 can	 be	 observed,	“permeation”	in	the	case	both	actors	share	the	same	list,	and	“competition”	in	the	case	the	actors	are	part	of	different	 lists.	 In	the	first	case	both	actors	act	under	the	same	internal	rules	sharing	the	benefits	and	the	consequences	of	the	defeats.	While	 in	 the	 second	 case	 they	 are	 simple	 electoral	 adversaries.	 Observing	 the	figure	20	it	 is	possible	to	see	that	the	final	outcome	depends	on	the	value	of	D,	and	 E	 that	 represents	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 player	 in	 the	 option	 of	 electoral	systems	with	no	 linked	 lists.	 If	 the	value	of	D	 is	higher	 than	 the	value	of	E,	 the	movement	will	be	part	of	the	same	list.	However,	if	the	value	of	E	is	higher	than	the	value	of	D,	the	movement	will	have	another	list.		
6.7.2	The	election	of	the	mayor	and	the	PSC.	The	 electoral	 system	 played	 also	 an	 important	 role	 shaping	 relationships	between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 in	 another	 situation	 of	 the	observed	cases.	This	situation	 is	 the	one	involving	the	Partit	dels	Socialistes	de	Catalaunya	(PSC)	with	Barcelona	en	Comú	(BeC)	at	 the	moment	of	electing	 the	mayor.	In	Spain	the	mayor	is	not	elected	at	the	same	moment	of	the	councillors,	but	later	in	time.	The	citizens	elect	their	representatives	in	the	City	Council,	and	then,	the	City	Council	appoints	the	mayor.	Thus,	the	Spanish	electoral	municipal	system	organizes	the	election	of	the	mayor	in	an	indirect	way,	since	are	not	the	citizens	 who	 directly	 elect	 the	 mayor,	 but	 the	 councillors.	 That	 makes	 the	municipal	elections	in	a	two-round	election	de	facto157.	One	round	dedicated	to	choose	the	councillors	and	another	round	dedicated	to	choose	the	mayor.	In	the	first	round	the	citizens	are	the	ones	with	the	right	to	vote,	and	in	the	second	one	the	only	people	with	voting	rights	are	the	councillors.	The	existence	of	this	sort	of	two-rounds	election	increases	the	opportunity	windows	to	reach	agreements	with	 various	political	 actors.	 Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 one	of	 those	 rounds	 is	restricted	to	few	actors	alters	the	context	limiting	the	electoral	pressure.	Thus,	a	collaboration	that	would	be	impossible	 in	the	first	round	is	not	anymore	in	the	second	round	when	the	parts	are	not	competing	for	the	support	of	the	voters.																																																									157	For	more	information	see	Chapter	Five.	
Chapter	Six.	The	analysis	of	the	elements.		
	 196	
	Based	 on	 the	 survey	 and	 the	 usual	 number	 of	 parties	 in	 the	 City	 Council,	 the	leaders	of	BeC	were	aware	 that	 they	would	need	at	 some	point	 the	 support	of	other	 political	 actors	 to	 obtain	 the	mayoral	 position.	However,	 they	 also	 knew	that	asking	 for	such	support	before	 the	elections,	at	a	 time	when	all	actors	are	competing	for	citizens’	support,	was	not	realistic.	In	the	elections	time	-the	“first	round”-	every	actor	is	looking	for	its	own	benefit,	that	is,	working	to	receive	the	maximum	 possible	 amount	 of	 votes.	 Once	 the	 voting	 is	 completed	 and	 the	numbers	are	clear,	 it	 is	possible	to	know	the	bargaining	power	of	each	actor	 in	the	second	stage.	It	is	at	the	moment	of	choosing	the	mayor	when	it	is	possible	to	reach	agreements	based	on	the	number	of	seats	in	the	City	Council,	the	ideology	and	governability	(Colomé,	Gabriel;	personal	 interview;	18th	of	May	2017).	 It	 is	for	that	reason	why	BeC	searched	the	support	of	others	political	groups	after	the	elections,	not	before.	In	fact,	they	were	particularly	interested	in	the	support	of	the	PSC.		In	 case	 that	 the	PSC	would	accepted	a	 collaboration	pact	with	BeC	 in	 the	 “first	round”,	the	Spanish	electoral	system	just	allows	for	them	to	join	together	in	the	same	electoral	list.	That	option	was	not	even	conceived	for	a	party	that	had	been	ruling	 Barcelona	 for	 32	 years.	 Especially	 because	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 possible	pacts,	 the	 PSC	 still	 believed	 to	 be	 the	 alternative	 to	 the	 incumbent	mayor.	 So,	another	possible	moment	for	collaboration	is	after	the	election	of	the	councillors	when	the	mayor	has	to	be	chosen.	In	that	moment,	the	PSC	had	no	fear	to	receive	any	electoral	punishment	 from	 the	voters	 and	 it	 could	 facilitate	 the	election	of	Ada	 Colau	 as	 mayor.	 The	 PSC	 preferred	 Colau	 to	 her	 adversary	 with	 more	possibilities,	Xavier	Trias.	Consequently,	at	 the	moment	of	the	mayoral	election	the	councillors	of	the	PSC	voted	for	her.	In	the	figure	21	it	is	possible	to	observe	the	options	of	BeC	and	the	ones	of	PSC.	BeC	had	the	option	to	make	to	the	PSC	an	offer	in	the	“first	round”	or	in	the	“second	round”.	In	every	case,	the	PSC	had	the	option	to	accept	it	or	reject	it.		
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Figure	21.	Options	of	PSC	and	BeC	based	on	the	types	of	electoral	systems.	
		The	 existence	 of	 this	 sort	 of	 two	 rounds	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 type	 of	relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 [see	 figure	 22].	Thus,	if	the	PSC	accepts	the	offer	before	the	election	of	the	City	Council	members,	that	 is,	 in	 the	 “first	 round”,	 the	 relationship	 between	 them	 and	 BeC	would	 be	“permeation”	as	the	only	way	to	join	forces	is	doing	it	through	a	single	electoral	list	and	they	would	be	under	the	same	internal	rules.	If	the	PSC	does	not	accept	the	 offer,	 they	would	 be	 in	 a	 stage	 of	 “competition”	 where	 both	 actors	 would	have	to	confront	their	political	positions	to	the	decision	of	the	voters.	However,	as	there	is	also	the	possibility	of	a	new	offer	due	to	the	existence	of	the	indirect	election	of	 the	mayor,	 if	 the	PSC	 accepts	 the	 offer,	 they	would	be	 in	 a	 stage	of	“independence”.	 Both	 actors	 would	 be	 interested	 in	 specific	 agreements	 but	would	 be	 still	 electoral	 adversaries.	 The	 final	 outcome	was	 precisely	 that	 last	one,	 when	 the	 PSC	 gave	 its	 support	 to	 Ada	 Colau,	 but	 just	 that,	 as	 no	 further	agreements	were	accorded.	The	situation	was	the	best	outcome	for	both	actors.	The	 PSC,	 would	 not	 accepted	 an	 agreement	 in	 the	 “first	 round”,	 and	 knowing	that,	the	BeC	just	offered	in	the	“second	round”.		
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Figure	22.	Consequences	for	the	PSC	and	BeC	based	on	the	types	of	electoral	systems.	
		The	 previous	 game	 is	 just	 possible	 with	 the	 institutional	 constrictions	 of	 an	electoral	system	as	the	Spanish	one,	were	the	mayoral	election	is	undirected	and	in	a	second	moment.	With	a	real	one-round	election	the	electoral	system	would	not	 create	 a	 second	 opportunity	window	 for	 pacts	 between	 the	 actors.	 In	 this	case,	the	game	is	reduced	to	just	the	top	part,	eliminating	the	second	negotiation	period.	This	difference	between	electoral	systems	affects	the	type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	as	it	eliminates	the	possibility	of	a	stage	of	“independence”	when	the	sort	of	second	round	disappears.	Thus,	 the	electoral	 system	 is	 again	 an	 element	 able	 to	 modify	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	between	parties	and	movements.		
6.8	The	existence	of	trust	among	the	actors.	The	 existence	 of	 confidence	 between	 partners	 is	 a	 crucial	 element	 for	 the	development	 of	 any	 relationship.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 the	presence	or	absence	of	 trust	 can	even	modify	 the	 type	of	 their	rapport.	 Thus,	 while	 its	 existence	 implies	 that	 actors	 are	 able	 to	 renounce	 to	immediate	benefits	in	exchange	of	future	gains	for	all	the	parties	and	invest	in	a	closer	 collaboration,	 its	 absence	means	 reducing	 the	 incentives	 to	 pact	 and	 to	reach	 closer	 collaborations.	 This	means	 that	 trust	 can	 alter	 the	 choices	 of	 the	actors,	making	possible	 to	 accept	agreements	with	other	parties,	 even	 if	 it	will	only	be	possible	to	verify	the	fulfilment	of	the	other	party’s	duties	in	the	future.	This	 decision	 of	 renouncing	 to	 present	 benefits	 for	 the	 expectation	 of	 future	
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benefits	 is	 not	 a	 secure	 move	 for	 the	 players	 since	 other	 players	 could	 cheat	them,	however,	as	it	exists	trust	among	them,	they	still	do	it.		The	amount	of	trust	among	the	actors	is	not	a	stable	feature	and	may	vary	over	time	due	to	the	actions	of	the	players	(Rousseau,	Sitkin,	Burt,	&	Camerer,	1998).	Trust	can	be	decline	by	 the	breach	of	agreements	between	 the	parties	and	can	also	be	generated	by	the	will	of	the	actors	(Sztompka,	1999).	Unlike	its	removing,	trust	 is	 not	 built	 in	 a	 single	 way,	 but	 in	 several	 ways.	 For	 instance,	 it	 can	 be	developed	 through	 instruments	 created	 especially	 to	 assure	 it,	 or	 through	 the	dynamics	of	the	relationship.	However,	to	be	able	to	generate	trust	between	two	actors	it	is	important	that	the	situation	in	which	they	are	in,	makes	it	possible	for	both	 players	 to	win	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 If	 they	 are	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 a	 zero-sum	game,	that	is,	a	situation	when	the	gain	of	one	actor	is	the	loss	of	the	other	actor,	they	can	only	be	adversaries	since	any	collaboration	will	imply	a	worst	payoff	for	one	 of	 the	 actors.	 Hence,	 players	 must	 be	 in	 a	 situation	 where	 they	 can	 both	improve	their	situations,	otherwise	trust	can	difficulty	be	created.			The	 reputation	 of	 the	 parties	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	games	since	the	strategy	of	the	actors	is	not	just	based	on	the	options	they	have,	but	also	on	the	knowledge	they	have	about	other	players.	Since	it	is	not	possible	to	be	sure	about	the	future	behaviour	of	the	counterpart,	actors	tend	to	look	back	to	 complete	 the	 uncertainties	 they	 have	 about	 how	other	 players	will	 act.	 The	way	 actors	 have	 fulfilled	 their	 compromises	 in	 the	 past,	 creates	 a	 reputation	about	how	they	are	going	to	act	in	the	future	(Kreps,	1990).	When	an	actor	has	fulfilled	his	or	her	commitments,	it	is	generated	a	status	of	a	trustworthy	actor.	On	the	other	hand,	when	it	is	known	that	a	specific	actor	tends	to	deceive	other	players	in	their	agreements,	it	hinders	the	generation	of	trust	between	them.	The	existence	of	a	reputation	allows	actors	that	have	not	collaborate	before	to	know	more	about	what	they	should	expected	of	the	counterpart.	Therefore,	when	the	actors	 have	 to	 continue	 interacting	 with	 other	 players,	 they	 are	 interested	 in	maintaining	their	reputation	as	reliable	actors	and	reducing	their	opportunistic	behaviour	 (Kreps	 &	 Wilson,	 1982),	 since	 for	 the	 actors	 who	 do	 not	 comply,	
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future	pacts	will	be	more	complicated	to	reach,	because	nobody	is	interested	in	agreeing	with	cheaters.		When	it	is	not	possible	to	know	about	past	decisions	of	the	other	players	or	this	information	is	limited,	there	are	other	ways	to	reduce	the	aversion	of	the	actors	to	 pact.	 Thus,	 the	 existence	 of	 instruments	 ad	 hoc	 to	 generate	 confidence	between	various	parts	is	a	common	practice	in	business	to	reduce	the	problems	related	 with	 information	 difficulties	 like	 moral	 hazard	 or	 adverse	 selection	(Wilson,	 1980).	 The	 codes	 of	 ethics	 are	 one	 of	 those	 instruments	 that	 can	 be	translated	from	companies	into	the	political	arena	as	Barcelona	en	Comú	did158.	Since	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 be	 sure	 about	 the	 real	 intentions	 of	 an	 actor	 at	 the	moment	of	reaching	agreements	since	each	player	is	the	only	one	who	is	totally	sure	about	his	or	her	aims,	it	becomes	necessary	some	instrument	to	reduce	the	moral	 hazard	 of	 the	 parties.	 The	 ethical	 codes	 are	 very	 useful	 to	 reduce	 the	opportunistic	 behaviour	 of	 the	 actors	 involved,	 as	 it	 creates	 the	 feeling	 of	certainty	 about	 which	 behaviour	 to	 expect	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 actors.	 Since	 it	 is	possible	 to	 discard	 certain	 types	 of	 actions	 by	 other	 actors,	 players	 handle	 a	narrower	 range	 of	 options	 to	work	with.	 This	 fact	 allows	 the	planning	 of	 each	player’s	own	actions	because	strategically	speaking,	these	codes	provide	the	way	to	calculate	the	“best	response	to	the	expected	behaviours	of	 the	counterparts”	(Sacconi,	 2000,	 p17).	 Thanks	 to	 them,	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 opportunistic	behaviour	 is	 limited,	 even	 in	 unexpected	 happenings	 typical	 of	 long	relationships.			Information	asymmetry	can	also	generate	adverse	selection	problems	at	the	time	of	reaching	agreements	as	George	Akerlof	proved	in	his	famous	article	dedicated	to	 the	 cars	 market	 (1970).	 In	 situations	 when	 information	 is	 a	 resource	 for	optimizing	the	benefits,	the	existence	a	different	amount	of	information	between	parties	 can	 generate	 reluctance	 to	 pact.	 Thus,	 the	 possibility	 of	 unfair	transactions	must	 be	 considered	 at	 the	 time	 to	 negotiate.	 Consequently,	when	one	 party	 knows	more	 than	 the	 other,	 the	 phantom	 of	 performing	 a	 bad	 deal	appears	 to	 the	 party	 that	 know	 less.	 If	 one	 of	 the	 parties	 considers	 that	 is																																																									158	See	Chapter	Five	and	next	section	(6.8.1).	
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probable	that	is	going	to	be	cheated,	obviously	this	will	generate	a	lack	of	trust	between	 the	 actors.	 Though,	 this	 situation	 can	 be	mitigated	 also	 thanks	 to	 the	code	 of	 ethics	 that	 anticipates	 behaviours	 in	 situations	when	 one	 actor	 has	 or	will	have	more	 information.	Lorenzo	Sacconi	 (2000)	who	dedicated	part	of	his	research	to	the	use	of	this	instrument	by	the	firms	holds	that,			 Given	the	set	X	of	allowable	decisions,	some	of	them	may	turn	out	to	be	abusive	 ex	 post,	 without	 the	 possibility	 to	 provide	 for	 them	 ex	 ante.	Nevertheless,	whether	abuse	were	identifiable	at	 least	ex	post,	 it	could	be	argued	that	reputation	effects	as	such	are	able	to	discourage	abusing	because	of	the	threat	to	the	prospective	abuser	of	losing	his	face	forever	(i.e.	in	the	following	repetitions	of	the	game).	P25.		Therefore,	 the	 codes	of	 ethics	 create	 incentives	 to	 comply	with	 the	pacts	 since	the	risk	of	not	 fulfilling	 them	creates	a	big	credibility	problem	 for	 the	cheating	player.	When	 the	expected	behaviour	 is	not	produced,	 the	uncooperative	actor	will	be	labelled	as	unreliable.	Be	defined	like	this,	by	other	actors	will	have	a	big	impact	on	his	or	her	reputation.	This	mark	will	difficulty	his	or	her	future	pacts	which	the	same	or	other	partners,	and	it	will	increase	the	cost	of	agreeing,	since	other	actors	will	not	be	willing	to	risk	unless	there	is	a	possible	big	gain.			In	addition	to	the	ad	hoc	instruments,	another	way	to	generate	trust	among	the	players	is	through	the	repetition	of	interactions.	When	there	has	been	already	a	past	 collaboration	 and	 the	 parties	 have	 fulfilled	 what	 was	 expected	 of	 them,	there	 is	 the	 conviction	 that	 it	 is	 rational	 to	 expect	 a	 similar	 behaviour	 in	 the	future	 (Fudenberg,	Kreps,	&	Maskin,	1990).	Repeated	 interactions	between	 the	same	 actors	 generate	 trust,	 helping	 at	 the	 same	 time	 to	 create	 a	 reputation	 of	compliant	 actors	 for	 the	 players.	 Additionally,	 trust	 is	 at	 the	 same	 way	 what	impulses	 new	 contacts,	 since	 the	 actors	 feel	 confident	 about	 other	 actors’	decisions.	 However,	 if	 the	 players	 know	 that	 there	 is	 no	 another	 game	 in	 the	future,	 they	 do	 not	 have	 incentives	 to	 keep	 fulfilling	 their	 promises,	 since	cheating	 could	 increase	 their	 profits	 (Kreps,	 1990).	 Thus,	 trust	 keeps	 a	relationship	 going,	 but	 the	 expectation	 of	 future	 interactions	 it	 is	 necessary.	
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Since	we	are	talking	about	a	succession	of	interactions,	in	this	case	the	repeated	games	rules	are	applied.		The	 fulfilment	of	 the	 reached	agreements	between	 the	 actors	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	existence	of	trust,	especially	in	long	interactions.	However,	this	compliance	does	not	need	to	be	absolute	to	maintaining	two	players	cooperating,	since	small	acts	of	 discrepancy	 are	 presumed.	 In	 such	 a	 complex	 relationship,	 such	 as	 that	 of	political	parties	and	social	movements,	 it	 is	unrealistic	to	expect	that	these	two	kinds	of	actors	with	such	different	conception	of	politics	to	agree	on	everything	during	their	period	of	collaboration.	Sometimes,	there	may	be	differences	in	the	interpretation	of	the	agreements,	or	due	to	their	own	nature,	the	partners	might	act	in	a	way	that	the	other	one	does	not	support.	An	agreement	for	collaboration	that	 goes	 beyond	 a	 single	moment	 in	 time	will	 produce	unexpected	 situations.	Even	if	the	parts	seal	their	pact	through	the	adoption	of	an	electoral	manifesto,	this	 one	 is	 going	 to	 be	 incomplete,	 since	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 foresee	 all	 future	events.	 After	 all,	 every	 political	 and	 governmental	 program	 is	 an	 incomplete	contract,	because	the	 frequent	restrictions	 that	will	affect	 the	realization	of	 the	political	 actions	 once	 in	 the	 government,	 never	 exactly	 correspond	 to	 those	 of	the	 planning	 phase.	 Consequently,	 some	 actions	 in	 the	 future	 can	 be	implemented	 with	 the	 opposition	 of	 one	 party.	 This	 decision	 could	 be	interpreted	 as	 an	 act	 of	 disloyalty.	 However,	 maintaining	 the	 core	 of	 the	agreements	 and	 with	 the	 right	 amount	 of	 communication	 between	 them,	 the	parties	 can	 accept	 some	 level	 of	 disagreement	 without	 breaking	 the	 trust.	Certainly,	 the	 level	 of	 breach	 cannot	 be	 too	 high	 to	 keep	 the	 relationship	with	trust,	but	it	is	not	necessary	to	be	a	complete	fulfilment.	The	reason	for	accepting	this	unwanted	 result	 is	 because	when	 there	 is	 an	 assumable	 level	 of	 breach,	 it	pays	 to	 be	 more	 forgiving,	 as	 future	 gains	 will	 already	 discount	 small	 losses.	Then,	 some	 non-compliance	 leads	 to	 forgiveness,	 but	 too	 much	 leads	 to	generalized	mistrust.		
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6.8.1	The	Code	of	Ethics	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	The	 interviews	 conducted	 in	Barcelona	 to	 the	members	 of	Barcelona	 en	Comú	showed	the	existence	of	a	concrete	aspect	that	impulse	the	creation	of	BeC	and	deserves	to	be	highlighted:	the	process	of	elaboration	of	the	ethical	code.	All	of	the	interviewed	emphasised	the	importance	of	the	works	to	create	and	approve	the	norms	of	the	elected	and	appointed	members	of	BeC,	to	create	a	collaborative	culture	 between	 the	 various	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 BeC.	 The	elaboration	of	 the	Code	of	Ethics	was	an	 instrument	 to	start	rolling	 the	project	and	 to	generate	 trust	between	 the	 individuals	 and	 the	organizations	 that	were	involved.	The	Code	of	Ethics	obligated	all	 the	parties	 to	work	 together	 for	 first	time	 to	 achieve	 a	 specific	 goal.	 Coming	 the	 actors	 from	 a	 very	 diverse	background,	 those	 works	 helped	 to	 combine	 different	 organizational	 cultures.	The	Code	of	Ethics	was,	hence,	a	catalyst	for	the	creation	of	a	common	political	project.	 While	 the	 common	 goals	 were	 clear	 and	 shared	 by	 the	 all	 the	 actors	involved,	there	was	a	lack	of	trust	among	the	actors	and	about	the	way	to	achieve	the	 objectives.	 The	 ethical	 code	 reduced	 that	 lack	 of	 trust	 and	 allowed	 the	creation	 of	 a	 common	 organizational	 culture.	 It	was	 established,	 thanks	 to	 the	Code	of	Ethics	a	way	to	face	the	problems	and	allowed	to	the	parties	to	observe	how	the	other	parties	react	 in	 front	of	 the	circumstances.	The	existence	of	 that	instrument	allowed	the	parties	to	have	more	confidence	between	each	other	 in	the	future	events.	The	Code	of	Ethics	generated	trust	in	two	ways.	The	first	way	was	 the	 elaboration	 process	 that	 allowed	 the	 actors	 to	 know	 each	 other	more	and	 to	 create	 a	 common	 organizational	 culture.	 The	 second	 one	 was	 that	 the	ethical	code	allowed	knowing	in	advance	the	behaviour	of	all	the	actors	involved	in	BeC,	reducing	in	that	way	the	fear	to	possible	opportunistic	behaviours.	Thus,	the	 moments	 when	 some	 of	 the	 parts	 have	 to	 renounce	 to	 their	 position	regarding	 an	 important	 matter	 were	 faced	 differently	 thanks	 to	 the	 Code	 of	Ethics.	 It	 reduced	 the	 risks	 related	 of	 the	 initial	 negotiations	 when	 the	 actors	when	sceptical	with	 the	project.	Thanks	 to	 that	common	organizational	culture	structure	and	the	trust	created	among	them	with	the	process	of	the	creation	of	the	 Code	 of	 Ethics,	 they	were	 sure	 that	 that	 renounce	was	 for	 the	 best	 of	 the	political	 project	 and	 they	 would	 be	 compensated	 in	 the	 future.	 Internal	
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agreements	that	would	be	difficult	or	impossible	became	possible	thanks	to	the	trust	in	fair	conditions	or	future	compensations.			The	existence	of	 the	Code	of	Ethics	generated	a	normative	pressure	among	the	parties	that	accepted	 it.	The	group	pressure	established	that	 if	a	party	deviates	from	 the	 rules	 the	 other	 party	 would	 punish	 it.	 This	 increased	 the	 internal	cohesion	 of	 BeC.	 Thus,	 thanks	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 ethical	 code	 the	 various	parties	 felt	 completely	 supported	by	 the	 others,	 and	with	 that	 confidence	 they	take	were	able	 to	 take	braver	decisions.	Rational	 calculus	always	makes	actors	cautious	 and	 slightly	 suspicious	 towards	others,	 but	 thanks	 to	 the	 ethical	 code	those	mental	reserves	were	substitute	by	trust	in	the	other	parties.	There	was	no	fear	that	the	other	parties	would	use	your	actions	against	you	or	that	they	would	try	to	cheat	you	to	achieve	a	better	negotiating	position.	The	parties	were	able	to	give	 their	maximum	 for	 the	 common	 project	without	 retaining	 anything.	 They	were	 able	 to	 do	 a	 vacuum	 jump	 for	BeC,	which	maximize	 its	 potential	 success	chances.	 Thanks	 to	 the	 full	 involvement	 of	 the	 parties,	 the	 outcome	 for	 all	 of	them	as	a	group	was	optimized.		With	the	debate	regarding	the	creation	of	a	new	political	subject,	all	the	parties	involved	 knew	 that	 they	 would	 have	 to	 face	 a	 negotiations	 period	 when	 they	should	 lose	 some	points	 in	 order	 to	 create	BeC.	However,	 actors	were	 initially	afraid	 of	 not	 being	 fairly	 compensated.	 It	 is	 in	 that	moment	when	 the	 Code	 of	Ethics	 is	 configured	as	an	element	 that	 fosters	 the	 formation	of	BeC	 creating	a	trust	environment	between	the	actors	as	a	mechanism	to	reduce	the	uncertainty	of	 other	 actor’s	 actions.	 Thus,	 actors	 had	 to	 decide	 between	 risking	 for	 the	creation	of	BeC	and	maximize	the	new	subject	opportunities	or	adopting	a	more	conservative	position	to	conserve	wider	margin	of	discretion	within	BeC	despite	that	 could	mean	 fewer	 opportunities	 for	 BeC.	 In	 the	 figure	 23	 it	 is	 possible	 to	observe	 how	 the	 situation	was	 for	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 BeC.	Either	with	the	ethical	code	or	without	it,	the	options	of	the	actors	are	the	same,	but	what	changes	are	the	choices	of	the	actors.		
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Figure	23.	Options	for	the	parties	with	and	without	the	Code	of	Ethics.		
		Each	actor	had	 to	decide	 in	some	moment	 to	risk	or	not	knowing	 that	after	 its	choices	another	actor	will	have	 to	 face	 the	same	dilemma	but	already	knowing	the	choice	of	the	previous	actor.	Thus	the	existence	of	trust	between	the	various	actors	involved	is	very	relevant.	If	there	is	the	confidence	that	the	next	actor	will	chose	also	with	loyalty	to	the	project,	that	is,	opting	for	the	common	benefit,	the	first	actor	is	able	to	sacrifice	itself,	because	it	has	the	conviction	that	it	will	not	be	punished	 for	 its	choices.	The	Code	of	Ethics	was	the	 instrument	 that	generated	this	trust	among	the	members	of	BeC	as	it	anticipates	the	behaviour	of	actors.	In	the	 absence	 of	 the	 ethical	 code,	 the	 predisposition	 to	 risk	 by	 the	 actors	would	have	been	lower	as	the	uncertainty	of	other	actors’	behaviour	would	be	higher.	All	the	actors	would	have	shown	a	more	conservative	strategic	calculus.		The	importance	of	the	Code	of	Ethics	for	the	solution	of	the	game	is	high.	In	both	cases,	 that	 is,	with	Code	of	Ethics	and	without	 it	 the	 final	payoffs	are	 the	same	[see	 figure	24].	The	higher	payoffs	 are	 received	when	everyone	 risk,	while	 the	lower	 for	 the	 players	 when	 they	 risk	 and	 the	 following	 player	 does	 not.	Moreover,	 in	both	 situations	 if	 a	player	knows	 that	 the	other	 actors	 choices	 to	not	 risk,	 the	 higher	 payoff	 is	 choosing	 to	 not	 risk	 too.	 However,	 what	 the	presence	 or	 absence	 of	 the	 ethical	 code	 modifies	 is	 the	 final	 outcome.	 As	 the	actors	 receive	 their	 rewards	 in	 the	 future	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 ethical	 code	
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changes	their	choices.	Whit	it,	actors	are	more	wiling	to	risk	for	a	higher	payoff,	while,	without	it,	actors	prefer	to	not	risk	and	receive	a	more	secure	payoff.	The	preferences	of	the	actors	are	in	first	place	to	risk	if	the	other	actor	risk	too,	as	the	maximum	payoffs	 are	 received	 in	 this	 situation.	 However,	 since	 the	 first	 actor	does	not	have	any	guarantee	 that	 the	 second	actor	will	 risk	 too,	 the	 first	 actor	prefers	to	not	risk.	Facing	the	same	dilemma,	the	second	actor	also	decides	the	same.	Thus,	the	equilibrium	without	the	ethical	code	is	“not	risk”-“not	risk”.	As	it	is	a	repeated	situation	with	different	or	same	actors,	each	actor	is	in	the	position	o	unknown	future	and	consequently	despite	what	the	previous	actor	did,	if	there	is	not	certainty	about	what	the	next	actor	will	do,	each	actor	will	decide	not	 to	risk.	Nevertheless,	 this	 situation	changes	when	 the	 first	actor	has	 the	certainty	that	the	second	actor	will	also	risk.	The	Code	of	ethics	gives	that	certainty	to	the	first	actor.	Consequently,	actors	are	going	 to	risk	since	 they	are	convinced	 that	the	other	actors	will	do	the	same.	Thus,	the	equilibrium	moves	to	“risk”-“risk”	a	Pareto	efficiency.		Figure	24.	Consequences	for	the	parties	with	and	without	the	Code	of	Ethics.	
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This	existence	of	trust	had	important	consequences	for	the	type	of	relationship	between	 the	 actors.	 The	 Code	 of	 Ethics	 established	 a	 level	 of	 trust	 among	 the	parties	 of	 BeC	 allows	 the	 relationship	 among	 the	 actors	 to	 go	 towards	 a	more	integrated	 stage	 that	 would	 not	 have	 been	 possible	 without	 it.	 This	 full	commitment	 of	 the	 parties	 for	 the	 political	 project	 that	 is	 Barcelona	 en	 Comú	established	the	type	of	relationship	in	“permeation”.	Despite	keeping	the	original	actors,	all	of	them	are	fully	committed	with	BeC	and	act	jointly	as	if	they	were	a	single	entity.	There	may	be	internal	debates	and	disagreements,	but	if	one	actor	loses	 in	these	debates,	 it	would	not	break	BeC	nor	start	retaliating,	as	 it	knows	that	it	will	be	fairly	compensated	in	the	future.	On	the	other	hand,	in	the	absence	of	Code	of	Ethics	 the	 type	would	have	been	 “alliance”.	As	all	of	 them	share	 the	same	goals,	the	actors	are	interested	in	the	proper	functioning	of	BeC.	They	want	that	the	BeC	is	able	to	win	elections	and	able	to	implement	the	common	policies.	However,	as	they	do	not	entirely	trust	each	other,	the	actors	prefer	to	pact	any	agreement	individually.		
6.8.2	Past	collaboration	between	the	Movimento	Arancione	and	
the	Partito	Democratico.	As	seen	before,	 trust	 is	an	 important	element	 to	shape	 the	 type	of	 relationship	between	social	movement	and	political	parties,	since	more	present	it	is,	more	the	various	 parties	 are	willing	 to	 integrate	 their	 projects.	 Thus,	meanwhile	within	BeC	trust	arrived	through	the	Code	of	Ethics,	trust	can	also	be	built	-and	kept-	in	other	 ways.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 PD	 in	 Milan	 with	 the	Movimento	Arancione,	trust	was	generated	thanks	to	a	past	of	collaboration.	The	fact	of	repeating	situations	with	the	same	actors	generates	the	confidence	among	them	that	they	are	going	to	behave	in	a	particular	way.	The	confidence	it	is	based	on	the	experience	of	similar	events	in	the	past.		After	 arriving	 with	 Pisapia	 to	 institutional	 politics	 in	 2010,	 the	 Movimento	Arancione	 started	 to	 collaborate	 with	 the	 PD.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 deciding	 the	continuity	of	the	centre-left	project	for	the	elections	of	2016	the	continuity	or	not	of	 this	 collaboration	 showed	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	 achieve	 citizen’s	 support.	 The	
Chapter	Six.	The	analysis	of	the	elements.		
	 208	
existence,	 between	 the	 movement	 and	 the	 party,	 of	 a	 common	 past	 sharing	working	years,	 created	 some	 tacit	 agreements.	The	 reason	 is	 that	 after	 several	satisfactory	 pacts,	 it	 was	 generated	 the	 expectation	 among	 the	 actors	 that	 the	other	party	would	fulfil	 the	agreements.	Thus,	both,	the	PD	and	the	Movimento	Arancione	 trust	 enough	 the	 other	 party	 to	 risk	 in	 their	 relationship.	 The	repetition	 in	 the	 compliment	 of	 pacts,	 it	 is	 what	 generates	 that	 confidence	through	 time.	 If	 every	 time	 you	 agree	 something	with	 another	 party	 the	 other	party	acts	as	you	expected,	this	generates	the	confidence	that	in	the	future	pacts	will	 also	 be	 respected.	 That	 is	 how	 the	 actors	 felt	 about	 their	 relationship,	confident	 that	 the	 agreements	would	 be	 respected,	 and	 consequently	 both	 felt	able	 to	 risk	 knowing	 that	 the	 other	party	would	 also	do	 the	 same	 thing.	 Paolo	Limonta	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	movement	said	that	they	were	loyal	people,	but	they	were	 like	that	because	they	also	knew	that	the	PD	was	also	 loyal	with	the	terms	once	they	had	an	agreement159.	Knowing	that,	the	movement	was	able	to	renounce	 to	 some	 proposals	 knowing	 that	 the	 PD	would	 respect	 the	 pact	 and	implement	 the	 terms	 once	 in	 the	 City	 Government.	 The	Movimento	 Arancione	had	no	fear	backing	up	the	PD	or	accepting	some	non-ideal	decisions	because	it	existed	a	trust	among	the	actors.	Also	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	PD	it	was	a	secure	investment.	The	PD	knew	that	their	initial	manifesto	was	not	ideal	for	the	Movimento	Arancione,	but	despite	that,	once	reached	an	agreement,	the	PD	was	confident	about	 the	movement’s	support	both	 in	 the	electoral	campaign	and	 in	the	City	Council.		As	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 in	 the	 figure	 25,	 once	 the	 actors	 decided	 to	collaborate,	 they	 had	 to	 decide	 between	 risking	 or	 not.	 Similar	 to	 the	 case	 of	Barcelona,	the	actors	maximize	their	benefits	 if	both	risk,	and	have	their	worse	payoff	in	case	that	they	risk	en	the	following	actor	does	not.	Consequently,	to	be	able	to	risk	is	necessary	the	conviction	that	the	next	actor	to	choice	will	do	the	same,	otherwise	the	actors	would	chose	not	to	risk	as	there	is	no	certainty	that	the	 actor	 who	 moves	 after	 will	 risk	 too.	 Thus,	 the	 existence	 of	 trust	 is	 what	generates	 the	conviction	among	 the	actors	 that	 they	can	risk,	because	 the	next	actor	is	going	to	do	the	same	generating	the	optimal	benefits	for	both	actors.	As	it																																																									159	For	more	information	see	Chapter	Four.	
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is	a	repeated	game	since	the	collaboration	is	continuous	in	time,	past	decisions	of	the	 actors	 is	 what	 generates	 the	 expectation	 about	 future	 decisions.	 Though	despite	 the	 best	 individual	 decision	 for	 the	 second	 actor	would	 be	 not	 risking	after	the	previous	actor	has	risk,	the	fact	the	first	actor	has	to	play	again	after	the	second’s	actors	decision,	incentives	the	second	actor	to	decide	to	risk	to	increase	the	 future	benefits,	 confident	 that	 the	 first	actor	 is	going	 to	do	 the	same	 in	 the	following	decisions.			Figure	25.	Past	collaboration	game.	
		Thus,	 assuming	 that	 both	 actors	 want	 to	 collaborate,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 past	working	 together	 had	 consequences	 for	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 the	actors	[see	figure	26].	Without	trust	the	type	would	be	“alliance”.	They	feel	that	each	 other	 are	 natural	 allies,	 but	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 give	 immediate	 benefits	 to	each	agreement.	On	the	other	hand,	thanks	to	the	existence	of	trust,	it	is	possible	the	 existence	 of	 “permeation”.	 All	 of	 the	 actors	 are	 fully	 committed	 with	 the	project	and	are	able	to	accept	to	not	have	opportunist	behaviour.	They	even	do	that	without	demanding	 for	guaranties,	based	on	 the	knowledge	 that	 the	other	actor	will	act	in	the	same	way.		
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Figure	26.	Consequences	for	the	actors	in	the	past	collaboration	game.	
		
6.9	The	capacity	of	making	public	appointments.		The	possibility	to	bargain	with	managerial	positions	in	the	administration	is	also	a	relevant	element	to	define	the	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	While,	as	seen	before,	some	actors	are	interested	in	the	influence	on	the	 elaboration	 of	 public	 policies	 –policy-seeking	 actors-,	 others	 are	 more	interested	 in	political	 positions	 –office-seeking	 actors.	 The	 reasons	 are	 various	and	 the	 literature	 is	 broad	 analysing	 why	 and	 how	 actors	 search	 for	 offices	(Müller	&	Strøm,	1999)	(Budge	&	Laver,	1986).	However,	what	remains	beyond	doubt	 is	 that	 political	 parties	 tend	 to	 be	 very	 interested	 in	 political	appointments,	 since	 it	 is	 part	 of	 their	 nature	 to	 hold	 executive	 positions	 to	implement	 their	 ideas.	 Therefore,	 the	 possibility	 to	 offer	 to	 parties	 those	positions	 it	 is	 a	powerful	 instrument	 to	 start	 collaborating,	 and	with	 it,	 able	 to	alter	the	type	of	relationship	between	the	actors.		
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6.9.1	The	inclusion	in	the	Barcelona	City	Government	of	the	PSC.	Barcelona	 en	Comú	was	 heading	 a	 single-party	 government	 in	 2016.	 The	 legal	requirements	and	the	amount	of	work	of	the	members	of	the	government	made	necessary	 to	 increment	 the	number	of	members	 of	 the	City	Government160.	As	the	only	way	to	do	it	is	including	members	of	the	City	Council,	an	agreement	with	other	political	group	was	necessary.	BeC	had	the	capacity	to	offer	some	positions	to	other	political	actors	as	the	PSC,	and	with	that	it	was	possible	to	create	a	kind	of	 relationship	 that	 without	 this	 capacity	 would	 have	 not	 been	 possible.	 Thus	configuring	 the	 element	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 offices	 as	 a	 key	 to	 delimit	 the	relationship	between	parties	and	movements.		As	it	is	possible	to	see	in	figure	27,	BeC	was	the	first	actor	to	make	a	move.	The	movement	 had	 the	 possibility	 to	 offer	 or	 not	 to	 the	 PSC	 entering	 in	 the	 City	Government.	 The	 offer	 was	 not	 ideal	 for	 BeC,	 because	 that	 meant	 to	 share	decisional	power	and	having	 to	 reach	pacts	 for	 their	political	 initiatives,	but	at	the	 same	 time	 BeC	 needed	more	members	 in	 the	 City	 Government	 to	manage	satisfactorily	all	 the	political	areas	and	they	also	needed	more	votes	 in	the	City	Council	to	pass	their	proposals.	Thus,	in	terms	of	game	theory,	for	BeC	to	make	the	 offer	 to	 the	 PSC	 and	 solve	 this	 dilemma,	 the	 payoffs	 the	movement	would	receive	 in	 case	 of	 acceptance	 by	 the	 PSC	 have	 to	 be	 higher	 for	 BeC,	 than	 the	payoff	 that	 BeC	 would	 receive	 in	 case	 of	 not	 offering.	 Figure	 27	 shows	 the	various	 options	 of	 the	 players	 with	 letters	 as	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 payoffs	assuming	 that	A	has	a	value	greater	 than	B.	 In	 case	 that	BeC	 finally	decided	 to	offer	to	the	PSC	to	enter	in	the	City	Government,	posteriorly,	the	PSC	would	have	to	decide	between	accepting	the	offer	or	rejecting	it,	that	is,	entering	or	not	in	the	City	Government.			
																																																								160	For	more	information	see	Chapter	Five.		
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Figure	27.	Public	appointments	game.	
		The	decision	of	the	PSC	about	entering	or	not	in	the	City	Government	was	deeply	discussed	and	analysed	within	the	social	democratic	party,	as	it	was	not	exempt	of	 disadvantages.	 Entering	 in	 a	 government	 with	 a	 figure	 as	 powerful	 as	 Ada	Colau	 as	mayor	meant	 that	 the	PSC	was	not	 the	one	 leading,	moreover,	 it	 also	meant	accepting	the	role	of	small	actor	in	the	City	Government.	This	choice	was	a	big	 risk,	 since	 it	 could	 definitely	 place	 them	 at	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 citizens	 as	 a	secondary	party	and	no	longer	as	a	mayoral	alternative.	Logically,	that	was	a	big	step	 for	 a	 party	 that	 ruled	 uninterruptedly	 Barcelona	 for	 32	 years.	 However,	entering	 in	 the	City	Government	 it	also	had	 important	advantages.	For	 the	PSC	being	 in	 the	 government	meant	 being	 able	 to	 shape	 the	 future	 of	 the	 city	 and	have	more	media	coverage	than	they	would	receive	in	the	opposition.	Translated	to	the	game,	 it	means	that	in	terms	of	preferences	if	C	is	higher	than	D	the	PSC	would	accept	 the	offer	otherwise	 it	would	reject	 it.	The	 final	outcome	was	 that	after	 the	 offer	 of	 BeC	 the	 PSC	 entered	 into	 the	 government	 as	 its	 leaders	 and	members161	considered	that	there	were	more	pros	than	cons.			The	 possibility	 to	 make	 some	 appointments	 affected	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	between	BeC	and	the	PSC,	as	it	is	possible	to	see	in	figure	28.	On	the	one	hand,	if	the	PSC	accepts	the	offer	of	some	government	positions,	both	actors	are	going	to	share	the	City	Government	and	the	decisions.	However,	despite	of	the	existence																																																									161	Once	negotiated	the	agreement,	the	decision	was	voted	for	the	members	of	the	PSC.	
Oﬀer
No oﬀer 
PSC
Accept
Reject
BeC
[A,C]
[B,E]
[B,D]
Chapter	Six.	The	analysis	of	the	elements.		
	 213	
of	a	signed	pact	they	are	aware	that	in	some	issues	they	will	disagree.	Thus,	the	stage	is	an	“alliance”.	It	is	important	to	point	out	that	the	PSC	wants	to	keep	its	own	political	profile	and	for	that	reason	the	party	would	not	accept	closer	stages	as	 for	example	“permeation”.	That	 is	also	why	it	 is	so	 important	 for	the	parties	the	collaboration	agreement,	 to	keep	a	balance	between	functioning	as	a	single	government	meanwhile	both	actors	keep	their	own	individuality	for	the	voters.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	PSC	does	not	accept	the	offer	or	BeC	does	not	offer	to	the	PSC,	the	type	of	relationship	would	be	“independence”.	The	situation	would	be	the	one	of	two	actors	with	a	similar	concept	of	city	and	similar	ideology,	being	potential	 allies	 for	 policies	 in	 the	 City	 Council	 votes,	 but	 without	 concerning	about	 possible	 electoral	 consequences	 for	 the	 other	 actor.	 Each	 pact	 or	agreement	would	have	 to	be	negotiate	 individually	and	would	be	 to	 reflect	 the	ideas	of	both	actors	 to	be	approved	as	BeC	minority	government	 is	not	able	 to	pass	 policies	 by	 its	 own.	 However,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 collaboration	 will	transform	 towards	 a	 more	 adversary	 positions	 when	 the	 new	 election	 call	 is	closer.		Figure	28.	Outcomes	of	the	public	appointments	game.	
		Therefore,	 the	 analysis	 has	 highlighted	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 possibility	 to	 offer	political	 positions	 to	 other	 actors	 is	 an	 element	with	 the	 capacity	 to	 shape	 the	relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 Without	 this	possibility	 the	 only	 possible	 collaboration	 between	 the	 PSC	 and	BeC	would	 be	
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the	one	of	sporadic	agreements,	as	the	stage	of	“alliance”	just	appears	when	it	is	possible	to	offer	offices.			
6.10	Summary.	This	chapter	presented	the	elements	extracted	from	the	narrative	of	the	cases	of	Milan	and	Barcelona,	which	could	potentially	 influence	 the	 type	of	 relationship	between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 Once	 made	 some	 general	assumptions,	 the	elements	were	analysed	to	know	more	about	their	role	 in	the	interaction	 between	 the	 actors.	 The	 ideology,	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 candidate,	 the	capacity	 of	 influence	 in	 the	 elaboration	of	 public	 policies,	 the	 electoral	 system,	the	capacity	of	making	public	appointments,	and	the	existence	of	trust	among	the	actors,	are	the	elements	that	in	a	different	way	and	in	a	different	moments	have	shown	to	be	able	to	alter	the	type	of	relationship	studied	in	this	dissertation.			 	
Conclusions.		In	 the	study	of	 the	 interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	this	dissertation	used	an	approach	that,	although	not	 frequent	 in	the	academia,	has	 proven	 to	 be	 systematic	 and	 useful	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 research.	 It	 is	thanks	 to	 analytic	 narratives	 and	 its	 combination	 of	 tools,	 that	 it	 has	 been	possible	 to	 highlight	 the	 existence	 of	 several	 elements	 that	 have	 a	 direct	influence	 over	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 that	 is	 established	 between	 political	parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 This	 method	 allowed	 not	 just	 to	 recap	systematically	what	happened	in	real	situations,	but	also	to	display	the	potential	alternative	 outcomes	 of	 situations	 in	which	 the	 actors	 involved	modified	 their	choices.	 Furthermore,	 the	 analysis	 of	 those	 elements	 provided	 worthwhile	information	 about	 their	 influence	 on	 the	 types	 of	 relationship	 and	 to	 better	understand	why	political	parties	and	social	movements	have	certain	behaviour	towards	each	other.			The	core	intention	of	this	work	was	to	reach	a	better	understanding	of	nowadays	politics	 through	 a	 better	 knowledge	 of	 the	 interaction	 that	 involves	 political	parties	and	social	movements.	To	do	that,	this	research	focused	on	the	elements	that	are	capable	to	produce	different	configurations	of	the	relationship	between	those	actors.	Thus,	the	investigation	started	with	the	aim	to	answer	the	question:	
How	do	 certain	 elements	 affect	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	political	 parties	
and	 social	 movements?	 Taking	 an	 enlarging	 the	 classification	 of	 types	 of	relationships	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 proposed	 by	Michael	 Hanagan	 (1998),	 and	 through	 the	 analysis	 conducted	 after	 the	 deep	study	 of	 two	 cases,	 it	 has	 been	 possible	 to	 prove	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 series	 of	elements	 that	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 delimitation	 of	 the	 type	 of	 the	relationship	 between	 those	 two	 actors.	 Elements	 such	 as	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	actors,	the	figure	of	the	candidate,	the	capacity	of	influence	in	the	elaboration	of	public	policies,	the	electoral	system,	the	capacity	of	making	public	appointments,	and	the	existence	or	not	of	trust	among	the	actors,	have	shown	to	be	crucial	at	the	time	to	end	up	with	one	type	of	relationship	or	another.		
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	The	 existence	 of	 a	 compatible	 ideology	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 or	 not,	 is	 an	 element	 that	 despite	 not	 shaping	 the	 type	 of	 the	relationship,	 conditions	 it.	 Thus,	 ideology	 allows	 collaboration	 between	 the	actors	 in	 some	cases	while	 in	others	 it	prevents	 it.	On	 the	one	hand,	when	 the	actors	have	contrary	ideologies,	-leftist	and	rightist	for	reasons	of	simplification-	the	only	possible	type	of	relationship	between	them	is	“opposition”.	That	is,	they	recognize	 themselves	 as	 adversaries	 and	 they	will	 fight	 for	 the	 defeat	 of	 each	other’s	 ideals.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 the	 actors	 have	 an	 ideology	 that	 is	compatible,	 that	 means	 not	 contrary,	 a	 door	 to	 collaboration	 opens.	 The	 final	type	of	relationship	between	the	actors	will,	 though,	depend	of	other	elements.	Hence,	 ideology	 shows	 to	 be	 an	 element	 that	 does	 not	 determine	 the	 way	 in	which	the	interaction	between	parties	and	movements	will	be,	however,	is	still	a	crucial	element,	as	without	the	right	configuration	no	collaboration	is	possible.		The	 choice	 of	 the	 person	who	has	 to	 lead	 a	 political	 project	 can	 produce	 hard	confrontations	within	 political	 parties	 until	 the	 point	 of	 dividing	 or	 destroying	them.	 Its	 relevance,	 however,	 does	 not	 end	 there,	 as	 it	 also	 influences	 the	external	 relations	 of	 the	 parties.	 Thus,	 the	 specific	 person	 who	 holds	 the	candidacy	of	a	project	is	an	element	capable	of	producing	alterations	in	the	type	of	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 The	 person	leading	a	candidature	is	a	key	figure	for	the	political	project	since	he	or	she	holds	a	position	with	a	great	capacity	for	decision,	which	will	increase	if	finally	elected.	Hence	 the	group	 that	 is	able	 to	appoint	 the	candidate	 it	 considers	appropriate,	ensures	 that	 its	 project	 will	 be	 defended	 or	 at	 least	 taken	 into	 consideration.	Therefore,	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 particular	 person	 can	 be	 an	 incentive	 for	 a	 closer	collaboration	 when	 he	 or	 she	 is	 accepted,	 or	 for	 a	 more	 distant	 type	 of	collaboration	 when	 the	 person	 is	 not	 considered	 valid.	 If	 the	 candidate	 is	considered	as	not	 completely	aligned	with	 the	political	 ideas	of	 the	group,	 it	 is	possible	 that	discontent	produces	a	reaction	that	ends	 in	 the	creation	of	a	new	political	 project,	 placing	 the	 actors	 in	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 known	 as	“competition”.	Instead,	if	the	candidate	is	seen	as	the	right	choice	for	all	parties,	this	can	produce	such	a	big	desire	of	collaboration	between	the	actors	that	they	
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may	end	up	being	situated	in	the	type	of	relationship	called	“permeation”,	where	actors	completely	identify	with	each	other.	Additionally,	as	seen	in	the	analysis,	the	 various	 middle	 degrees	 of	 consensus	 around	 the	 person	 who	 holds	 the	position	can	produce	intermediate	stages	of	relationship	between	the	actors,	that	is,	“alliance”	and	“independence”.		The	 capacity	 of	 deciding	 which	 public	 policies	 should	 be	 implemented	 is	 a	common	 object	 of	 desire	 for	 any	 political	 actor,	 playing	 a	 significant	 role	 in	political	 agreements.	 Thus,	 this	 influence	 in	 the	 elaboration	 of	 policies	 is	revealed,	 apart	 from	being	 a	 bargaining	 target,	 as	 an	 element	 able	 to	 alter	 the	pacts	 between	 actors,	 and	 also	 to	 influence	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	them.	 In	 particular,	 for	 social	 movements	 this	 capacity	 is	 high	 valued	 since	altering	public	policies	is	the	natural	way	to	have	their	demands	satisfied.	Social	movements	requests	are	based	on	particular	changes	about	an	issue;	therefore,	public	policies	are	one	the	best	way	to	alter	the	status	quo	for	them.	Being	this	element	 so	 important	 for	 social	movements,	 if	 they	 can	 influence	 policies	 it	 is	more	probable	 that	 the	movements	are	 interested	 in	a	closer	relationship	with	those	 political	 parties	 that	 can	 provide	 them	 with	 such	 impact.	 Meanwhile,	 if	their	 policy	 demands	 are	 ignored,	 they	 will	 have	 much	 less	 interest	 to	collaborate.	The	most	common	situation	in	which	policies’	arrangement	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	takes	place,	is	when	the	party	asks	for	the	electoral	endorsement	of	the	movement	 in	exchange	for	approving	some	of	the	movement’s	 demands	 after	 the	 elections.	 Thus,	 the	 support	 of	 the	 social	movement	is	not	in	exchange	of	an	instant	profit,	but	on	the	basis	on	the	promise	of	 forthcoming	 actions.	 With	 this,	 social	 movements	 are	 investing	 in	 future	benefits,	despite	the	risk	of	being	ignored	by	the	political	party	when	it	achieves	a	decisional	position.	Additionally,	 social	movements	have	 to	deal	with	 the	 fact	that	 due	 to	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 political	 parties,	 they	 have	 a	 better	 knowledge	about	 institutional	 politics	 than	 movements.	 This	 privileged	 position	 of	 the	parties	implies	a	bigger	familiarity	with	the	institutions’	insides,	such	as	its	limits	or	 its	 particular	 terms.	 These	 insights	 can	 be	 invoked	 by	 political	 parties	 to	devalue	 the	 initial	 pacts,	 transforming	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 relationship	 in	 a	more	convenient	 way	 for	 party’s	 interests.	 Consequently,	 this	 situation	 is	 a	 perfect	
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example	of	 opportunistic	behaviour	by	political	parties	based	on	a	 situation	of	information	 asymmetry	 regarding	 the	 social	 movements.	 To	 reduce	 this	opportunistic	 behaviour	 some	 mechanisms	 can	 be	 implemented	 so	 social	movements	 feel	 more	 wiling	 to	 have	 a	 closer	 collaboration.	 The	 extent	 of	influence	 on	 policies	 and	 the	 belief	 of	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 agreements	 will	determine	the	type	of	relationship	that	will	be	established	between	the	actors.	As	seen	in	the	analytical	part,	this	type	can	vary	from	“permeation”,	when	the	actors	are	integrated	in	the	same	project,	until	“competition”,	when	the	influence	on	the	elaboration	of	public	policies	is	considered	as	inadequate	by	some	of	the	actors.		The	 specific	way	 in	which	norms	 regulate	 an	 issue	has	 a	big	 impact	on	actors’	behaviour.	It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	the	analysis	performed	showed	that	institutional	constraints	affect	the	type	of	relationship	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	In	particular,	among	all	possible	institutional	limitations,	the	 specific	 configuration	 of	 the	 electoral	 system	 has	 shown	 to	 be	 an	 element	that	 can	 foster	 the	 collaboration	 between	 actors	 or	 obstruct	 it.	 Although	 not	envisaged	by	the	legislature	at	the	moment	of	producing	the	electoral	norms,	the	particular	 configuration	 of	 them	 influences	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 existing	between	political	 parties	 and	 social	movements.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 two	 cases	studied,	 the	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 with	 respect	 to	 single-round	 electoral	systems,	 two-round	 electoral	 systems	 create	 additional	 periods	 of	 negotiation	between	 actors	 with	 diverse	 characteristics	 at	 each	 stage.	 Once	 forces	 are	confronted	 in	 the	 first	 round,	 the	second	round	allows	new	pacts	based	on	 the	results	 of	 the	 first	 round.	 This	 expands	 the	 possible	 types	 of	 relationship	between	 the	 actors.	 While	 in	 one-round	 elections,	 where	 the	 types	 can	 be	“permeation”	 when	 the	 actors	 form	 part	 of	 the	 same	 project	 or	 “competition”	when	 they	 are	 electoral	 adversaries,	 in	 two-round	 elections	 the	 type	 of	“independence”	 is	 also	 a	 possibility,	 as	 the	 actors	 can	 reach	 agreements	 in	exchange	 of	 endorsements.	 That	 way	 both	 actors	 can	 be	 mutually	 benefited,	without	being	part	of	 the	 same	project.	However,	 the	number	of	 rounds	of	 the	elections	is	not	the	only	feature	of	the	electoral	systems	affecting	the	relationship	between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements.	 The	 specific	 regulation	 of	 the	electoral	lists	has	also	proven	to	affect	the	type	of	this	interaction.	For	instance,	
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when	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 have	 more	 than	 one	 list	 linked	 to	 the	 same	 mayoral	candidate,	 new	dynamics	 appear	 among	 the	 actors	 that	would	 not	 exist	 under	other	 regulations.	When	 linked	 lists	 are	 an	 option	 for	 the	 actors,	 the	 potential	number	 of	 types	 of	 relationship	 grows.	 Since	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 have	 a	 different	kind	 of	 commitment	 with	 a	 project	 beyond	 being	 fully	 in	 or	 fully	 out,	 the	relationships	 between	 the	 actors	 have	 more	 nuances.	 Thus,	 thanks	 to	 this	increase	in	options,	it	is	possible	to	observe	collaboration	that	otherwise	would	not	 exist.	 For	 example,	 some	 actors	 are	 not	 willing	 to	 assume	 a	 complete	identification	with	particular	actors	as	a	one-list	system	would	demand,	but	are	open	to	have	a	less	demanding	collaboration	if	the	electoral	regulation	allows	it.	Hence,	other	than	 in	electoral	systems	with	not	 linked	 lists	where	we	only	 find	the	 types	 “permeation”	when	 the	 actors	 join	 together	 and	 “competition”	when	they	do	 it	 in	 other	 lists,	with	 linked	 lists	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 also	 include	 the	 type	“alliance”	in	the	electoral	systems.			In	this	work	we	have	seen	the	way	in	which	trust	acts	to	shape	the	relationship	between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 at	 the	 time	 of	 reaching	agreements	 in	 the	 cities	 of	 Milan	 and	 Barcelona.	 Thus,	 confidence	 in	 the	counterparts	 is	crucial	 to	reach	agreements	 in	situations	where	one	party	does	not	 automatically	 receive	 the	 benefits	 of	 their	 interaction,	 otherwise	 the	collaboration	 risks	 to	 not	 exist.	Moreover,	when	 the	mechanisms	 that	 assured	the	fulfilling	of	the	promises	are	little	or	inexistent,	the	presence	of	trust	between	the	actors	became	even	more	necessary	since	it	is	the	only	thing	that	makes	the	pacts	possible.	Without	trust	in	a	relation,	actors	are	afraid	to	do	their	part	while	other	 actors	 do	not	 do	 their	 own.	However,	when	 there	 is	 trust	 among	 actors,	they	 are	 able	 to	 forego	 immediate	 benefits	 since	 they	 are	 convinced	 that	 the	other	party	will	 fulfil	 its	promises	at	 the	 right	 time.	With	 trust,	parties	 are	not	afraid	of	opportunistic	behaviour	from	other	parties	and	are	open	to	search	for	a	higher	 common	 benefit	 that	 it	 is	 just	 possible	when	 all	 parties	work	 together.	Therefore,	with	such	an	impact	on	interactions,	trust	is	another	element	capable	of	 affecting	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 that	 exists	 between	 political	 parties	 and	social	 movements.	 Being	 a	 mutable	 element,	 in	 opposition	 to	 institutional	constraints	 that	 tend	 to	 be	 stable	 through	 time,	 trust	 can	 be	 present	 in	 a	
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relationship	in	various	ways.	One	of	the	most	usual	 is	the	knowledge	about	the	other	party’s	previous	behaviour.	Whether	in	the	same	situation	or	in	others,	the	fulfilling	of	promises	by	one	actor	creates	a	reputation	and	an	expectation	about	its	 future	 decisions.	 This	 kind	 of	 repeated	 game	 generates	 the	 belief	 that	 if	 an	actor	 has	 fulfilled	 its	 promises	 in	 the	 past,	 it	will	 do	 it	 again.	 Thus,	 if	 an	 actor	displays	an	opportunistic	behaviour,	 this	will	 complicate	any	 future	pact,	as	he	will	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 unreliable	 player.	 This	 kind	 of	 player,	 does	 not	 just	 make	possible	future	deals	with	other	actors	more	difficult,	additionally	he	will	have	to	offer	 much	 higher	 benefits	 and	 guarantees	 of	 compliance	 for	 any	 agreement.	However,	 trust	 can	 also	 be	 present	 in	 other	 ways.	 For	 instance,	 when	 a	relationship	 starts	 from	 scratch,	 in	 which	 knowledge	 about	 the	 actor's	 past	behaviour	is	not	possible,	the	result	risks	not	being	optimal	for	the	parties,	since	they	 do	 not	 know	 if	 the	 other	 party	 is	 trustful	 in	 their	 promises	 and,	consequently,	 they	 are	 less	willing	 to	 risk.	 Knowing	 this,	 some	mechanisms	 to	reduce	parties’	aversion	to	pact	with	unknown	actors	can	be	implemented.	Tools	like	ethical	codes,	as	seen	in	the	analytical	part,	can	facilitate	the	rapprochement	between	the	parties.	These	instruments	create	a	feeling	of	certainty	about	which	behaviour	 to	expect	 from	 the	 rest	of	 the	actors.	Consequently,	 actors	are	more	open	 to	 collaborate	 despite	 lacking	 previous	 information	 about	 which	 type	 of	actor	 they	 pact	 with.	 Thus,	 when	 trust	 is	 present	 in	 a	 relationship	 between	political	parties	and	social	movements,	closer	levels	of	collaboration	are	possible,	affecting	the	types	of	relationship	than	can	be	observed.		The	 final	 element	 analysed	 as	 capable	 of	 influencing	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	established	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements,	 is	 the	 capacity	 of	making	public	appointments.	Similar	to	the	influence	on	the	elaboration	of	public	policies,	public	positions	are	crucial	in	any	political	bargain,	due	to	the	influence	that	is	linked	to	them.	When	there	is	the	possibility	to	make	public	appointments	the	actors	are	more	open	to	collaborate,	as	there	is	a	clear	benefit	in	exchange	of	support.	 However,	 meanwhile	 the	 analysis	 has	 been	 able	 to	 show	 that	 the	influence	 on	 policies	 is	 especially	 appreciated	 by	 social	movements,	 occupying	public	offices	is	highly	valued	by	political	parties.	Although	no	actors	relinquish	any	kind	of	 influence,	due	to	their	own	nature	political	parties	tend	to	be	more	
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office-seeking	 actors	 than	 social	 movements.	 Consequently,	 when	 there	 is	 a	possibility	to	distribute	positions,	actors	are	more	open	to	establish	some	kind	of	collaboration	 with	 those	 actors	 that	 can	 provide	 these	 positions.	 Without	 the	presence	of	 this	element,	a	more	 limited	range	of	options	exists	 for	 the	 type	of	relationship	 found	 between	 the	 actors.	 Thus,	 while	 without	 the	 possibility	 to	make	 appointments	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 ad	 hoc	 collaborations	 between	 the	actors,	defined	as	the	type	“independence”,	in	scenarios	where	appointments	are	possible,	a	closer	collaboration	type,	such	as	“alliance”,	is	possible.		This	 dissertation	 is	 a	 small	 and	 initial	 attempt	 to	 connect	 two	 fields,	 those	dedicated	 to	 the	 study	 of	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 These	 two	political	 players	 have	 received	 a	 lot	 of	 individualized	 attention	 from	 the	academia,	but	the	interaction	between	them	has	been	a	secondary	issue	for	the	scholars.	 This	 work	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 the	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 about	 this	matter.	 However,	 despite	 the	 effort	 dedicated	 here,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 lot	more	 to	study	 about	 this	 interaction.	 For	 instance,	 the	 elements	 highlighted	 to	 be	relevant	for	shaping	the	type	of	relationship	between	the	actors	are	probably	not	the	 only	 elements	 that	 play	 a	 relevant	 role.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 studied	 elements	have	arisen	from	two	particular	cases,	suggests	that	more	elements	could	appear	from	 the	 study	 of	 other	 cases.	 Consequently,	 future	 research	 should	 seek	 to	delimit	exhaustively	which	are	the	elements	that	are	relevant	in	the	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	movements.	Some	elements	that	deserve	to	be	studied	due	to	their	potential	to	influence	the	type	of	relationship	established	between	 those	 actors	 are:	 electoral	 campaigns,	 the	 double	 membership	 and	personal	 connections	 of	 the	 individuals	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 organizations,	 the	possibility	 of	 victory	 in	 the	 elections,	 the	 assumption	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	retain	 the	 government	 after	 the	 elections,	 and	 the	 expectation	 of	 close	 results.	Additionally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 study	 the	 interaction	 under	 other	 institutional	constrictions	 apart	 from	 the	 ones	 studied	 here.	 Hence,	 other	 features	 of	 the	electoral	systems,	such	as	the	existence	of	a	high	or	low	threshold,	limitations	on	the	 lists	 (open,	 closed,	blocked,	unblocked…),	 or	 rules	 about	 the	kind	of	 actors	that	can	run	in	the	elections,	deserve	a	further	enquiry	to	discover	more	ways	in	which	 the	electoral	system	 is	able	 to	affect	 the	 type	of	 interaction	between	 the	
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actors	 of	 this	 work.	 However,	 all	 these	 elements	 and	 their	 impact	 are	 not	necessarily	 exclusive	 for	 the	 interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements.	They	also	can	have	a	role	to	play	in	the	relationship	between	other	political	 actors,	 especially	when	 there	 are	 agreements	between	 them.	Deciding	who	 holds	 the	 position	 of	 the	 central	 figure	 of	 a	 project,	 the	 existence	 of	information	asymmetry	between	 the	parties	and	how	to	solve	 it,	or	bargaining	with	policies	 and	offices	 are	 elements	 that	 affect	 several	 kinds	of	 negotiations.	Exploring	further	configurations	of	actors	would	be	an	expansion	of	the	method	used	in	this	study	and	this	deserves	to	be	taken	into	consideration.		The	analysis	 in	Chapter	Six	of	 this	dissertation	 studies	 the	 influence	of	 each	of	the	 elements	 on	 the	 type	 of	 relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	movements	 individually.	 A	 logical	 step	 forward	 in	 the	 research	 would	 be	 to	analyse	 the	 joint	 influence	 of	 these	 elements.	 This	would	 allow	 to	measure	 in	each	case	which	element	has	more	weight	to	define	the	final	type	of	relationship.	However,	this	task	is	not	easy,	since	apart	from	the	complexity	of	measuring	the	influence	 of	 each	 element,	 there	 are	 elements	 that	 act	 in	more	 than	 one	way.	These	 elements	 influence	 the	 relationship	 directly	 but	 also	 indirectly,	 by	 also	affecting	other	elements	that	have	influence	over	the	relationship.	For	instance,	the	electoral	system	influences	the	interaction,	but	at	the	same	time	it	influences	the	profile	of	the	candidate,	another	element	with	influencing	capacity.	The	fact	that	some	institutional	constrictions	can	affect	the	existence	of	trust	among	the	actors	involved,	can	be	relevant	in	this	context	too.			Once	 the	 crucial	 elements	are	analysed,	 the	examination	of	 the	events	 through	the	eyes	of	path	dependency	might	additionally	provide	useful	information.	Path	dependency	 allows	 contemplating	 circumstances	 that	 affect	 the	 type	 of	relationship	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements	 that	 are	 hard	 to	include	 in	game	 theory	models.	Furthermore,	 the	presence	or	absence	of	 some	elements	is	not	the	only	relevant	factor	to	consider,	but	also	the	sequence	when	these	 elements	 deploy	 their	 effectiveness.	 The	 exact	 moment	 in	 which	 each	element	acts	is	important	since	it	conditions	the	following	acts	of	the	rest	of	the	elements.	 This	 shows	 that	with	 the	 same	elements	 there	 is	more	 than	 a	 single	
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potential	 equilibrium	depending	on	 the	 sequence	of	 events.	Thus,	 in	 situations	where	despite	the	presence	of	the	same	elements,	the	final	outcome	is	different,	path	dependency	helps	to	discover	the	reasons	that	cause	this	difference.		This	dissertation	is	a	preliminary	study	on	the	matter,	and	the	use	of	quantitative	tools	to	confirm	what	is	suggested	here	should	be	considered.	The	possibility	of	codifying	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 some	 strategies	 happen	 would	 allow	creating	a	database	of	cases	in	which	an	interaction	between	political	parties	and	social	 movements	 took	 place.	 This	 would	 permit	 to	 establish	 hypotheses	 to	verify	the	various	models	presented	in	this	work,	as	well	as	analysing	the	way	in	which	the	variables	interact.		In	conclusion,	 it	 is	necessary	to	use	different	approaches	and	tools	to	study	the	interaction	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 social	 movements.	 We	 still	 have	 to	learn	 much	 more	 about	 this	 matter,	 and	 we	 need	 to	 look	 for	 the	 answers	 to	several	questions	 that	are	still	waiting	 to	be	 formulated.	Analytic	narrative	 is	a	way	 of	 facing	 the	 study	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 from	 a	 novel	 point	 of	 view.	 This	methodology	furnished	us	with	knowledge	that	we	previously	lacked.	However,	as	consequence	of	this	originality,	this	work	is	not	exempt	from	failures	or	from	simplifications	 of	 certain	 aspects	 of	 reality.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 dissertation	provides	answers	about	 the	 importance	of	 certain	elements	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 parties	 and	 movements,	 as	 well	 as	 establishing	 insights	 into	 the	potential	outcomes	of	interaction	when	the	actors	involved	change	their	choices.	Finally,	 this	work	shows	that	the	type	of	relationship	existing	between	political	parties	and	social	movements	 is	not	arbitrary,	but	 is	conditioned	by	a	series	of	elements	that	shape	the	relationship	to	be	one	type	or	another.			 	
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Annex	I	
List	of	interviewed	people	in	Milan.		
• Ambrosoli,	 Umberto.	 Interviewed	 the	 7-06-2016.	 Candidate	 to	 the	Lombardy	Regional	Government	for	a	coalition	of	centre-left	parties	and	civic	movements	in	the	elections	of	2013.	Former	head	of	the	centre-left	coalition	in	the	Parliament	of	Lombardy.	Honorary	president	of	the	social	movement	“Giorgio	Ambrosoli”.	
• Bassetti,	Piero.	Interviewed	the	5-07-2016.	First	president	of	Lombardy.	Member	of	the	Parliament	in	the	VII	and	VIII	legislatures.	President	of	the	Italian	 Union	 of	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce.	 Mayoral	 candidate	 in	 the	elections	of	1993.	Member	of	the	City	Council	of	Milan	during	the	time	of	Giuliano	 Pisapia	 as	 mayor.	 Founder	 of	 the	 association	 Rotary	 in	 Milan,	former	member	of	National	Council	for	Economics	and	Labour,	president	of	Assoconsulenza	and	the	Giannino	Bassetti	Foundation,	and	impeller	of	several	organizations	linked	to	the	social	tissue	of	Milan	and	Italy.	
• Bussolati,	 Pietro.	 Interviewed	 the	 6-07-2016.	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Partito	Democratico	Metropolitano	of	Milan	(head	of	the	party).		
• Comincini,	 Eugenio.	 Interviewed	 the	 28-06-2016.	 Mayor	 of	 the	 city	 of	Cernusco	 sul	 Naviglio	 (Metropolitan	 city	 of	 Milan).	 Member	 of	 the	national	board	of	the	PD.	Former	deputy	metropolitan	mayor.	
• Dalla	 Chiesa,	 Fernando.	 Interviewed	 the	13-06-2016.	 Full	 professor	of	sociology	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Milan.	 Mayoral	 candidate	 in	 Milan	 in	 the	elections	 of	 1993.	 Honorary	 president	 of	 the	 social	 movement	 “Libera”	which	 is	 dedicated	 to	 fight	 against	 the	 organized	 crime.	Member	 of	 the	Parliament	 in	 the	 XI	 and	 XIII	 legislatures	 and	 Senator	 of	 the	 Italian	Republic	in	the	XV	legislature.	Undersecretary	of	State	for	University	and	Research	2006-08.	Former	member	of	the	national	board	of	the	PD.	
• Lerner,	 Gad	 Eitan.	 Interviewed	 the	 9-06-2016.	 Journalist,	 writer	 and	television	anchorman.	Founder	of	the	PD	and	former	member	of	various	
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national	 organs	of	 the	PD.	 Linked	 to	 the	 candidacies	 of	Giuliano	Pisapia	first	and	Francesca	Balzani	later.	
• Limonta,	 Paolo.	 Interviewed	 the	 24-06-2016.	 Founder	 and	 one	 of	 the	leaders	of	the	Movimento	Arancione.	Member	of	the	City	Council	of	Milan.	Head	 of	 the	 list	 “Sinistra	 X	Milano”	 linked	 to	 the	mayoral	 candidacy	 of	Giuseppe	 Sala	 at	 the	 local	 elections.	 Founder	 of	 the	 movement	 for	 the	defence	of	 the	quality	of	 the	public	education.	One	of	 the	closet	aides	of	Giuliano	Pisapia.	Head	of	the	Relations	Office	with	the	City	of	Milan	under	Pisapia.	 Coordinator	 of	 Pispia’s	 electoral	 campaign.	 Member	 of	 several	leftist	social	movements.	
• Majorino,	 Pierfrancesco.	 Interviewed	 the	 30-06-2016.	 Member	 of	 the	City	Government	of	Milan	with	Giuliano	Pisapia	and	Giuseppe	Sala.	Head	of	the	list	of	PD	at	the	local	elections.	Candidate	on	the	primary	elections	to	chose	the	centre-left	mayoral	candidate.	Former	leader	of	the	PD	group	in	the	City	Council.	
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Annex	II	
List	of	interviewed	people	in	Barcelona.	
	
• Andrés,	 Carmen.	 Interviewed	 the	 17-05-2017.	 Member	 of	 Barcelona’s	City	Government	 in	 two	 terms	–one	under	a	PSC	mayor	and	now	under	the	 leading	 of	 Ada	 Colau-	 and	 Barcelona’s	 City	 Council	 for	 three	consecutive	 terms.	 Speaker	 of	 the	 PSC	 group	 in	 the	 Barcelona	 City	Council.	 Founder	 of	 a	 social	 movement	 dedicated	 to	 impulse	 the	education	in	southern	countries	INTI.	Activist	of	Amnesty	International.		
• Bertomeu,	 Marc.	 Interviewed	 the	 14-02-2017.	 Leader	 of	 Podem	Barcelona	at	the	time	of	the	talks	for	the	creation	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	Member	of	the	negotiations	team	for	the	creation	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	Former	political	adviser	in	the	Catalan	Parliament	for	“Catalunya	Sí	que	es	Pot”	former	Catalan	brand	of	BeC.	
• Cid,	David.	Interviewed	the	2-02-2017.	Co-head	of	ICV.	Former	co-leader	of	ICV	of	Barcelona	at	the	time	of	the	talks	for	the	creation	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	Member	of	the	negotiations	team	for	the	creation	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	 Activist	 of	 several	 social	 movements	 like	 “Plataforma	 Aturem	 la	Guerra”	or	“Unitat	contra	el	Racisme	i	el	Feixisme”.	
• Colomé,	Gabriel.	 Interviewed	the	18-05-2017.	Full	professor	of	political	science	 at	 the	 Autonomous	 University	 of	 Barcelona.	 He	 specializes	 in	research	on	political	campaigns	and	interest	of	citizens	in	politics.	Former	president	of	the	PSC	group	in	the	Barcelona	City	Council.	Former	speaker	of	 the	 PSC	 group	 in	 the	 Barcelona	 City	 Council.	 Former	 director	 of	 the	Centre	 d’Estudis	 d’Opinio	 the	 public	 Catalan	 social	 research	 institute.	Former	director	of	the	Rafael	Campalans	Foundation,	think	tank	linked	to	the	 PSC.	 Founder	 of	 the	 Asociación	 de	 Comunicación	 Política	 (ACOP),	international	 association	 dedicated	 to	 join	 together	 professionals	 and	scholars	of	the	political	communication.	Campaign	manager	of	the	PSC	in	the	 national	 elections	 of	 2016.	 Invited	 in	 the	 International	 Visiting	
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Program	by	the	State	Department	to	follow	the	USA	presidential	elections	since	1988.	
• Gomà,	 Ricard.	 Interviewed	 the	 9-02-2017.	 Full	 professor	 of	 political	science	 at	 the	 Autonomous	 University	 of	 Barcelona.	 He	 specializes	 in	research	 on	 social	 policies,	 local	 governments,	 citizen	 participation	 and	social	movements.	Former	leader	of	ICV	list	for	the	local	elections.	Former	head	 of	 ICV	 in	 Barcelona’s	 City	 Council.	 Former	 member	 of	 the	 City	Government	 of	 Barcelona	 for	 two	 terms.	 Former	 member	 of	 the	 City	Council	for	three	terms.	Activist	of	several	social	movements	like	the	anti-nuclear	 movement,	 and	 anti-war	 movement.	 Former	 president	 of	 the	Nous	Horitzons	 Foundation,	 think	 tank	 dedicated	 to	 research	 about	 the	leftist	ideology.	Member	of	the	national	board	of	ICV.	
• Martín,	 Lucía.	 Interviewed	 the	28-01-2017.	Member	 of	 the	Parliament.	Member	of	the	group	which	founded	the	PAH.	Former	activist	of	the	PAH.	
• Sanz,	 Janet.	 Interviewed	 the	 25-01-2017.	 Fifth	 deputy	 mayor	 of	Barcelona.	 Member	 of	 Barcelona’s	 City	 Government.	 Member	 of	Barcelona’s	City	Council	for	two	terms.	Activist	of	the	youth	and	feminist	movements	among	others.	
• Segovia,	Susanna.	Interviewed	the	15-03-2017.	Speaker	of	Barcelona	en	Comú.	Specialist	in	citizen	political	participation.	Activist	of	several	social	movements	 like	 the	 fight	 for	 indigenes	 rights	 or	 urban	 organizations.	Member	of	the	national	board	of	BeC.		 	
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Annex	III	
Script	interviews	Milan.		
Area	 1:	 l’esperienza	 milanese,	 continuità,	 discontinuità,	 evoluzione	 dalla	candidatura	di	Pisapia	a	quella	di	Sala.		1. Un	breve	 ritratto	dell’esperienza	milanese	 che	ha	portato	 all’elezione	di	Pisapia:	singolarità	del	movimento	arancione.	Come	inizia?	Per	che?	2. Che	cosa	è	cambiato	dal	2010	al	2016	nel	rapporto	fra	partiti	e	movimenti	civici?		3. Come	 vede	 la	 campagna	 2016?	 Differenze	 con	 quella	 di	 Pisapia.	 Più	individualizzata	sul	candidato	o	più	corale?	4. Dove	sono	gli	arancioni	adesso?		
Area	2:	ruolo	dei	movimenti	in	politica	1. Che	ci	siano	liste	che	non	fano	parte	de	un	partito,	vuole	dire	che	c’è	gente	interessata	in	politica	ma	che	non	si	sente	rappresentata	per	l’offerta	dei	partiti	 esistente.	 Per	 che?	 Per	 che	 si	 creano	 i	 movimenti	 e	 le	 liste	 non	partitista?	2. Pensa	che	i	movimenti	sociali	abbiano	più	connessioni	con	la	società	civile	che	i	partiti	politici?	Per	che?	Come?	3. Sono	oggi	i	movimenti	sociale	o	civili	la	“voce”	del	popolo?	4. Allora,	per	che	s’incontrano	i	movimenti	con	i	candidati?	Qual	è	lo	scopo	finale	di	questo?		
Area	3:	gradi	di	lealtà/defezione	rispetto	al	percorso	delle	primarie.	1. Come	 si	 è	 arrivati	 alle	 liste	 presentate	 alle	 elezioni	 comunali,	 passando	per	la	fase	delle	primarie	per	il	Sindaco.	2. Quanto	pesa/ha	pesato	il	fatto	che	il	proprio	candidato	abbia	perso/vinto	le	primarie	e	quindi	sia	o	meno	il	candidato	Sindaco	dello	schieramento	3. Sono	 le	 liste	 civiche	 un	 canale	 che	 usano	 le	 fazioni	 dissidenti?	 È	 la	creazione	 di	 un	 movimento	 sociale	 uno	 di	 questi	 canali?	 Hanno	 i	movimenti	dei	rapporti	più	stretti	con	qualcuna	corrente	del	partito?	
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4. Pensano	 i	movimenti	 civici,	o	 sociale	 l’elezione	come	un	primo	paso	per	creare	un	partito?		
Area	 4:	 la	 dialettica	 fra	 partiti	 e	 liste	 civiche,	 lo	 spazio	 di	 rappresentanza	esclusivo	delle	liste	civiche.	1. Quanti	 settori/segmenti	 della	 società	 civile	 milanese	 si	 ritrovano	compiutamente	nelle	liste	civiche	(la	civica	“arancione”	dei	sostenitori	Balzani	 e	 la	 civica	 “del	 Sindaco”)	 …	 sono	 liste	 che	 rappresentano	universi	diversi/complementari	…	 s’integrano,	 competono	o	no	 sullo	stesso	segmento	di	elettorato	ecc.	2. Qual	è	 lo	spazio	che	assegna	ai	partiti	e	alle	 liste	di	origine	civica	nel	costruire	il	consenso	attorno	al	candidato	Sindaco?		3. [Per	 gli	 intervistati	 di	 espressione	 “società	 civile”]:	 come	 vedono	l’evoluzione	 del	 rapporto	 fra	 partiti	 e	 liste	 ed	 esperienze	 civiche	(conflittuale,	cooperativo	ecc.)	4. [Per	 gli	 intervistati	 di	 espressione	 “partitica”]:	 che	 ruolo	 assegnano	alle	 liste	 ed	 esperienze	 civiche	 nella	 costruzione	 di	 una	 proposta	politica	di	governo	della	città		
Area	5:	strategie	di	campagna	elettorale,	agenda	setting,	grado	di	influenza	sulla	campagna	di	partiti	vs	liste	civiche.	1. Com’è	 la	 collaborazione	 per	 i	 temi	 a	 trattare	 in	 campagna.	 Come	 si	 fa	 a	decidere	de	cosa	parlare,	quando	e	chi	deve	farlo.	2. Agenda	 setting	 della	 campagna	 elettorale:	 come	 si	 costruisce,	 con	 quale	dialettica	sullo	sfondo…	Come	si	definiscono	gli	slogan	principali?	3. Quale	rapporto	esiste	fra	il	candidato	Sindaco	e	le	liste	rappresentative	di	diversi	ambiti	della	società	civile:	in	che	misura	la	presenza	di	liste	civiche	compensa/integra	 la	 capacità	 del	 candidato	 Sindaco	 da	 raccogliere	 quel	voto	più	fuori	dai	recinti	di	partito?	Non	può	farlo	da	solo	 il	candidato	a	Sindaco?	4. Su	 quali	 temi,	 key	 issues,	 questioni	 dell’agenda	 di	 governo	 per	 la	 città,	messaggi	 e	 strategie	 di	 campagna	 elettorale,	 il	 contributo	 delle	 liste	
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civiche	è	più	caratterizzante,	e	quindi	non	riconducibile	all’offerta	politica	dei	partiti	dello	schieramento.	5. Che	cose	possono	fare	in	campagna	elettorale	i	movimenti	e	i	partiti	no?		
Area	6:	aspetti	organizzativi	e	logistico-strategici	della	campagna	elettorale.	1. Chi	segue	per	la	lista/le	liste	civiche	la	campagna	elettorale	del	candidato	Sindaco?	da	quanto	“vicino”	o	“lontano”	segue	quella	campagna?	C’è	una	cabina	 di	 regia	 comune	 con	 le	 liste	 civiche?	 C’era	 all’epoca	 della	candidatura	di	Pisapia?		2. Quanto	 concorrono	 le	 liste	 civiche	 alla	 definizione	 dell’agenda	 degli	appuntamenti	di	campagna	elettorale	del	candidato	Sindaco?	3. Satisfazione	con	la	relazione	(1-10).	4. Chi	ha	iniziato	i	contatti?	5. Ce	 stato	 un	 dibattito	 interno	 en	 relazione	 con	 gli	 incontro	 o	 la	collaborazione	 fra	 candidatura/partito	 e	 movimenti?	 De	 che	 tipo?	Positivo,	Negativo,	Neutro…			 	
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Annex	IV	
Script	interviews	Barcelona.		
Área	1:	la	experiencia	de	Barcelona.		- El	nacimiento	del	proyecto.		- Las	partes	implicadas.		- El	 contacto	 con	 las	 partes	 ¿cómo	 comienza?	 ¿Quién	 lleva	 la	 iniciativa?.	¿Quién	lleva	el	impulso	del	proyecto?	¿Cómo	se	negocian	los	candidatos?	- ¿Cómo	se	acuerdan	los	roles	de	las	diferentes	partes?	¿Por	qué	Ada	Colau?		- El	por	qué	del	proyecto.	Retrato	de	la	experiencia	del	proyecto.		
Área	2:	el	papel	de	los	movimientos	sociales	en	política.	- ¿Que	exista	un	proyecto	como	el	de	Barcelona	con	gente	del	mundo	social	significa	que	la	gente	no	se	siente	representada	por	los	partidos?	- ¿Tienen	los	movimientos	sociales	más	conexión	con	la	sociedad	civil?	- Entonces	¿por	qué	encontrarse	movimientos	y	partidos	para	el	proyecto?		
Área	 3:	 ¿Qué	posibles	 salidas	había	en	 las	negociaciones?	 ¿Cómo	se	aseguraba	que	todo	el	mundo	cumpliera	lo	acordado?	- El	proceso	de	primarias.	- Lealtad	a	un	candidato	externo.	- ¿Cómo	ha	sido	el	grado	de	compromiso	de	los	miembros	entre	si	y	con	el	proyecto?	- Un	nuevo	partido	como	proyecto	impulsado	por	movimientos	sociales.		
Área	4:	distribución	de	roles.	¿Qué	ha	aportado	cada	parte	al	proyecto?	Estructura	de	la	campaña.		
Área	5:	temas	de	agenda	setting.		- ¿Cómo	se	decidían	los	temas	de	campaña?	¿quién	debía	decir	qué,	cuando	y	como?	
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- ¿Cómo	 era	 la	 relación	 entre	 la	 candidata	 y	 los	 grupos	 que	 formaban	 la	coalición?		
Área	6:	estructura	de	la	campaña	electoral.		- Órganos	de	coordinamiento.		- Debate	interno	sobre	la	conveniencia	del	proyecto.			
Questions	just	for	the	members	of	PSC:		 - ¿Cómo	se	vio	desde	el	PSC	el	proceso	de	creación	de	BeC?	¿Qué	suponía	para	el	sistema	de	los	partidos	de	la	ciudad?	¿Cómo	estaba	el	PSC	en	ese	momento?	 ¿Cuál	 era	 el	 proceso	 o	 la	 situación	 que	 vivía?	 ¿Era	 BeC	 una	amenaza?	¿Qué	suponía	la	inclusión	de	ICV?	Y	¿el	hecho	de	PAH	y	Ada?	- ¿Cuáles	fueron	las	razones	de	la	perdida	de	apoyos	del	PSC?	De	ser	claro	dominador	a	5	partido.	- ¿Cómo	fue	el	proceso	de	voto	para	la	alcaldía?	- El	pacto	de	gobierno	con	BeC.	¿Por	qué	pactar	con	ellos?	¿Qué	se	buscaba?	¿Qué	obtenían	las	partes?	- ¿Cuáles	fueron	los	elementos	que	aseguraron	el	pacto?	¿Qué	instrumentos	se	produjeron	para	asegurarse	que	el	pacto	se	mantuviera	por	las	partes?	- ¿Cuál	 es	 el	 rol	 de	 los	 movimientos	 sociales	 en	 política?	 ¿Y	 el	 de	 los	partidos	políticos?				 	
